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1. Most of the dominant paradigms in sociology have been contested in this century, though new 
ones are hard to come by. This intellectual impasse has sapped the ability of academics to 
believe in the reality of either the inner world or the social world. Current trends have 
reduced most analytical and political discussions to the 'tropes' of post-modernist discourse. I 
am looking forward to the time when we will be able to read some all-time classics with 
renewed eyes. 
2. The obsession with concepts of power and empowering - apparently indispensable buzz 
words in academic and general parlance - has reified the social processes in which 
individuals make their living. The diversity in the interpretation of these concepts has 
rendered mem vacuous words mat can signify anything, everything or nothing. 
3. In the process of analysing the field data I became aware of the enormous responsibility I had 
to portray as faithfully as possible what my informants had confided in me. Consequently I 
sought to make the paradigms fit the data rather than the other way around. The result was an 
eclectic analysis of state intervention and decision-making in surgarcane production. 
4. I collected the data in Spanish and wrote the first drafts in English. However, the rewriting of 
the final ones should be seen as a collective creation of me, my husband and friends. 
5. I am very puzzled by the Dutch. They speak a language that they are reticent to share with 
anybody, have manicured their landscape, have sacrificed flavour to beauty in the production 
of their vegetables, produce an incredible amount of dairy products, yet eat margarine. 
6. Social scientists who do fieldwork should be aware of the burden they can be to their 
informants. 
7. I am concerned that the ad hoc British style of organisation and respect for amateurism 
(meaning studying or doing something for the sheer love of it) are being eroded by the let-
loose Total Quality Managament CTQM) pundits. They are making significant contributions to 
both the commercialisation of academic work and the process of under-development in 
Britain. 
8. The PRI has finally exhausted Mexicans' patience. But the party's long political patronage has 
managed to throttle the development of a strong independent opposition. Thus the right wing 
party, which passes as the opposition, lacks an alternative political vision capable of driving 
Mexico into the next century. Poor Mexico, so far from God and now formally tied to the 
USA by NAFTA. 
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INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW 
This thesis examines the struggles between different social actors involved in 
sugar cane production for the Melchor Ocampo refinery in the Valley of 
Autlán-El Grullo in Western Mexico. It opens (Chapter 1) with an account of 
a strike organized by one of the sugar cane producers' associations, which 
provides a social drama through which the main protagonists involved in the 
process of sugar production are identified. This also serves to introduce a 
critical discussion of literature on Mexican peasants, giving especial attention 
to works on sugar cane growers, and commenting on the relevance of these 
studies for understanding the processes and dilemmas of sugar cane 
production in the case of Autlán. 
This is followed, in Chapter 2, by an overview of the general historical 
background to sugar cane production in Mexico and of the expansion of 
sugar cane in the area serving the Melchor Ocampo refinery. The argument 
also takes account of changes in government policy. Having provided this 
contextual backdrop, we move in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 to a detailed analysis 
of various categories of sugar cane producers. These categories differ 
according to the size of their plots planted with sugar, their economic assets 
and social origins, and their affiliation to one of the two sugar cane 
producers' associations. These different interests shape, on the one hand, 
their involvement in sugar production and their role in producers' 
organizations, and, on the other hand, the ways in which sugar activities 
articulate with their other economic or livelihood concerns. The comparisons 
reveal marked differences between ejidatarios and private landowners. 
Chapter 6 identifies the political concomitants of these socio-economic 
differences and patterns of livelihood and enterprise organization. Its main 
focus is on the dealings and tribulations of the leaders and producers 
involved in the running of the two associations of sugar cane producers, one 
affiliated to the Confederación Nacional Campesina (the CNC) and the other 
to the Confederación Nacional de Pequeños Propietarios (the CNPP). 
After this the spotlight (in Chapter 7) turns on those actors involved in 
the administration of the refinery and on their career profiles. The 
individuals concerned are embedded in a government bureaucratic structure 
but to be successful in their tasks and responsibilities they must reach a 
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strategic balance in their relations with the various parties involved: 
producers of different types, the leaders of producers' associations and other 
politically and administratively influential actors. If they achieve this, then 
they have a good chance of furthering and consolidating their personal 
careers and enhancing their economic opportunities. In the second part, I 
depict the outcomes of the meetings of the Production Committee where 
producers' representatives and refinery administrators discuss and negotiate 
the organization of sugar production. When these negotiations fail, the kind 
of confrontation described in the social drama of Chapter 1 is likely to 
follow. 
The ethnographic description from the point of view of the different 
social agents involved in sugar cane production in Western Jalisco illustrates 
the types of social changes that have taken place in the organization of 
production as it has evolved in the past twenty years in Mexico. Their 
accounts present a complex social fabric where sugar cane production, which 
was the first agro-industry in Mexico, mirrors the national plans for 
industrialisation, land reform and the character of national politics as 
embedded in the everyday life of the social agents involved. The latter have 
to find ways of expressing their economic interests and forging local political 
alliances within the framework of national politics. At the same time, these 
wheelings and dealings have buttressed the national political and economic 
structures and relations with the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 
as well as highlighting the roles played by local individuals within the wider 
framework. These actors have been key contributors to the integration of 
local markets into the national and international markets. They have achieved 
this task by various means and at different levels of participation varying 
from their individual insertion into the international labour market to the 
management of the organization of sugar production and their political 
participation in local and national bodies. 
Sugar cane production was in fact one of the first industrialised 
production processes. Indeed Mintz (1986: 47-48) wonders whether the 
integrated process of sugar cane production in the seventeenth century should 
not be called the harbinger of industrialization in a pre-industrial era. The 
combination of farming and manufacturing in sugar cane production demands 
a more tightly controlled organization of the labour force than other crops. 
Colonial plantation owners in Latin America and the Caribbean islands, like 
it happened in the colonial plantations in other regions, organized their slave 
labour in strenuous shifts. In post-colonial Mexico, indebted and landless 
peasants replaced slave labour in sugar plantations (Barret, 1977 and 
Ronfeldt, 1975); and the land reform initiated in the 1930s granted the 
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usufruct of the plots surrounding the sugar mills to peasants, though the 
landlords retained the ownership of the factories. During the 1940s and 
1950s, the Mexican state imposed controls on the price of sugar, which 
secured the provision of cheap sugar to the sweet-toothed Mexican 
population and the fledging food industry (Coote, 1987). However, this 
policy hit both the sugar mill owners and peasant sugar growers badly. The 
state had to provide large loans to the refinery owners to maintain the 
internal supply of sugar, while the cane growers continued to endure their 
wretched living conditions. 
During the 1960s, the sugar cane agro-industry in Mexico ran into 
another of its recurrent production crises. The magnitude of this crisis 
compelled the Mexican Government to take drastic measures which included 
increasing the price of sugar and acquiring sugar mills at the brink of 
bankruptcy (Paré, 1987). The 1960s saw the peak of economic growth in 
Mexico based on import-substitution industrialization and, in spite of its 
inefficiencies, sugar production was one of the leading industries (Hansen, 
1971 and Teichman, 1988, 1992). This made it possible for the sugar mill 
workers and sugar cane growers to consolidate their unions under the 
umbrella of the PRI and to flex their political muscle against both the 
refinery owners and the Mexican state. Thus, on the one hand, sugar 
workers and growers through their leaders obtained better salaries and cane 
prices, and, on the other hand, refinery owners received large low-interest 
rate loans and handsome payments for what where obsolete factories. 
In the 1970s, the Mexican state bought most of the sugar refineries still 
in production and even opened a handful of new refineries, one of which was 
the refinery Melchor Ocampo in the Valley of Autlán-El Grullo. This 
modern factory had to entice local peasants and farmers to grow sugar cane, 
which had not been the case in the longer-standing sugar cane producing 
regions. The negotiations between the refinery administration and the 
potential sugar producers in this new area were fairer than the traditional 
settlements in the old sugar cane producing areas. Sugar cane growers in 
Autlán-El Grullo managed to negotiate good terms and a better price for 
their cane. They were lucky to join the national struggle of the sugar cane 
producers at the time when their political struggles were coming to fruition 
and thus benefited immediately from the going mode. Hence sugar growers 
in mis valley have faced different kinds of problems from those of other 
sugar producing regions. For one thing they did not have to fight the 
refinery owner during the period of the land reform, though they fought 
other local landlords. The accounts of different sugar cane producers in the 
Autlán-El Grullo area highlight the diversity in their economic strategies 
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aimed at accommodating the use of their ejido plots with their other 
economic activities such as seasonal migration to the USA. 
Land reform in the Valley of Autlan-El Grullo divided most large estates 
into small ejidal plots which were handed out to local landless peasants. 
Most of the land in the valley was rainfed which limited the choice of crops 
that peasants could grow. It was not until the 1960s when the state sponsored 
the building of the irrigation system in the area (van der Zaag, 1992) that the 
agricultural alternatives were increased. The opening of the refinery at the 
end of that decade added sugar cane to the choice of cash crops in the 
region. As the sugar growers explain (in Chapter 3, 4 and 5), sugar cane did 
not attract the immediate attention of local agricultural producers. It was for 
this reason that the refinery administration offered low interest loans for 
growing sugar cane to entice producers to plant sugar. Most of the first 
growers were ejidatarios, who had to struggle to acquire funds to finance 
their crops, living from season to season. However, sugar cane was only one 
of their possible choices. They were therefore social agents making decisions 
under social conditions not entirely of their own choice (Long, 1992: 24-25). 
Decision making for these growers was embedded in a diverse set of 
economic and political opportunities which they aimed to manage skilfully. 
The individual accounts of their dealings are described in Chapters 3, 4 and 
5. 
Economic activity is interlocked with politics and success in one paves 
the way for success in the other. All sugar cane growers - large and small -
have combined their economic activities with political participation, to 
different degrees, in the ejido committee, the organizations of sugar cane 
producers at local and national level, and as local authorities and members or 
officers of the PRI. Sugar cane producers have pursued these activities with 
different outcomes thus highlighting the stochastic component of socio-
economic activities carried out by individual agents. However, the relevance 
of intertwining political and economic activities shines through the sugar 
cane producers' accounts of their socio-economic achievements. Social agents 
deal with conditions that are not of their choice but they nevertheless develop 
their own strategies which re-organize and change these conditions. The 
degree to which they manage to do so depends not only on the objective 
conditions but also on their subjective abilities to handle them. Thus some 
ejidatarios have been able to increase their assets through the skilful handling 
of networks and the seizing of opportunities to obtain low interest loans and 
acquiring or extending the size of their ejidal plots. Others have opted for 
combining sugar production with migration mainly to the USA. 
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The trends in local politics and the organization of sugar cane production 
in Autlan-El Grullo are influenced by national political and economic 
tendencies but they are contested and shaped by the social agents in the local 
arena, who in an expanding economy, had ample room for manoeuvre. The 
opening of the state-owned refinery was not a gift from god, but a reward 
for the hard lobbying of local politicians and cabinet ministers within the 
local constituency. The Mexican state led economic development with 
substantial public investment in all economic sectors. Such economic 
interventionism was coupled with, what it is called the corporatism of the 
Mexican state, in which "representation is mediated through a system of 
public 'corporations' which are constituted on the basis of their members' 
function within the division of labour" (Jessop, 1990: 120). 
The kind of corporatism characteristic of Mexico has managed to 
develop the support of different social agents through a system of sectorial 
political representation. Under this system disagreements are resolved within 
the PRI and the decisions legitimised and accepted by the all parties 
concerned. The sexennial political turnover of the president and his senior 
coterie keeps the different groups rotating positions of power (Cornelius and 
Craig, 1988 and Gonzalez Casanova, 1985). The drawback of corporatism, 
however, is that it brings labour conflicts into the core of the state apparatus 
which can obstruct the political milieu of accumulation. The wheeling and 
dealing of the different interests of the Mexican state, through its ruling party 
(PRI), have surpassed this obstacle and developed an operational arena of 
negotiation wherein politics and economic policies are legitimised (Purcell 
and Purcell, 1980). How this is negotiated and enacted by sugar cane 
producers, their leaders and the refinery administrators in Autlia-El Grullo is 
described in the Chapter 6 and 7. 
Active members of the PRI in Autlan were approached by the national 
leader of the refinery workers and the Ministry of Defense to mobilise local 
farmers and ejidatarios to petition for the opening of a sugar refinery in the 
region. This was considered for those involved as a boost to the local 
economy which had been set back since the closure of the manganese mines. 
They were successful in their bid and the factory, which was intended to go 
to some other region, was built in the middle of the Valley of Autlan-El 
Grullo. This contrasted with earlier experiences of sugar cane producers in 
other regions who became subjected to the will of the refinery owner, with 
little room for pushing their own interests (Pare\ 1979). This time 
independent farmers lobbied for the sugar refinery to be installed. The 
accounts of how this came about in Autlan portray the conjunction of local 
and national agents harnessing public funds for a regional project. The local 
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agents (farmers, community leaders and politicians) had in common the fact 
that they were all involved with the PRI; and those who became involved 
early in the process had an edge over others and drew more benefits from it. 
The refinery administration encouraged sugar producers to form 
associations; and to facilitate the organization of production. All such sugar 
cane producers' associations were affiliated to CNC up until the 1970s, when 
they had the alternative of joining the CNPP. The first leaders of the 
organization in Autlan-El Grullo were selected from among the leading local 
negotiators in the bringing of the refinery to the valley. They retained their 
leadership roles during the trial-and-error years of expanding sugar cane 
production in the region. During these years local farmers learnt to deal with 
their leaders and the refinery administrators and started to participate more 
actively in the running of the organization. At the same time a local sugar 
cane producer worked his way up to become head of the extension 
department in the refinery. Thus, a decade after the state opened the refinery 
of Melchor Ocampo in the region, local agents had in effect taken over the 
control of the organization of sugar cane production. 
In the 1980s, sugar cane production was one of the priority areas of the 
agricultural policy implemented by the Mexican state. The government 
pegged the price of sugar cane to the soaring inflation rate. This made sugar 
cane an attractive cash crop with an agreed, secure basic price. Although 
other cash crops could produce larger profits than cane, the security of the 
protected price of sugar and the subsidised credit enticed more local farmers 
to grow sugar. Sugar cane begun to attract not only small-scale farmers, who 
otherwise had to struggle to obtain access to credit, but also the large ones 
who were facing more profitable choices. In this way sugar cane production 
and the profits of producers in the valley increased steadily in this decade. 
Middle and large sugar cane producers have different interests to those 
of the small producers. These larger producers rallied to create an 
organization which would cater for their own specific interests, though it 
took a few attempts before the CNPP finally took off in 1980. Their main 
concerns were reduced costs and increased profit. The CNPP members, it 
seems, have a more detached and utilitarian approach to the PRI than most 
CNC members do. In contrast to the larger ones, small-scale producers have 
not been able to invest in their own agricultural machines and lorries to carry 
the cane to the refinery. Whereas CNPP members have to balance out their 
interests as machine owners with the interests of those sugar growers who 
hire them; most CNC members have to hire machines to work their plots. 
The few CNC members owning machines or lorries drive them themselves. 
Thus, several CNPP members have invested considerable capital in sugar 
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cane production, whereas, most CNC members have only their small plot to 
risk. These different economic interests pervade the political agenda of the 
two associations of sugar cane producers, even though their main targets vis-
a-vis the refinery administration. The CNPP producers, while being more 
instrumental politically, are shared take entrepreneurial risks with the capital 
they have sunk in the sugar venture. In contrast, the CNC, predominantly 
made up of small farmers and having less, risk less, and therefore use sugar 
as a subsistence supplement rather than an enterprise. 'Security first' (Scott, 
1976) small producers juggle with their economic chances but without risking 
their life's security. 
The corporatism of the state is embedded in the all-encompassing 
structure of the PRI, which includes among its membership all the groups 
taking part in the organization of sugar cane production. This political 
commitment to the party has, over the years, worn thin and is now taken 
with different degrees of seriousness depending upon their interests. The 
negotiations over the organization of production take place in the Committee 
of Sugar Cane Production. The negotiations mainly center on economic 
issues and are skilfully handled by all the parties involved as described in 
Chapter 7. 
The negotiators represent the sugar cane producers affiliated to the CNC 
or CNPP, the refinery's administrator and the head of the extension 
department. All parties are, through their insertion into the corporative 
political structure, members of the PRI, though this does not entail that they 
have common interests and goals. With corporatism as a backcloth, the 
different parties focus their discussions mostly on economic issues. The 
refinery administration aims to cut down its costs and the sugar cane 
producers to increase the credit allowances and the price of cane, the latter 
being subject to national policies. Of course sugar cane producers, especially 
the CNPP members, are concerned about cost but in a more complex and 
delayed way. The current administration pursues a cost-effective management 
style and tries to bring market considerations into its decisions as much as 
possible in a publicly-own refinery. Whereas sugar cane producers have to 
weigh up their different economic needs, some producers might be short of 
cash and prefer to draw credit for some of the work undertaken, though it 
would be discounted later when they are paid for their cane. Interest can be 
as high as the commercial rates though it tends to be pegged a few points 
lower. Thus, even as a pure speculative measure, getting credit from the 
refinery can be profitable. However, most sugar cane producers borrow 
money because they need it at that time in the their economic cycle. 
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The refinery administrator is the person most concerned with 
implementing a more cost-efficient managerial style, which reduces the 
negotiable economic agenda, thereby loading against the sugar cane 
producers. However, their response - and inspite of their differences - is 
quick and well coordinated as described in Chapter 7. CNC leaders are not 
as concerned as the CNPP to take care of their pennies. In the case of the 
CNC leader in Autlan-El Grullo, his political ambitions pervade his careful 
balancing of the interests of the sugar cane affiliated to the CNC, as is 
illustrated by his intervention in the incident discussed in Chapter 7. In 
contrast, the CNPP leader seems to be mainly concerned with cutting down 
costs and improving profits. In the analysis of the negotiations of the 
Committee of Sugar Cane Production these differences are carefully 
discussed before reaching a agreement satisfactory to all parties involved. 

CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCING THE POLITICS OF SUGARCANE PRODUCTION 
Sugarcane producers and refinery employees have reached, through negoti-
ations and confrontations, a modus vivendi for the organization of sugarcane 
production in the zone served by the Melchor Ocampo refinery in the 
Autlán-El Grullo region of western Jalisco, Mexico. The producers' leaders 
and the refinery's manager have created a framework in which each of the 
partner's interests are respected and given space. In this thesis I describe 
how local farmers and politicians lobbied to attract state investment for a 
refinery in the region, and how refinery employees and management devised 
their own strategies vis-à-vis the state and producer interests, and I examine 
the social characteristics and organization of different groups of producers. 
Throughout institutional politics pervades at both local and national level 
with the ruling party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), playing 
a major role. 
I start the thesis by describing a social drama in which the larger of the 
two associations of sugarcane producers called a strike, which had far 
reaching repercussions for the political organization of production and 
processing. Following the account of the drama, I sketch in the background 
of the dramatis personae, followed by a summary of the prevailing 
theoretical cast, including a brief outline of the sociological paradigms that 
underpin current interpretations of the interactions between the different 
actors involved in sugarcane production in Mexico. 
Social Drama: The Strike 
On Thursday, 14th of May, very early in the morning, Maximino Castillo 
Arenas, general secretary of the CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina, 
National Peasant Confederation) and several other members of the CNC 
committee, stood guard at the gate of the refinery. They gave instructions to 
all drivers, arriving with lorries full of cane from CNC producers, to queue 
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up at the side of the road and wait for instructions before emptying their 
loads. The drivers obeyed without question. In a couple of hours parallel 
lines of sturdy lorries balancing their mounds of sticky black cane extended 
from the entrance to the refinery to as far as the eye could see. By mid-day 
there must have been some eighty lorries waiting there. Drivers leaned on 
their vehicles or sat resignedly on the grass and ate their breakfast, while 
some organized teams to play football at the side of the road. They tolerated 
the delay, stoically eyeing the sticky mounds, knowing that even when the 
strike was called off and they could shed their loads, they would not have 
time to make a second trip. This would mean a considerable reduction in 
income for the day. Of course they complained. They were able vaguely to 
guess the reason for the standstill. According to them it had something to do 
with Limón, a former head of the extension department at the mill, recently 
reinstated after having been dismissed two years previously. But they were 
not sure about the real cause and commented that the drivers were likely to 
lose the most. 
Meanwhile, Maximino, wearing a black leather jacket, paraded in front 
of the gate, pushing back his sombrero, twirling his moustache, engaging in 
lively conversation with lorry drivers and some of the sugarcane producers 
who had arrived at the entrance of the sugar refinery. These conversations 
were often interrupted by the bleep of the walky-talky that Maximino held in 
his hand which he answered in a loud voice. He was in great spirits. He 
knew that every minute of delay in the delivery of the sugarcane meant a 
considerable economic loss for the sugar mill and that seemed to be his main 
aim in keeping the strike going; he recognized that the lorry drivers were 
going to lose part of their regular daily income (most lorries were owned by 
the cane producers) but he said that there were times when sacrifices had to 
be made: "it is better to lose money than your dignity" he told them. Jacinto 
Rojo, the secretary of CNC was very busy going to different plots to check 
that they had stopped burning the sugarcane and telling the team in charge of 
burning to wait for the strike to be called off before they continued with the 
scheduled list of burnings.0 
The producers belonging to the other, smaller association of producers 
in the valley, affiliated to the CNPP (Confederación Nacional de Pequeños 
Propietarios, National Confederation of Small Landowners) did not join the 
strike, but on the contrary, mobilized all the lorries and carts they could get 
hold of in order to make up the missing delivery quota produced by the 
strike of the CNC producers. The amount of sugarcane that CNC producers 
deliver every day accounts for two-thirds of the three thousand metric tonnes 
of sugarcane that the refinery grinds every twenty four hours during the 
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zafra or harvesting season. The CNPP members tried to collect as much cane 
as they could above the eight hundred tonnes that they were supposed to 
deliver themselves that day. They managed to deliver one thousand tonnes 
before noon but were unable to supply the amount needed. The refinery 
quickly ran out of the sugar stored up at the side of the mills, called batey, 
and with a sharp and resigned wail from the siren, it was obliged to 
announce, before midday, that the mills were stopping until sufficient 
sugarcane was accumulated to keep them fed. 
Maximino was in an expansive mood that morning and he treated lorry 
drivers and the CNC affiliated sugarcane producers who happened to pass by 
the refinery gate to a barrage of condemnatory comments about Limdn's 
administration. He declared that Limdn had bribed the judges of the Commit-
tee of Industrial Relations, and that they had therefore convened the trial 
when the refinery's defendants were on holiday so that Limdn would be 
absolved and reinstated. He asserted that Limdn was supported by the Lopez 
Arreola family (a powerful local family with political presence in the region) 
to whom he had given huge credits to grow sugarcane, and that they had 
paid him a commission for getting permission from the refinery. 
While the drivers and CNC committee members buzzed around the 
lorries and looked for shade from the scorching sun, I visited the offices of 
the CNPP to find out why they had decided to continue to deliver cane to the 
refinery. The secretary and the administrator were busy coordinating the 
suddenly increased level of activity. I could hear the exchange of instructions 
through the 2-way radio. The person in charge of the transportation team 
announced that they had loaded all the cut cane available and there would be 
no more before late afternoon. Arturo Sanchez Ruy, the general secretary of 
the CNPP, came into the premises and in response to my questions gave me 
his appraisal of the strike and the reasons why the CNPP members did not 
agree with the refinery's sanctions against Limdn, or support the CNC's 
industrial action. 
"The harvest before Maximino became president of the CNC, the 
mill manager said that if we backed him he would sack Limdn 
because he had accumulated a long list of credit defaulters and had 
lots of land planted with sugar-cane in his own name. However, I 
think that the truth of the matter was that General Santiago Ldpez 
Arreola was the sugar-cane producer. When he asked for credit 
they had to give it to him and the manager and the accountant at 
that time had to approve the credit, not just Limdn. Castillo Arenas 
is very heavy-handed with him, he has accused Limdn of bribing 
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some sugarcane producers and charging them input costs that they 
have not received. I'm not saying he did, I'm not saying he didn't. 
Power corrupts anyone. Castillo is sick with power... the CNC and 
CNPP are like oil and water, we don't mix. But we need each 
other to control the costs that the refinery would like to charge us. 
We are better organized than the CNC sugarcane producers and 
have lower harvesting costs than them. In spite of my position as 
president, I am a-political and have rebelled against the policies of 
our national committee." 
Back at the gate I talked to Jacinto Rojo, secretary of the CNC, who had just 
returned from supervising the sugar plots. He looked tired and agitated. He 
had a wet handkerchief hanging losely round his neck and he slowly came 
alive as he described to me his reason for supporting the strike to get rid of 
Limdn. 
"When Limón was superintendent of the extension department he 
did many things to his own advantage. He ordered his own cane to 
be transported immediately after cutting while others had to wait up 
to fifteen days, which is disastrous since the sugar in the cane 
begins to ferment. He used to rent bad quality land and ask the 
refinery for big loans to plant sugarcane on those plots even though 
that money could not be repaid because of the low yields from such 
land. The list of credit defaulters increased tremendously during his 
time in the refinery. Limón is honey-tongued and treacherous, the 
more pleasantly he speaks the less you should believe him... He is 
always friendly to your face, but he'd just as soon stab you in the 
back when you are not looking. He put the rope around his own 
neck when he declared that he was not the one to blame for the 
expanding list of debt defaulters. Limón was supported by the 
regional director of Azúcar, S.A.25 When Maximino attacked 
Limón, the regional director came to his support and demanded that 
we stop. Maximino was not around at the time but I told him that 
we were all one on the matter. Maximino criticized Limón in 
public many times, once in the national meeting of sugar producers 
and various times in the assemblies of the CNC. The last time was 
in Guadalajara two years ago. Roque, the national leader of 
sugarcane producers affiliated to the CNC, supported our demand 
to remove Limón from office. Sugarcane producers of this region 
threatened not to harvest if he remained in his post. We finally 
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won. We gave the director of Azúcar S.A. a file with copies of all 
the illegal transactions and abuses he had inflicted upon many 
sugarcane producers." 
Jacinto was one of the people who had participated longest in the 
organisation of sugarcane production in the valley. He not only knew the 
practical side of production but had known most of the previous managers 
and heads of the extension department in the refinery and he was openly 
against Limón's reinstatement. 
Although the factory had to stop midway through the morning shift, the 
workers remained on the premises until it was over. When the morning shift 
workers, among them Engineer Limón and Adán Romo, left the refinery, 
Maximino and the other members of the CNC committee went in to talk to 
Armando Osuna Gómez, the general manager. According to some of the 
secretaries they talked for more than an hour. Maximino must have reached 
an agreement with Osuna who dictated a letter to one of the secretaries 
formally accusing Limón and Adán Romo of having arrived in an inebriated 
state at the factory and of using foul language to employees, including some 
of the secretaries. When the accusation was typed and ready they took it 
around the different departments pressing employees to sign it. Some did, 
but others, in spite of the threats, refused to sign. The latter were informed 
that they would have to suffer the consequences of not supporting the 
manager's decisions. 
Later I learnt that Maximino took the accusation against Limón to court, 
which gave the factory administration an injunction against the previous court 
decision that reinstated him. 
Next morning, just before nine o'clock, Limón and Adán Romo drove 
towards the refinery gate and were stopped by the permanent gate keeper. 
Limón got out of his car to talk to the gate keeper and behind him appeared 
four rural policemen holding machine guns dark with rust tightly to their 
chests, an obvious discouragement to Limón's attempt to reason with the gate 
keeper.3) He turned around, got into his car and drove off at speed. They 
drove straight to the court of civil law in Guadalajara to register a complaint 
against the Melchor Ocampo manager for denying them the right of entry to 
the premises, against the court ruling that had reinstated them as employees. 
He also made a statement to the press declaring that he and his family's lives 
were in peril. The incident was mentioned in the local weekly tabloid and in 
the regional newspaper. However, when a journalist interviewed the man-
ager, Armando Osuna Gómez, he denied that there had been a strike and that 
no sugarcane had been delivered that Thursday morning. The CNC secre-
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tary, Maximino, confirmed all of Osuna's comments and added that he did 
not want to see Engineer Limon in the refinery ever again. The manager 
explained to the journalist that Maximino had threatened to stop the refinery 
but had not done so because an agreement had been reached with the 
administration, an agreement that he declined to make public. They were 
both openly lying and covering for each other. 
The CNC leaders and the mill administration were thus temporarily able 
to abrogate Limon's right to reinstatement as head of the extension depart-
ment. Maximino, though denying the journalist his involvement, proudly 
admitted to those present at the monthly CNC assembly that he had been 
instrumental in the second dismissal of Limon. He claimed that he was 
protecting the sugarcane producers interests against the corruption of 
Limon's adminstration. Maximino had just been re-elected for his second 
period as president of the CNC and he was concerned to reassure the 
members that he was still defending their interests above all else. Maximino 
repeated vehemently that he had been the main instigator in getting Limon 
sacked the first time around and that "he would not allow any f..-er make 
fun of him. If we don't demand respect from the factory administration, it 
would be easy for them to deceive us". 
The decision to interrupt the delivery of sugarcane produced by CNC 
producers brought the mill grinding to a halt, delayed the schedule of the 
harvest and meant economic loss for the mill. However, the negotiations 
among the different parties involved in this industrial action take us beyond 
the mere confrontation between one of the producers' organizations and the 
state-owned mill administration. The various social actors involved in sugar 
production in the valley, depicted briefly in the above account, played 
different roles and adopted different strategies which reflected the existing 
socio-political conditions of the region. In order to understand the nature of 
these confrontations and negotiations it is necessary to place the background 
of the actors and their social strategies in the wider national context of state 
intervention in Mexican agriculture. 
State Intervention in Sugar Production 
The Mexican state intervenes directly in different sectors of the economy i.e. 
oil, steel, electricity; and in agriculture in sugar and tobacco production. 
This intervention is organized and negotiated by different groups, channelled 
through the government administration, the PRI that has been in power for 
the last sixty years, and the producers' and workers' organizations (Stevens, 
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1977). The organization of sugar production and the way the state intervenes 
reflects a general tendency in Mexico whereby the interest of the sugar sector 
has managed to stretch to its limits the policies implemented by the state. 
Likewise those actors in charge of national economic policy have, in spite of 
their revolutionary rhetoric, established financial and political structures in 
which private entrepreneurship has thrived; politicians have encouraged all 
production sectors to work under the political umbrella of the PRI (Purcell 
and Purcell, 1977). 
In the 1930s, in order to make sugar affordable to the majority of the 
population, the state intervened by controlling the price. Since the price fixed 
by the state fell below the production costs of many refineries some went 
bankrupt, and so to ameliorate the impact of this price policy, the state 
created a development bank to support those who had survived. During the 
1940s and 1950s, although the Mexican economy grew at a steady pace 
(Hansen, 1977), the refineries could not pull themselves back into solvency 
and their debts steadily increased. Thus, at the end of the 1960s, the sugar 
industry was on the edge of collapse. The state had two alternatives, either to 
renegotiate the debts or to acquire them. The latter was chosen and so the 
state began taking over the administration of most refineries, a policy that 
continued throughout the 1970s. 
The consumption of sugar in the diet of the majority of Mexicans is one 
of the highest per capita in the world - 45.3 kilogrammes in 1985 (Coote, 
1987: 75). Thus by keeping an artificially low price for sugar in the 
domestic market, the government could indirectly subsidise its consumption 
by the low-income earners whilst providing the biggest users of sugar, 
namely the subsidiaries of large multinational food and drink processing 
companies, with a cheap input (Coote, 1987: 95). 
The organization of sugarcane producers was proceeded, during the 
private ownership period, by the consolidation, at national level, of the 
powerful union of sugar workers, with which the government had to reckon 
when faced with the collapse of the sugar industry. This greatly influenced 
the government decision to acquire the ransacked sugar refineries and keep 
them in production. Although sugar refinery workers have had political clout 
for a long time, they followed the rules laid down under the corporative 
labour structure led by the PRI. When the government took over the sugar 
refineries they had to negotiate the terms of production individually for each 
refinery, because there was no national organization that represented the 
majority of the producers with whom to deal. Therefore the government 
encouraged local leaders in the PRI and CNC to extend their political and 
organizational influence beyond their regional boundaries, which they did 
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with great success, to the point of becoming a strong political force in their 
own right. At the same time leaders of the sugarcane producers acquired 
more elbow room than they had when they dealt with the private refinery 
owners. Between 1977 and 1985, the sugar producers organized confronta-
tions with the authorities and strikes which were among the most important 
and numerous in Mexico in that period (Rubio, 1987: 115). At the end of the 
1970's, the regional organizations of sugar producers, having consolidated 
their regional position, extended their influence to the national political arena 
where they seized control in a similar way to that held by the refinery 
workers. 
Government administrators sponsored sugarcane production by negotiat-
ing the distribution of financial rewards between the different groups 
involved. In the 1930s, they gave financial support to the refinery owners; in 
the following two decades, government (the PRI) supported the organized 
refinery workers who in return closed their ranks behind the PRI. From the 
1960s onwards, with direct government intervention in the administration of 
the majority of sugar refineries, sugar producers' organizations came to play 
a more relevant role in the organization of sugarcane production. Thus in the 
Mexican political scene, state representatives, producers' and workers' 
organizations, through their affiliation with the PRI, became inextricably 
intertwined with the corporatist state, in which the interests of state and civil 
society are institutionally bound. Hence government intervention in sugar 
production has resulted in more and stronger participation of the different 
groups involved in its organization. The nature of this organizational arena 
and its structure is described in the following sections and more fully 
elucidated in other chapters of the thesis. 
Dramatis Personae 
The principal protagonists in the social drama described were the leader and 
secretary of the CNC, the manager of the Melchor Ocampo refinery, and the 
former head of the extension department, all of whom were directly involved 
in the events that led to the strike. The others who influenced the outcome of 
the strike did so by negation. Thus the abstention of the representatives of 
the CNPP, the smaller of the two producers' associations, deprived Limdn of 
his only political support against the attacks of the CNC leaders and the 
acquiescent condoning of their actions by the refinery administration. The 
following paragraphs provide a brief account of the social characteristics of 
these actors, concentrating on their activities related to the organization of 
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sugar production. Each character has different interests and perspectives 
which pervade their participation in the organization of sugar cane produc-
tion. 
Until the 1980's, there was only one producers' organization to which 
all sugar cane producers in the valley belonged. It was affiliated to the 
CNC, 4 ) and is still the larger of the two sugar producer organizations in the 
Autlán region. However, the CNC association belongs to the peasant sector 
within the PRI, whereas the newer CNPP organization is part of the mixed-
bag called 'the popular sector'. The party is made up of three main sectors: 
the sector of workers, convened under the CTN (Confederación de Trabaja-
dores Mexicanos, Confederation of Mexican Workers); the peasant sector 
assembled under the CNC (Confederación Nacional de Campesinos); and the 
'popular sector', consisting of the CNOP (Confederation National de 
Organizaciones Populares, National Confederation of Popular Organizations) 
which includes all the other groups, ranging from teachers and small mer-
chants to professional employees and entrepreneurs. The smaller organisation 
of sugar cane producers is part of the CNPP which is affiliated to the CNOP. 
Although both associations of sugar cane producers are members of the PRI, 
their interests and policies do not always coincide. Yet, Maximino and 
Jacinto, as leaders of the CNC, and Arturo as president of the CNPP, are all 
active members in the PRI. Osuna, as manager of a state-owned refinery, 
can also be considered an active member of the PRI, though not a voluntary 
one, since he complains about his quota for the party being automatically 
deducted from his pay cheque. 
All the producers have to sign a contract with the mill, in which the 
latter commits itself to buying the crop and extending credit for the growing 
and cutting of the cane. The growers agree to sell all their produce to the 
mill at a nationally-agreed price. The individual contracts signed by pro-
ducers and refinery have to be sanctioned by one of the two producer 
organizations. Both organizations are very keen to attract as many farmers as 
possible to their ranks, regardless of the size of their plots or economic situ-
ation. However, most of the small producers, mainly ejidatarios5*, join the 
CNC; and most of the larger producers tend to gather around the CNPP. 
Both organizations are constitutive members of the PRI, though representing 
different interest groups. The refinery is a parastatal institution which, in 
contrast to the entrepreneurial leeway for decision making in privately-owned 
refineries, must follow certain general regulations about the administration 
and organization of sugar production, thus making it subject to politically-
tainted decisions to a greater extent than those in the private sector. 
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The Leaders of the CNC 
The Rise of a the New Political Figure 
Maximino Castillo Arenas became the president of the CNC for sugar 
producers in January 1984. He agreed to run for the presidency if Jacinto 
Rojo continued as secretary and agreed to teach him how to direct all the 
activities that the organization was expected to perform. Maximino was a 
keen learner and after one harvest as the organization's chief had understood 
how to deal with the employees in the refinery and the way to cultivate the 
producers' acquiescent support. His style is rowdy and self-assured. He is 
very proud of having climbed up from a poor childhood in a large family to 
his current position of power as president of the larger of the two 
organisations, and as municipal president of a town located just over the 
mountains that enclose the valley of Autlan. Maximino divides his time 
between both official appointments, though the CNC takes more of his time. 
When Maximino took over the presidency of the organization in 1984 
from his predecessor, Ramon Gordillo, Limdn was still superintendent of the 
extension department, the then current general manager of the refinery had 
only been in office a few months, and the Committee of Sugar Cane Produc-
tion'9 had been working for only two years. According to some of CNC 
representatives, the refinery administration was not aware that it might be 
possible for the Committee to curtail the refinery's control over sugar cane 
production and enlarge the producers' room for manoeuvre. From the 
beginning, Limdn kept a tight hold on the meetings of the Committee. He 
had, after all, more experience in sugar production in the valley than other 
committee members. However, the arrival of a new mill manager in 1983, 
and the election of a new president to the larger producers' organization the 
following year, tilted the balance of power in favour of the Committee. 
Limdn's leadership was under siege from then onwards. Sugar cane pro-
ducers felt more confident and able to voice their dissatisfaction with the 
extension department service. The complaints grew and became more 
forceful and were heard beyond the local Committee, in both regional and 
national meetings. Finally, their protests were heard and Limon was dis-
missed without compensation on the grounds of professional dishonesty, 
though a legal demand was not pursued by the refinery administration. As 
president of the CNC affiliated organization, Maximino was instrumental in 
removing Limdn from his post. Meanwhile, the leaders of the CNPP affili-
ated association remained quiescent and refused to follow the other 
organization's surprise attack on Limdn. 
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From Ejidatario to the Secretary of CNC 
Jacinto Rojo was one of the first sugar cane producers in Ejido Escondido. 
He started to work for the CNC in 1980, when he was invited to help 
organize the cutting. This was the time oi la tripartita (a faction within the 
CNC) which in Autlan organized sugar production with Limon taking the 
decisions and coordination of the groups of cutters and transporters. Jacinto 
was in charge of burning the cane before bringing in the groups of workers 
involved in cutting and transporting the cane to the refinery. In those first 
years he learned a lot about all the stages of the production process and how 
to deal with the people in the refinery. When la tripartita members decided 
to fuse into one organization, elections were held and Jacinto was voted 
secretary of the unified organization and Ramdn Gordillo, a member of his 
ejido, was chosen as president for a period of three years. Gordillo was very 
easily persuaded by Limon to do what he wanted, regardless of whether it 
was in the producers interests or not. At the end of his term, he decided to 
run for re-election. Jacinto disapproved because of Ramdn's poor 
achievements as president and he started to organize a group that would 
lobby for a different president. The election of Maximino Castillo Arenas as 
their candidate to run against Gordillo was covertly approved by Limdn and 
other producers committed to the local branch of the PRI. 
As Jacinto points out, the conditions offered by the mill provided small 
producers with advantages, such as loans to improve the levelling and 
furrowing of their plots. Through the credit that the refinery offered, they 
had access to cash, regardless of the use to which they put it. The local 
producers were then encouraged by their representatives and local politicians 
to plant sugar cane. But they would not have been successful, if it had not 
been the most attractive option at the time for the majority of the small 
producers, as well as to some large farmers in the valley. Planting cane 
offered producers, among others things, an opportunity to improve the 
conditions of their plots. Although the economic return was not high during 
the early years, the refinery was required to provide those growing sugar 
with health services not generally available in Mexico. Access to health 
services and a scheme for a minimum retirement pension were perks that 
tipped the balance in favour of cane. These conditions did not resemble those 
in other regions of Mexico, such as Morelos in the central plateau, where 
sugar cane has a long history going back to the arrival of the Spanish 
Conquerors and was cultivated during the colonial period (1519-1821) by 
Indian serf labour and processed by African slave workers, and where the 
refinery administrator still ruled over most aspects of cane production 
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(Barret, 1977). Nor did the conditions in the valley of Autlan resemble the 
harsh circumstances endured by peasants and workers in the Atencingo 
refinery, as described by Ronfeldt (1973), and by Pare* (1979). 
The CNPP Leaders 
The conspicuous refusal of the CNPP to support the strike called by the 
CNC reflected the different interests that attracted sugar producers to one or 
other of these organization. Small landholders, who account for the majority 
of members of the CNPP, have different property arrangements to those held 
by ejidatarios. They look down with some contempt on the rights of 
ejidatarios to a small plot following the agrarian reform in the 1930's. A 
large number of the private farmers only started to grow sugarcane in the 
late 1970's when it had already proved its comparative advantage. Seventy-
six of them are members of the CNPP organization which represents seventy 
per cent of the membership, and the other thirty or so members are 
ejidatarios. Although as a whole the CNPP members make up only eleven 
per cent of the thousand or so sugarcane producers in the valley, they plant 
one quarter of the sugarcane milled by the Melchor Ocampo mill on some 
1,700 hectares. Extension workers and early producers experimented with 
different varieties of cane and overcame the shortcomings of some of those 
experiments. The initial costs of opening access roads to the sugar cane plots 
had been covered already by the innovative ejidatarios before the price of 
sugarcane was raised considerably in 1980. Growing sugarcane had by then 
become a profitable and attractive economic activity to local farmers.7* 
Local Entrepreneur 
Arturo Sanchez Ruy remained president of the local branch of the CNPP 
until the end of the 1987 harvest. He is a young entrepreneur, the oldest son 
of a family of six children. His only brother had emigrated to the USA. 
Arturo inherited the responsibility for administering the family businesses 
that included two petrol stations, a video shop, various lorries, agricultural 
machinery and land planted with sugarcane. He is very proud of the 
achievements of the CNPP in the relatively short time that it has been 
working, and he thinks they might have done more if the members were 
more cooperative. 
Landowners who produce sugarcane in the Autlan valley do not 
resemble the proletarianised sugarcane producers or paid producers described 
by Pare" (1987) and Rubio (1987), and to a lesser degree the medium to 
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large-scale producers. The latter could be described as wealthier farmers, 
who combine growing sugar cane with other business ventures. The 
differences between these larger and wealthier sugar producers and the small 
ejidatario producers should not be described in terms of the homogenizing 
generalizations made about sugarcane producers in the Mexican literature, 
which obscure important differences among producer groups. In the chapters 
that follow, I will describe the critical differences that distinguish the various 
groups and show how my ethnographic data support an alternative theoretical 
interpretation which emphasises actor strategies and social diversity. 
It is important to analyse the lack of involvement of the CNPP leaders 
in the strike, as it reflects the different commitments among the two sugar 
producer organizations. The strike was organized by the CNC leaders against 
the refinery administration because they had re-instated the suspended head 
of the extension department, even though not to his previous job. However, 
as the events unfolded, it became clear that the manager of the refinery was 
not against the CNC demand that Limdn be kept out of the refinery, but had 
different reasons for wanting this. This highlights the diverse interests that 
inform discussions between the different parties involved in the organization 
of sugar cane production. 
The Administration of the IMO 
The Rise and Fall of Limón 
High level employees in the Melchior Ocampo mill have always been 
appointed by the senior bureaucrats of the parastatal company, Azúcar, S.A., 
in charge of organizing and controlling state-owned sugar mills in Mexico. 
The appointments have always been politically tainted and they tend to be 
shuffled around among their employees. Thus it was very unusual for 
Gabriel Limón, one of the local topographers hired during the construction 
of the refinery, to be kept on when it went into production, and for him to 
remain in the extension department for over ten years. He was, at the time of 
its construction, a young, recently graduated engineer.* He is a member of 
large and well known local family and his father owns a medium-sized farm. 
He thus comes, not from a peasant, but from a small landholder background. 
He worked first as a topographer and in August of 1971 he was hired as an 
extension worker. At the end of 1974, the refinery administration changed 
and a new head of agricultural extension was appointed. Limón was pro-
moted to the post of technical coordinator of the extension officers. He 
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worked hard and acquired a detailed knowledge of the area. He could 
identify soils types by sight and had memorised the map of soil types in the 
valley. 
In 1978, the refinery administration changed and again Limdn was made 
head of the extension department. He remained in this post until 1984, when 
he was sacked by Ramando Osuna Gomez, the newly-appointed general 
manager. He was accused of dishonest management and denied compensa-
tion. Limon sued the refinery. A Federal court of labour heard his case and 
dismissed the accusations, ordering that he be reinstated or granted legal 
compensation for having been unjustly dismissed. In an interview with him 
in his shop in May 1987, he commented that people should defend their 
rights. He felt that the Federal court ruling concerning his innocence was not 
something to be sneezed at and that the charges were dropped because there 
were clearly no grounds for them. He had the law on his side and felt that he 
had been dismissed for political reasons. 
Before the establishment of the CNPP in the 1980's, the local branch of 
the CNC had supported the strategies of the National Committee to obtain a 
better deal from the Mexican State (for historical background see Paré, 
1988). The confrontations and negotiations between the producers, under 
their united organizations, and the State lasted until December 1979, when 
President Lopez Portillo signed the sugarcane decree that laid down the rules 
and regulations, rights and obligations of all the parties involved in the sugar 
industry in Mexico. There were three main points in this document: 1) the 
price of sugarcane was bound to the inflation rate as calculated by the central 
bank, based on indices of wholesale prices of basic products; 2) the local 
price of sugarcane was to be determined by the level of sucrose obtained by 
the refinery and not to be lower than the basic national price; 3) a production 
committee was to be created where representatives of the producers could 
discuss with administrators the organization and harvesting of production. 
These agreements were a great improvement, especially compared with 
the conditions for production of other agricultural products. The active 
participation of the representatives of the sugarcane producers in the 
organization of production, harvesting and transporting sugarcane from the 
plots to the refinery was thus legally reinforced and the mill administration 
had to accept them as partners in deciding policies and shared administrative 
tasks concerned with sugarcane production. The mill administration had to 
comply with the decree, because the leaders of sugar producers demanded it, 
which did not happen in the majority of sugarcane refineries or mills in 
Mexico. 
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The shift in control from the extension department to producer organiz-
ations took place very shortly after the formation of the second association of 
sugarcane producers in the valley, the CNPP. As is always the case in such 
periods, the approach in sexennial political upheaval when national elections 
take place, bred uncertainty among government employees. This, together 
with the feeling that the CNC did not represent the interests of all those 
involved in sugarcane, was the background to the emergence of the CNPP 
association, sponsored by Limdn and the mill manager of that time. In the 
Spring of 1983, a new manager arrived at the refinery, Armando Osuna 
Gdmez. 
An Efficiency Seeker 
Then in the spring of 1983, a new manager arrived at the refinery, Armando 
Osuna Gomez. Appointments of managers and chiefs of various departments 
in the refinery are closely linked to the political changes of national directors 
and ministers at government level. Osuna Gomez was appointed when the 
newly elected government came into power. Although he had twenty years 
earlier obtained a degree as an engineer in sugar production and had worked 
in the sugar industry when it was privately owned, he had been employed 
during the previous sexennial in administrative positions in various 
ministries. One of these had been as sub-director of the Industrias de Azucar, 
Celulosa y Papel (Sugar, Cellulose and Paper Industry), which was state 
controlled and under the Ministry of Mines and Parastatal Industries. 
Osuna Gdmez concentrated all decision-making in his own hands and 
left little room for the heads of the different departments in the mill. Osuna 
Gomez has wide ranging experience from direct knowledge of the chemical 
processes involved to political intrigue, which makes him a shrewd manager 
to deal with, and which sometimes subdues his counterparts in the industry. 
However, the producers, through their respective organizations, have 
encroached upon Osuna's organizational territory. They are now equal 
partners in the Committee of Sugarcane Production, though the refinery 
administration can still impose some financial pressures. In spite of these the 
producers have their own forms of resistance, as evidenced by the disruption 
that the strike created. 
The strike highlights the intricacies of how the different social actors 
involved in sugarcane production in the Valley of Autlan defend their 
particular interests and how they finally create an interactional modus vivendi 
where the conditions of sugarcane production are negotiated. Hence the 
assumption that cane producers have surrendered to an imposing industrial 
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administration clearly is not valid for this case. On the contrary, the 
producers have found various ways of dealing with the refinery 
administration, and especially through their two associations they have 
consolidated their influence over the organization of sugar production. 
As I show in Chapter 2, these events can better be understood when 
placed within the historical context encompassing the various interests and 
social processes at local level, in which the actors pursue their own interests. 
But before turning attention to the local context, let me provide a brief 
overview of the national political scenario and outline the theoretical frame-
work that underpins the ethnographic account of how the actors have made 
their mark on the organization of sugar production in the Valley of Autlan. 
Interpreting the Political Scenario 
Differences in resource endowment and political structure, together with the 
periodization of the development of sugarcane production, account for the 
specific forms of regional political and economic organization that emerge. 
The feasibility study for the refinery in the Valley of Autlan was made at the 
beginning of 1968 and the negotiations and lobbying of different national and 
local agents finally succeeded in bringing the team of engineers and workers 
to the valley in 1970. They built the Melchor Ocampo mill, its basic 
infrastructure and the roads. The building of the mill was not part of a 
national plan to develop agricultural production in the region, but the 
outcome of active negotiations by local farmers and politicians, through their 
contacts with national actors who wielded political power and had a 
particular interest in bringing a new source of economic development to the 
region. Nevertheless the difficulties of those negotiations and their outcome 
has to be set against an understanding of the consolidation of the State in 
Mexico, its direct involvement in agricultural production and, in particular, 
its control over sugar production, and the political organisation of 
agricultural producers. 
The Mexican Government and the Political System 
The political complexity of modern Mexican government institutions is tied 
to the workings of a one-party state, which is embedded in what Gonzalez 
Casanova (1981: 62) describes as a political culture that accommodates 
popular interests to those of the oligarchy, the former often being subsumed 
by the latter under the hegemonic logic of power which trammels the 
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everyday lives of the Mexican population. Purcell and Purcell (1980: 200) 
make a similar point when they describe the Mexican political system as 
'simultaneously mass-based and elitist'.95 This ideological conflation has 
pervaded political action in Mexico and colours the methods political 
agencies use for political action. 
The predominant modes are built upon patron-client networks, where 
the patron has gained control of the different private and public resources 
which he hands over to his clients following an unwritten code of unequal 
reciprocity and exchange. De la Pena (1986) highlights the relevant role that 
local and regional patrons have played in Mexican politics, being the pivot 
between local needs and national policies. These patron-client relations 
skilfully combine, at two levels, what we might call the 'politics of 
appearances' and the 'politics of facts' which are intermingled beyond 
recognition in everyday political negotiations. Both sets of relationships play 
equally relevant roles in the public decision-making process and should 
always be kept in mind alongside each other, since there is always a blurred 
threshold between what political agencies actually say and what they actually 
mean. For example, when the refinery administrator denied to the journalist 
that there had been a strike, explaining that the reason for the mill's stoppage 
was a mechanical fault, he was in fact denying the political action taken by 
the CNC leaders, although he had to admit that the refinery did in fact stop 
functioning for several hours on Thursday 14th, May 1987. 
Maximino made it very clear to the cane producers attending the 
monthly CNC general assembly that he was proud of their intervention, that 
their action constituted a blow to the reinstatement of Limdn, who was 
openly accused of embezzlement. Such apparently contradictory interpreta-
tions of events are part of the manipulations of political discourse. They have 
to be understood within a wider political perspective, which must build upon 
an analysis, not only of the opinions of the main characters directly and 
indirectly involved in the strike, but also on an explanation of the interests 
they share with other actors in similar positions. 
The forms of political action based on patron-client networks explain the 
kind of relationship that Limdn developed with an important local political 
group within the PRI who rallied around the figure of the late General Lopez 
Arreola, a nationally prominent figure, who was instrumental in the estab-
lishment of the sugar mill. Limdn's extended family has leant on their close 
relations with the general's group. The other characters in the social drama 
i.e. Maximino Castillo and Jacinto Rojo, the CNC representatives, partici-
pated in the political arena through networks other than those of the general's 
group. Jacinto is a local peasant who had not politically participated beyond 
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his ejidal community until he was employed in the refinery extension depart-
ment. Limdn was already the head of the extension department when Jacinto 
joined it. He said he got on with him, but even then there were rumours 
about Limdn's dishonest practices. 
Maximino was the first newcomer to the valley to be elected president 
of the CNC. He further enhanced his position by allying himself to Jose" 
Zarate a regional patron who had expanded his political influence in the area 
when his brother-in-law Luis Echeverria became President of Mexico 
between 1970-76. Maximino arrived in the valley in 1974 on a government 
project, sponsored by la Comision del Sur (The Commission of the South, 
i.e. the south of Jalisco) to provide drinking water for the population of El 
Grullo. When the project was finished and the sexenio came to an end, 
Maximino decided to remain in Autlan. He found a job in the local office of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, where he was put in charge of an irrigation 
section. It was in this way, in 1982, that, by chance, he became involved in 
sugarcane production. A year later, in 1983, he was approached by some 
members of the CNC, including Jacinto, then current secretary, to run 
against the president of the CNC, who had already started his campaign for 
re-election. Maximino made his candidacy conditional on Jacinto remaining 
secretary. Maximino and Jacinto won the election by a small majority. 
In January, 1984, just before the start of the harvest, new members of 
the Committee of Sugarcane Production (the refinery manager and the CNC 
president) began to juggle with the balance of power, thus curtailing Limdn's 
influence, the doyen of the Committee. Osuna and Maximino were not only 
newcomers to the Committee, but they were, in differing degrees, aliens to 
the regional political scene. Maximino had already been in the valley for ten 
years, during which time he had established solid local political networks. 
Osuna was in a different situation. He had only held his position as manager 
at the mill for six months and had not had time to master the political 
intrigue at local level. However, Osuna was a shrewd public employee, who 
had survived the political and bureaucratic turnover that comes with the 
change of president every six years. He would soon become familiar with the 
local political arena. 
The periodic renovation of Mexican political cadres is quantified by 
Peter Smith (1979) who compares the continuity of Mexican elites with 
Russian and American elites. His study estimates that continuity in the 
Mexican political elite from 1920 to 1970 reached no more than 35%, 
whereas in Russia this fluctuated between 65 and 80%, and in America, 
when power shifts from one party to the other, only 10% keep their top 
public offices, though they always strike back when their party returns to 
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power. Smith also reveals that in Mexico after three presidential periods, that 
is every eighteen years, 90% of the political leaders are replaced by new 
political stars. 
Smith's analysis considers this sexennial reshuffling one of the most 
enduring characteristics of the Mexican political system, which has been 
considered by several political scientists as an 'atypical political system'. 
Gonzalez Casanova (1981: 195) comments that the majority of the political 
leaders and public administrators in Mexico have a middle class background. 
They start their careers attaching themselves to a political cadre (camarilla), 
that spreads its network as far as possible into different ministries and sectors 
within the PRI. The entrammelled networks of public offices and ruling party 
are set in motion by political groups usually rallying around a strong figure, 
such as, for example, General Lopez Arreola of Autlan. When the negoti-
ations for bringing the sugar mill to the region took place, the General was 
the Ministry of Defence and pulled the strings of political groups within the 
PRI in Autlan. 
Grindle (1986) describes how the Mexican state has wielded power 
through its agrarian reform and its development policies, which have, on the 
one hand, managed to keep under control violent outbursts in the country-
side, and, on the other, provided the economic infrastructure for the 
development of modern agriculture, though mainly among the better-off 
farmers. In the case of cane production, government participation increased 
in response to the demands of the different groups involved in the 
organization of production. At the beginning, in the 1930's and 1940's, it 
was financial support for the refinery owners who had seen their profits 
reduced by capping the price of sugar. The state financially supported sugar 
production because it provided a cheap source of energy for the low-income 
majority and a low priced input for the fledgling food processing industry. 
The next stage in sugar production, during the 1950's and 1960's, balanced 
financial support to the refinery owners with attention to the demands from 
the nationally-organized labour force in the refineries under a corporative 
union affiliated to the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers), one of the 
main sectors within the PRI. It was at this stage that the decision was taken 
to build the Melchor Ocampo refinery. In the 1970's and 1980's, the cane 
producers, who had been fighting regionally to improve their conditions, 
finally managed to form a national organization to represent their interests. 
However, local producer groups differed greatly in the amount of power they 
could wield. Producers in the Valley of Autlan-El Grullo achieved much 
better conditions than those linked to longer-standing refineries in Mexico. 
Cane producers for Melchor Ocampo began growing sugar cane when 
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national negotiations for the organization of the industry had been settled on 
much better terms for the producers than ever before. Cane producers in the 
valley have no memories of being exploited heavily by refinery owners. Nei-
ther can they dwell on the cruel fight against refinery owners in their 
attempts to obtain land, as was the case among older sugarcane producing 
regions. Thus cane producers in Autlan, who were instrumental in the 
opening of the refinery in the valley, also capitalised on the favourable terms 
that the leaders of the national organizations of sugarcane producers had 
negotiated. 
The intertwining of party politics and government policies has been at 
the core of the development of the Mexican state. Purcell and Purcell (1977: 
192) have described the involvement of the Mexican government as political-
ly authoritarian, with unorganized constraints, and as having a 'relatively 
well-defined ideology of "state-interest"', all of which could be detected in 
government intervention in sugar production. All the parties involved were 
and are linked to the PRI. The headship of the national institution in charge 
of administering state-owned refineries became an important public post that 
was highly contested for by high ranking politicians, indicating that middle-
range administrative jobs also suffer from the sexennial shake-up. 
Thus although there is some evidence to substantiate Olson's 
generalisation that '...the Mexican state nurtures the capitalist class, con-
structing institutions necessary for capitalist accumulation' (1985: 24), the 
process is far from all-embracing, and the diverse forms it takes must be the 
object of a more careful analysis that sheds light on the historical conditions 
shaping the specific actions and possibilities of the different actors. Indeed in 
recent years the corporative control of the state has dwindled. 
Conceptualizing Agrarian Change and State Intervention 
State participation in the expansion of agricultural production in Mexico is a 
topic that has been depicted and analysed in detail from various perspectives 
and at different times. Discussions about the peasantry, agrarian reform, 
rural change and transnational ization of agriculture have been going on for 
the last thirty years, about which many articles, theses and books have been 
written. 
Early discussions focused upon the study of the social and cultural 
obstacles to development using concepts such as Redfield's 'rural-urban 
continuum' and Foster's 'limited good'. Whereas Redfield explained in a 
linear fashion what he considered the unavoidable path from traditional 
peasant community to modern urban society, Foster attempted to explain the 
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apparent lack of economic ambition among the dwellers of a rural commun-
ity in southwestern Mexico by depicting their idiosyncratic assumption that 
all good things in life are available in limited quantities and that therefore 
taking a larger slice of the cake deprives somebody else of her/his fair share 
(see Hewitt de Alcantara, 1982). Long (1977: 48) criticises these contribu-
tions for giving causal priority to cultural phenomena. 
Other researchers, such as Eckstein (1966), have focussed on a 
quantitative analysis of differences between rural producers, and have con-
structed typologies where the use of labour force outside the household is 
taken as one of the key factors causing socio-differentiation. These studies 
stress the material limitations that most small-scale peasants, mainly 
ejidatarios, endure, and help to contextual ise the structural characteristics of 
the peasantry and agrarian transition. 
Among the next batch of critical approaches to rural development, 
Stavenhagen's work opened up new ground in Mexican studies when, in the 
sixties, he criticised the interpretations of obstacles to development based on 
material and cultural deprivation, offering instead an analysis based on 
notions of external dependency and internal colonialism, thereby placing the 
blame for underdevelopment not only on international capital but also on 
national power structures and local ruling classes (1975: 16-18). Gutelman 
(1974) adds to Stavenhagen's analysis of agrarian classes by concentrating on 
the process of accumulation, or the lack of it, in most small farm units. 
Later, in the early eighties, Schejtman (1985) refurbishes these typologies of 
rural producers, adding two factors: the hiring or not of labour and the 
balance of production and consumption within the productive unit. His study 
provides a revised, more complex and up-to-date typology of agricultural 
units of production at national level, which calls for more systematic regional 
and local studies to thrash out the bare bones of such a typology and 
analysis. 
As peasant unrest in several regions of Mexico hit the news in the 
1970's (see Rubio, 1987), the polemics on agrarian structures split into two 
main currents, one predicting the imminent process of proletarianisation of 
peasants (see Bartra, 1974, Paré, 1977), and the other proclaiming that 
capitalist exploitation had only partially ruined Mexican peasants, pushing 
them to recover their long-time demand for land (see Bartra, 1979; Warman, 
1974 and 1976). Interestingly, these opposing analyses became part of the 
political discourse which impinged upon peasant organisations, the PRI and 
various left-wing organizations and independent parties. There was also a 
third analytical current with a wider scope that joined the debate. Writers 
such as Hewitt de Alcantara (1978), Feder (1979), Barkin y Suârez (1983), 
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Echeverría (1984), Sanderson (1986), and Goodman (1981), all highlight the 
participation of the state in the transnational isation of agricultural production 
in Mexico. Intervention is seen as an inevitable responsibility for most 
governments in developing countries, a responsibility, however, that is 
withering away as national productive processes are more fully integrated 
into the international division of labour. This incorporation of agricultural 
production into the international market, it is argued, either transforms 
peasant producers into small agricultural entrepreneurs or reshuffles them 
into rural labourers or industrial workers (Sanderson 1986: 239). 
The debate between what has been called the campesinistas, who stress 
the 'peasantization' of the rural producers, and the descampesinistas who 
argue for the eventual proletarianisation of the mass of the rural population, 
has, it seems, reached an impasse which allows more recent studies to pick 
up the threads from both perspectives and interweave them in a more pen-
etrating social analysis. Processes of socio-economic change taking place 
among different groups of producers in the Mexican countryside have often 
resulted in the persistence of peasant production alongside the participation of 
some members of the same households in external labour markets through 
either temporary or permanent migration to urban centres or agricultural 
zones in Mexico and die USA. 
Although it is possible to explain these composite economies along the 
lines suggested by Meillassoux, who analyses die exploitation of peasant 
labour force and its 'domestic community' through international temporary 
migration (1981: 120-123), his analysis remains skewed towards the 
generalising assumption that capitalism, as a deus ex machina, has to create 
its necessary labour-power. Furthermore, the way in which peasants, on the 
one hand, have become commodity producers, and on the other, have joined 
intermittently both the national and international labour force, cannot simply 
be understood within this general framework; it must be explained through 
detailed studies of the configuration of local circumstances. In the case to be 
examined in this thesis, the tradition and opportunity to work in the USA and 
to earn income in sugar production has given actors the freedom to assemble 
a combined income from these particular income-earning opportunities. This, 
I suggest, is better explained by defining the diverse interests of the actors 
involved in decision making aimed at securing their livelihoods, than by 
recourse to either some cultural notion of a persisting 'peasant way of life' 
sustained by state intervention or by the laws of capitalist accumulation. 
The concept of the 'logic of capital' assumes that the economy is 
directed by universal laws of capital accumulation in which the processes of 
commoditisation, the polarisation of social classes and surplus value 
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extraction are seen to set in motion similar tendencies wherever this form of 
production predominates. This approach has had a great influence in studies 
of developing countries, notably in dependency theory (Kay, 1989:128-9). 
This paradigm sees the development of the advanced capitalist economies as 
inextricably connected to the 'underdevelopment' of 'third world' nations. 
Facing these obstacles, the State is given a primordial 'developmentalist' role 
in fostering capitalist development (de Janvry 1981). This type of analysis 
may provide an overview of the general tendencies of capital accumulation 
but, in doing so, it leaves out of its analysis the diverse socio-economic 
processes that take place in the producers' daily struggle to earn their living. 
Long exposes this shortcoming in his discussion of de Janvry: 
'The major difficulty with de Janvry's formulation is that, while 
pinpointing certain crucial dimensions of Third World underdevelopment 
(e.g. the role of cheap labour, dualism and income inequalities between 
the peasant and export linked sectors), it interprets the pattern of 
agrarian development in peripheral economies as resulting from the 
logic of capital accumulation, thus according little attention to other 
factors such as the style of political intervention and ideologies of 
development represented by State programmes, or the influence of 
forms of peasant organisation or resistance' (1988: 110). 
It is important to recognise that there are individual economic logics, 
not necessarily congealing into a coherent whole, even though this might be 
expected from these individuals' involvement in the larger processes of 
accumulation (Block 1990: 293-309). Economic laws are not autonomous and 
the economy is always the creation of a combination of individual decisions, 
State action and other economic agencies. The ethnographic material I 
present in the chapters that follow illustrate this point. 
The State's development and implementation of agricultural policies is 
not the straight forward management of the crisis of capitalist accumulation 
as suggested by de Janvry (1981) and O'Donnell (1973). The corporatism 
that the Mexican State spawns has provided its officials with room for 
manoeuvre (Grindle 1977 & 1986). Furthermore, these bureaucrats have 
been involved in agricultural production in a variety of ways, which range 
from being extension officers and policy administrators to managers of the 
state-owned sugarmills. Thus we cannot assume State policy to be a coherent 
system of policies serving some abstract entity promoting capital 
accumulation. There are other forces at play which can be seen in the 
multiplicity of ways the different parties organize and involve themselves in 
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agricultural development. Whereas Grindle focuses on the negotiations 
among the bureaucratic cadre involved in agriculture, Long and Arce (1989) 
have brought our attention to the sparkling interactions between the officers 
and the producers. It is this level of analysis which demands an actor-
oriented approach, of the kind I take in this thesis. This perspective aims to 
take full account of human agency in agrarian processes (Long 1988). 
My study is located in the area of peasant politics within the context of 
commercial agriculture. I am particularly interested in the way that sugarcane 
producers seize and mould the conditions in which they find themselves. It 
was for this reason that I took issue with Paré et al earlier on. 
Parallel to the discussion on peasants or proletarians, there have been 
other works that have made their object of analysis the processes through 
which bureaucrats and politicians involved in policy making and implementa-
tion mesh their networks and consolidate their alliances with different 
political cliques. Grindle (1977), for example, describes how agricultural 
policies in Mexico are the object of tough political negotiations among state 
employees with different interests, and shows how the outcomes of policy 
implementation in Mexican agriculture (e.g. the low guaranteed price of 
staple crops) have undermined the already precarious income of most small 
producers. Such policies, combined with the expansion of transnational 
agricultural production, have limited the production of staple crops, mainly 
among small producers (see Spalding 1984). In an attempt to reverse this 
process, the Mexican government, relying on its oil revenues, launched a 
development programme to improve the production of staples and their 
distribution among low-income groups in rural and urban areas. The pro-
gramme was called SAM (Sistema Alimentario Mexicano or the Mexican 
Food System)10). 
The different government organizations involved in the implementation 
of this SAM programme became enmeshed in bureaucratic contests for the 
unexpected, generous funds that were available. Then with the collapse of 
the oil price, the programme ran out of funds and was terminated soon after 
the new President came to power in December, 1981. The resources that 
eventually reached the agricultural producers were mostly seized by the 
wealthier producers to increase their production of staples, thus creaming off 
the economic incentives that SAM offered (Arce, 1993; Grindle, 1985; 
Gates, 1988). Following this, SAM's objectives were reshuffled into more 
modest programmes called PRONAL (Programa Nacional de Alimentación), 
which hardly got off the ground, though some of SAM's aims have impinged 
on more programmes for rural development, which the Ministry of Agricul-
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ture has promoted in a more subdued style than during the oil boom years 
(see Esteva, 1988: 56). 
Studies of the policies and politics of agriculture tend to endow state 
organizations with the protagonist's role in rural development. The better-off 
farmers, the main beneficiaries of state expenditures on agriculture, are 
accorded a secondary role, and the small producers, who are in the majority, 
are merely cast as sundry extras, who combine the production of staples with 
the sale of their cheap labour to the agricultural sector and other sectors of 
the dependent capitalist system of production in Mexico. These studies 
conflate the diverse social actors involved in agriculture into all-encompass-
ing categories that depict the general trends of social change among rural 
producers. This is done at the cost of leaving out of the picture the historical 
conditions in which social actors assume and recreate their socio-cultural 
values and interests and find ways of reproducing their livelihoods. Hence 
sugarcane producers are not only a diverse group, but, regardless of their 
material conditions, are also very resourceful. The better-off farmers have 
diversified their sources of income by both investing in agricultural machin-
ery that could be used on sugar production and by going into other busi-
nesses, whilst the small and less well-off cane growers have consolidated 
their sources of income by growing staple crops and entering, when they 
need to, outside labour markets. 
In order to understand the interrelations between the different groups 
involved in the organization of sugarcane production in the Autlan-El Grullo 
Valley, I draw on political analyses of the Mexican State that highlight its 
peculiar way of intertwining patron-client relations with the consolidation of 
a ruling party (see Purcell and Purcell, 1980; Gonzalez Casanova, 1985; De 
la Pefia, 1986; and Stevens, 1977). At the level of direct government 
intervention in the organization of production I bring to the fore the 
arguments of Grindle (1986) and Sanderson (1986) who analyze how 
Mexican government representatives negotiate and impinge upon agricultural 
production. The political arena where negotiations over the organization of 
sugarcane production take place can be characterised along the lines of 
Burawoy's (1985) concept of 'production regime'. In deploying this notion, 
Burawoy highlights how the organization of work has political repercussions 
that are linked to a process of production that is constantly reshaped by 
struggles and negotiations with respect to industrial action and state 
intervention. 
The organization of production involves the negotiation of the different 
interests of all the parties involved. The local agricultural producers and their 
representatives have to push the sugar mill administrator to get all the credit 
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they need and the national government to agree to a good protected price for 
the cane. The sugar cane producers aim to obtain as much profit as possible, 
whereas the domestic and industrial consumers of sugar, especially the latter, 
try to reduce the cost of thisbasic input. In this way, the Mexican State has 
had to juggle with the demands from both parties and, at the same time, 
fulfil the career expectations of its employees. Adding to these demands the 
state has made a commitment to implement agro-industrial policies geared to 
providing employment in the rural areas and to supporting the domestic 
production of such a basic input. Although the international price of sugar 
cane has very often been below its production cost in Mexico, the state has 
maintained its support for the domestic production of sugarcane, even now, 
after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) n ). Cane has 
been the only cash crop that has withstood the flood of imported goods that 
NAFTA has swept into the Mexican market. The state's support for sugar 
cane has made it an even safer cash crop. This has attracted more farmers to 
growing cane on their land. Thus sugarcane production in the Autlan-El 
Grullo valley has expanded by 50% 1 2 ) . 
The Mexican state on the one hand has yielded to the pressure for free 
trade and opened its markets, making imported sugar generally available in 
Mexico. On the other hand, it has sustained a guaranteed price for sugarcane 
so as to encourage producers to increase their production. Considering that 
the protection for other cash crops has been lifted, this policy has privileged 
sugarcane producers, and they have certainly seized the opportunity. In the 
1990s, the state has been engaged in privatising most sugar mills but has not 
relinquished the control of the financial institutions involved in sugarcane 
production. However the role of the state has changed and its direct 
intervention has been curtailed. This new political-economic scenario should 
be the subject of further research. 
The discussions in the chapters that follow are based upon case studies 
of different categories of sugarcane producers: ejidatarios, and medium and 
large-scale private producers. I describe how they have developed their 
respective organizations, emphasising their political leanings and the role 
their representatives play in the Committee for Sugarcane Production. In this 
way I explore the participation of different cane growers and other actors in 
this particular production regime. The majority of sugarcane producers in 
Autlan are ejidatarios, though the better-off farmers produce one third of the 
sugarcane crushed in the mill. Thus, ejidatarios, private land owners and the 
leaders of their organizations, together with the refinery employees, 
constitute the key figures in my analysis of the political organization of 
sugarcane production in the Autlan-El Grullo Valley. 
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Methodology 
I have used an actor-oriented approach which combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods in the collection of the data for this study. The initial 
research question was why local farmers and peasants decided to grow 
sugarcane when the production of vegetables seemed more profitable at the 
time. This perspective made it imperative to conduct intensive field research 
among the main actors involved in sugarcane production in the area of study. 
I went straight to meet the sugarcane producers in their fields, households 
and associations; I also followed them to their interfaces with the refinery 
administration. After establishing a rapport with the producers, I gained 
access to the files in both producers' associations. I soon realised that the 
committee meetings were the key arena wherein sugarcane producers 
negotiate and establish the ground rules for sugarcane production. For this 
reason I made these meetings a vital aspect of my field research agenda. 
Fortunately I was granted the right to attend the meetings as an observer, 
which I did every two weeks for a year. 
In order to gather detailed information on the management of sugar 
plots, and on local politics, I lived in an ejido about six months. This was 
made possible thanks to the hospitality of one of my key informants. She not 
only made me feel at home but also spelt out to me the difficulties of 
bringing up a family on her own, when the only asset she possessed was a 
small ejidal plot planted with sugar. Since the income from this crop was 
insufficient to raise her four children, she, like many others, had to 
supplement her income with wages from migrant labour in the USA. 
My data on sugarcane production included the wealthier producers 
whose distinct interests were reflected not only in their comments but also in 
their greater financial investment in the crop. My participant observation and 
long interviews with a snowball sample of sugarcane producers sometimes 
placed me in awkward situations, such as having to listen to the litany of 
complaints that most interviewees would direct towards the refinery 
administrator, and the contempt of the wealthier producers for the 
ejidatarios. I tried to be impartial and avoided taking sides with any party as 
much as possible. And I hope that I have succeeded in presenting a balanced 
account of the processes involved in organizing the sugarcane production in 
the Valley of Autlan-El Grullo. 
To supplement these ethnographic data, I also consulted the relevant 
literature and the official statistics on sugarcane production in Mexico. 
However, the backbone of my study consisted of interviews with the 
producers themselves, which furnished me with detailed accounts of their 
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involvement in sugarcane production, and my extensive notes on meetings, 
conversations and productive and social activities, as I became an accepted 
participant observer. The diverse voices provide detailed information on how 
each individual pursued her/his own interests in the context of regional, 
national and international structures, which not only influenced their 
individual decisions but in a dialectical way were also affected by them. Thus 
by adopting an actor-oriented perspective, the study attempts to flesh out the 
skeleton depicted by macro theories. 
Paraphrasing Sennett (1978: 43), I wish to excuse myself for not 'arriv-
ing at an immutable statement'. However, I hope I am able to reveal signifi-
cant analytical connections through the ethnographic data I recount. The 
earlier description of the strike has introduced some of the protagonists in the 
organization of sugarcane production. Other protagonists, their roles in 
production and the degree of involvement in the negotiations with the sugar 
mill administration, will be identified in the chapters that follow. However, 
before I describe the case studies, I step back from the strike scene and 
present, in Chapter 2, the historical background of agricultural development 
and the opening of the refinery in the valley Autlan-El Grullo. I also provide 
a brief reference to national arenas where policy decisions have been taken 
that have had great repercussions for the sugarcane production in the region. 
NOTES 
1. The cane is burnt in the fields, a few hours before it is cut. Though this is not 
the most environment-conscious practice, the cutters prefer to do it that way 
because the burnt cane is easier to cut. All sugar cane is cut manually in the 
Autlán Valley. 
2. Azúcar, S.A. is the parastatal company that administers all the sugar mills 
owned by the Mexican State. The national director appoints regional directors 
to coordinate the refineries' organization in each of the ten sugar-cane pro-
ducing areas of the country. 
3. It was not unusual to see the police on the premises since every Friday they 
escort the payroll from the bank to the mill. 
4. Before the seventies, sugar cane producers were organized regionally. At the 
end of the decade three regional organizations managed to seize power and 
coordinate organizations beyond regional boundaries. National policies to 
restructure sugar production bolstered the consolidation of producers' 
organizations with national coverage. See Luisa Paré (1988). 
5 . An ejidatario is a peasant who is granted by the Mexican State the individual 
usufruct of a small plot of land but not the unconditional ownership of it. 
6. On October 22nd, 1982, presidents and secretaries of the different sugar cane 
producers' organizations and the general manager of the refinery and 
superintendent of the extension department came together to form the 
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Committee of Sugar Cane Production. Further details are discussed in Chapters 
6 and 7. 
7 . Some private farmers were among the first sugar cane producers in the area 
and a few of them accumulated large debts that they defaulted on. I managed to 
get a quick look at one list of defaulters and the largest debtors by far were the 
private farmers. 
8. Gabriel Lim6n joined the refinery as a student doing his social service, a 
service that most public universities demand from their students before they can 
obtain a degree. 
9. This characterization fits uneasily the changes in political discourse introduced 
since 1988 when president Carlos Salinas de Gortari came to power. 
10. For a detailed analysis of the nature and consequences of this system in parts of 
Jalisco, see Arce, 1993. 
1 1 . The North American Free Trade Agreement includes the participation of 
Canada, United States of America and Mexico and started its operation on 1st 
January 1994. 
12. Information provided by the current president of the CNPP association in an 
interview in El Grullo, December 1994. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE MELCHOR OCAMPO REFINERY COMES TO THE 
AUTLÁN-EL GRULLO VALLEY 
History and Development of the Local Sugar Industry 
This chapter gives a historical summary of the development of agriculture in 
the Autlán-El Grullo Valley and discusses the impact of the opening of the 
Melchor Ocampo refinery on local farmers. In the last section I examine the 
relationship of local agricultural processes to national policies for sugarcane 
production. 
The Autlán-El Grullo Valley is situated 900 metres above sea level, and 
is surrounded by hills and mountains which reach between 1500 and 2700 
metres of altitude. The mountains of Manantlán that border the valley 
constitute the threshold to the southeastern region of Jalisco. The temperature 
remains warm, with a yearly average of 26° centigrade, being lowest (23.5°) 
in January and February, with an occasional night frost. The annual rainfall 
fluctuates between 800-1200 mm. The River Armería runs through the valley 
and is crossed by the rivers Ayuquila and Tuxcacuesco that drain an area of 
72,300 hectares, creating a flow of 652 million cubic metres of water every 
year. 
The main irrigation system (El Operado) in the valley, which was 
inaugurated in December 1960, presently irrigates some 8,700 hectares, of 
which 69% is planted with sugarcane. A doubling of the system is expected 
once the new Trigomil dam comes into operation. A further 2,662 hectares 
are irrigated from 88 deep wells, though the indiscriminate drilling of these 
in the valley is decreasing the ground water level (see van der Zaag, 1992: 
51-56; Proyecto, 1985: 39,43-5). 
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A Brief Historical Description of Agriculture Development and Sugar Production in Autlan-EI Grullo 
The historiographical and archaeological records show that there was a large 
population living in the valley when the Spanish conquerors arrived in the area in the sixteenth century. The Spanish immigrants who followed took 
over the land from the local caciques (bosses) and subjected the rest of the 
population to a system of peonage, which turned the majority of the native 
population into a locally available pool of labour. During the three colonial 
centuries spanning the mid-sixteenth to mid-nineteenth, harsh conditions and 
epidemic diseases depleted the valley of a large section of its population 
(Olivier, 1977: 50). After independence in the nineteenth century, Autlan, 
like other relatively isolated areas of the country, expanded its population 
and developed a regional subsistence agriculture controlled by a few 
powerful landlords. Rapid change came to the valley only in the 1950's. 
Until then access to this region of western Jalisco remained difficult. The 
road from Autlan to the port of Manzanillo was only paved in the beginning 
of the 1950s, when the manganese mine needed it to transport its products, 
then, in 1958, an asphalt road was opened from Guadalajara to Autlan. 
The economy of the region changed considerably from the 1950s 
onwards. The new road to Guadalajara allowed local producers to market 
their agricultural products in major urban centres, which also increased job 
opportunities for the valley's inhabitants. But, from 1950 to 1964, the main 
source of waged income was the manganese mine on the outskirts of Autlan, 
which created an economic bonanza in the region until its closure in 1964. 
Its sudden closure left a large number of workers needing to find new 
sources of income in the area or to search for work outside the region. The 
rate of population growth in the Valley of Autlan (including the municipal 
districts of Autlan, El Grullo and El Limdn) increased by 3.7% between 
1950-1960 when the mine was in production, decreased during the sixties by 
1.5%, after its closure, and picked up again by 2.8% during the 1970s when 
commercial agriculture expanded. These demographic swings were linked to 
changes in the regional economy. The demographic expansion in 1950s, 
when the manganese mines were in full production and when the paving of 
the roads took place, was followed by contraction in 1960s, when the closure 
of the mine depressed the local economy for some years. In the 1970s, after 
a decade of high emigration, the rate of population growth increased again 
by 0.9%, following the impact on the local economy of the building of the 
El Operado irrigation system which was followed by an expansion of 
vegetable production and the opening of the state-owned Melchor Ocampo 
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refinery.1* The latter became an important direct source of income for 
sugarcane producers, factory workers and employees, and an indirect one for 
merchants and providers of other services. 
Agriculture in the Autlan-El Grullo Valley 
The development of modern agriculture in Autlan was enhanced by the 
construction of the El Operado irrigation system which began work in 1961. 
According to official data, 50% of the agricultural land available in the 
valley of Autlan benefits from irrigation and 80% of it is mechanised. 
Ejidatarios control 75% of the arable land, the size of their plots being, on 
average 6 hectares. In contrast to the small size of ejidatarios' plots, the 
other 25% of the arable land is in the hands of private landowners who 
control an average of 16 hectares each. In addition, there is a handful of 
large-scale landowners who own several hundred hectares of arable land 
each. Although prohibited by the agrarian law, which specifies that there 
should be no landholding larger than 20 irrigated hectares, there are it seems 
always ways of circumventing such law. Private landowners have irrigated 
plots of 11 hectares on average, and ejidatarios 3 hectares. The degree of 
mechanisation is also skewed: only 3% of private landowners are not 
mechanised; but for ejidatarios this is 25 percent. Thus private farmers not 
only own much larger plots than ejidatarios, but they also are more 
mechanised. 
The modernisation of agriculture has shifted production away from 
staples to cash crops i.e. sugarcane, vegetables and fruit. Whereas staples 
covered all the arable land in 1950, by the 1980s this had been reduced to 
only 60%. Sugarcane and vegetables followed the opposite trend, 
continuously increasing their land area, sugarcane from 4.7% in 1970 to 
21.4% of the arable area in 1984, and vegetables to around 13% and then 
remaining stable. However, vegetable production accounted for 42.6% of 
agricultural production and 11.5% of the volume in 1984; sugarcane 
contributed 20.2% of the value and 77.2% of the volume during the same 
year. Thus, although sugarcane has the highest volume per crop, its 
economic value is only half that of vegetables. Staples account for 33.7% of 
the value and 9.3% of the volume, covering 59.9% of the arable land in the 
region. Only 30% of the staples are grown on irrigated land, in contrast to 
almost all the sugarcane, and certainly all the vegetables. Thus, commercial 
crops have taken over the irrigated plots and have attracted public and 
private capital. Sugarcane, in particular, has become an important crop in 
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Jalisco. The ten refineries in the state produce 10% of Mexico's total 
production and cover 50,000 hectares in Jalisco, 80% of which are irrigated, 
5,000 of them in the Autlân area (Reyes, 1983). 
Livestock production, with the exception of pigs, has steadily declined 
in the last ten years. Plots that were used for grazing catde and growing 
grain declined by 30% between 1970-1984 in favour of sugarcane. This steep 
drop in staples and fodder crops coincides with a reduction of government 
credit for these activities. BANRURAL (the rural bank) decreased its credit 
for staples by 39%, with the number of creditors dropping by 20% 
(Proyecto, 1985: 165). The expansion of cane growing contrasts sharply with 
the downward trend for staples. Cane production increased from 1,134.55 
hectares of harvested cane in 1971/72 to 5,172.30 in 1986/87, with most of 
these hectares received some credit. However, the level of borrowing among 
sugarcane producers varies greatly and the assumption of a uniformly strong 
economic dependence on refinery credit should not be taken for granted, nor 
should we assume that 'the mode of producer dependence (among sugarcane 
producers) differs little at the local level from that of the old refinery of the 
Caribbean or Mexico or Brazil' (Sanderson, 1986: 59). The opposite is true 
in fact of the cane producers in Autlân, as we will explain in the following 
chapters. 
The Melchor Ocampo Refinery: Its Promoters 
Sugarcane production in the valley started in 1968 with 27 producers. They 
were, in one way or another, linked to the local branch of the ruling political 
party, the PRI. Under its umbrella, the first association of cane producers 
was founded and Luis Rosales, a local farmer, was elected as its president. 
He retained control of the association for the next eight years. One of the 
pioneers of sugarcane production in the valley was Mariano Encino, a local 
merchant and local political activist, who at that time was the PRI 
representative for Autlán. In an interview, he repeated several times that he 
and Luis were told by the national leader of refinery workers, Don Chuy 
González, to dispatch telegrams to the President of Mexico, Gustavo Diaz 
Ordaz, requesting that a sugar mill be installed in the region. Two important 
politicians of the State of Jalisco held ministerial positions in Diaz Ordaz's 
cabinet: Juan Gil Preciado who was Minister of Agriculture, and General 
Santiago López Arreóla, a local political patron, who was Minister of 
Defence. They were both interested in sponsoring the petition to install a 
refinery that would bring work to the area from which they came. Chuy 
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Gonzalez knew that the government had bought French machinery for a 
refinery to be installed in Nueva Ibérica, Michoacán (Caso González, 1988). 
Don Chuy insisted that the peasants and landowning farmers of Autlán 
should ask the government to change the location of the refinery to the 
Valley of Autlán and assured them his support. 
As the national leader of refinery workers, Don Chuy had a special 
interest in opening a new sugar mill in this area. The old sugar mill of 
Usmajac, near Autlán, had been closed in the 1950's and most of its workers 
had found employment in a sugar mill at Martinez de la Torre, in Veracruz 
on the Gulf of México, a great distance from their home area. This mill later 
also closed and Don Chuy promised the workers that he would do everything 
in his power to get them back to Jalisco. Thus a new sugar mill in Jalisco 
became a priority for this powerful national leader of sugarcane workers. 
Mariano Encino thinks that Don Chuy was the first to think of asking for the 
mill to be installed in the Autlán valley. But General López Arreóla, who 
had very close personal ties with the region, also enthusiastically supported 
and used his influence to promote the project, knowing that the local people 
would receive benefit from it. 
In 1968, they were notified that it had been decided that the refinery 
was to be installed in Autlán and the company in charge of carrying the 
feasibility study for the project arrived in the same year. A representative 
from the National Union of Sugar Industry workers (affiliated to CTM) was 
charged with recruiting for people to work on the construction of the 
refinery. However, since he was not acquainted with the region, he looked 
for someone local ti help him fill the vacancies that had not been assigned to 
the workers from Martinez de la Torre. Later the person placed in charge of 
hiring people was accused of being unfair and of accepting bribes or 
charging for jobs. Once Don Chuy found out about this he fired him. As a 
consequence of his political connections, Mariano Encino was then hired, 
and became one of the first local people to be hired by the refinery as labour 
recruiter and contractor. Encino was instructed not to accept bribes and in 
this he claims he did not let Don Chuy down, although this did not prevent 
him from giving preference to his family and friends. His brother-in-law, for 
example, got work through him and worked as a driver until his retirement 
in 1986. 
When most of the workers needed were installed in their new jobs, 
Encino was relieved of his responsibilities as middleman and his commission 
of fifty pesos came to an end. However, a job was made available for him in 
charge of the tool room, which he accepted. It carried only a small salary 
but offered him the opportunity to remain in contact with and get involved in 
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other groups. He became a local promoter for the refinery, not only hiring 
workers, but, together with other members of the PRI, enticing ejidatarios 
and landowners to plant sugarcane. The origin of his participation in 
sugarcane production then sprung from his political participation in the local 
branch of the PRI and in municipal government. Mariano Encino recalled his 
struggles hiring people to work in the building of the refinery: 
T called many people to come and work, but lots of them did not 
come because it was hard work to excavate and build the mill. 
However, when the mill was installed and it started to crush cane, 
the work became much easier. It was a matter of pushing buttons. 
Then many people complained that I had not asked them to work at 
the refinery. Some even said that I only asked my friends to come 
and work at the mill. But that was not true. Those who complained 
did so because they did not want to do the heavy work, and were 
therefore not hired in at beginning'. 
Mariano's accounts of the first years of sugarcane production illustrate 
vividly the complex negotiations that took place among the different parties 
involved in setting up the new sugar mill. Encino was involved in these 
dealings from the very beginning. As he explained: 
'The first instigator of the project was Don Chuy Gonzalez who 
ordered us to bombard the President and Ministers with telegrams 
asking that a new refinery intended for the Michoacan area (which 
government deemed a highly suitable sugar zone) be re-located in 
the Valley of Autlan, because we desperately needed a new source 
of work in the area. When we heard that the refinery was coming 
to Autlan, twenty-seven producers formed an association of 
producers. The company that built the mill bought 30 hectares of 
land. In the beginning, people did not like the refinery. We, the 
members of the Committee of the PRI, went around asking in the 
ejidos for support in bombarding the President with telegrams 
asking for a new source of employment in the valley. Originally, 
the mill was to be installed in El Grullo, but the mayor of the town 
refused to help find a convenient place for it. They did not want a 
refinery in the area. They said that they had enough with their 
crops of rice and peppers. Also the brothers who owned the land 
where the mill was finally installed did not want to sell it. The 
Governor of Jalisco invited them to talk to him and the matter was 
36 Chapter 2 
settled by his authorizing an exchange of properties in the area so it 
could be built. Mario Reyes Drake (a wealthy landowner from El 
Grullo) sold the land that made the exchange possible. General 
Ldpez Arreola donated land close to the river up to the hill close to 
the canal, including the land where the offices stand '. 
Pioneers of Sugarcane Production 
Among the pioneering sugarcane producers in Autlan was Humberto 
Riesling, who like Mariano Encino, was involved in the creation of the first 
producers organization of the valley, called the Committee of Voluntary 
Sugar Cane Producers. Inherent in the name was the idea that producers 
were free to plant cane, with the expectation that growing cane would 
increase and become the main source of local income. However, this was not 
the case until several years later, due to the factors that lay outside the 
regional arena (see below). 
The first sugarcane producers were members of the PRI. Riesling 
confirmed Encino's description of the origins of the first sugarcane 
organization: "Sinforiano Limdn, Luis Rosales, Mariano Encino were the 
ones who organized the first cane growers. All of them were active members 
of the party". Committed PRI members and those farmers who could be 
cajoled into sugarcane production, first planted in 1968, at the same time as 
the foundations to the mill were begun. The first cane harvest in the valley 
was used to expand the crop in the area and the second was large enough to 
run the refinery for five weeks2). 
Riesling, like Encino, thinks that the sugar mill was brought to the 
valley because Ldpez Arreola and Chuy Gonzalez lobbied for it and 
convinced the President, Diaz Ordaz, of its need in the area. He mentioned 
how Paulo Ldpez Arreola, the General's brother, looked around the valley 
for a place to build the mill. People from El Grullo were against having the 
mill and boycotted its construction, but it was finally installed closer to El 
Grullo's urban centre than Autlan's, though within the municipal jurisdiction 
of the latter. 
Riesling knew the local PRI and CNC leaders because he participated in 
both party politics and the cane growers' organization. He even became vice-
president of the latter in one of the first committees of the organisation and 
learned a lot about the regional and national struggles of the leaders of the 
cane growers. 
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The Participation of ejidatarios in Sugarcane Production 
Most producers interviewed mentioned that the majority of the first cane 
growers were ejidatarios. Some had been persuaded to plant sugarcane, 
others were actively involved in the attempts to convince the government that 
Autlan needed the refinery. This does not fit the usual assumption in 
previous accounts of the sugar industry that ejidatarios simply resigned 
themselves to accepting government policy. The picture is that of groups of 
ejidatarios from different communities, along with the more prosperous 
farmers of the area pushing for cane production in the Autlan-El Grullo 
Valley. In order to shed light on this process I present a series of accounts 
by ejidatarios from Escondido who were among the first sugarcane producers 
in the valley. This material helps establish the reasons why the less well off 
ejidatarios not only planted cane, but also promoted its production. 
Jacinto Rosas, one of the ejidatarios from Escondido, who was very 
active in local politics when the mill was being built, recalled how cane 
producers from Casimiro Castillo (a region with a refinery near the valley of 
Autlan) came to explain to them how to grow cane. Jacinto Rosas was the 
Comisariado Ejidal (elected head of the ejido), a position which allowed him 
to offer ejidal land in La Tuna for the refinery, but instead another plot in La 
Calera was finally chosen, which was nearer to the main road. Jacinto 
remembered some of the difficulties of Escondido ejidatarios: 
'We were among the first sugarcane producers. They (refinery's 
employees) unloaded some cane on Don Trini's plot and then let 
three weeks pass before they told him how to plant it. Half of the 
canes had been eaten by the cattle by the time they finally planted 
it. Although I promoted sugarcane, I did not plant it until 1976 
because I had cattle and it was more profitable to grow maize and 
beans. When the costs came down and the prices increased, it 
became good business to plant cane. I only planted it when it was 
proved profitable. Thus I have always obtained good profits from 
growing cane'. 
Jacinto Rosas went on to tell how, when the IMO was being built, many 
commissions came from Mexico City and Guadalajara to check the progress. 
These commissions had to be entertained at dinner parties with mariachi (a 
traditional band with brass and strings). The costs were charged to the first 
growers. People from the town of Autlan participated very actively in the 
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negotiations to bring the refinery to the valley. He described those early days 
as a process of trial and error involving all parties in cane production: 
'There were a lot of inexperienced technicians and workers among 
the first workers at the mill. Some of them knew nothing about 
anything. I saw how much the mill charged the growers. I decided 
I was better off cultivating maize, and on a smaller scale, beans, 
courgettes, chile and tomatoes'. 
Like Jacinto Rosas, Don Trinidad Carretfn, one of the founding 
members of Ejido of Escondido, also participated in the promotion of 
sugarcane. But unlike Jacinto, Don Trini planted cane immediately. In 1968, 
when the canals were being drained to construct the laterals for the irrigation 
system, and there were rumours that the government was going to open a 
refinery in the valley, he and his son Dario, Humberto Riesling, Saul Lopez 
Arreola (the General's brother), and Luis Rosales ('El Feo', 'the ugly one') 
carried out the General's wishes. They requested the local branch of the 
Ministry of Agriculture to drain the main canal and construct the laterals. 
Don Trini remembered how when the mill was built he, his son, Dario, and 
Ladislao Escobar planted 10 hectares of cane for seed. Everyone thought 
they had gone mad. He insisted -contrary to what is said- that he made a 
profit from his first harvest. 
Trinidad Carreon has been growing cane for 20 years. He is adamant 
that it is the best and safest cash crop than can be sown in the valley. Adan 
Romo, another pioneer grower from Escondido, also considers sugar the 
most profitable crop available to them. He started growing sugarcane at the 
beginning of the 1970's and has continued to do so since. Adan Romo says 
that Escondido and Las Paredes were the two first ejidos where cane was 
planted in 1969. At that time there was plenty of cheap land to rent. Adan 
used to rent up to 40 hectares for growing cane. He also remembered that 
the ejidal committee of Escondido offered land for the factory but preference 
was given to a place nearer the road. The members of the committee knew 
that the construction of a refinery in the valley would open new economic 
possibilities and they were very cooperative with the personnel involved in 
its construction. But not everybody in Autlan was as keen as Adan to grow 
sugarcane. He recalled: 
'First they planted the seed plots while the sugar mill was being 
built. Then the inspectors from the extension department went 
round to each ejido and village asking people to grow cane. In El 
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Grullo the inspectors were almost thrown out but now it is an ejido 
with a lot of cane. Today the food is ready and on the table and 
everybody wants to grow sugarcane. But I have been told that there 
is going to be no further extension of cane planting. The mill is 
working at its limit and suffers lots of mechanical failures. I planted 
my ejidal plot with sugarcane and immediately afterwards rented 
some additional hectares. The rent was very low and from the 
beginning I made some profit because I worked extremely hard. I 
was not ashamed to work, knowing that it was going to bring me 
money. I planted it myself and supervised every job we needed to 
do.' 
Ejidatarios from Escondido shared common experiences regarding their 
decision to plant sugar, though they emphasised different reasons for 
growing it. For example, in 1972, Ramon Gordillo decided to plant cane on 
four irrigated hectares in his ejidal plot for the fringe benefits growing can 
bring, such as the chance to receive medical insurance for the whole family. 
He recalled: 
T had a big family and in order to be entitled to medical services I 
planted sugarcane. In the beginning it was a very bad business. 
With all the roads that had to be opened up, there were lots of 
expenses that were spread equally among all the cane growers'. 
Ramón was the ejido comisariado of Escondido when the late General 
Lopez Arreóla brought the IMO to Autlán. He was given a job in the 
organisation of sugarcane producers supervising the cutting. Like Mariano 
and Riesling, Ramón was directly involved in introducing cane to Autlán. 
But not all early sugarcane producers were so directly involved in the 
organisation. Most ejidatarios and farmers, who decided to grow sugarcane, 
did it in a more detached way, without participating in the producers' 
organization. For example Don Lalo planted his three hectares plot with 
sugarcane but complained that he could not keep animals because it is very 
difficult to feed them without owning a field for grazing. He recalls: 
'Sugarcane used not to be good business; though I never did badly, 
I always received some profit, even if it was close to nothing. I 
myself used to do all the jobs that I reported to the mill, and so the 
money the mill advanced us for wages to hire people was all for 
me. I worked in the sugar mill in Bellavista between 1927 and 
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1929. I learnt something about sugarcane, though they did things 
differently there. The extension workers in the refinery ordered us 
to do jobs they did not know how to do themselves. Once one 
extension worker saw me applying some herbicide to my canes and 
he told me off because I was going to burn them the way I was 
doing it. Yet, later the extension worker himself tried my way with 
success on some other plots he was administering. Since then he 
has come to consult me. I have learnt by trial and error. This black 
land, that they say is good to plant sugarcane, is very hard to 
work.' 
Tacho, another forbearing sugarcane producer in Escondido, who was 
not involved with the mill or growers' organization, emphasized with pride 
that he was one of the first sugarcane producers in the valley. He recalled his 
friendship with Luis Rosales (El Fed), and who became the first leader of the 
organization of producers, who helped him to improve the poor drainage on 
bits of his land due to bad levelling. His friend, El Feo, was president of the 
organization, and sent machinery to drain and level his land properly. He 
first planted three hectares and the next season another three. As he moved 
into cane growing he began to reduce the size of his herd: 
T began getting rid of cattle as the grass and fodder became 
scarcer. Sugarcane finished off the grass around here 12 years ago'. 
He remembered the first years of cane growing as being very difficult: 
'The first year as cane growers we did very badly because we had 
to pay for roads to have access to our plots and at the end of the 
harvest we had no money and could not pay our rates. The 
situation started to improve when José Zarate organized la tripartita 
(the local factional group within the PRI which defended the rights 
of sugar cane producers). Gordillo Luna was the leader of sugar 
cane producers in Mexico. He helped us obtain some soft loans 
from FIMAIA [a public financial institution for sugar cane 
production]. When Maximino Castillo became our leader things 
improved even more. All the ejidatarios in Escondido that have 
planted cane have benefitted from it'. 
Ernesto, too, endured hard times when he first started to grow 
sugarcane. But he mentioned that inspite of its problems, the refinery helped 
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them to improve the conditions of their plots and obtain the meagre credit to 
plant cane. What was left after paying the loan back kept them going: 
'At the beginning, we all learnt together how to plant and grow 
cane. Not even the engineers in the mill knew how to do it. They 
recommended making winding furrows in black heavy soil, which 
was disastrous. They paid us 57 pesos per tonne but we had to wait 
until August to get our money;3) they didn't give us an advanced 
payment. It was not until Echeverría became President (1970-76) 
that our situation improved. Like the engineers in the refinery, we 
did not know how to do it properly; we used the fertilizer for the 
cane on other crops and did not look after our cane. I received 900 
pesos for the first harvest. I did not consider that to be very much 
and so I switched to sorghum, which turned out to be as bad as the 
cane, so I returned to plant cane again.' 
Jacinto Rojo was also among the first sugarcane producers in 
Escondido. He confirmed the conditions prevailing when the mill first 
opened: 
'Our lands were of poor quality and uneven; we did not obtain very 
much from them. The credit to improve our plots providing we 
planted sugarcane influenced our decision. Cane paid very badly 
and the costs were very high because we had to pay for the new 
bridge and roads to our plots as well as for the maintenance of the 
main road.4 )' 
Jacinto Rojo, like most of the sugar pioneers, was an ejidatario who had 
a small plot and restricted access to credit, mainly obtained from public 
institutions. Thus the economic opportunities and other benefits offered by 
the mill access to credit and regular cash to pay for the expenses and salaries 
of planting and cutting the cane, enrolment of producers and their families in 
the national health insurance scheme, and the opportunity to have the 'co-op 
machinery' level and drain their plots, tempted him and other ejidatarios to 
plant sugar. These economic opportunities were not equally accessible to the 
producers of staple crops; and the tendency of public financial institutions to 
cut credit for staple crops became more acute in the 1980's. In fact the area 
financed by the rural bank in Autlán decreased by 39% between 1980 and 
1984 (Programa de Deasarrollo Rural Integral del Estado de Jalisco: 165). 
The scarcity of agricultural credit hit ejidatarios harder than private 
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landowners, since the latter not only had access to other financial resources 
but also owned the necessary agricultural machinery. Therefore ejidatarios 
had fewer productive options than many private landowners, and under these 
conditions their decision to run the risk and plant sugarcane represented one 
of their best alternatives, especially as they could continue growing staple 
crops on part of their land. The extra advantage found after the first harvest 
was that cane needed less labour days than other crops, which left time for 
other activities, even temporary migration. The pattern of economic diversity 
within growers' households that resulted is discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
The decision to switch from staple crops to sugarcane growing was also 
influenced by existing political and social relationships and networks. As 
many growers mentioned, the involvement of local political groups affiliated 
to the PRI was essential to organizing cane production in Autlan. Thus local 
leaders at the ejido and municipal level played a role in the opening of the 
mill and in enticing peasants and private landowners to take the risk and 
plant sugar cane. Before I elaborate on how local political participation was 
perceived by these sugarcane pioneers, we need to review the broader 
national political and economic arenas wherein general policy over sugarcane 
production was fought out. 
Sugarcane Production in Mexico 1960-1988 
The origins of sugarcane production in the valley of Autlan go back to 
colonial times when the Spanish conquerors settled in the valley in the first 
half of the sixteenth century. The traditional sugar mills, trapiches, were 
small and mainly produced jaggery (a type of unrefined brown sugar) for the 
local market. In El Grullo alone there were seven of them (van der Zaag, 
1992). These primitive mills continued production until the mid-1950s but 
could not compete with the modern refineries, which were able to find a 
wider market due to the opening of new roads throughout the country. The 
last of the small mills closed down at the end of the 1950's. The Mexican 
Sugar industry expanded greatly through the 1960's, but it only reached 
Autlan at the end of the 1960's when the Melchor Ocampo refinery opened. 
The Melchor Ocampo Refinery comes to the Autlán-el Grullo Vally 43 
Sugar Boom 
The increase in sugarcane production in the 1960's was sponsored by 
generous public loans to obsolete sugar mills. According to an official 
appraisal in 1968, 48 of the 64 refineries in operation were declared obsolete 
(Gallaga, 1984: 68). The aim of the government was to take over part of the 
import quota that the USA had withdrawn from Cuba after the revolution of 
1959 (Lopéz Arce, 1979: 16). The policy was intended to capture foreign 
currency by exporting sugar. From the 1950s, Mexico had exported one fifth 
of the sugar produced; the rest was sold internally at a price kept artificially 
low, the lowest local price in the world and which remained the same from 
1958 to 1969 (Paré, 1987: 25). The sudden expansion of public loans 
available for sugar production was immediately seized upon by mill owners 
with large debts, who had no qualms about diverting these funds to more 
lucrative uses. However, production did temporarily increase to the point of 
contributing 14.45% of Mexican agricultural exports in 1961. The amount 
varied in the following years, but sugar exports remained the main export 
until the mid-1970's (ibid: 17). The increase of exports to the USA market 
reached its highest level in 1969, when Mexico sent 604,920 tonnes of sugar 
to the USA (Gallaga, 1984: 54). Although the total amount exported to USA 
began to diminish during the 1970', it nevertheless still accounted for 10% 
of the total exports from Mexico to USA in 1971 (ibid: 57). 
The export expansion to the USA in the 1960's and 1970's provided the 
industry with a temporary relief from its chronic ailments, which were still 
hampered by the uneconomic local pricing. The price of sugar in the USA 
market increased steadily between 1965-1974, being higher than the price 
fetched by sugar in the international market for the same period (Lopez 
Arce, 1979: 18). Hence the Mexican government was eager to seize the 
possibility of increasing sugar exports to its USA neighbours. In order to 
achieve this, it had to make available substantial financial resources as an 
inducement to refinery owners, who, feeling insecure about government 
policies, had left their factories to age and become obsolete. Such financial 
support provided by the state succeeded in increasing sugarcane production 
up until the late 1960s, after which it declined as a consequence of the 
closure of three refineries and the subsequent loss of 40,000 hectares of 
sugarcane in 1968 (Gallaga, 1984: 65). That was the year when several 
feasibility studies for new sugar mills in suitable regions of Mexico were 
made, including the refinery of Melchor Ocampo at Autlán. 
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Sugar Slump 
The government realized that it had to do something about the precarious 
conditions of the national sugar industry, which still faced bankruptcy inspite 
spite of huge government subsidies and export earnings. The reasons for this 
state of affairs have their origins in the tight control of the price of sugar and 
sugarcane by government from the early 1950's. The refinery owners had no 
choice but to accept this artificially devised pricing system. However, they 
tried to make a profit by other means, which included squeezing the income 
of their refinery workers and cane growers, and grabbing whatever financial 
support came from government. They seemed to be been able to accomplish 
both successfully, though not without drawbacks. Both the refinery workers 
and the sugarcane producers dragged their feet and on several occasions, 
protested more openly -that is, as far as they could within the legal 
restrictions of the 1943 decree that stipulated that all the land within the 
supply area of a refinery should be planted with specified area of sugarcane. 
Some growers, especially in the traditional cane producing regions, voiced 
their grievances loudly. 
Between 1977-1983 the sugarcane producers organised 34.7% of all 
peasant protests in Mexico, which Rubio (1987: 116) explains in terms of the 
degree of proletarianization that pervaded the conditions of production among 
sugarcane producers. This leads her to consider them not as agricultural 
producers or peasants but as 'waged producers', which, she argues, explains 
why they have become more active politically than the producers of other, 
less industrialized crops, such as staples. Whilst agreeing with the description 
of the organization of sugarcane production that underlines Rubio's analysis, 
it is difficult to regard the complex organization of sugar production as 
necessarily imposing an all-pervasive process of proletarianization upon its 
producers. The cane growers of Autlan have, particularly in more recent 
years, been able to negotiate a niche in the organization of production, in 
which they are able to mobilize their own networks and effectively look after 
their own interests. Sugar producers do not possess total autonomy yet they 
are not simply fettered to the ubiquitous power of the refinery. 
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Sugarcane Producers' Association 
The National Arena 
During the 1960's, cane growers were coerced into continuing to grow 
sugarcane, in spite of the low or negative returns. To eke out their income, some small-scale producers did all the work on their plots, which allowed 
them to keep the minute credit for wages paid by the refinery. Striving 
against disadvantageous relations of production, many cane producers 
dragged their feet and worked sparingly on their plots which hastened their 
declining productivity which in 1967-1968 fell below five tonnes per hectare 
in 1968-1969 (Gallaga, 1984: 113). Most of these producers were 
ejidatarios, 84% of the total number registered for the 1967-1968 harvest 
(ibid: 107). Also as we mentioned above, some cane growers protested 
constantly against state policies. These social protests accounted for a third of 
the social movements in the countryside in Mexico between 1977-1983 
(1987: 115). 
Some economic grievances could be channelled through the local 
producers' associations affiliated to the peasant sector of the PRI. Other local 
associations joined forces with other interest groups, both within and outside 
the PRI. For example, growers in Veracruz joined together to create regional 
associations and alliances. By the end of the 1960's, there were three major 
national associations representing the majority of sugar cane producers. The 
two largest and most powerful of these associations were affiliated to CNC 
and these were the ones that prevailed and finally negotiated the unification 
of all the associations of sugarcane producers in Mexico during the early 
1970's. 
These consolidated associations faced new contenders in their pursuit for 
better conditions of production. In the 1970's, producers had to confront the 
nationalised refineries and functionaries of CNIA (Comisión Nacional de la 
Industria Azucarera), the parastatal institution in charge of planning and 
financial sponsorship of the sugar industry, instead of the refinery owners. 
These confrontations were a front page item during the 1970's, showing the 
shift from the original arena of negotiations between refinery owners and 
producers to the arena of state institutions and the producers' organizations. 
During this period the Mexican state stepped in and nationalised most of the 
private sugar refineries; by 1987, 50 of the 66 refineries had been 
nationalised (Estadísticas Azucareras, 1981), the majority of which were 
either bankrupt or on the brink of it when the state took them over. 
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After nationalisation, only 14 of the most efficient and economically 
viable refineries remained in private hands. The vigorous attempts of the 
Mexican State to rescue the wrecked sugar industry resulted in the opening 
of refineries in new regions in an effort to consolidate a refurbished industry. 
In this way the Ingenio Melchor Ocampo, was able to start afresh. This 
allowed the refinery to adopt a different set up for the organization of sugar 
production in Audita and develop a new pattern of social relations among the 
different participants. 
The sugar cane producers in Autlán did not participate directly in the 
negotiations between CNIA and national producers' associations. During 
those years the farmers in Autlán, who hastened to plant sugarcane, could 
use this new situation to extract better conditions from the refinery 
administration. Thus some of the improved conditions of production 
advocated by the national associations of producers were implemented more 
swiftly in Autlán than in other cane growing areas. These complex and 
diverse conditions of sugar production in other regions of Mexico, is 
described in the works of Ronfeldt (1975), Paré et. al (1987), and Glantz 
(1979). 
During the first half of the 1970's, the leaders of the regional 
organizations of sugarcane producers strived to expand and consolidate their 
influence. In 1977, the three main national associations affiliated to the CNC 
decided to join forces and merge into one organization, with the exception of 
private landowners who in 1973 formed their own association, the UNPPC 
(Unión Nacional de Pequeños Propietarios Cañeros), (Paré, 1987: 202). In 
Autlán, before the beginning of the 1980's, there was only one association of 
sugar producers, though different political factions vied for its control. 
National and Local Negotiations 
Although the producers in the valley kept a low profile in the struggles at 
national arena level, they were well aware of the competing groups and 
conflicts among the leaders. Riesling recalled how Soto Leyva, the national 
leader of one of the three main associations, supported the local management 
of the organization and how he faced a challenge to his leadership from 
Roque Spinoso Foglia, of the national organization that was striving to merge 
with other regionally based cane producers' associations. Soto Leyva and 
Roque Spinoso decided to sign a truce and agreed to leave a third party as 
head of the unified CNC-affiliated association of sugarcane producers. 
However, Roque Spinoso had an advantage over Soto Leyva, since he was 
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supported by the producers from the sugar mills on the Gulf of Mexico, the 
largest single cane producing region. Although the confrontation took place 
at national level, there were other local contests for the leadership of the 
sugarcane producers, i.e. a coalition of cane producers in the valley gathered 
around the figure of the local strong man, José Zarate. Zarate became a 
powerful regional figure through the various planning and development 
projects that he had sponsored as head of the Commission of the South. This 
commission funnelled public funds to specific projects selected by them. 
Riesling mentioned that the coalition that gathered together some of the cane 
producers in the valley was coached by Zarate, who was trying to expand his 
political dominion. However, Roque Spinoso had more experience, and 
Riesling considered he 'knew everything about anything related to sugarcane 
production and its organization'. These political re-organizations took place 
at the end of Echeverria's six-year presidential period. Zarate lost most of 
his influence and federal government support when the new government took 
over. 
Meanwhile, at the national level, Soto Leyva's control over the national 
association was taken over by Roque Spinoso. At the local level, an 
ejidatario from Escondido was elected as the secretary of the Union of 
Sugarcane Producers of Melchor Ocampo affiliated to the CNC -Ramón 
Gordillo. These changes caused Riesling to distance himself from the 
association and concentrate his efforts on his own private business and to 
refuse to become a member of the new committee. According to Riesling, 
Ramón Gordillo was not capable of being president of the cane producers' 
organization. He simply lacked the brains'. 
Political Re-organization of Sugarcane Production 
At the end of the 1970's, the government was faced again with acute 
economic problems in sugar production at national level, which once more 
was at the edge of bankruptcy. But this time, the government could not 
threaten to take over the administration of the industry from incompetent 
managers, because most of the refineries (56 of the 66 in production) had 
already been nationalised or had always been under state control (Paré, 1987: 
196). 
The other vital factor in the negotiations over the organization of 
production was the unification of the various regional associations into one 
strong national organization affiliated to CNC, which accounted for two 
thirds of all the sugarcane producers in the country. Though most studies 
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emphasize that union leaders, like the heads of official peasant unions, are 
subject to government pressure, in fact the leaders of the sugarcane 
producers carved out a niche of power and successfully confronted the 
parastatal administration of the refineries. This is graphically depicted in 
Glantz's book on a sugarcane leader in a north-western region of Mexico. 
Another example was Roque Spinoso Foglia, the leader of the unified 
national association of producers, who managed to gather enough support 
from producers to demand from the government a re-shuffle, giving them a 
significant say in the organization of production. 
In December 1979, the CNIA negotiated with the sugar producers' 
conditions that until now have regulated the organization of production. One 
of the new agreements made concerned the amount to be paid for sugarcane. 
Whereas under the 1975 decree, the level of saccharose in the cane was 
calculated before it was processed, in the 1979 decree the saccharose was 
calculated after being crushed, on the basis of 83 kgs. per tonne. Although 
this agreement was contested by some producers, they were a minority and it 
continues to remain valid (Paré, 1987: 234). The legal obligation that tied all 
land holders surrounding a sugar mill to planting sugarcane had earlier been 
rebuked and it did not find its way back into the new decree. The other 
agreements were related to the organisation of the different institutions 
involved in sugar production, such as the financial institution FINASA 
(Financiera Nacional Azucarera), the legal owner of the refineries, ONISA 
(Operadora Nacional de Ingenios), FIMAIA (Fideicomiso para la Inversion 
de Maquinaria en la Industria Azucarera), which ensured investment for 
producers wishing to acquire agricultural machinery and lorries, IOSCER 
(Fideicomiso de Obras Sociales para Cañeros de Escasos Recursos), the fund 
for social welfare among the poor sugar cane producers and cutters, CNIA 
(Comisión de la Industria Azucarera), the institution in charge of 
coordinating all the others, including those that used to be controlled by the 
refinery owners, such as UNPASA (Union Nacional de Productores de 
Azúcar, Sociedad Anónima), which took charge of marketing and 
distribution. 
The 1979 decree specified that a Committee of Production should 
replace the Tripartite Commission made up of representatives of the 
producers, the mill and the state. The latter commission had played a crucial 
role in the 1970's, when refineries were in economic difficulties and had 
hardened their policies towards the producers. Under this arrangement state 
representative had then to negotiate between the two parties and try to 
resolve their differences. However, in refineries like Melchor Ocampo, 
which had always been state-owned, the Tripartite Commission played a low-
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key role. In this case, Engineer Limon, head of the extension department, 
was charge with organizing the Tripartite Commission, together with the 
refinery's chief administrator. After the 1979 decree, the Tripartite 
Commission was superseded by the Committee of Production that had a 
different composition, reflecting the outcome of the intense negotiations 
between CNIA, the state commission for the national coordination of sugar 
production, and the national leaders of producers. The decree required that 
the Committee of Production should be made out of one representative of 
each party and a deputy - the president and secretary of each local 
organisation of producers - and the manager and the head of the extension 
department to represent the refinery. In this coordinating body the producers' 
delegates usually outnumber the refinery agents, since there are two 
associations of producers in most places, one representing the ejidatarios and 
the other the landowners. 
The new regime of sugarcane production laid down better conditions for 
producers. The two most important were: the linking of the price of 
sugarcane to the inflation rate and the introduction of a more balanced 
constitution for defining the rights and obligations of the Committee of 
Production. Although, ordinary producers in the valley of Autlán did not 
participate directly in the negotiations, they were aware what the issues were. 
The cane growers were well informed and did not need to confront an old-
style plantation administration in order to implement the new order, as was 
the case in most of the traditional sugar cane producing regions. Hence 
producers in Autlán started under different conditions of production and at a 
time when the state was encouraging the expansion of irrigated cane for 
export. In 1969, the sugarcane produced in rainfed plots accounted for 58% 
of total production (Estadísticas Azucareras, 1970). These particular 
conditions provided the new producers in Autlán with more room for 
manoeuvre than those in the long-established cane producing areas, who had 
to fight to change the unprofitable conditions of production characteristic of 
the old refineries. 
The 1970's was a period of expansion of the sugar industry in Mexico 
as in most other sugar-producing countries. It provided 60% of the sugar 
consumed in the world; the other 40% coming from sugar beet (Coote, 
1987: V). Production in Mexico had not only to fill the export quota to the 
USA, which amounted on average to one fifth of total production, but to 
cope with increasing national consumption. There is a world wide tendency 
for sugar consumption to increase with income up to a certain level and then 
drop.5* In Mexico, consumption has been on the increase since the 1940's 
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and shows no sign of declining. In 1985, sugar consumption per capita was 
45.3 kgs per year, which is one of the highest in the world. 
The Mexican Government took upon itself the task of improving and 
expanding sugar production, which in spite of high international prices had 
been in troubled waters since the 1960's, partly because of the artificially 
low price that the government imposed on sugar for the internal market, 
which remained the same throughout the 1960's. The discrepancy between 
international and national prices enticed some producers to smuggle sugar 
across the US border; but the most limiting effect of this policy on the 
industry was the series of financial deals between refinery owners and 
government officials. Although owners were unable to squeeze profit from 
sugar cane production, but they more than compensated for their losses by 
borrowing from public banks, money which they invested in more profitable 
activities, and which they never paid back. Meanwhile the cane growers 
were left trying to eke out an income. 
In spite of government efforts to consolidate and expand sugarcane 
production, it withered away. By 1979, from being a sugar exporting nation, 
Mexico had to import sugarcane to meet its national demand. This shadow 
still hangs over Mexico, and remains a threat to agricultural self-sufficiency. 
However, within this bleak scenario, recent producers (among them 
Autlan's) have carved out their own niche, which provides producers with 
enough room to manoeuvre to consolidate their own diverse economic 
household strategies. The harbingers of sugar cane production in the valley 
of Audan-El Grullo were ejidatarios, who lacked the economic resources to 
try other more expensive crops and with little the financial support from 
government development agencies. The better-off farmers could afford to 
wait and see if the small producers could make a profit growing cane. In the 
1980's sugar production in Mexico thrived in state-owned refineries whose 
organization of production became a contested terrain between the growers 
and refinery administrators. This will be examined in the next chapters. 
A Brief Description of the Sugarcane Process 
In western Jalisco the best season to plant sugarcane is during the summer 
rains when the temperature and soil humidity are high i.e. in June and July. 
However in the irrigated plots the planting can wait until the end of the rainy 
season in October and take advantage of the humidity left in the soil. 
Sugarcane is a not a labour-intensive crop and for the next 12 to 16 months 
when it will be ready for the first cut, it needs little attention - fertilizing, 
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watering and weeding. During this period sugarcane producers could 
dedicate their time to other crops or other economic activities, which include 
among the Autlan-El Grullo producers migration to work in the USA. 
The associations of producers are in charge of buying and distributing 
the fertilizer and the IMO extension department limits itself to checking the 
growth of the cane and that the producers are using the credit to buy and 
apply the fertilizer to their cane. However, the careful monitoring of the age 
and growth of the canes is crucial to establishing a good cutting programme. 
This labour-intensive activity consumes a good part of the extension workers' 
time, (see Chapter 7). According to age of the canes, they programme the 
sampling of the canes most likely to be ready for cutting and immediately 
send an invoice to El Operado to cut off the water to that particular plot and 
then plan the cutting of its cane at least three weeks after that. 
The foremen in the CNC and CNPP associations collect the cutting 
schedule and organize the teams of cutters and drivers to deliver the cane to 
the platform at the entrance of the refinery near the conveyer belt where the 
cane processing commences.* 
The organization of planting, growing and cutting sugarcane is the 
Valley Autlan-El Grullo is accomplished through the close coordination of 
sugarcane producers, their associations and the IMO employees. The 
Committee of Production, discussed in Chapter 7, plays a crucial role in 
concerting the interests of the various parties. 
In this chapter, I have sketched the background to the development of 
sugar production in the Autlan-El Grullo valley. Sugar cane producers 
consolidated their political clout through their national associations, which 
managed to fulfil their demands, although still within a corporative 
government framework. In this process all the agents involved made a 
contribution to the development of sugarcane production in the valley, from 
the smallest producer to the national representatives. In the following 
chapters I will describe how different ejidatarios and private landowners 
were enticed to plant sugarcane and their reasons for doing so. 
NOTES 
1. Programa de Desarrollo Rural Integral del Estado de Jalisco 1985-1988, 1985: 
187. 
2. From 15 March to 20 April, 1971. The cane harvested was not ground but 
planted on other plots. (Manual Azucarero Mexicano 1972). 
3. The harvest begins in December and last until the end of May or early June 
before the rainy season starts. 
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4. This bridge connects the two main towns in the valley making a long detour 
unnecessary. The construction of this road and bridge was charged to the first 
cane growers. 
5. '[Sugar] Consumption begins to rise when a country's gross domestic product 
reaches about US $400 a head and continues to rise until GDP reaches about 
US $6,000 a head, when it starts to decline' (Coote, 1987: 31 and 91). 
6. The study of the labour force in charge of transforming the juices extracted 
from the cane into granulated sugar goes beyond the scope of this work but it 
deserves to be in its own the topic of a whole dissertation. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE FORERUNNERS OF SUGARCANE PRODUCTION IN THE 
VALLEY: SMALL-SCALE EJIDO PRODUCERS 
Most sugarcane producers in the Valley Autlan-El Grullo are ejidatarios 
living in the villages scattered in the valley, or private landowners, who live 
in Autlan and El Grullo, the two largest towns in the valley. There is a great 
variety in the size of plots, type of land tenure and availability of resources 
among producers. These differences correlate to some extent with the time 
sugarcane was first planted: whereas ejidatarios were more willing to try 
their luck with the crop from the moment the state-owned refinery sponsored 
its production, the better-off farmers planted it only when it was proved to 
be reliably profitable. In this, and the following two chapters, I describe the 
socio-economic conditions under which a handful of agricultural producers 
decided to grow sugarcane. These individual accounts highlight the 
resourcefulness of peasants in seizing the economic opportunities made 
available by the state. These producers, contrary to what Pare1 and others 
have argued (1989), have not been pushed around by government institutions 
to follow acquiescently their projects. Quite the opposite, peasants and larger 
farmers in the valley were themselves the ones who promoted the opening of 
the refinery and endured the hardships of the early years, because they 
perceived there were no other viable alternatives. 
This chapter describes the historical background and socio-economic 
conditions of the ejido 'Escondido', and shows why the majority of 
ejidatarios in Escondido now grow sugarcane. I first present an account of 
the foundation of Escondido, an ejido or agrarian community that was 
created in the 1930's, following the post-revolutionary agrarian reform in 
Mexico. The story is constructed through personal accounts of their 
participation in the setting up of the sugar refinery in the Autlan-El Grullo 
valley. I then present two groupings of ejido producers who decided, ahead 
of the majority of larger landowners, to include sugarcane production in their 
livelihood strategies. I have grouped these cases of ejidatarios generationally, 
in order to show how their political involvement differed over time. Whereas 
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the older ejidatarios fought to obtain land under the original agrarian reform, 
the next generation had to struggle, because of increased demographic 
pressure on existing ejido resources, to secure new land extensions. They 
also became more involved in local affairs consequent upon the opening of 
the refinery. Thus two of the early leaders of the CNC association of 
sugarcane producers were from Ejido Escondido. 
The Creation of Ejido Escondido 
In a corner of the Valley of Autlan the rural community of Ejido Escondido 
leans on the edge of a hill that naturally rims the village. The road ends in 
front of an old gate that is often guarded by small children who like to swing 
the gate open as vehicles approach it. The streets run parallel to the gate and 
they suddenly merge with the skirts of the hill. The streets are unpaved and 
are bordered by long crevices down which dirty water dribbles. The houses 
in Escondido have electricity and running water but they still lack a system 
of sewage and drainage. Each house has its own septic tank in the backyard. 
Electricity and water services reached Escondido at the end of the 1960's, 
but the drainage might have to wait a while longer. The houses are well built 
and stand in rows with their front doors facing the edge of the road. Most of 
them have three rooms, a kitchen, an outside toilet and a backyard where 
they keep chickens, turkeys, pigs and cows. The oldest houses have adobe 
(clay and straw) walls and red tiles; the more recent are built of brick. All 
the houses have been built by the owners and they follow the same local 
style, especially the older ones. In the last ten years, with the extra income 
obtained from growing sugarcane and migrating to the USA, new houses 
have risen out of the dusty streets. Some of them remain empty most of the 
time, probably waiting for their owners to be sent back by the border patrols 
in the USA, or in the few lucky cases to receive their pensions. 
The ejido of Escondido was born out of the former hacienda called 
'Escondido', that was owned by Benito Rivera, an absentee landlord who 
lived in Autlan. The founding members of the ejido are now in their eighties 
and some have passed away. One of the survivors of that original group, 
Don Genaro Carreon, was born in a nearby hacienda, called El Palmar, in 
1905. He arrived in Escondido in 1917, when Benito Rivera still owned the 
hacienda. Then later, in 1922, Rivera exchanged Escondido for another 
property in Chacalitos belonging to Domingo Villasenor. The new landlord 
of Escondido wanted to get rid of the old tenants, telling them: 'New 
landlords, new tenants'. The 'tenants' of the property had to return the land, 
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but the houses were theirs and they remained in them, though they had to 
take their animals to graze elsewhere. Don Genaro recalled with nostalgia 
those times. He remembered that they brought a case against him. It was 
around that time that they joined the Agrarian Committee in Autlan that was 
formed in 1924 with the intention of claiming land, under the new laws. 
Autlan did not have enough members to complete the two hundred 
petitioners that were required before land could be applied for as an agrarian 
community. Some of the landless farm workers of adjacent haciendas -
Escondido, Mezquitan, Ahuacapan, Lagunillas and Bellavistas - thus grouped 
together to form the Agrarian Community of Autlan. 
Another survivor of the original group of land petitioners was Anastasio 
Plaza, born in 1913. He had learned that the President, Adolfo De la Huerta, 
had passed a law that allowed landless peasants to ask the Municipal Council 
to take over untilled, or land left fallow by its owners. Anastasio went and 
asked two of his well-to-do friends in Autlan about the new law and then 
went with friends to petition the municipal president or mayor of Autlan. He 
was very sympathetic but warned them to be firm and serious because he did 
not want the secretary to waste her time typing inconsequential legal 
papers.1* They went back to Escondido and rallied twelve neighbours to sign 
the petition. Unfortunately somebody alerted the landowner who threatened 
to send his armed guards to kill them, but they persisted and the municipal 
president granted them the legal access to the unused fallow plots owned by 
Domingo Villasenor in 1924. 
Those were convulsive times in the country as a whole, but particularly 
in the rural areas. The 1917 Constitution tried to settle the demands of 
landless peasants who had participated in the armed movement of 1910. The 
inhabitants of the Autlan-El Grullo valley area, were only sporadically 
involved in the battles that took place during the decade from 1910. But they 
did participate fully in the armed conflict that spread over some regions of 
Mexico between 1925 and 1929 when the Church and the landowning class 
protested at the new Constitution and its laws. Some men of Escondido took 
sides with the Government and joined the federal army to put down the 
rebels in what became known as the Cristero movement. Don Genaro 
remembered vividly when the Cristeros set fire to the twenty-two houses 
where they lived, shouting "Viva Domingo Villasenor!". Don Genaro with 
other young men from Escondido were drafted into the Mexican Army and 
they participated in ten battles. When the Government had defeated the 
rebels, they were asked to provide a list of the peasants in Escondido who 
could claim rights to a plot of land. Don Trinidad Carreon wrote down the 
names of all the men he could remember even of the young fellows. With 
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the promise that the government would give priority to the claims of peasants 
who had risked their lives to defeat the Cristeros, they went back to till their 
leased plots. 
However, Don Domingo, the landowner, had not lain idle. He had 
manoeuvred to ensure that the size of his property would come within the 
limits allowed for private properties, and that the peasants of Escondido 
would therefore have had to return the plots they were renting from him. He 
had divided his properties fictitiously among several of his close friends and 
distant relatives and argued that they had been tilled by the farm workers 
under the various owners' supervision. In the document relating to 
Escondido, kept in the office of the Jalisco Office of the Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform, dated 1st July, 1929, Domingo Villaseñor argues that the 
land that had been tilled by the peasants in Escondido could not be affected 
by the Agrarian Reform because it fulfilled all the requirements of small 
private properties demanded by the Agrarian Law. That was the beginning of 
a long legal battle between the peasants of Escondido and Domingo 
Villaseñor which was finally resolved in favour of the former in 1932, much 
to the chagrin of the latter. This auspicious outcome for the peasants was 
assisted by the enrolment of some of them in the army that fought the 
Cristero rebels in the area. 
The Agrarian Commission had given the peasants of Escondido the 
provisional ownership of their plots in January, 1930. This affected 127 
hectares of first class cultivable rainfed land that were part of the private 
Escondido estate, and 182 hectares of poorer soil quality from a 
neighbouring estate. Two years later in February, 1932, it became officially 
approved.2' There were fifty-two individuals - heads of family and single 
males of sixteen years old or older - who each received four hectares of first 
class rain fed cultivable land or its equivalent in other qualities of soil, and 
access to communal land that was later divided into plots and shared out 
among the original petitioners. The 309 hectares granted were not sufficient 
to provide land for every young man entitled to receive it. 
In 1935, there were several young men without land in Escondido, and 
the young men who had now reached the age to apply, joined with those left 
out of the first distribution, to demand a plot of land. Through the 
representatives of the ejido, an extension of land was thus asked for. The 
application was submitted in July 1935, and one year later they were granted 
393 hectares, 238 hectares of rainfed arable land and 155 hectares of grazing 
lands for the communal use of all the members of the ejido. This second 
petition had been dealt with rapidly, as were most of the petitions for land 
during the Presidency of Lázaro Cardenas. Five years later, in April 1940, 
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the ejido obtained its second and extension of 81 hectares that were then 
divided into ten plots of eight hectares each. In the 1960's, landless vecinos, 
or neighbours (the name given to residents of ejidos who have no ejidal 
rights) from Escondido, with the support of all the ejidatarios asked for a 
third extension, but they were unsuccessful, on the grounds that there was is 
no longer any available land in the area that could be seized or redistributed. 
In the agrarian census of 1942, the authorities in Escondido declared 
that there were 106 people entitled to an ejidal plot, seven of whom were 
women (all of them widows and with an average age of forty). In a basic 
census carried out by myself in 1988, I counted 87 ejidatarios of whom 27 
were women, and 69 vecinos. The population of Escondido is over 500, 
some of whom are away working either temporarily or permanently in the 
USA. The average size of ejidal plot is eight hectares - four of irrigated land 
and four of rainfed arable land. The proportions of irrigated to rainfed land 
varies from one plot to the other and has its origins in the fact that when the 
plots were distributed, the irrigation system did not yet exist and each 
ejidatario received four hectares of rainfed arable land and access to 
communal pasture land which as mentioned was later divided among the 
ejidatarios in four hectares plots, some of which later benefitted from the 
construction of the irrigation system. In the late 1950's when the irrigation 
system was built, who benefitted depended on the geographical location of 
their land; some ejidatarios were lucky and their whole plot fell within the 
area irrigated, which accounts for some of the economic differences among 
ejidatarios which had not existed when the ejido was formed some sixty 
years ago. 
From its creation, ejido Escondido has been regarded in the area as a 
liberal and anti-clerical community. This fame was earned by their 
participation in the fight against the Cristeros, regarded as the defenders of 
the Catholic Church and the landed class. The Cristeros who attacked 
Escondido were sponsored by local landowners, among them the notorious 
Domingo Villasenor, the then owner of the land in Escondido, as mentioned 
above. Setting fire to the houses in Escondido triggered the peasants into 
joining the federal army to fight the Cristeros to the end. After a final three-
month campaign, at the end of 1929, they were discharged and went back to 
their villages to fight their other battle, the battle for survival and land. In 
the first difficult years on their ejidal plots, they cultivated maize and beans 
but most young men were obliged to supplement what they grew by finding 
seasonal jobs in the coastal region or farther away in the USA. 
At the end of the 1950's, the irrigation system was built and agricultural 
perspectives in the whole valley changed dramatically. The main and 
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secondary canals criss-crossed the valley, opening the door to the cultivation 
of other crops and some of the ejidatarios in Escondido began to experiment 
with crops other than traditional maize and beans. One of these crops was 
sugarcane. How they went about it and what they did in order to develop 
successful sugarcane production is the focus of the account to follow, drawn 
mainly from the life histories of the sugarcane producers in Escondido. 
The ejidatarios who became sugarcane producers did so for different 
reasons and with varying results. Their individual conditions were 
interwoven with broader socio-economic conditions but nevertheless what 
each individual ejidatario did varied. They were able to act with a degree of 
independence that is often overlooked by studies of sugarcane production.3* 
Sugarcane has become the main crop for the majority of ejidatarios in 
Escondido, 73 of the 87 (i.e. four in every five) cultivate one or more 
hectares. Those who do not grow sugar cane produce maize and keep cattle. 
Members of the Escondido ejido were among the pioneers of sugarcane 
production in the valley. How and why they decided to change their 
traditional crops for an industrial crop is best described through the 
producers own recollection of it. 
Sugarcane Producers in Escondido 
The number of hectares that ejidatarios plant with cane varies from one 
hectare to all eight. There are a few who plant larger areas when they can 
rent land. The average size is 2.7 hectares, which does not yield enough to 
live on exclusively. Most of the land available for rent is planted with cane, 
and it usually belongs to ejidatarios who are away working temporarily in the 
USA. The ages of the cane producers ranges from those in their teens to men 
and women in their seventies to eighties. Those who decide to grow cane 
must join one of the two producer associations before they can sign a 
contract with the refinery that entitles them to credit and services provided 
by the extension department of the refinery. In Escondido, all the sugarcane 
producers are members of the association affiliated to the CNC, rejecting the 
association affiliated to the CNPP as being an organization for rich farmers. 
Sugarcane producers find their own way around the stipulated contract 
stretching its terms to their individual needs e.g. using the credit to clean the 
cane to other purposes. In the following pages I will depict some of the ways 
in which each producer in Escondido reached the decision to plant sugar and 
add its economic benefits into their livelihoods. 
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Ejidatarios of Escondido have dealt with several productive changes is 
the last fifty years. The older generation made the transition from 
sharecropping to ejidatario, and were concerned with what Scott (1976) calls 
'safety first', that is they grew staple crops and took only small risks to 
produce cash crops, with mixed results, and they went to work in the USA. 
When the sugar refinery was built, they were the among forerunners of 
sugarcane production, but those who originally grew cane (now the older 
generation), did so on a small scale, without dropping their staple crops. The 
children of this generation not only diversified their crops and went to the 
USA for temporary work but they have also participated in local and 
municipal politics and have been involved in the leadership of the CNC 
association that has played the key role in sugarcane production in the valley. 
In the next three sections I will present thumbnail sketches of ejidatarios of 
different generations who decided to grow sugarcane, and the repercussions 
this had on their livelihoods. 
The Old Guard of Ejido Escondido 
The oldest ejidatarios in Escondido, now in their retirement years, remember 
the hardships of ploughing rainfed and badly drained land. Most have at 
some stage in their lives worked in the USA and were among those who 
promoted sugarcane when the refinery was built at the end of the 1960's. Of 
the five cases I present, only one no longer grows cane, having turned all his 
land to the production of staple crops which contribute towards keeping a 
handful of cattle. They all recall with nostalgia their endeavours to obtain the 
land and the struggles to eke out a living from it. They are in their seventies, 
and remember the refinery being built, and being enticed by members of the 
PRI from Autlan to plant sugarcane on their plots. I have chosen five 
founding members of ejido - Trinidad Carreon, Felix Ramos, Anastasio 
Plaza, Eduardo Plaza and Mario Gama - and describe how and when they 
decided to grow sugarcane, and why the last one decided to return to 
growing staples. Of the four who still produce sugarcane, only Trinidad 
Carreon could live solely from the income yielded by from the crop; the 
other three, like most sugarcane producers in Escondido, have had to 
diversify their activities to include staple crops and a few head of cattle, local 
jobs in the refinery, the CNC association and municipal government, and 
migration to the USA. Very few ejidatarios have put all their eggs in one 
basket by planting their total area with sugarcane. Where this has been the 
case they have usually had more than four hectares of irrigated land. 
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Trinidad Carreon: God and Sugarcane 
Don Trinidad Carreon was born in a village not far from the Escondido 
estate. He arrived at the hacienda in 1917, looking for work. Those were 
difficult times, the landowners sensed the winds of change and were worried 
about government threats of an agrarian reform. However, Don Trinidad 
became a sharecropper in Escondido. In 1923, when the landowner sold the 
estate, the new landowner attempted to revoke the previous agreements with 
the sharecroppers. Trinidad and the other sharecroppers in Escondido rallied 
against this and took legal proceedings against him. In Audan, in accordance 
with the new agrarian decrees, some of the vecinos were getting together to 
form a new agrarian community, in order to be able apply for land that was 
to be distributed among the landless. As there were not enough vecinos 
among the sharecroppers and workers on the estates around Autlan, the 
instigators extended an invitation to all vecinos on the neighbouring estates 
and hamlets in the valley to join their petition. Trinidad, together with other 
sharecroppers from Escondido, signed on with the Agrarian Committee4*. 
At the same time they also applied for the right to use the land belonging to 
their old patrons. Under this arrangement sharecroppers were entitled to 
produce on this land for a period of three years before having to re-negotiate 
the terms. Trinidad and the other sharecroppers went back to plough the land 
until 1926 when a hundred Cristeros attacked the hamlet setting fire to its 
twenty-two houses. They were cleared out with only the clothes they were 
wearing. Trinidad remembers how the war cry 'Viva Domingo Villasenor', 
the name of the landowner, reverberated as they fled, seeking refuge in the 
nearby hills. In 1929, Trinidad and another fifteen men from Escondido 
enlisted in the federal army to fight these Cristero gangs. At the end of the 
military campaign and having defeated the rebels, the enlisted peasants were 
sent back to their places of origin, with their arms for security. They 
returned to tilling the land. 
At the beginning of the 1930's, when Margarito Ramirez was Governor 
of the State of Jalisco, and Emilio Portes Gil, President of Mexico, the land 
grant was signed in favour of the peasants in Escondido. The provisional 
titling of their plots took place in January 1930. From the early days of 
ejido, Trinidad plunged himself into the running of the community, having 
been elected to several posts in both the executive and vigilance Ejido 
committees. According to older ejidatarios, he was a committed worker, and 
in time came to be regarded as a legitimate authority in the village. Some 
years later, between 1947-1954 he became a police constable in Autlan and 
during the following years held a job in the local Military Zone V. Trinidad 
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claims to have managed to combine these different activities within and 
outside the ejido without hiccups. In the 1960's, he was invited by local 
people and by representatives of the PRI, to participate in the CNC 
association of ejidatarios in the valley. Later, in 1971, Trinidad was elected 
member of the regional branch of the CNC. This was in the early years of 
the Melchor Ocampo refinery. 
In 1968, due to the lack of maintenance the canals were silted-up and 
had to be drained. This occurred at the same time as rumours spread that the 
government was going to build a refinery in the valley. Saul López Arreóla, 
brother of General López Arreóla, Minister of Defence, had rallied the PRI 
supporters in Autlán, such as Luis Rosales (nicknamed El Feo, the Ugly) and 
Humberto Riesling, Santiago's son-in-law. In Escondido, Dario Carreon, 
Trinidad's eldest son was among the political vanguard who were also 
promoting the opening of the refinery in die valley. Don Trinidad recalls that 
Dario and other ejidatarios in Escondido planted sugarcane on their plots in 
1969, at the same time that the refinery was promoting cane growing in the 
valley. Trinidad explained: 
'Everybody thought we had gone crazy. The first sugarcane 
producers in the valley were the ejidatarios of Autlán, El Grullo, 
Las Paredes, El Limón and Escondido. I did make a profit from the 
first time I harvested this cane $3,000 pesos (approximately $240 
US dlls in the early 1970s) after paying off the credit. But from the 
last harvest I earned ten million pesos ($3,300 US dlls in 1987. The 
ejidatarios of Unión de Tula, El Limón, El Grullo and Autlán have 
benefitted from growing sugarcane. It was in 1975 or 1976 when 
sugar started to provide us with profits, good profits. Before that 
there were very high basic costs to be paid. I planted cantaloupe 
melon at one time but did not succeed with it. Melon made a loss 
for us, it is a very delicate crop. Sugar has always given us better 
results. We have had our problems with some of the administrators 
of the mill because they are careless and let the juice boil over in 
the tanks and we the are the ones who lose from it.'5* 
Don Trinidad was lucky that his plot was one of the very few that was 
not divided by the construction of the irrigation canal. Thus all of his almost 
eight hectares is now irrigated and planted with sugarcane. He has been very 
thrifty and with the help of his youngest son keeps some cattle. Trinidad is 
one of the wealthiest ejidatarios in Escondido. He mentioned that he had lent 
forty million pesos ($13,000 US dlls) to water melon producers on the 
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Coast. His house is a roomy, well built brick bungalow where he lives with 
his wife and youngest son who is now in charge of the sugarcane and catde. 
He is very grateful to the 'revolutionary governments' as he calls them, 
because they supported the poor against the landowners, and that has brought 
many economic benefits to all the people of Escondido. When I asked him if 
he did not have any criticism of government officials, his eyes peered 
through the pair of thick glasses that he wore, squinting as he tried to give 
me a good look, and commented emphatically that he was a great supporter 
of the PRI, and he went on to defend government actions against what he 
called maligning comments. He conceded that a few bad officers abused the 
power that working for the government gave them. 
Don Trinidad made good use of the opportunities offered by the 
agrarian reform, and in the process of fighting his way alongside others for 
land, he joined first the army, later the police force and then the municipal 
administration. These varied experiences seemed not only to have opened up 
economic rewards but to have given him political skills and influence in the 
ejido, which he used judiciously. Although he is relatively better off than the 
other ejidatarios, they do not resent it or make snide remarks about him. 
According to other informants he was always involved in the negotiations 
with the Ejidal Bank and other government agencies that had business in the 
ejido. Now he is old and still very fit, although he no longer accepts any 
public position in the ejido or any commission, arguing that his eyesight is 
almost gone. But he does not miss ejido meetings and when he discusses a 
topic at these he usually makes reference to the history of the ejido and 
brings back stories and facts which are unknown to the younger members. 
He is now out of touch with the world outside the ejido, thus his influence 
on ejido affairs has waned. 
Having a large family, his daughters stand little chance of inheriting 
Trinidad's ejidal plot, which is reserved for his youngest son who has 
already taken over the responsibility for it. Don Trinidad's success was based 
on effectively combining his agricultural activities with different municipal 
jobs (thus giving him a regular income and putting him in contact with other 
government officers). These various activities made sugarcane an easy choice 
since it is a crop that needs little labour and therefore a good crop to 
combine with the activities that kept him away from Escondido for long 
periods; especially when he could plant all eight hectares of his plot with it. 
Trinidad has thus accumulated more economic assets than most old guard 
ejidatarios though his life style has not changed, and he still wears his old 
sombrero and worn-out huaraches (Mexican leather and tyre-soled sandals). 
The sugarcane from his ejidal plot yields sufficient to maintain his family and 
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even to save money. With his daughters married and independent financially, 
and his eldest son with his own ejidal plot, Trinidad is very well placed to 
accumulate. 
Felix Ramos: Sugarcane brought Life to Escondido 
Felix Ramos, like Trinidad Carreon, belongs to the founding group of the 
ejido. He was born in Escondido in 1915 and has lived there most of his life. 
Felix also joined the federal army when he was only twelve years old. He 
was only a child, too young to enlist, but his father had been murdered by 
the Cristeros and so he begged the officer to let him join the troupe as a 
horse groom. When the rebellion was crushed, Felix became a member of 
the rural guards who remained active until the end of the 1940's. After two 
years with the rural guards, he was called to join the regular army by Lopez 
Arreola, then a Captain and an ambitious officer who would become 
Minister of Defence three decades later. Though he always went back to 
Escondido for three to four months to harvest his plot, the rest of the year he 
went wherever his battalion was sent. When he left the army he went to the 
USA and worked as a farm labourer near to Los Angeles for a year. Don 
Felix mentioned that his boss wanted to help him to settle there, but he did 
not like the American way of life and so he returned to Escondido. He went 
back to the USA to work on two further occasions. The second time he 
found a job in a foundry, again close to Los Angeles, where he worked for 
eight months. This time he managed to save money which he invested in 
animals. The third and last time that he went to the USA was to find 
agricultural work close to the border, that he could reach by walking and 
without having to pay the coyotes to help him cross illegally. That third time 
he saved more than on previous visits and was able to buy more animals and 
make improvements on his plot. 
Don Felix has four children. From his first marriage he has one 
daughter, Sonia, who received rights to the ejidal plot of her husband who 
had died twenty years ago. From his second marriage he has a son and two 
daughters. They all live in the valley, but only the son has settled down in 
Escondido. He is already in charge of cultivating sugarcane on the plot and 
will receive Don Felix's ejidal rights when he dies. He gives Don Felix the 
income from two of the hectares of cane which amounted to $300,000 ($100 
Us dlls) in 1987. That money, plus the $55,000 from his monthly 
government pension from the mill, allows him and his wife to live modestiy. 
The entitiement to a pension was one of the concessions wrung from the 
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government by the CNC for the sugar cane producers. He also plants rainfed 
maize on public land along the borders of the canal. He has very poor 
eyesight, in spite of the thick glasses he wears, which is the reason why he 
has relinquished his plot to his son. He was one of the first sugar cane 
producers in Escondido and remembers when the first president of the local 
CNC association came to Escondido to tell them that things were going to 
improve with the opening of the mill. The improvement took longer than 
they were led to believe because the price of sugar cane was kept artificially 
very low by the government for several years. In spite of this Felix 
recommended his eldest daughter, Sonia, to plant cane on her plot. Sonia 
was working in California during those years but Felix took care of her crop. 
Though the profits were meager, they were enough to augment Sonia's 
savings in the USA to enable her to replace her old house with a new one 
with brick walls. The domestic price of sugarcane, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, remained very low until the end of the 1960's when the 
two recently-formed national associations of producers exercised their 
political muscle (see Chapter 6 for details). However, Don Felix, like many 
other ejidatarios, linked the much improved price to the negotiating abilities 
of Maximino, one of the leader of the CNC affiliated association: 
'At the beginning I made no profit from producing sugarcane. 
Neither did we when Ramón was secretary of the CNC (an 
ejidatario of Escondió who became leader of the local branch). It 
was only when Maximino became leader that things really changed. 
I have five hectares of sugarcane though I get money from only two 
hectares because I have given the profits of the other three to Mario 
(the son). With Maximino we have achieved something. It is thanks 
to him that we have snatched more money. Mario had been able to 
buy his second-hand lorry with the profits from the cane and what 
he could scrape together from his earnings as a lorry-driver. They 
sold the lorry to him very cheaply in Tamazula. He has helped 
himself and his large family quite a bit driving the lorry'. 
Don Felix is one the founding members of Escondió. He is partially 
retired, but still helps his son Mario with some light work on his land. Felix 
fought for the land and has participated in the ejido's administration. He has 
held different posts in the community and has always participated and 
supported the collective works promoted by the local authorities. Although 
Felix remained in the army for several years and met local politicians and 
leaders, he did not consolidate his networks like Trinidad Carreon did. 
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However, Felix considered the opening of the sugar refinery in the valley as 
a new lease of life, specially when the price of cane increased. He believes 
they could not have done better than plant sugarcane. Like Plaza, Lara, and 
Gama, whose cases I discuss later, and in contrast to Trinidad Carreon, Don 
Felix has saved only enough to get by. The son did not receive his own 
ejidal plot, though he still hopes that a third petition for an extension will 
come through. Thus Felix's plot has to be shared between them. The yield is 
not enough to support both families. It is supplemented by Don Felix's 
pension, and for the son by his earnings from his lorry. Theirs is a common 
case among ejidatarios who are compelled to diversify their economic 
activities as they lack the resources to intensify their use of their only asset: 
the land. 
Anastasio Plaza: The USA and Sugarcane 
Anastasio Plaza, nicknamed Tacho, is another founding member, was born in 
Escondido in 1913. He continues to be involved in community affairs, 
including the third and last unsuccessful petition for an extension to the 
ejido. The petition has been rejected several times and stands little chance 
under the new agrarian policies of the government. He recounts with 
rancour, how, when the ejido was being formed, the landowner, Domingo 
Villasenor, used to dismiss them. He relishes the story of how he 
eavesdropped on some rich landowners from Autlan complaining about the 
agrarian law passed by La Huerta's government that entitled the municipal 
authorities to grant the use of fallow land to local peasants for at least three 
years with the right to renew (much land was left fallow, i.e. it was unused 
by landlords who were often absent). Tacho rushed to his friends in Aultan 
to find out more about the new law and he and other neighbours from 
Escondido managed to lease some of this fallow land. As Tacho describes it: 
'When the three-year lease was coming to an end the landowner 
sent soldiers to push us off his land. But we also had arms, that the 
government had distributed among peasants like us. Captain Trejo 
had to explain that he came on behalf of his uncle Don Domingo to 
recover his land. I explained that we had a contract that was still 
valid. The Captain said he did not care about that, and if we did 
not relinquish our claims to the land he would hang us on the 
mezquites (a common tree in the area). I answered that we had 
arms to defend our tiny plots of land. We were some twenty 
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peasants. The Captain didn't want to fight and said he already had 
in his pocket what he wanted, and pulled out a large banknote. He 
said that the landowner had given it to him. He turned round and 
left with his five young soldiers. The Captain was only trying to 
scare us but he didn't succeed. When the term was coming to its 
end, we received the provisional grant to our plots. The rural 
defense remained for many years more. We had in the ejido 
twenty-two rifles and two hundred cartridges.' 
Some years later, in 1939, Tacho decided to try his luck in the USA. 
He was one of the first to get a temporary contract to work there, which he 
extended and renewed, remaining mere for sixteen years, until 1956. He 
used to send money to his wife to buy cattle. When he came back to stay for 
a while his wife had managed to increase the herd to twenty heads and she 
was growing maize, beans and chick peas in his plot. He had worked in a 
fruit and vegetable packing plant in the Imperial Valley in California where 
he was in charge of gathering the waste and loading it onto trucks. He 
worked long hours - from 7am one morning to 2am the next. The work was 
not physically hard but he had to be there checking for very long periods of 
time. 
When Tacho went back to Escondido he had saved enough to make a 
living from his land, and his herd. He hired local farm workers to help him, 
at one time hiring as many as fifteen to help him with his animals. He 
claimed to have owned up to sixty head, twelve of which were milking cows. 
Tacho emphasized with pride that he was one of the first sugarcane 
producers. He recalled his friendship with El Feo, Luis Rosales, who became 
the first leader of the association of producers at the IMO, the refinery, who 
helped him to improve the strips of his land that were not level, badly 
drained in some places and suffering filtration in others. Fortunately for 
Tacho, his friend El Feo sent him some machinery to drain and level his 
land. He first planted sugarcane on three hectares and the next season 
another three. As he moved into sugarcane production he began to "to get rid 
of cattle as grass and fodder became more scarce. Sugarcane put an end to 
pastureland around here twelve years ago" he said. He said the first years as 
sugarcane producer had been very difficult: 
'We did very badly because we had to pay for the roads to have 
access to our plots and at the end of the harvest we did not even 
have enough money to pay the interest. The situation started to 
improve when José Zarate organised the La Tripartita [a forum of 
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representatives of the mills, producers and government]. Gordillo 
Luna was the leader of sugarcane producers in Mexico and he 
helped us to obtain loans from FIMAIA [a parastatal finance 
house], which helped us to make the improvements needed to our 
plots. When Maximino Castillo became our leader things improved 
even more. All the ejidatarios in Escondido that have planted 
sugarcane have benefitted from it'. 
Tacho participated in the administration of the ejido as member of the 
overseeing committee during several periods. He condemns the way the third 
and last extension petition was dealt with. He was present in the negotiations 
between the representatives of the ejido and die landowner that were 
mediated by employees of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Tacho described 
them in these terms: 
'We have fought thirty years for an extension to our land, without 
success. José Posadas [ejidatario of Escondido] spends all the time 
in the offices of the Agrarian Reform and he knows how to deal 
with them, he was very involved in the application for the 
extension. An engineer from the Agrarian Reform came to inspect 
the boundaries and to check that our claims were right. This 
engineer and José went to talk with Mario Reyes Drake (the 
landowner) and they were bribed. We were given only eight 
hectares of his land because he claimed that he had sold his 
property before the petition for the extension. José went to the 
committee of the old agrarian guard and told them that he knew the 
state of the petition and tried to disqualify me from handling the 
petition. José went to the offices in Mexico and repeated his lies to 
the engineers, who advised their boss Auguste Villanueva to turn 
down our petition, damaging our interests. Through the old guard 
(an association of old agrarian fighters who are cherished by the 
government) we complained about the way that the petition had 
been handled. José, being the opportunist he is, insisted that not 
everything was lost. Though it would cost us some money to re-
open the case, that we had to hand to him. Against capital, we 
cannot win. We are poor with large families. We made a mistake 
bringing the engineer. He came only to sell off our case. The 
engineer's wife told another lady in Escondido when they went to 
wash some clothes that she very seldom accompanies her husband, 
but this was a business that involved lots of money and that was the 
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reason why she came with him this time. The engineer, Adán 
Flores, made me suspicious of his intentions when he kept on 
repeating that he had never sold out an agrarian case for money. 
Since then we have tried several times to re-open our case for the 
third extension without success. I went so many times to the offices 
of the Agrarian Reform in Mexico City that they got to know me 
quite well. I took local cheese and tequila, they preferred that to 
going fifty-fifty, knowing that we are poor ejidatarios'. 
Tacho recollects his memories of dealing with the employees of the 
Ministry with certain disdain. He considers some of the engineers corrupt 
and always willing to give their support in exchange for the right amount of 
money. However, noted also that not all of them were corrupt. Tacho has 
had poor health lately and his plot is attended by one his grandchildren from 
their only daughter who died several years ago. The grandchildren spend 
part of the time in the USA working and come back to Escondido to help 
Tacho with the harvest. He thinks that sugarcane has brought prosperity to 
Escondido and he hopes that its price keeps pace with inflation, as has been 
the case for the last ten years. Tacho thinks well of Maximino's work to 
improve the price of sugarcane, which he thinks the best option for them. 
Tacho is better off than Felix but not as well off as Trinidad, he grows 
sugarcane because it is a cash crop and easy to grow, and with his poor 
health he cannot do other work. Tacho considers that the pension he will be 
able to draw as a grower, is another sweetener to encourage peasants like 
him to grow sugarcane, but like Felix, Tacho thinks it a valuable incentive 
for it improves his income and allows him and his wife to live without 
economic worries, and his grandchildren who work in the USA take turns to 
come and help him during the harvest. 
Eduardo Lara: Hard Work and Sugarcane 
Eduardo Lara (better known as Don Lalo) also belongs to the founding 
fathers of the ejido. He remembers in great detail when he, together with 
other sharecroppers in Escondido, signed the first petition for land. He also 
recalls the Cristero rebellion that forced him to abandon his plot and flee 
with his family to Autian. They remained there with friends for several 
months, until die rebellion was crushed by the federal army and they could 
return safely to their leased plots. Don Lalo was elected the treasurer of what 
had become the 'agrarian community' of Escondido; they had been 
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threatened so many times by the landowner that he decided to buy a gun 
before returning, emphasizing that this was only to defend his family against 
the landowner's gunmen. He added that later on the government itself armed 
peasants so they could protect their plots against the former landowners 
themselves. From the thirties onwards Don Lalo has owned a three hectare 
plot. However, for some unknown reason, he was unable to get extra land, 
as most of the other ejidatarios did when the communal land was re-
distributed: he regrets bitterly this injustice and he speaks out about it to any 
willing audience complaining that the better-off impose their will on others 
and show favouritism. 
Don Lalo has his three-hectares planted with sugarcane and would like 
to keep animals but it is difficult to feed them as there is little land for 
grazing. He got rid of his animals little by little as he started to plant sugar 
cane. 
'Sugarcane did not use to be a good business; though I never did 
badly, I always received some profit, even if it was really close to 
nothing. I used to do all the jobs myself so the money that the mill 
gave us and lent us for hiring somebody was all for me. I worked 
in the sugar mill in Bellavista during 1927, 1928 and 1929. I learnt 
something about sugarcane, though there they did things differently 
to way we do them here. In the beginning extension workers in the 
refinery ordered us to do jobs they did not know how to do. Once 
one extension worker saw me applying some herbicide to my canes 
and he told me off because I was going to burn them the way I was 
doing it. Later on the same extension worker followed my 
recommendations with great success on a plot planted with cane 
that he was administering. He corroborated the effectiveness of my 
way and since then has continued to consult me. I have learnt 
through trial and error. This black land that they say is good for 
sugarcane demands a lot of hard work'. 
Don Lalo has been the Comisariado of the ejido four times, finishing his 
last term the previous year. He was asked to stand for re-election but he had 
not accepted, being happy to stay on as deputy. His following statement 
gives a glimpse of the kind of man he was: 
'Since I became ejidatario I have always served in different posts. I 
did not put up with errors and asked not to cover other people's 
errors. I decided off my own bat to keep the animals out of the 
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streets. Before my intervention they left the animals wondering 
around the ejido and over all the plots. Now they walk them to 
grazing fields and bring them back to their stockyard, thus the 
cattle do not go into the plots destroying other people's property or 
eating their grass'. 
Don Lalo, like some other ejidatarios in Escondido is very sceptical of 
the Catholic church. He recalls as being the oldest practising religion in 
Escondido. He remembers the coming of the Evangelists and much later the 
Jehovah's Witnesses, whom he dislikes because they oppose things related to 
the agrarian reform. Neither do they respect the national flag or participate 
in any ejido affairs. Despite his scepticism he is an adamant advocate of his 
religion: 
'I base my action on the government's laws and biblical scriptures. 
But neither of them are followed nowadays. The Catholics 
misbehave because they are ignorant of their doctrines; they are the 
ones that make the biggest mistakes, they accept and even 
encourage alcoholism. In the other denominations they are a bit 
better. The Catholic religion was against the peasants and the 
teachers because they were spoiling the children's spirits. I'm very 
different from my brothers and father, I don't drink. I don't like 
beer or wine and I decided to follow my own path, different from 
theirs'. 
Don Lalo is a good farmer and proud of it. He does most of the work 
himself and has had very good yields; in the last harvest he produced around 
500 tonnes on his three hectare plot. After he had repaid all the credit, he 
received over a million pesos plus the wages he paid himself for his work. 
He hires a tractor once a month, but complains it is a hassle and expensive. 
He mentioned that one extension worker said that he had the best sugar cane 
in the ejido: 
'My plot doesn't look like the others, you could always walk 
through my canes, the rows are not full of weeds and the irrigation 
canals are free of debris. Being myself only a poor peasant it is 
something to be admired that I keep my plot tidy because there are 
millionaires whose plots of cane look like a jungle'. 
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Don Lalo makes his living out of the cane. He lives alone and he is 
renowned for his stern moral standards that have weighed heavily on most 
members of his family, to the point that he has driven them away from him, 
not only his children but his wife also. They have found jobs outside 
Escondido. Don Lalo has never understood why he could not do better for 
himself in Escondido. He claims to be an honest and hard working farmer, 
who never drinks. However, he thinks he was cut out of the distribution of 
the communal land and he has never been able to straighten that out. He has 
been promised land if they obtain the third extension, which has been 
impending for the last twenty years. He holds out some hope, but sees as 
less likely as time goes by. His character was the ideal when it came to 
getting the ejidatarios to accept their social responsibilities. He is still asked 
to help when differences among neighbours develops into a confrontation. He 
said very few violent outbursts had occurred in Escondido. 
Mario Gama: Staple Crop and the USA 
The fifth member of the old guard presented in this section, Mario Gama, 
gave up growing sugarcane in the early days when prices were very low and 
the costs high. He was unable to make ends meet, and went back to growing 
maize and raising cattle. He has an eight-hectare plot, the first four were 
acquired from the dividing of the common land and the other after the 
petition for the extension. Five are now irrigated. Mario is very proud of 
having kept his maize production even when he was producing sugarcane. 
He remembers all the problems he had to face when he was trying to make 
his living from growing sugarcane. He worked hard but he had also to 
migrate for work to the USA. He had been twice before to California 
between 1946-1947. The first time he had saved enough money to repay 
debts. The second time he had only been working for six months when the 
migra (migration police) sent him back to Mexicali, threatening him never to 
dare cross the border again without a legal permit. Mario was so shaken by 
the experience that he had never again attempted to do so. He went back as a 
visitor with a visa. He says he likes the USA to live but not to work. 
However, his children must think differently, since five of the eight live 
permanentiy in the USA. They would like Mario and his wife to go and live 
with them, but his wife does not like the USA. She prefers to live quietly in 
Escondido. They share their house there with a son and a daughter. The 
migrant children only come to visit once in a while but they do send money 
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regularly which they have used to improve their house and build a byre for 
their cattle. 
Mario has always kept some animals. In 1987, he had twenty three 
heads, five of them cows. The young bulls pasture on the hills and he keeps 
the cows in a byre in his backyard. He planted sugarcane very soon after the 
sugar mill was built, but despite the good yields (around 320 tonnes on a 
three-hectare plot he did not even earn enough to cover the rent of the land. 
The largest amount he ever received for his cane was $17,000 pesos in 1980, 
($680 US dlls) but even that was not a good income. Like the other 
ejidatarios he blamed this on the fact that the growers were expected to pay 
for the new infrastructure and that they lacked experience and bargaining 
power in those early days with the mill. It was easy for the mill to cheat 
them. He grew sugar until 1981 and now that it is profitable he would like to 
grow it again but cannot get permission from the administrators and 
extension department of the mill, nor the extra water to do so. He was then 
wrongly advised to plant melon and that was even worse. 
So he went back to growing maize, two crops a year on the irrigated 
part of his land and one on his rainfed land. Growing maize is not easy when 
a plot is surrounded by sugarcane, since when the sugar is irrigated, some of 
the water runs off into his maize at the wrong time. Mario has rented a third 
yunta (four-hectare plot) and borrows money from the rural bank, 
BANRURAL. "I have never had any debts with the bank", he says. 
'Thank God! The ones who complain about the bank are fooling 
themselves. We all know that if you don't pay back the credit, the 
interest increases and that is what happens when they procrastinate 
and defer payment. I think the bank is a good thing. They insure 
the crops and if you behave yourself with the people from the bank 
and insurance company and pass them a banknote under the table, 
they always help you. They evaluated the loss of one of my yuntas 
at a million and a half [pesos]. With the money they gave me I paid 
my debt to the bank. They kept some money and I made some 
money too, so we both made it a gain'. 
Mario belonged to the rural guards for twelve years which permits him 
to carry a rifle. He got to know several people involved in the offices of the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Autlan, Guadalajara and Mexico City. All 
those relationships became very handy when he had to help one of his 
stepsons fight for the ejidal rights bequeathed to him by his grandfather and 
contested by his uncle, his father's brother. The litigation was long and 
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expensive. It lasted for 22 years and they spent lots of money travelling and 
bribing people in different offices. Finally they won the case but not before 
having to stop an injunction accusing the stepson of invading the ejidal plot 
in dispute. Mario was informed of that order by a friend who was still 
working in the rural guards, and he had to go with his stepson to 
Guadalajara and stop proceedings. Meanwhile, the ejidal tribunal disowned 
the uncle's claims over the land and Mario's stepson finally claimed his right 
Mario thinks that all ejidal matters can be sorted out with money and he 
mentioned the case of the petition for the extension of ejidal land: 
'José 'the Wolf [an ejidatario from Escondido with good networks 
in the Ministry in Mexico City] is a spiv of an operator, but he 
does get things done. I went with him in a commission representing 
the ejido. In the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Mexico City they 
told us that the survey of Escondido showed that there were eighty 
eight hectares at one edge of the ejido that could be included within 
its boundaries, but to get hold of them we would need to pay them 
seven million pesos and they would draw a new map including the 
extra hectares and we would then be able to claim them as our 
property. They also told us that there were four hundred hectares 
that Reyes Drake [the landowner of the disputed land] had 
pretended to have divided up, but the ejido's prior claim to that 
land overruled his claims that it was not one whole property. As far 
as I understood it, José said that if we invested some money in it, 
we would win the case. With money you can make a dog dance, 
without it you dance like a dog! Really, seven million for adding 
eighty eight hectares to the ejido is nothing. Right now, with those 
millions you could not buy one hectare of irrigated land. But we 
are apathetic and greedy and always suspect other people. If it had 
been my own decision, I would have accepted the deal and paid to 
get those extra hectares'. 
Mario is seventy years old and has occupied, like most male ejidatarios 
in Escondido, different posts in its administration. He has on several 
occasions been a member of the vigilance committee. Now he thinks that he 
could not afford the time to participate so actively in the ejido's organization. 
He is getting older and feels just about able to do the work on his plot and 
the extra plot he rents. His income is eked out by the small but regular 
contributions he receives from his children in the USA. The two still living 
in Escondido help him with the crops and cattle and work as day labourers 
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locally. He considers that he is better off growing maize and cattle than some 
sugarcane producers. He thinks you need clout with the mill to make 
sugarcane really pay. But he is the exception that confirms the general 
agreement among the majority of ejidatarios in Escondido who consider 
sugar cane a reliable low-risk source of income. Even he would like to get 
his right to grow it back. 
With the exception of Mario, the other four founding ejidatarios, 
consider that the cash crop brought economic prosperity to the ejido. 
However each of them qualifies its impact differently, in line with their 
economic means. The fact that the five of them own plots of similar size and 
all appeared to start work under similar conditions, suggests that economic 
differences in Escondido began before the Melchor Ocampo refinery was 
built. The origins of socio-economic inequality among the ejidatarios do not 
stem from the opening of the refinery, though its economic impact in the-
valley of Autlan-El Grullo might have hastened the already divergent 
individual material conditions. The main source of economic opportunities 
for the old ejidatarios in Escondido were developed through their 
involvement with different government institutions. For example, Trinidad 
worked in the administration of the municipality of Autlan, and Felix was in 
the army. Each ejidatario has woven differently the political networks 
available to him with differing results, casting doubt on the notion that 
macro-structures, even though they may somehow cast the boundaries to 
available material possibilities, impose unavoidable tramlines. One must 
accept that the older ejidatarios started without inherited assets and got hold 
of similar sized plots, but they have, nevertheless, reached different levels of 
economic welfare. They appear to have thriven on their individual family 
commitments and political networks, which have played a significant role 
among the ejidatarios described in the next Chapter. 
The old guard of Escondido fought for their land and dealt with the 
integration of their households into the agricultural market through their 
production of staple and different cash crops which they combined with their 
participation in the labour market as temporary migrants to other regions of 
Mexico, but mainly to the USA. Trinidad, Felix, Anastasio, Eduardo and 
Mario, like many other members of their generation in Escondido, were the 
leaders of sugarcane production in the valley. With few exceptions, they 
have combined sugarcane with staple crops, cattle and migration. Some of 
the old guard's children have their own ejidal plot, but most have had to find 
alternative ways of earning their living. The majority of the ones who have 
been able to get a plot in Escondido combine growing sugarcane with other 
economic activities as I describe in the following section. 
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Coming of Age in Escondido 
The second generation of ejidatarios in Escondido have either inherited their 
father's plot or received land from the first and second extension of the ejido 
when they were in their teens. Although they were too young to remember 
the time when their parents fought for the land, they recount the stories as if 
they were members of the old guard, all the old stories of land struggles, 
economic hardship, and the upheavals sparked by the Cristero rebellion. 
These ejidatarios are now between late forty to sixty years old, and are now 
the ones in charge of the administration of the community. Most of them are 
men (60 of the 87 ejidatarios); of the women, the majority are widows who 
have inherited their ejidal rights and often make agreements with relatives to 
help them work the land. However, the younger women tend to take 
responsibility for the land themselves, among them Sonia Ramos, presented 
in this section. 
This generation of ejidatarios were not sharecroppers but were more 
enticed than their elders to try their luck in the USA. Most of this generation 
have worked at least once there. Some of them have been involved in local 
politics and also in the association of sugarcane producers affiliated to the 
CNC. They are among the most vocal and committed sugarcane producers in 
Escondido. They will be unable to help their children to obtain a plot of land 
as their parents did for them, since it is unlikely, particularly in the political 
climate of today, with the liberalization of the economy and drive towards 
privatization of land. Bearing in mind that they have, on average, four 
children, and only one of them will receive land, there are many who need 
to look outside of agriculture for an alternative occupation. Some have 
already chosen to migrate for work. Most families in Escondido now have at 
least one family member working in the USA, some have emigrated 
permanently, though most of them are illegal temporary workers. 
Participation in local politics or in the association has not deterred the 
cyclical wave of migration to the USA. 
Ejidatarios have remained as the main providers of sugar cane to the 
refinery, i.e 761 or 81% of the 929 sugarcane producers in the region were 
ejidatarios in 1986. Among them, the ejidatarios from Escondido have played 
a leading role in the association affiliated to the CNC. They have produced 
two Presidents of the CNC association and until recently, mere has always 
been an ejidatario from Escondido working in the CNC board. How they 
became involved in the promotion of sugarcane in the region is pointed out 
by the ejidatarios that I will present in the next chapter. 
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Of this next generation Jacinto Rosas is a good example of a resourceful 
social actor, who has always combined working the land with teaching (he is 
a qualified teacher) and participation in the activities of the local branch of 
the PRI. Rosas had good links with the leader of the PRI branch in Autian 
and the Comisariado of Escondido when the refinery was being built. He 
became one of the main promoters of sugarcane in the ejido, though he did 
not plant any himself until later on and he had no time after fulfilling his 
duties as teacher and headmaster of the local elementary school in 
Escondido, and working on his plot to find a job in the refinery as did Adan 
Romo, Ramon Gordillo and Jacinto Rojo, producers discussed in next 
chapter. 
Most ejidatarios in Escondido have worked or tried to find a job in the 
USA at some point in their lives. The type of job they find, and how long 
they stay out, has direct repercussions on the way they reorganize their 
livelihood in Escondido. Sugarcane is a crop that can convenientiy be 
combined with other activities such as food crops, cattle, local waged jobs 
and migration, as is the case with the producers discussed below, Ernesto 
Rojo, Jacinto's brother, Sebastian Posada, and Sonia Ramos. 
Ernesto Rojo went once to the USA and having suffered the hardship of 
deportation decided not to try it again. He invested his savings in improving 
his land, which combined with being economically careful, as befitted 
someone of his religious conviction, ensured his family a comfortable living, 
in which income from sugar was an essential component. Sebastian Posada, 
was away for long periods in the USA and with the help of his father, who 
besides looking after his land, took care of the cattle acquired by Sebastian 
from his savings. Thus when his father finally bequeathed his ejidal rights to 
Sebastian, he came back to Escondido for good. Sonia Ramos, Felix 
Ramos's daughter, had to fend for herself and her children when her 
husband died unexpectedly. What she obtained from her land was eked out 
with the income from selling prepared food at the weekends, from a table 
outside her house, which was just enough to keep them going. When her 
eldest son expressed his desire to attend secondary school in Autian, Sonia 
took the decision to go to the north of Mexico, near the boarder of the USA, 
to find a job with higher remuneration than she could receive locally, to pay 
for the cost involved. Her meager savings from her work kept her son in 
secondary school but provided little else. So she came back home and began 
to organize her next migratory trip which took her to various places in 
California, where three of her four children now permanently live. These 
three sugarcane producers did not participate in the promotion of sugarcane 
production, but have been chosen to highlight the contrast with the 
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ejidatarios of the next chapter, who participated more fully in sugarcane 
production. They provide us with a different piece of the rich social tapestry 
of sugarcane producers in the valley of Autlan-El Grullo. 
Ernesto Rojo: Jehovah's Witnesses and High Sugarcane Yields 
Ernesto Rojo obtained his plot of land at the same time as his brother 
Jacinto, around 1957, some thirty years ago. He has 3.5 hectares of irrigated 
and three hectares of rainfed land. Ten years ago he became a Jehovah's 
Witness as did one of his sisters and his mother. Jacinto was the only 
member of the family still living in Escondido who did not embrace this 
religious sect. It has remained a sore point in the family, whose members are 
polarised into pro and anti Witnesses. During the time of my fieldwork, 
Jacinto was the Comisariado of the ejidal committee and was expected to 
enforce the internal law against ejidatarios who did not attend ejido meetings. 
Ernesto, like the other few ejidatarios who had become Jehovah's Witnesses, 
did not attend these monthly meetings on the grounds that matters were 
discussed which went against his beliefs, such as the organizing of dances 
where profane music would be played and alcoholic drinks sold, two things 
that forbidden by his religion. These strict attitudes opened a cleavage within 
the ejido between the majority, who claim to be Catholic, and the handful of 
Jehovah's witnesses. However, these differences have been dealt with in an 
amicable way, and the Jehovah's Witnesses have traded off their lack of 
economic support to non-pious activities for their commitment to clean and 
repair the unpaved streets and public lamps in Escondido. This has satisfied 
most ejidatarios, though they insist that everybody in the ejido should follow 
the decisions made at the ejidal assembly. 
The ejidal committee previous to the one presided over by Jacinto, had 
tried to take firmer measures to discourage ejidatarios from missing the 
monthly assemblies. The sanctions were to range from a fine of 5,000 pesos 
(just over two US dollars at that time) to the threat of losing ejidal rights. 
However, Ernesto and the other members of the Jehovah's Witnesses in 
Escondido did not pay any attention to these threats and the committee, 
headed by Jacinto, did nothing to enforce the agreements. The rest of the 
ejidatarios were put out by this, but did not pursue it as it provided them 
with a convenient excuse to attend the meetings only intermittently 
themselves, as most of them do. 
Ernesto like most ejidatarios in Escondido, found his way to 'the north' 
and worked in a small place close to Lancaster, California, for a year and a 
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half as the operator of a machine to crush stones. He saved no money but 
regularly sent amounts home to his grandfather in Escondido to pay his debts 
and he brought a record player back with him. When he was thrown out of 
the USA, he set some tables up in front of his family house to sell cold beer, 
charging customers for playing records while they drank. "I charged twenty 
cents per song and made good money", he said. "There were plenty of 
boozers who loved to spend all their time and money drinking and having 
fun". Ernesto now comments disapprovingly of this, but it was before he 
became a Jehovah's Witness. 
Ernesto recalled his visit to the USA with mixed feelings: 
'The USA is a nice place, but one went there to work and they 
caught us and threw us into jail. They beat some of us up very 
badly. They kept us in a tiny room where we could only fit 
standing on our feet, like in a packet of cigarettes. Fortunately I 
ended up very close to a window and I could puff and pant. One 
runs huge risks in USA as Mexican. Since then I haven't gone back 
to USA and none of my children have been there. All of them have 
done practical or vocational training. The eldest is working in 
Mexico City as a computer programmer, The others are still living 
with us'. 
Ernesto, like most of the sugarcane producers in Escondido, remembers 
how they started to grow sugar cane. He said that not even the refinery 
engineers knew much about it in the beginning and so they all learnt 
together. He claimed that they used to use the fertilizers for their other crops 
and neglected their cane. The mill paid 57 pesos per tonne for the cane and 
often made them wait until August, three months after the harvest, for their 
money. It was not until Echevarría came into power that this situation 
improved. He received 900 pesos for the first harvest which he considered 
very little and he switched to milo-maize, but it turned out be as bad as the 
cane, so he planted cane again. At least with the cane he could get credit 
from the refinery and access to the health service. 
Ernesto had mango trees before he planted sugarcane and it had been 
quite profitable but the market had collapsed so he grew tomatoes. He did it 
for two years, a small area the first season and as they did well he planted a 
bigger area. This led him into debt but he did not try to go back and work in 
the USA. He planted other crops, but like the tomatoes and mangos, he 
always hit a point when the market was very bad for the crop. At one time 
he had papaya trees and he liked the fact that they could cut the fruit and 
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take it to the market every week and bring back some money back, but again 
the market collapsed and he changed crop. He still peanuts, beans, water-
melon, tomatoes, papaya and mangos and sugarcane. He mentioned that he 
was among the first sugarcane producers in Escondido, and although it 
brought few returns to begin with they continued to grow it because it 
entitled them to free medical care. Although they constantly repeat that the 
medical service provided is not very good, it is better than nothing. 
However, after the Presidential Decree of 1979, which laid down new 
and better conditions for the producers, sugarcane became a more profitable 
crop to grow. Ernesto did most of the work himself and had not hired 
anyone since 1970, except to do the cutting and cheat immediately after. This 
saved him money and he noticed that since he had been taking care of his 
canes himself, their yield had improved. He obtained over one hundred 
tonnes per hectare in the 1986 harvest. The money he draws from the credit 
department in the refinery to cover wages, he pays to himself. Though he 
complains that what the mill allows them is not enough to hire a local tractor 
and driver. The last time it had been 40,000 pesos more than the amount 
provided. But Ernesto thinks that it is worth paying out of his own pocket 
for it; the tractor driver he hires is very conscientious and levels the land 
very precisely, which makes watering easier. He also complains that the 
officers in charge of the irrigation system are not always very efficient and 
they cut the water supply to avoid drowning a neighbouring plot that is due 
to be cut, even though it might damage Ernesto's sugar cane. Thus on the 
whole he claims to be quite content with the conditions under which they 
produce sugarcane. 
He has never been keen on animal husbandry, and has never worked out 
whether it could be profitable. He mentioned that his father-in-law gave them 
a cow when they were married but he did not accept it. Later on he bought a 
cow with money saved from the peanut harvest and his grandfather gave him 
another. He then went and bought two 'spotty ones' and very soon there 
were seven but it was too much work and he sold them. Some years later he 
had pigs but they caught a disease and he also got rid of them. Ernesto 
considers that it is better to have some animals that none at all. He 
mentioned that he once bought a cow for $4,800 pesos and sold her for 
$28,000 pesos five years later. At that moment he was satisfied with only 
having chickens because they were less fuss but provide the family with eggs 
and poultry. 
Ernesto had participated in the ejido administration as treasurer, before 
he became a Jehovah's Witness. He also once worked for the municipality 
but he found it very demanding because people were difficult and tend to 
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speak badly of anybody holding a public post. Like the other Jehovah's 
Witnesses, Ernesto's family have rebuilt their home in a modern style which 
contrasts with the majority of the other houses in Escondido, that retain their 
native architecture. They have contributed to the construction of a Kingdom 
Hall in the village, where they hold regular meetings. They also go around 
the ejido proselytizing, but without much success. The membership of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses in Escondido (about 20 adults and children) has 
remained the same since they started in the early 1980's. They are pointed 
out by the other ejidatarios because they do not attend the assemblies and 
refuse to cooperate in any festivities organized by the ejidal committee. They 
are accused of being traitors to Mexico, their motherland, because their 
children do not participate in the weekly ceremony at school where they sing 
the national anthem and salute the national flag. However, they are not 
ostracized and have reached a compromise with the other ejidatarios, and 
instead of cooperating in celebrations they use their contribution to do 
improvement work in the community. 
Being an active member of the Jehovah's Witnesses has kept Ernesto 
from political participation, and this has also restricted his involvement with 
the association of sugarcane producers, thus reducing his opportunities to 
benefit from any of the economic resources available through these channels. 
However, Ernesto, like the other four members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, 
has improved his livelihood through hard work, and thriftiness. He 
considers, like most ejidatarios in Escondido, that sugarcane is a profitable 
crop, providing one does all the hard work oneself. 
Sebastian Posada: Sugarcane and Public Services 
Sebastian Posada Limón is Escondido's elected representative for the 
municipality and he also participates in different local committees such as the 
parent teach association of the primary school. People in Escondido say that 
he is ambitious and a bit of a crook. They comment that his reasons to 
participate so willingly in all these different public activities is just to see 
what he can grab. He has inherited his father's ejidal rights. The plot is one 
of the very few that is all irrigated, allowing him to grow cane on all eight 
hectares. He also has a herd of sixty cattle. At one point he had over one 
hundred animals, but he had to sell some because it was becoming very 
difficult and expensive to provide pasture. "The government", he 
commented: 
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'does not give any attention to cattle breeders. There are no 
protected prices for the cattle. The best thing is to have a butcher's 
shop. I have suggested to the association of cattle breeders that we 
should administer the slaughter house, but we do not seem able to 
reach an agreement about it. You are making me say what I don't 
want to say, but catde breeding is only profitable if you buy catde 
for slaughtering, and for the those who want to launder their 
money. Some cattle owners are very rich, too rich to believe they 
made their money just from cattle; there is no honest way to make 
so much money in such a short time. Truly honest tomatoes 
producers and cattle owners end up as they start - immaculately 
poor'. 
Sebastian has been going to 'the north' regularly for short periods since 
1958, and he managed to save the money that he invested in cattle. Some 
years ago there were none of the problems that he now faces in getting hold 
of pasture. T planted melons ten years ago in the 1970Y he said, 
'but the American companies stole from us the major part of our 
production. They said that they were going to pay us twelve or 
thirteen dollars for each cradle and when we handed over our 
production they paid us what they pleased. In some cases we ended 
up in red numbers. I could not sleep. I grew melons for two 
seasons on one yunta [his half a plot of four hectares]. After that 
we decided to try our luck with sugarcane. But before growing 
sugarcane I grew maize, but the credit from the agricultural bank 
did not cover all the expenses, and they decide when a yield is 
good or not. Thus the insurance refused to pay us back what we 
have spent. The last time I planted maize, it was in a rainfed plot 
that I rented and I did not ask for credit. However, the prices were 
not high enough to make it profitable. They are paying $350,000 
for hybrid maize and $400,000 for white maize. But you need three 
workers to harvest the fourteen hectolitres that a hectare produces 
and that alone costs you $45,000 to $60,000 pesos.'9 Then you 
have to remove the grain from the cob and take it to the depot 
where they would only pay you $350,000. It is not worth the 
effort. Sugarcane is a bit more profitable, though it only became 
profitable four years ago. Before then it only left us in debt to the 
refinery. This last time, it was two years ago, and I planted 
sugarcane again on the eight hectares. But I don't draw credit for 
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all the work. I only borrow what is indispensable because it is very 
expensive. This year we are paying up to 50% interest [a bit less 
than the rate at that time].' 7 ) 
Sebastian's sugarcane yield is high, he harvested over a thousand tonnes 
in the 1988 season from his eight hectares. He explained to me that he buys 
more fertilizer than the amount recommended by the extension workers in 
the sugar refinery. He waters the plots with the help of one of his brothers 
and he is always alert to whatever he can do to improve the yield. Sebastian 
considers that one serious problem with the organization of production and 
the distribution of water, is that everybody takes advantage of their position 
at work to increase their personal wealth. He recalled Maximino's account 
(president of the CNC association) of why he had asked Jacinto to step down 
as secretary of the association. He had abused his position by asking to 
borrow ten million pesos of the sixty the manager of the sugar mill had 
offered to the CNC association, without interest. Maximino had told Jacinto 
not to accept the offer because it would make them obliged to the mill and 
that would weaken their hand in fighting for the producer's rights. He 
claimed that Jacinto, however, had gone behind his back and borrowed the 
ten million from the mill management and that had really annoyed him. He 
also accused Jacinto of making a pass at a young girl who used to work in 
the office. Sebastian had told Jacinto to confront Maximino about his 
accusation, as people would otherwise believe everything Maximino had 
said. But Jacinto decided to avoid a confrontation and stopped attending the 
assemblies. Sebastian did not understand why Jacinto did that.' 
Sebastian was willing to give to Jacinto Rojo the benefit of the doubt but 
would not stick his neck out for him. However, he had very strong opinions 
against the local teacher Jacinto Rosas. He mentioned that he had too many 
activities beside his teaching and his pupils were the sufferers since he was 
often not at school doing his job properly. He spent a lot of time in Autlan 
politicking in the municipal offices and the PRI quarters, and the pupils were 
left on their own. Other ejidatarios commented that Sebastian was greedy and 
had wanted to rent the school land to grow sugar cane and had also wanted 
the school to sell him its pastures very cheaply, but that the teacher Jacinto 
was careful with the money and would not allow Sebastian to get away with 
it. Somebody else mentioned that when Sebastian was the treasurer of the 
school parents association the teacher Jacinto had asked for an enquiry into 
the association's accounts. Sebastian retaliated by accusing him of absenting 
himself from school to the loss of his students. As municipal agent, Sebastian 
had to collect the individual contributions for the street lighting and water, 
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and people thought he kept the money in his account longer than was 
necessary so that he could pocket the interest. He is a lively character and by 
local standards wealthy. He owns a small lorry, cattle and eight hectares 
planted with sugarcane. He moves around and knows people in the 
government offices in Autian and El Grullo, which makes him suspicious to 
some of the ejidatarios in Escondido. He would like to be elected ejidal 
Comisariado but most ejidatarios do not trust him. However, he managed to 
be appointed municipal agent. 
Sebastian Posada was not among the pioneers of sugarcane in the valley. 
When the refinery started he was busy pursuing other economic activities 
which he thought more profitable than growing sugarcane. At the beginning 
of the 1970's he spent long periods working on both sides of the boarder 
with the USA. He returned to Escondido to live permanently when his father 
transferred his ejidal rights to him. Sebastian had cattle, bought with the 
saved while working in the USA. He had only be back a short time when he 
came to the conclusion that sugarcane would be a profitable and relatively 
safe crop to grow. Thus he immediately turned all the land his father had left 
him into sugarcane and the income, added to what he obtains from raising 
catde, provides him with a good income, above the average for Escondido. 
Sebastian has very good relations with the local representatives of the PRI in 
Autian and he nurtures his friendship with Maximino Castillo, President of 
the CNC association. He was not coaxed into growing sugarcane, as Ernesto 
Rojo or Sonia Ramos had been, when it was unprofitable to do so. Sebastian 
has always obtained a good return from his investment in it. Ernesto Rojo 
and Sonia Ramos planted sugarcane in the 1970's but they could not live 
from what they received from it thus the former turn over the canes and 
grew other crops; the latter kept working in the USA. Both Sonia and 
Ernesto have participated in the ejidal administration but they have not 
extended their networks as Sebastian managed to do. Ernesto has religious 
reasons to keep himself out of political commitments. Sonia spent several 
years working in USA and being a woman thinks that is better to leave 
political dealings to men, who have less domestic responsibilities and can 
move around more easily. 
Sonia Ramos: 'God and the North are Better than Growing Sugarcane' 
How and when Sonia Ramos came to grow sugarcane on a small part of her 
shaggy plot, highlights different aspects in the reasons for and process of 
deciding to grow sugarcane. The daughter of Felix Ramos, discussed in the 
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previous section, she was the first woman to become treasurer of the Ejido 
Escondido. As mentioned, Sonia's husband died in 1964 leaving to her his 
ejidal plot. She was with child at the time. In order to pay back the debt that 
her husband had with the Ejido Bank, Sonia had to sell twenty-two 
hectolitres of maize, which was all they had left from the harvest. She and 
her three children and the one to be born had to move in with her father for 
a while. Don Felix paid for the midwife when the child was born and bought 
her weekly provisions as a payment for the fodder he took from Sonia's plot. 
As soon as Sonia recovered from the shock of her husband's death and the 
birth of her fourth child, she took responsibility herself for the plot and eked 
out her income preparing meals on Sundays. With the money she earned, she 
bought the weekly groceries and fuel. The maize she produced in her plot 
was consumed by her family, her two cows and her father's cattle. She 
worked very hard to maintain her children in school. 
In 1968 when the eldest child completed elementary and expressed his 
desire to continue his studies, Sonia was worried. He would have to attend 
the secondary school in Autlan and that would imply spending more than she 
could afford, which is why she decided to go 'north'. Chole, her mother-in-
law offered to take care of the children and she took a bus to Mexicali, Baja 
California, where Chole had a sister who offered Sonia a room to live in. 
She recalled how she cried all the way to Mexicali. It was the first time she 
was going to be separated from her children for several months. She found a 
job in a tortilleria but it was unbearably hot and badly paid, thus she moved 
to a clothes factory where she worked as sewer, earning forty pesos a day 
(when the a day's pay in Escondido was twenty pesos), thus she could save 
very little, also because Chole's relatives were poor and she spent most of 
her salary paying their bills. As she said: T was eager to work hard and I 
accepted without complaints the unpaid extra time that very often we were 
expected to put into the factory. In eight months, besides sending a monthly 
cheque to cover her children's expenses, she managed to save enough to buy 
the first communion dresses for her daughters and very little else so she went 
back to Escondido. 
In 1970, Sonia was very apprehensive about their meager income and 
she wrote to her uncle Isaac who was at that time working in California. He 
offered to look for a 'coyote' to help Sonia cross the American boarder 
illegally. She went to Tijuana and was driven to San Diego, California, 
where she was put on a plane to Los Angeles. Sonia found a job as maid in 
Palo Alto where she was paid thirty five dollars a week. She sent fifty 
dollars to Chole, her mother-in-law every two weeks and fifty dollars to her 
father every two months. She had to pay back the two hundred dollars that 
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the 'coyote' charged her for crossing into the USA. Sonia worked with a 
family for a year until she found a better paid job in a china factory, where 
she earned sixty five dollars a week, though without food and lodging. 
In 1970, Don Felix wrote to his daughter asking for approval to grow 
sugarcane on her plot. Sonia agreed to it and sent back a signed lease 
contract in his name. She remembered that they did not obtain any profit 
from growing sugarcane, giving much the same reasons as the others who 
had grown it in the early period. Isaac (Sonia's father's brother) was told 
once that after the liquidation he still owned to the mill seventeen cents, he 
was infuriated and threw them a copper coin of twenty cents to settie his 
debt. 'To me God and the north, not the sugarcane!' she said 'If I had 
counted on the profits from the canes I would not have my house. I went to 
work in the north to earn money and build my house and sustain my 
children's education'. 
When Sonia came back from the USA, she asked her father to give her 
back the money that she had been sending to build a house. Felix said that at 
that precise moment there were only six hundred pesos left in the bank. She 
asked him to find the money so she could buy the materials to build her 
house. He did it reluctantly. She remembered the prices for the bricks and 
cement: eighty pesos for a hundred bricks and nineteen pesos for each bag of 
cement. Sonia wonders if what her father gave her from growing sugarcane 
on her land was the right amount but she had no way of finding out and 
preferred to forget about it and keep her good relations with her father. 
When the money had gone, she went back to work on 'the other side'. This 
time her oldest son, Samson, accompanied her. He remained in the USA 
when Sonia came back. She took over from her father the growing of sugar 
cane and continued building the new house and meanwhile her son sent the 
money to finish it. 
Sonia has only one and half hectare planted with sugar cane and earned 
800,000 pesos from the 1987 harvest. She considered sugarcane could be a 
good business if you had five or more hectares planted with it. She thinks 
that Maximino, current leader of the CNC sugarcane producers, had done a 
good job defending the producers rights against the refinery administration, 
though his probity had been tarnished by some of his latest actions: 
'He told us that we shouldn't cash our advance payment [for the 
harvest] because the mill administration was charging very high 
interests rates on it; I like many other stupid sugarcane producers 
therefore did not pick up my check, and he opened a bank account 
with our money. When we received our final accounts and noticed 
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that they had discounted from it the advance payment, Maximino, 
without acknowledging that we had only followed his 
recommendation, explained he had cashed the checks that had not 
been picked up to avoid the administration sending them back to 
Mexico City. He paid back the money, but without the interest that 
it had accumulated for several months. To the farmers who 
complained he gave a blanket at the end of the harvest'. 
Sonia knows Jacinto Rojo, the current Comisariado of ejido Escondido 
very well. She confirmed that he had been secretary of the CNC association 
for several years until he fell out with Maximino, who has been discrediting 
him in public as a crook and philanderer. Sonia praises Jacinto's 
performance as Comisariado. As the treasurer of the ejido Sonia always 
hands to him the money he asks for. She thinks he is honest, though 'like all 
men a womanizer'. However, Sonia complained that nothing happens in the 
ejido, because Jacinto is too busy on his own and his rented plots to take 
care of ejido affairs. Since he fought with Maximino he had topped going to 
the CNC offices, cutting off the direct links that ejidatarios in Escondido 
have had with the CNC for many years. Sonia mentioned that nobody knew 
what exactly happened between the two of them. 
Sonia wanted to go to California to visit her son and two daughter living 
but could not leave while the deputy treasurer was away. When the deputy 
treasurer came back, Sonia went to visit her children in California. Her son 
had sent the money for her air fare and she stayed there for five weeks. 
When she came back she sold her sow for $330,000 pesos. She kept the nine 
piglets, the cow and its calf and the turkeys, chickens and chicks for her own 
consumption. Because she lives in her own she is always giving away eggs, 
chickens and maize from her rainfed plot. She distributes them among her 
only daughter who still lives in Escondido, and her other siblings in the 
ejido. Sonia considered that keeping animals is not a profitable activity from 
an economic point of view. She buys a sack of fodder that costs $22,500 that 
the piglets consumed in ten days; the piglets and the cattle ate $300 pesos of 
alfalfa daily plus maize that she grows herself. Without taking into 
consideration her work and the maize that she harvested, Sonia had to 
expend $31,500 pesos a months to feed her large animals. She sold only the 
pigs and after feeding them for six to ten months they fetched only around 
$300,000 pesos each ($100 US dlls). But although she considers the profit 
negligible, "keeping animals is like having a piggy-bank" and it does make a 
small contribution to her income, perhaps more than she receives from 
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growing sugarcane. The cow produces only around two litres that Sonia 
delivers to her two year old granddaughter. 
Every morning, just after five o'clock, before the local bus clatters 
around Escondido hooting its horn and picking up the youngsters who study 
in Autian, Sonia takes the nixtamaf to the mill, then, around six o'clock in 
the morning she milks the cow, then she takes it and the calf to pasture, 
during the rainy season to the skirts of the hills or the sides of the canals, 
and after the harvest, to her land to consume the left over stalks of maize. 
Soma, like most women in Escondido, drags herself to the tortilleria mill, 
not only to grind the cooked maize into a dough to make tortillas, but also to 
keep updated on village affairs. Sonia's daily schedule is punctuated with 
attending her animals, feeding and milking the cow and pigs and cleaning 
their sty. After breakfast, she sweeps the back yard where chickens and 
turkeys scrape around, and feeds them. All these activities are performed 
before nine o'clock when her granddaughter and mother pass by on their 
way to the kindergarten. Sonia usually has a sweet or a fruit for her to take 
to school. After that she goes to work on her land when there is work to do, 
even when she has hired somebody to do it for her, when she goes to take 
the farm workers food and checks on their work. When she does not have 
those activities she has to go and wait for the water guard to book her 
irrigation turn. 
The daily tasks are interwoven with the weekly activities. At the latest 
on Tuesday morning, Sonia, like the other sugarcane producers, has to go 
the office of the extension department at the refinery to report the works she 
has done on her sugarcane and ask them to book the costs which will be 
discounted from her account when she delivers the sugar cane from the 
harvest. Around mid-day on Friday, sugarcane producers have to visit the 
sugar mill again, but this time to the credit department where they pick up 
their checks which can be deposited or cashed at the International Bank in El 
Grullo. Because most of the sugarcane producers need the cash immediately 
and the bank closes at 13.30 hrs, they have to rush to the bank to get their 
money, and they turn the bank into a friendly gathering place, where they 
talk loudly to each other and joke with the bank employees. Sonia tries to 
avoid the crowds and prefers to cash her checks some other time, usually 
going to town early after the weekend. 
To Sonia's chagrin she was elected the treasurer of the ejido, which she 
considers is not a woman's job. She commented: 
'My compadre Jacinto told me that it would be better to have 
women as treasurers because they are more honest than men. I did 
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not want to become treasurer, it is a job for men not for women 
and it takes so much time. But Isaac, my uncle, refused to be re-
elected and the other possibilities were not much trusted by the 
ejidatarios. So I had to accept. But I want the time to run out fast 
and give back the books and bank accounts to the next victim'. 
Sonia complains about the lack of commitment and participation on ejido 
works. Nobody wants to take on the responsibility for doing the maintenance 
work on the roads to the ejido or the canals. In September 1988, they had to 
hire forty-five workers to clean the roads. Some ejidatarios cooperated with 
their labour, others, provided some money for the wages to hire workers. 
Sonia went to the CNC offices to ask Maximino to lend them a machine to 
do the road works that the rains had left impassable. He agreed, but the ejido 
had to pay for the operators wages and fuel. However the use of the machine 
was of great help and not unduly expensive. Very soon after the cleaning of 
the roads Sonia had to organize the hiring of eight construction workers to 
build the classrooms for the television secondary school. The Minister of 
Education provided the material to build the classrooms but the community, 
in this case Escondido, had to contribute the labour either directiy or in 
money to hire labour. Sonia had to go around the ejido for the contributions. 
Very few gave without complaining, some argued that they did not have 
children who might benefit from the school, others just complained about the 
frequency of the contributions they were expected to make to the ejido. 
Though Sonia got tired and exasperated with the responses, she was always 
polite and understanding. Her main complaints were that the ejidatarios had 
become self-satisfied individualists, who only cared about themselves, and 
because of that she had to spend more time than should have been necessary 
putting moral pressure on them to comply with ejido demands. Sonia 
commented about the people of Escondido: 
'People around here are real trouble makers. They don't want to do 
anything. They think that by giving their contributions they have 
fulfilled their obligations towards the community. We are very 
divided and suspicious of each other. Isaac (her uncle) always asks 
them, when he was elected and re-elected as treasurer, if he was 
the only one who had been taught by his mother to respect other 
people's property!'. 
Sonia's comments depict the economic and political transformation that 
the ejido has undergone over the last forty years. The town looks clean and 
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the houses attractive; most ejidatarios consider that they have achieved a 
decent standard of living, though they also complain that things are getting 
difficult with unbridled inflation. However, ejidatarios miss the long lost 
solidarity among themselves, which propelled them to fight against the 
landlords for a plot of land. Sonia remembered that they were more united 
when their living conditions were hard: 
'Years ago life was hard. The woman was worn out quickly. She 
had to prepare breakfast and lunch and take them to the plot. She 
had to set the nixtamal on a hearth, feed the children. She washed 
the cloths in the canals to avoid having to draw water from the 
well. She got soaked and then warmed her feet as she hung out the 
clothes on the shrubs to dry. Most men did not gather enough wood 
and the women had to go with a machete into the bush and cut it 
herself, and while the men lounged around the street corners 
gossiping and drinking, the women carried the wood on their 
backs. The man was supposed to supply the maize, collect the 
wood, and maintain the wooden fences. But many men, most of 
them, did not retain enough maize to sell when prices were better, 
but preferred to sell at half price at harvest time to buy booze. The 
women had to look around and find someone to buy maize from. It 
had to be done at night when the man arrived home because men 
always carried all the money in their trouser pockets. That was 
machismo. I am certain that if I were young now I wouldn't marry, 
I would remain free and sovereign. We did not have electricity, the 
animals ran free around the place. In the evening, if one went out 
we had to be careful not to trip over cows and pigs. Most people 
did not maintain their fences and we had to watch our animals to 
finish their fodder and discourage other animals to come and snatch 
their food. We did not know about 'the North'. The only thing we 
knew from there was the tin of sardines that we opened with a 
knife, running the risk of cutting a finger. We made our clothes of 
poplin that we had to iron carefully and we patched the garments 
until they look like a map. How many people do you see wearing 
patched clothes these days? They prefer to throw clothes away than 
to patch them. There in the norm there are many conveniences. The 
houses are carpeted and you don't need to sweep them. You 
vacuum the carpets and mop the kitchen linoleum that is very 
popular out there. But despite our poverty we were more united 
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and helped each other. It was not like now, when ejidatarios sell 
their rights without notifying anyone'. 
According to Sonia, going to work in the USA has been the most 
profitable enterprise for most families in Ejido Escondido, as it was for her. 
With the money they save they start to build their brick houses. Though she 
thinks that nowadays if one have five or more hectares planted with cane one 
could make a good living out of it. Sonia only has one and a half, but she 
considers that the fringe benefits to which she is entitled as a sugarcane 
producer makes it worthwhile. She ekes out her meagre income from 
sugarcane with the money her son sends regularly and she grows maize on 
the land that is not suitable for cane. 
All those described in this chapter have consolidated their incomes by 
growing sugarcane and they are active members of Escondido in different 
ways: Sebastian as municipal agent, Sonia as treasurer to the ejidal 
committee. However, none of them have been directly involved in the 
organization of sugar cane production as the ejidatarios who will be 
presented in Chapter 4. 
Jacinto Rosas: Waiting for the Right Time to plant Sugarcane 
Jacinto Rosas has been for several years headmaster of the elementary school 
in Escondido. He promoted the planting of sugarcane in the area but 
cunningly waited until it was profitable before he substituted his staple crops 
for cane. He was born in Escondido in 1926 and has always lived in the 
ejido. He recalls the stories heard from his father, the same as those told by 
all the old ejidatarios. He was a baby when the Cristeros attacked and burnt 
the village. His mother had told him about it. They took their horses, 
donkeys and every possession that they could get their hands on. The only 
blanket left to his family was the one in which Jacinto was wrapped. Jacinto 
remembers that it was Captain Arnulfo Diaz, the one in charge of the federal 
troops who pursued the Cristeros to a nearby village, where they held out for 
three days before they surrendered. Some months after the siege and the 
murder of Captain Diaz, men from Escondido joined the federal army to 
fight against the Cristeros around Sayula. 
Eleven men of Escondido joined the federal army under Trinidad 
Carreon's command. When the military campaign was over, the officers 
made a census among the soldiers. From Escondido, Trinidad was asked to 
provide the names of males who would be entitled to receive a plot of land 
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when the agrarian reform law was implemented. Don Trinidad wrote down 
the names of all the men he knew would qualify, among them Jacinto's 
name. But there were not enough land to grant a plot to all petitioners and he 
was young and without family responsibilities thus he had to wait a few 
years until the first extension of Ejido Escondido to receive his plot. Jacinto 
works his land together with two other plots whose rights belong to his 
mother and mother-in-law. 
Jacinto's brother decided to migrate permanently to the USA and agreed 
to give Jaime Juan, Jacinto's son, the ejidal right to his four hectares of land. 
Later on another ejidatario gave up his ejidal rights and left the village 
because he was very embarrassed by his wife's affair with Tacho. He left a 
debt with the bank and Jacinto and another ejidatario asked the Ejidal 
Committee if they could pay back the debt and divide the plot between them. 
The committee accepted and in this way, Jaime Juan was given four hectares 
to make up his land to the size of the average ejido plot in Escondido. Some 
years later, Juana, the daughter of the ejidatario who left, on the advice of 
José the Wolf, an ejidatario from Escondido with good networks in the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Mexico City, tried to recover the ejidal 
rights that her father had relinquished, but they took the case to the Agrarian 
Reform offices and with a recommendation from a local power broker, 
Guadalupe Zuno, Jaime Juan won the case. 
Jacinto's dealings with the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agrarian 
Reform have always been resolved in his favour and, according to him, 
without having to bribe anybody. This might have been possible because 
Jacinto's connection at different levels of the political framework. He was 
very active in local politics when the refinery was installed. He remembered 
that some sugarcane producers from Casimiro Castillo came to the valley to 
explain how to grow sugarcane. He was Comisariado of Escondido, a 
position from which he could cajole other ejidatarios in Escondido to offer 
some of their ejidal land in 'La Tuna' for the refinery though the commission 
finally chose 'La Calera', a more convenient place close to the main road 
that crosses the valley longitudinally. Jacinto commented that some 
ejidatarios in Escondido were among the first sugarcane producers. 
Jacinto did not have any qualms about advising his fellow ejidatarios to 
plant sugarcane while he continued to grow traditional crops and waited for 
the new crop to prove its comparative benefits. He knew the people involved 
in the organization and running of the agricultural machinery depot that was 
funded by FIN AS A5* very well, and knew that the first growers would bear 
the brunt of the considerable initial costs and that the sugarcane producers 
contribution would be discounted from their final accounts after the harvests. 
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Jacinto recalls that the sugarcane producers were annoyed with El Feo and 
Mariano Enciso (in charge of die machinery owned by the sugarcane 
producers): 
'When they auctioned the depot because they had not paid back the 
credit to FINASA, the producers were annoyed that bad 
administration had pushed the machine depot into bankruptcy. They 
were also very angry about the house, which had been bought for 
the offices of the depot, and was in El Feo and Enciso's names. 
They never found out what happened to that property'. 
Jacinto remembered that when they were negotiating the building of the 
refinery in the valley there were lots of expenses sending commissions to 
Mexico City and Guadalajara and when people from different governmental 
institutions came to check if they were really committed to grow sugarcane, 
they had to organize dinner parties with 'mariachi' (a vernacular music 
band). The frequent commissions that were sent accumulated a big debt 
which according to Jacinto was later on charged to the first sugarcane 
producers. People from Autlan participated very actively in the negotiations 
to bring the sugar mill into the valley. He recalled those early days: 
'There were a lot of improvised technicians and workers among the 
first workers in the sugar mill. Some of them did not know a thing 
about anything. I saw how much money the mill charged to the 
sugarcane producers as shared expenses and decide I was better off 
cultivating maize, and in a smaller scale beans, courgettes, chile 
and tomatoes. But my commitments with the school leave very little 
time to be expended in agriculture. Thus I decided to plant 
sugarcane because it is a crop that could wait for its tilling, 
fertilizing and insecticides without suffering for it. I made some 
profit since the first harvest. I have 3.5 hectares of sugarcane, that 
is all the irrigated land I have; in the other part of my plot I 
produce maize and milo maize. I also have cattle, only twenty two 
heads, three horses and chickens. The maize I produce is for my 
family and for fodder for my animals, I don't sale any'. 
Jacinto's son, Jaime Juan cultivates 3.5 hectares of sugarcane that 
belong to his mother along with his own sugarcane plot and he is also in 
charge of the animals and production on the rainfed land. His involvement in 
the family's agricultural production has been of great help to Jacinto who at 
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different times has occupied several public posts in the ejido administration 
and on the municipal council in Autlan, which combined with his school 
commitments, have made it difficult to care for the land. 
Jacinto works both morning and afternoon shifts at the school. He is 
very proud of the school and is the one in charge of organizing a parade on 
Revolution Day, the 20th of November. All the children in Escondido attend 
the elementary school and on that day march around the village, some 
wearing sparkling clean uniforms and others wearing the costumes of the 
beginnings of the century when the armed rebellion took place. Jacinto leads 
the contingent in its parade, which often culminates in a festival in the plaza 
where children dance and sing revolutionary songs and recite patriotic 
poems. Jacinto initiates the festival reminding his audience about the courage 
of the Mexican peasants who fought for land and freedom and who made 
possible the agrarian reform from which they had benefitted so much. The 
proud parents, except the Jehovah's Witnesses, attend the festival wearing 
their best clothes and the atmosphere is convivial. 
Jacinto, like the majority of ejidatarios in Escondido, knows that in spite 
of the inherent problems, the revolution did change the socio-political 
conditions in Mexico and he is proud to have been part of it. However, he 
expressed despair of some government employees who he accused of being 
inefficient and corrupt. But Jacinto blames individuals not the government 
and still supports the ruling party that has been in power since the end of the 
armed struggle in the first decades of the century. In Jacinto's case it is very 
clear that he and his family benefitted from the agrarian reforms. 
Jacinto's mother was the midwife of Escondido and she encouraged and 
helped her children to get qualifications. Most of them became teachers like 
Jacinto who came back to work in Escondido. Jacinto has combined his 
educational training and political skills to secure a diversified source of 
income. He is one of the better-off ejidatarios in Escondido. His house 
stands next door to the gate that protects the village from stray cattle. It is a 
turn of century, roomy house, with high ceilings and long windows with 
wooden shutters. It is next door to the school where most of his daily 
activities take place. He owns a tractor and a two vehicles, a small car and 
lorry. 
Some ejidatarios complained that his many commitments outside the 
school affected their children's education. They also mentioned that he had 
profited from the funds that resulted from the school land that he had 
administered for the last ten years. Before then its administration had been 
taken in turn by different ejidatarios, which meant that the profits were 
shared around. There is a covert animosity against 'the teacher Jacinto', that 
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found outiet in the complaints that the parent teacher association of secondary 
students presented at die municipal offices of the Ministry of Education, 
opposing the appointment of Jaime Juan, Jacinto's son, as teacher in charge 
of the new television secondary school in the ejido, meant to start in 1989. 
They were vehemenfly against his appointment, to the point of threatening to 
withdraw their children from attending the secondary if the local person in 
charge of the Ministry had insisted on confirming Jaime Juan's appointment. 
This time the complainers managed to revoke the official decision and Jaime 
Juan's appointment was transferred to a nearby village. Some people in 
Escondido commented that Jaime Juan seemed a decent fellow who was 
paying for his father's errors. 
Jacinto Rosas has a more critical view of Maximino Castillo Arenas, the 
leader of the sugarcane producers association, than most ejidatarios in 
Escondido. In the monthly assemblies he has expressed his disagreements 
with decisions that Maximino has taken without consulting the majority of 
the members, as he is supposed to do according to association rules: 
T showed my disagreement with the arbitrary decision of charging 
every sugarcane producer a quota to buy water pumps that would 
not benefit us, the producers that already receive water from the 
Tacotan dam. The policy of the sugar mill, supported by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, is to expand the planting of sugarcane as 
much as possible. I'm sure the refinery convinced Maximino to 
spread the expense of buying the pumps that would benefit other 
farmers. But not happy with doing that, they reduced the water 
supply to our plots. They put pressure on our previous leaders but 
they refused to do it. But as soon as Maximino took power, he 
obliged us to buy the pumps. In an assembly, some sugarcane 
producers said yes, though nobody signed the consent. He has lot 
of female admirers that always cheer his decisions, regardless of 
their pertinence. However, I have to recognise he has managed to 
increase the price of sugarcane'. 
Jacinto was very surprised when I told him that I doubted very much 
whether the increase in the price of sugar cane had been mainly the result of 
Maximino's negotiations. I mentioned that as far as I knew, it had been 
decided in Mexico City between the national leaders the associations of 
sugarcane producers and the chief administrators in charge of the parastatal 
administering the state owned refineries. He just commented on how misled 
they had been by Maximino who had always emphasized that it was his own 
The Forerunners of Sugarcane Production in the Valley 95 
achievement. Jacinto distrusts Maximino's handling of the association but he 
said that most sugar cane producers were still content with his leadership. In 
spite of the mentioned complaints about Maximino's performance, Jacinto 
commented that he had attained more benefits for the sugarcane producers 
than Ramón Gordillo, the previous President, who is an ejidatario of 
Escondido. 
Jacinto Rosas was swaddled in a blanket hanging in a hammock when 
the Cristeros set fire to Escondido. His mother, Escondido's midwife, put 
him and his brothers and sisters through school. Jacinto and one of his sister 
continued their studies to obtain their teaching qualifications. Through 
teaching Jacinto became involved with the PRI and the teachers union, which 
is also affiliated to the PRI. With his political network he was in a position 
to develop an insider's perspective on the opening of the sugar refinery and 
therefore planted the crop himself when he knew it would be most profitable 
to do so. He has combined his teaching salary, sugarcane production, 
growing staples and keeping cattle, but he considers sugarcane to have been 
the keystone of his family's economic welfare, as do most sugarcane 
producers in Escondido. 
Conclusion 
The peasants of Escondido chose to grow sugarcane because it was a 
profitable cash crop. Sugarcane demands less working-days than other crops 
such as tomatoes or melons and is easier to grow than either of them. Some, 
like Anastasio 'Tacho' Plaza, Sonia and Felix Ramos, Ernesto Rojo, and 
Eduardo Lara combine sugarcane production with maize. Others have 
combined it with grazing cattle and most of them at different times of their 
family cycle have worked in the USA. Trinidad Carreon, Sebastian Posada 
and Jacinto Rosas have increased their family income by working for the 
municipal administration, while others like Adan Romo, Ramon Gordillo and 
Jacinto Rojo, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, have worked in the CNC 
association which has allowed them easier access to loans and credit from the 
refinery and the government development bank underpinning sugarcane 
production. A few members of Escondido have stopped growing sugarcane, 
such Mario Gama, who prefers to grow maize to feed his cattle. 
Ejidatarios in Escondido have improved their living conditions 
considerably in the last sixty years. The overwhelming majority have grown 
sugarcane for the last twenty years and are still convinced that it is by and 
large their best option. They have done so without surrendering control over 
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their livelihood to the refinery. Their experience of growing sugarcane does 
not resemble the precarious conditions of some sugarcane producers in other 
regions in Mexico. One reason is that Escondido ejidatarios had the choice 
about planting or not sugarcane. Thus these ejidatarios have been able to 
secure their livelihood by combining tilling the land with other economic 
activities. They are integrated not only to the national but the international 
labour market but they have not become Paré's proletarianised peasants. 
These ejidatarios have chosen to grow sugarcane because it provides them 
not only a reliable income but other perks like health service and access to 
credit, and it could be combined with other economic activities. As I 
described in this chapter, sugarcane profits were meagre at the beginning but 
they improved after a few years. This combined with the perks it came with 
and its small requirement of labour force, turn sugarcane into a convenient 
crop for the ejidatarios in the valley. Their decision was tried and tested and 
responded more to the ejidatarios' needs than the Mexican Government 
demands. In the next chapter I will describe the whereabouts of sugarcane 
producers who have been involved in the political organization of the CNC 
association and have benefitted from it. These ejidatarios have been able to 
consolidate their economic prospects through their work in the CNC 
association. 
NOTES 
1. Don Anastasio told me that the mayor had a grievance against Domingo 
Villasenor who was thought to have sent someone to kill the mayor's brother. 
2. See Diario Oficial, Monday, 22 Feb. 1932: 15-16. 
3. The available literature on sugar cane production in different countries 
emphasizes the dominant control that the sugar mill administration imposed on 
individual sugar cane producers. See **. 
4. In the early 1930s landless peasants from different villages in the Municipality 
of Autlan formed the Agrarian Committee, which would lobby on their behalf 
for access to a plot of land. 
5. The percentage of sucrose is calculated just before the juice extracted to the 
canes is crystallized and according to its level the mill has to pay an extra 
amount per point above a previously determinant level that was 8.3 point of 
sucrose at that time. 
6. The Mexican peso's exchange rate was 3,000 to an American dollar in 1987. 
7. Fifty percent interest was still lower than the commercial rate in Mexico at that 
time, which reached up to hundred per cent. 
8. Nixtamal is the dry maize corns simmered with chalk which after being ground 
it is used to make tortillas. 
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9. Governmental Financial Institution that funds the mechanization of sugar cane 
producers. 
CHAPTER 4 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND SUGARCANE PRODUCTION: 
WEALTHIER EJIDO SUGARCANE PRODUCERS 
In this chapter I describe the wealthier sugarcane producers in the valley of 
Autlân-El Grullo. They are the ones who were able to choose the right 
moment and the best conditions to jump onto the sugarcane wagon, 
combining diverse economic activities, including their participation in the 
sugarcane producers associations. They chose to grow cane when the 
majority of smaller producers had already paid the costs of its introduction 
and had set it onto a profitable track. These better off producers (private 
landowners and a few ejidatarios), not only have larger plots planted with 
sugarcane, but they also own other resources which they have invested in 
agriculture and other economic sectors i.e. in transport, commerce and the 
service sector. Eighty per cent of these larger farmers have plots of more 
than 4.1 hectares planted with sugarcane, and over 50% more than 8 
hectares - whereas figures for the ejidatarios show exactly the opposite, 70% 
of them have sugarcane plots smaller than 4 hectares, the average in 
Escondido being 2.7 hectares (see Table 1). This disparity in plot size, and 
the other assets owned by the better off sugarcane producers, provide the 
material conditions and base for their participation in the organization of 
sugarcane production. 
Middle- to large-scale farmers could afford to wait for the optimum time 
and conditions to plant sugarcane. Thus sugarcane production for these 
farmers has been a profitable enterprise from the beginning, unlike the 
experiences of most of the early producers discussed in Chapter 3. There is a 
wider range of difference among the larger farmers than is to be found 
among sugarcane producers in Escondido. There are 167 private landowners 
among the 929 sugarcane producers listed in the refinery's register for the 
harvest 1986-87. Although the plot size among private landowners varies 
widely, it tends to be larger than the eight hectares allocated to most 
ejidatarios. They not only own larger plots but they own better financial 
resources and have wider political networks, which have buttressed their 
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Table 1: 
SUGARCANE PRODUCERS IN THE VALLEY OF AUTLAN 
AND THEIR ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION 
A. Ejidatarios 
Hectare under CNC CNPP Total 
Cane affiliates affiliates 
(N) (%) (N) (%) (N) 
0.5 - 4.0 ha. 508 66.75 3 0.41 511 
4.1 - 8.0 ha. 233 30.61 0 0.00 233 
8.1 - 1 2 . 0 ha. 17 2.23 0 0.00 17 
12.1 - > 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 
TOTAL 758 99.59 3 0.41 761 
(100%) 
B. Small Landowners 
Hectare under CNC CNPP Total 
Cane affiliates affiliates 
(N) (%) (N) (%) (N) 
0.5 - 4.0 ha. 0 00.00 33 19.64 33 
4.1 - 8.0 ha. 18 10.71 30 17.85 48 
8.1 - 1 2 . 0 ha. 20 11.90 30 17.85 50 
12.1 - > 19 11.30 18 10.71 37 
TOTAL 57 33.91 111 66.05 168 
(100%) 
economic success and political consolidation as a group to be reckoned with 
in the organization of sugarcane production. This is particularly the case with 
the largest producers, who have joined the CNPP association, and are the 
subject of Chapter 5. 
Of the 167 private landowners in the valley who produce sugarcane for 
the refinery Melchor Ocampo, 111 of them (60%) have joined the more 
recenfly formed branch of the CNPP, instead of joining the group affiliated 
to the CNC. In spite of their smaller representation, the CNPP has carved 
out a space in the political arena where the administration of the refinery and 
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representatives of the two organizations of producers thrash out the 
conditions and terms of production. This chapter provides a discussion of the 
CNC producers and in Chapter 5, I discuss the members of the CNPP. The 
participation of middle- and large-scale producers in the politics of sugarcane 
production differs from the participation among small-scale ejidal producers. 
They begin with access to a wider economic and political resource base. The 
way in which these better off cane producers deal with the refinery 
administration and the political organizations, highlights the complex 
interweaving of different interests within the refinery administration, 
producer organizations and State politics in Mexico. As Pereyra (1981) 
points out, the Mexican State consolidated its protagonistic role through an 
all embracing corporativism in which different social groups and associations 
were able to find their place within the ubiquitous ruling political party, the 
PRI, which has been in power in Mexico for the last sixty years. Thus 
employees of the state owned refinery, Melchor Ocampo, and the producers 
affiliated to the two associations of the CNC and CNPP, are all involved in 
one way or another in state politics. Although they all have a place in the 
wide political umbrella provided by the PRI, they have not congealed into a 
homogeneous group. Each actor, pursuing his individual interests, has joined 
the political grouping within this larger whole, that suits best his heart and 
interests. How they have managed to do it within their own given 
circumstances is highlighted by the political disposition of the middle and 
large sugarcane producers depicted in the following sections of this chapter. 
Ejidatarios in the valley Autlan-El Grullo lobbied for the opening of the 
Melchor Ocampo refinery in their region, and pioneered sugar production. 
They have remained the main providers of sugarcane to the refinery, i.e of 
the 927 producers in the region, 761, or 81%, were ejidatarios in 1986. Of 
these, the ejidatarios from Escondido, affiliated to the CNC, played a leading 
role in the organization of production. There have been two Presidents or 
General Secretaries of the CNC from Escondido and until recently, there has 
always been an ejidatario from Escondido working in the CNC 
administration. How they became involved in the promotion of sugarcane in 
the region is pointed out by the ejidatarios that I present in the first section 
of this chapter. 
Adan Romo, Ramon Gordillo and Jacinto Rojo are sugar cane producers 
from Escondido whose participation in the CNC association provided them 
with new economic possibilities around sugarcane production, that is, easier 
access to credit than the majority of producers. The three of them have 
thrived on these economic advantages. The outcome of their participation, 
which is described below, highlights their transition from local to regional 
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arenas. Adán Romo participated in the early attempts to coax ejidatarios into 
planting sugarcane; he continued collaborating with the secretariat of the 
CNC organization until a political reshuffle left him out of it. During that 
political turnover, Ramon Gordillo was brought into the leadership of the 
CNC. Meanwhile Jacinto Rojo remained secretary throughout the leadership 
of his two friends from Escondido and survived them, when at the next 
elections for the secretariat both Adan and Ramon tried again to seize the 
leadership of the CNC but without success. Although the President who 
succeeded Ramon was not an ejidatario from Escondió, Jacinto Rojo 
remained in his post as secretary to the newly elected executive committee. 
Thus sugarcane producers from Escondido continued to have direct access to 
the secretariat of the CNC through Jacinto's intercession. 
In the second section of this chapter 1 present two vignettes of middle-
scale sugarcane producers from Autlán who have also had a high profile in 
the CNC - Manuel Enciso and Humberto Riesling. They are both active 
members of the PR! in Autlán. Enciso was involved in setting up the refinery 
in the valley and was put in charge of finding local labourers to work in it. 
He also rented land and planted sugarcane. Riesling has planted sugar cane 
on-and-off, as it has suited him, trying in the interim a variety of cash crops 
with mixed results, until finally returning to sugar cane in the 1980's. 
The process of differentiation in Ejido Escondido becomes very clear 
when we compare the sugarcane producers discussed in the first section of 
this chapter with those described in Chapter 3. Sugarcane producers involved 
in the political organization of its production have expanded their set of 
interests and the means to achieve them. These producers have acquired 
political and administrative experience which they have channelled 
successfully to their private benefit. The two sugarcane producers described 
in the second section highlights the creativity of social actors to bend the 
rules and play the system. Enciso and Riesling did not fulfil the legal 
requirements to obtain an ejidal plot but they found their way around them. 
The fact that they were town dwellers with good political networks facilitated 
their dealings to acquire legal rights to an ejidal plot. 
Leading Participation in the CNC Association of Sugarcane Production 
Political and administrative changes at national and local levels are to be seen 
in the participation of the leadership of the Melchor Ocampo refinery and the 
two producer associations formed in the second part of the 1970's. The five 
protagonists of this chapter have all participated, along with other ejidatarios 
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and private landowners, in the local CNC association. I recount the 
dwindling participation of Jacinto in the executive committee, which could be 
interpreted as a reduction in the power of the ejidatarios of Escondido to 
negotiate against the new leadership of the CNC. From the early days of the 
CNC, ejidatarios from Escondido were involved in setting up and 
consolidating the organization of sugarcane production in the valley and its 
committee had always included at least one member of the ejido. Adan, 
Ramon and Jacinto Rojo had participated the administration of ejido 
Escondido's affairs, and saw the installation of the refinery as an opportunity 
to expand their economic horizons. They got involved in sugarcane 
production as refinery employees and later as elected members of the 
executive committee in the CNC. All three of them crossed paths either in 
the extension department of the mill or in the CNC. All have successfully 
combined farming and political activities with migration for work. Thus 
although sugarcane is not the only source of income for most of the 
producers in Ejido Escondido, it is a substantial part of it, and what seems to 
be more important, it entities them to health coverage and a small state 
pension, two fringe benefits than most rural producers and dwellers in 
Mexico do not have. 
Adan Romo: Renting Land to plant Cane 
Adan Romo has grown sugarcane since the refinery opened. He has rented 
extra land to grow sugar from other ejidatarios in Escondido. Adan and his 
family moved out of Escondido to live in Autlán fifteen years ago; he 
explained that they had to move to town because his wife's job as a primary 
teacher in Autlán made it very difficult for her to travel everyday from 
Escondido. Public transport is not very frequent and spent many hours 
waiting at each end of the day. Also later, when their three daughters 
continued their education in town, it became peremptory for the whole 
family to move to Autlán. Thus Adan has to drive every day to his plot in 
Escondido, but he does not mind it. He mentioned that when he spends the 
odd night in their house in Escondido, he is always bored by some ejidatario 
with his problems. He prefers to live in Autlán and drive every day to work 
on his plots and those he rents and every month on the occasion when he 
attends the ejidal meeting. 
He has grown sugar since the beginning of the seventies. He mentioned 
that the mill had been a project promoted by General López Arreóla. Though 
built much closer to El Grullo than to Autlán it is within the municipal 
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boundaries of Autlan. According to Adan, ejidatarios from Escondido and 
Las Paredes were the first to plant sugarcane in the valley of Autlan-El 
Grullo. The seed plots for sugarcane were planted in 1969, when there was 
still plenty of cheap land to rent. Adan rented up to fourty hectares to 
produce sugarcane. He mentioned that Escondido had offered some of the 
ejidal land to built the factory, but the offer was not taken up and a place 
nearer to the main road was chosen. The members of the committee 
recognised that the mill would open up new economic possibilities and they 
were very cooperative with the people involved in lobbying for it. But not 
everybody was a keen as Adan to grow sugarcane, he recalled: 
'First they (refinery's employees) planted the seed plots of 
sugarcane when the sugar mill was being built. Then the inspectors 
from the extension department went around to each ejido and 
village encouraging people to grow sugarcane. In El Grullo, which 
is now a sugarcane producing ejido, the inspectors were almost 
thrown out. Today the food is ready and on the table; everybody 
wants to grow sugarcane. But I was told that there is not going to 
be any extension of sugarcane planting. The sugar mill is working 
to its limits and really the mill is suffering lots of mechanical 
failures. I planted my ejidal plot with sugarcane and immediately 
rented some other hectares. The rents were very cheap and from 
the beginning I made some profit because I worked extremely hard. 
I was not ashamed of working very hard, knowing this was going 
to leave me some money. I planted the canes myself and supervise 
every work that we needed to do to them. Some people had their 
minds very cloudy and they allowed the extension workers to do all 
the jobs on their plots. Some people do not even know when their 
canes were cut. Our leaders in the association bring their people to 
cut the cane and we should complain to them not to the sugarcane 
cutters because they are difficult people and when they get angry, 
and carrying their machete they could turn to be dangerous'. 
Adan Romo took over the presidency of the CNC association of 
sugarcane producers of the refinery Melchor Ocampo in 1976. It was a 
period of political changes among the sugarcane producers and Adan had to 
deal with different political groups at the regional and national level. Leaders 
from different national associations were trying to coax the participation of 
local sugarcane producers to join their respective associations. Adan 
remembers how the sugarcane producers in three sugar mills in that part of 
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the country were represented by José Maria Zarate, a regional strong 
political patron. Luis Rosales, (better known as 'EL Feo'), the first leader of 
the association belonged to the political group of General Lopez Arreola, 
which was the regional political contender of Zarate's group. This political 
tug-of-war shed a favourable light into Adan's abilities and his lack of strong 
political commitments to the general's group. Thus he was elected president 
of the sugarcane producers. Adan had a very difficult time trying to 
conciliate the antagonist political interests of the diverse groups among the 
sugarcane producers to the point that he could not complete his three years 
term and left after the second year. At that time the mismanagement of the 
'central' (a depot of agricultural machinery administrated by the CNC), that 
had been under the control of the previous president, came out into the open. 
Adan described the situation as very difficult: 
'El Feo (CNC leader) did not want to leave power. He had made a 
pig's ear of the depot. The Government gave us some machinery 
that we paid a bit with some shares we were obliged to buy and bit 
with what we paid to the central for the works they made on our 
land. But el Feo embezzled some money and he did not account for 
its performance as head of the depot to anybody. I once asked 
about our shares of the central to Soto Leyva, the national leader 
who came to the valley, I also demanded that we were given exact 
accounts of the deposits and drafts in the central's accounts. I 
wanted to open peoples's eyes... However, they auctioned off the 
machinery and sold it for pittances. There were several good big 
imported tractors and they gave them away. The sugarcane 
producers who suposely were share-holders did not even received a 
screw from the sell out'. 
Adan left the presidency after the confrontation with the administrators 
of the depot of machinery (the central), which seemed to have open a can of 
worms and became a sore point among sugarcane producers, without having 
been ever resolved. However, Adan is convinced hat he acted rightiy and he 
remained very much an active member of the organization. He still attends as 
often as he can all the meetings in the CNC. Some years later in Escondido 
he was elected general secretary of the ejidal committee. In that post he also 
ruffled some feathers in relation to the Rural Bank, he recounted the 
incident: 
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'There was a liquidation on our favour of one of the insurance we 
were entitled to, but the bank refused to give it to us. I fought the 
bank and I won. The problem is that ejidatarios are used to be 
screwed up by the bank all the time. Although I managed to obtain 
the whole liquidation for us, the current ejidal committee has not 
done anything about'. 
Adan considers that ejidatarios should learn how to deal with the 
different government officers. He mentioned that Maximino, the current 
CNC leader, should keep certain distance from the sugar mill administration; 
he commented about it: 'Maximino and the manager are like one person. But 
you know that chickens should not befriend wolfs'. Adan is very critical of 
Maximino's leadership. He mentioned that he spends the money of the 
association on expensive trips: 
'He recently went on holidays to Cuba, supposedly to work but he 
took with him his lover. It is very difficult to ask him anything in 
public because he manages to put you on the spot and make you 
look ridiculous'. 
Adan mentioned that when Maximino was elected for his first term, 
Ramon Gordillo from Escondido tried to be reelected. But there were some 
sugarcane producers who were in principle against re-election and did not 
want Ramón to remained as president of the association and decided to 
nominate Adan as a third candidate to snatch some of his votes. The plan run 
smoothly and Ramón lost by very few votes. Adán insisted that he did not 
want to be elected but he only accepted to run as candidate to curtail 
Ramon's chances of being re-elected and they succeeded. 
Adan is very critical of Maximino's administration, he mentioned that 
the organization of the cutting and transporting of the sugarcane in the last 
harvest (1987) lacked good coordination. He asked Riesling, the person in 
charge of the cane-cutting team, why the picking of the cane was lagging so 
much behind the cutting when everybody knows that cut sugarcane loses its 
saccharose content by the second. Riesling only passed the blame on to the 
refinery administration. Adan told me that Riesling knew he had lied, both 
knew nowadays the producers organization is the only responsible for the 
cutting and transporting of the sugarcane. The complains about the current 
administration of the CNC cover different aspects from inefficient 
organization of the cutting and transporting of canes to unfair charge to 
producers for the expenses of buying new water pumps; they were bought by 
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the organization, and according to Adan, they would only benefit a small 
number of sugarcane producers, who should be the only ones to pay for 
them and their maintenance. Adan complained that people accept 
acquiescently everything that Maximino says, but he is aware that without 
other producers support there is not very much he could do to curtail 
Maximino's tight hold of the association. Adan spoke out in a assembly 
without any success: 
T told Maximino to stop making us pay for those water pumps and 
their maintenance because they only benefit the ones from El Grullo 
who did not want to become sugarcane producers at the beginning 
and who have never help us with anything. And now we are 
helping them to pay those pumps for their exclusive benefit. We 
had to pay maintenance and repairs. People say that the manager of 
the refinery bought some land on that area and the pumps happen to 
benefit that area. We wrote a letter of complain to Maximino and 
he got angry and accused the one who signed it of being vermins. 
Some people are angry with him but they seem to be unable to get 
together and do something against him'. 
Adan praises the economic transformation that has taken place in the 
valley but he condemns the abuses of the government functionaries. He has 
decided to keep away from politics because it does not pay to spend time on 
it. He thinks that it is better to work on his own business and forget about 
public responsibilities that are always misunderstood: 
Tn the gatherings in Escondido when people are drunk they tell me 
things that they would not dare to say when they are sober. They 
have even suggested that I should run again for the presidency of 
the CNC but I have learnt that there is not anything better than 
minding my own business'. 
Adan still grows sugarcane in six and a half of his eight hectares ejidal 
plot. He complained that they stop renewing the contracts of the plot he used 
to rent. He remembers when he planted forty hectares of sugarcane. He is 
very proud of his yields, he claims to produce around two hundred tonnes in 
a hectare at the first cut and over one hundred on the following ones. He 
lives in Autlan in a roomy house where his married daughters and grand 
children visit them all the time. He drives backwards and forwards to his 
plot three or four times at day. He also has to go to the CNC offices and the 
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refinery's extension department. His wife Marcia, Jacinto Rosas's sister, 
joined the conversation to praise her husband: T am very thankful to God for 
the honest and hard work husband that he gave me'. Adan endured the 
compliment with subdued pride and he continued commenting on the 
sugarcane yield that he produces on his plot and how it always turns into a 
good profit at the end of the harvest. He emphasized that he has always 
obtained some profit from growing sugarcane, though it was only in the last 
ten years (since 1980) that it became highly profitable to grow it. 
Adan Romo, like the other ejidatarios of the younger generation in 
Escondido, has been able to do better that the majority of the older 
generation; he came of age when the irrigation system had already been built 
and he was always able to make some profit of growing sugarcane on his 
plots and the ones he managed to rent; his election as president of the CNC 
helped him to develop his networks, that are vital to find out about the 
available credits from the refinery and development banks, as much as to 
learn the best conditions to get hold of them. His wife's salary as a teacher 
in Autian provided the family with a regular but modest income. Adan's 
sugar cane contributed to keep the family in a comfortable standard of living 
without any of its members having to migrate to work in USA, as it is 
common in Escondido. 
Ramón Gordillo: Sugarcane, Medical Insurance and CNC Participation 
Ramón Gordillo received his ejidal rights from an uncle twenty five years 
ago. At that time he only grew maize and he had to migrate to work to the 
coastal region. His father gave him two cows when he got married and 
'working like donkey' with the help of his wife and children they managed to 
increase the herd to around fifteen cows. They were straight local cows that 
he had exchanged by small bulls of his herd, they were not of a good breed 
but produced some milk. He did not ask for credit to the bank to improve 
their yield, but he did go to work in USA twice to save some money, he 
commented: 
'Some time ago it was a good business to go and work in the north. 
But not now, everything is so expensive that you pay what you earn 
on living expenses. Anyway, I don't like towns, I prefer my 
village, we are used to living like the animals, alone. I do not like 
USA, you have to work really hard, if you don't work you don't 
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eat; you have to work all the time, even when you're sick or with a 
toothache'. 
In 1972 I planted sugarcane in the four hectares that are irrigated, the 
rest of his plot is above the canal and cannot be irrigated. Ramón mentioned 
that one of the reason to plant sugarcane was the possibility of receiving 
medical insurance for the whole family, he recalled: 
'I had a big family and in order to be entitle to medical services I 
planted sugarcane. It was a very bad business. With all the roads 
that had to be open, there were lot of expenses that we the 
sugarcane producers had to cover'. 
Ramón was the president of Ejido Escondido when the late general 
Lopez Arreóla brought the refinery to Autlán. He was given a job in the 
CNC association of sugarcane producers to supervise the cutting of the 
sugarcane. He was given a motorbike to move around the sugarcane plots. 
He could not remember exactly how the divisions among sugarcane 
producers came to be but he mentioned that after Luis Rosales (el Feo), the 
first general secretary of the CNC, three groups were formed among them, 
one from Autlán, one from El Grullo and one sponsored by Jose Maria 
Zarate. They reached an agreement and formed a tripartite alliance leaded by 
Adán Romo from Ejido Escondido. 
The money he obtained planting sugarcane in the 1970's was not 
sufficient to sustain his family. His precarious economic situation was 
aggravated by all that the extra expenses that as president of the ejido 
executive committee he had to pay out of his pocket, e.g. the expenses when 
he had to negotiate any ejidal issue in the offices of the Agrarian Reform in 
Guadalajara. Thus he felt economically besieged and decided to go to the 
USA and work for six months. He knew that as general he should ask the 
ejidal assembly for a lift of absence. But he feared that they might deny it to 
him so, he decided to leave without warning; the ejidatarios turn very angry 
and even tried to take away from him his ejidal rights. However, he came 
back to Escondido after six months and sort out all the complains. 
Ramón continued being in charge of burning the canes in the extension 
department until 1981 when he was proposed to run for as general secretary 
of the CNC. He was reluctant to accept the post because he thought he could 
not do it properly: 
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'I was in our office (CNC premises) in Las Paredes when some 
sugarcane producers proposed me to run for the presidency. I 
excused myself because I did not have any studies. But they started 
campaigning on my behalf. A few days later, sugarcane producers 
from different parts in the valley gathered together in the ejidal 
committee in Escondido and they insisted that I should accept the 
nomination to presidency of the CNC. People was very happy and 
though I apologized again for my lack of studies, I had to accept, 
but I laid as a condition that I would not have an accountant 
because they only study how to steal. I'd rather have a very good 
secretary who could help me in the administrative matters. There 
were not other ticket running and Pancho Silva (a national leader in 
the CNC) told me that I was fucked up and had to accept the post'. 
Ramón worked very hard during that time, he commented that on one 
occasion, during lent he worked two days in-a-row, night and day, to keep 
the sugar mill working. He had to change some of the people working in the 
organization, like Juan Lopez that according to Ramón: 
'He only showed up to draw his salary. He was dismissed and I 
chose Jacinto (Rojo) from this ejido to be in charge of the cutting'. 
Ramón considers that the expenses in the cutting have increased because 
the bad administration and excessive number of personnel working in the 
association. He also mentioned that providing eating facilities for the CNC 
workers in the office is very expensive. A different sort of complain about 
Maximino, was the fact that he was at the same time municipal president of 
Unión de Tula (a town thirty kilometres away from the valley) and general 
secretary of the CNC. Therefore he could not dedicate all the necessary 
attention to the problems of sugarcane producers. He added that it was very 
likely that Jacinto saw something that he did not approve of and that was the 
reason why he left the organization. However, he said: 
'People complain but they don't dare to defend their rights in 
public. We are like sheep, all that we could do it is to bleat'. 
Ramón has other sources of income, he mentioned that he received a 
loan from FIMAIA to buy a lorry. At the beginning he did not want to 
accept the credit to buy it, he wanted to avoid nasty comments about him 
taking advantage of his position to get the loan. But he was advised by 
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Pancho Silva to get the loan and buy the lorry. He also was told that 
regardless of his behaviour, people would accuse him of embezzlement. He 
is very content with his lorry especially now that he drives it himself; for a 
while he hired a driver, but he did not like his careless driving and he 
decided to take it over. Ramón also obtained with other ejidatarios a loan to 
buy a crane-machine to pick up the cane and load the lorries. At the end, 
when the credit had arrived, only four ejidatarios accepted to take it and they 
went ahead and bought the machine. Finally only two of the four remained, 
Ramón and Luis Vargas. They decided to buy each other their parts. Ramón 
said he could afford to pay Luis out and had to ask to José de Jesus, his son 
working in USA, for a loan to reach the five million pesos that he would 
have to pay. The son sent Ramón $2,700,000 pesos and he kept the machine. 
Ramón income is pretty good, he has four hectares planted with sugarcane, 
owns a lorry and a loading machine that bring good money during the 
harvesting season. Another advantage of Ramon's household is that their 
children still living at home are hard working and they do most of the work 
in their plot without demanding payment. 
Some ejidatarios in Escondido are very critical of Ramón and comment 
he had profiteered when he was general secretary of the CNC, before that 
time he was a poor ejidatario like everybody else. They mentioned that he 
did not have a Volkswagen, two lorries, a big one and a small one, and the 
loading machine before his election. Some added that he wanted to be re-
elected to be able to grab more money. Against these comments Ramón 
retorted that he was asked to run again by a good number of sugar cane 
producers and he did but there were three candidates and he lost for very 
few votes. He thinks that he still have lots of supporters among the 
sugarcane producers but he would not like to have the responsibility of 
running the association. 
The succession of Ramon Gordillo to Adan Romo's leadership of the 
CNC association consolidates the influence of Escondido producers in the 
politics os sugarcane production which has buttressed by Jacinto Rojo long-
standing participation as the secretary in charge of supervising the cutting, 
this provided a continuity to the strong presence of Escondido's ejidatarios in 
the CNC. However, as it is described in the next section, their participation 
would be ebbed by the turn of events that would leave Jacinto out of play. 
These changes could be seen as the consolidation of a new political group in 
the CNC under the Maximino Castillo's leadership, who militates within a 
different faction of the local PRI to the ones that all the ejidatarios from 
Escondido belong. 
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This new CNC leadership not only went on strike, as it was described in 
Chapter 1, but it also re-shuffleded the political forces among its members. 
On the refinery headquarters, the newly appointed administrator of the 
refinery Melchor Ocampo, Armando Osuna, purports a technocratic 
perspective very much in ascendency among the high ranks of the Mexican 
State. This administrator felt constrained by the organization of production as 
it had been negotiated by the head of the extension department, Gabriel 
Limon and the CNC leaders, who belonged to the political group that was 
still headed by general Lopez Arreola. Thus, Armando Osuna plot how he 
could style the modus operandi of Limon and the earlier CNC leaders from 
Escondido, which he managed to do successfully with Maximino's alliance, 
who was not identified with the general's political group. These changes in 
the refinery adminstration and the election of Maximino, a new-comer in the 
political scene but holding a strong political clout, would begin to 
marginalised the previously influential ejidatarios from Escondido; who in 
spite of their political achievements did not transcend their local arena thus 
did not consolidate their regional and national networks that could have 
buttressed their influential participation in sugarcane production. 
Jacinto Rojo: The USA, Sugarcane and the CNC 
Jacinto Rojo was born and raised in Ejido Escondido. Although he had not 
been born when the 'cristero's rebellion' ravaged the region, he recalls the 
story like if he had been caught in the crossfire and the details he mentions 
resemble the ones carefully recounted by the older ejidatarios who 
participated in the first period of the struggle for land. He joined in as a 
young landless peasant when the ejido's old guard requested an extension to 
provide with a plot of land their coming generation of children. There was 
still some land in the hands of large landowners and the ejido extended its 
area. They managed after very long and time-consuming procedures to obtain 
a first and second extension of the ejido's land. The third extension has not 
been granted; they complain bitterly about this endless waiting. Meanwhile 
the ones who have planted sugarcane, like Jacinto Rojo, received a fair price 
for their crop and got on with their lives. However, their increased incomes 
have not been able to arrest the steady flow of seasonal migration to the 
USA, some of them remain on the other side of the border and make it their 
home. But the majority works for short periods, saves a bit and comes back 
home. 
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Jacinto and many other ejidatarios told me that they had to go to work 
in the US because they could not make their living only growing sugarcane. 
However, the agricultural cycle of sugarcane allow them to migrate 
temporally when they have done the basic jobs to the canes, at the time they 
need it most, and leave somebody else (mainly a relative) in charge to do the 
necessary jobs during the growing period. When the harvest season arrives in 
winter, most of the seasonal migrants are back on their plots. Jacinto made 
this journey several times and he brought back with him an old pick-up that 
is always breaking down. The first time he went to USA, he was part of a 
government treaty that allowed contracted Mexican peasants to cross the 
boarder and work there for several months, he kept returning to work 
seasonally for ten years. When the governmental programme of importing 
seasonal labour force to USA ended he had to change his working pattern but 
still kept going back illegally until 1972. He commented that he was lucky 
that one friend gave him a wallet that he had found in the bus station in 
Tijuana: 
'Some years ago a friend of mine from Escondido who was living 
in San Luis Rio Colorado (a boarder town with the USA) by chance 
found a wallet in a bus station when he was going to the USA. He 
gave me the wallet with personal papers and cards. There were a 
visa to USA and the social security card. In Tijuana somebody 
replaced the photos with mine and I used the forge visa to cross to 
the USA several times. They even sent me back some income tax 
from the social security'. 
Five months before the end of my fieldwork period, Jacinto decided to 
go back to USA and work again in the construction where he said that they 
pay very good salaries, much higher than the works in agriculture. He had 
worked in that kind of job before and he claimed to have kept some contacts 
there that would provide him with a job a soon as he could get there. He had 
to ask for an absent leave from his post as general secretary of the ejidal 
committee. He assured them that he would stay there only three months and 
that he would come back to take care of the ejidos's matters when the new 
harvest start. When I left the field the three months had passed and Jacinto 
had not return. The harvest was about to start and the ejidal committee 
decided to call for an extraordinary meeting to decide what to do about 
Jacinto's absence. 
Jacinto was one of the first sugar cane producers in Escondido. He 
explained to me why he and other members of his ejido were among the first 
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ones persuaded to grow sugarcane in the valley. According to his own 
testimony, which is worth quoting in full: 
"Our lands were of bad quality and bumpy. We were not obtaining 
very much from it. The possibility of getting credit to improve our 
plots if we planted sugarcane influenced our decision to do so. We 
were the only daring ones who wanted to grow sugarcane. They 
paid the cane very badly and there were very high costs of 
production because we had to pay for the building of the bridge and 
roads to our plots as well as for maintaining the main road.1*'. 
Jacinto Rojo started to work in the CNC association of sugarcane 
producers in 1980, he was invited to help organizing the sugarcane cutting. It 
was the time of the tripartite agreement, which reflected locally the national 
struggles among the larger regional groups of sugar cane producers, as was 
explained in Chapter 2. The tripartite's leaders, among whom was Adan, 
have handed over to Limón some of their organizational responsibilities, ie 
most of the decisions and the coordination of different groups of cutters and 
freighters were in Limón's hands. Jacinto was in charge of burning the 
sugarcanes before bringing the groups of workers involved in cutting and 
transporting the cane to the refinery. In those first years he learned a lot 
about all the stages of the process of sugar cane production and the ways to 
deal with the people in the refinery. When the tripartite members decided to 
fuse into one association, elections took place and Jacinto was elected as 
secretary of the unified association and Ramón Gordillo, discussed in the 
previous section, was chosen as president for a period of three years. 
Gordillo was very easily persuaded by Limón to do what he wanted, 
regardless of whether or not it was against the producers interest. At the end 
of his term, he decided to run for a re-election. Jacinto disapproved of that 
decision because of Ramon's poor achievements as president and he started 
to organize a group that would rally for a new president. The election of 
Maximino Castillo as their candidate to run against Gordillo was covertly 
approved by Limón and other producers committed with the local branch of 
the dominant state party. Maximino had to run against two other tickets 
leaded one by Ramon Gordillo and the other by Adan Romo, both from 
Ejido Escondido, the contend was fought closely but Maximino was elected 
by a small margin of votes. 
When I met Jacinto in the Summer 1987, he was the secretary of the 
CNC. Jacinto was in charge of the organizating the cutting and transporting 
of the sugarcane produced by the farmers who were members of the CNC. 
114 Chapter 4 
He was a very efficient coordinator of the different people involved in it. He 
had to deal with the sugarcane cutters and their leaders, with the operators of 
the crane-machines that pick up the cane and unload it on the lorries and 
with the lorry drivers. He had been doing that job for the last six years and 
he had become very good at it. Suddenly, after the end of the 1987's 
harvest, Jacinto stopped going regularly to the offices of the CNC. At the 
beginning nobody took any notice of his absence. It was not unusual for the 
representatives to take some time off after the harvest. But rumours began to 
spread from different sources. Maximino and Jacinto had had a serious 
disagreement and Jacinto had stopped going to the CNC offices and he did 
not go back to finish the term for which he had been elected as secretary. 
Maximino accused Jacinto of having gone behind his back to ask the 
manager of the sugar mill for a personal loan, which according to Maximino, 
puts the CNC in a disadvantageous position to negotiate with the 
administration. Jacinto admitted that he asked for the loan but denied that it 
would jeopardize their negotiations with the sugar mill. He explained 
Maximino's anger as a typical example of his authoritarian style of running 
the CNC. Jacinto mentioned a different reason for Maximino's aggressive 
attitude toward him: 
T had discovered that the CNC administration was keeping the 
documents of the loans signed by the sugarcane producers who had 
already paid their loans back to the CNC, which meant that the 
CNC could ask the producers to pay those loans again. When one 
pays back a loan the documents are return to the borrower. When I 
found out about it I told the secretary off for doing that and she 
went straight away to complain about it to Maximino. The secretary 
is one of Maximino's lovers and she does everything that Maximino 
asks her to do. Maximino considered I had surpassed his authority 
and he started to attack me'. 
Without following the stipulatory procedures, Jacinto was removed from 
his post and Riesling, without having been elected by the assembly, replaced 
him immediately. Jacinto took it very philosophically and he insisted that it 
would work out better for him to have left the CNC. He claimed that he 
would have more time to attend his plots (own and rented), and he might be 
able to instil some discipline on his sons who have grown out missing his 
close supervision and are incapable of tilling the land properly. Jacinto turn 
his time and energies to work on his plot planted with sugarcane and spent 
more time on the ejidal matters. He started to go to the government offices 
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to push the ejidal demands for credit and more land. He had to travel to 
Guadalajara and Mexico City. Several friends of Jacinto advised him to raise 
his case in the CNC assembly and confront Maximino publically. If he does 
not do it, people are going to believe that Maximino did have serious reasons 
to remove him from his post. However, Jacinto said that he would not gain 
anything by doing it. He would like to work with Maximino's group again 
and he might antagonized them to the point of jeopardizing his sugarcane 
production. Jacinto mentioned several ways how they could that: The CNC 
committee could refuse a membership to him and he would have to ask the 
CNOP to accept him as member. That in itself would create several 
problems. But even if he remains in the CNC, they could delay his payments 
and deliveries of the necessary inputs e.g. fertilizers and herbicides, which 
would hamper sugarcane yield on his plots. Thus, he never brought his case 
into the public forum in the monthly that he kept attending regularly. 
Jacinto Rojo together with other ejidatarios from Escondido participated 
in the political and administrative changes at national and local levels in the 
refinery Melchor Ocampo and the CNC association in the second half of the 
1970s. However, the new refinery administration and the election of a new 
comer as the president of the CNC would bring with the reshuffle of the 
producers in charge of the executive committee in the CNC the demotion of 
Jacinto. This could be interpreted as a lost of power negotiation of the 
ejidatarios of Escondido against the leaders of the CNC, which used to be 
under their control. The participation of Adan Romo, Ramon Gordillo and 
Jacinto Rojo in the politics of sugarcane production has been beneficial not 
only to them but some of it has treacled down to the other sugarcane 
producers in Escondido, who through Adan, Ramon and Jacinto used to have 
direct access to the decision making in the organization of sugarcane 
production. Unfortunately the political turnover in the CNC have dwindled 
the participation of the ejidatarios from Escondio in it had moved over to 
other sugar cane producers, who seemed to be better located than the 
Escondido ejidatarios in the political landscape of the late 1980's. The 
ejidatarios from Escondido have lost ground to the more aggressive 
sugarcane producers who were in the position to negotiate the new deal 
between the association of sugarcane producers and the refinery 
administration under different political agreements to the ones settled during 
the previous two decades; which involved the support of local political group 
leadered by general Lopez Arreola. 
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Mariano Encino: PRI, Refinery and Sugarcane 
As I describe in Chapter 2, sugarcane production in the Valley of Autiân 
started in 1968 with twenty seven producers. They were, in one way or 
another, linked to the local branch of the PRI, the dominant political party. 
They created the first association of sugar cane producers. One of these 
pioneers of sugarcane production in the valley was Mariano Encino, a local 
merchant very actively involved in local politics and who was at that time the 
representative of the of PRI in Autlan. He repeated several times that he was 
told by the national leader of the workers in the sugar mills, Don Chuy 
Gonzalez, to bombard the President of Mexico, Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz with 
telegrams asking for a sugar refinery to be installed in the region. Two 
important politicians of Jalisco had ministerial positions in Diaz Ordaz's 
cabinet: Prof. Juan Gil Preciado was the minister of agriculture and Gral. 
Santiago Lopez Arreola was Minister of Defence. They were very interested 
in sponsoring their petition to install a new source of employment in the state 
they come from and where they have political supporters. Don Chuy 
Gonzalez knew that the government had bought some new French machinery 
to run a sugar refinery and it was going to be installed somewhere in 
Michoacan and he insisted that some farmers (peasants and landowners) of 
Autlân-El Grullo should ask the government to reallocate the refinery to their 
valley. A few local landowners and PRI political activists in Autlan were 
wooed to promote the project of the refinery in the valley. Mariano worked 
diligendy helping to securing the public investment in the region and 
consolidating his family's sources of livelihood through his multi-stranded 
participation in sugar production in the Valley of Autlan. 
Mariano Encino is a very interesting case of how a social agent has 
seized the opportunities that his political participation opened to him. He was 
a local merchant who had a well situated place in one corner of the local 
market since 1954. His wife was very hard-working and helped him in the 
shop and that allowed Mariano some time to pursue other interests e.g. 
political participation and later on some economic activities. Through his 
political involvement he became acquainted with the farmers in the Valley of 
Autlan who fought for land and succeeded in creating the Ejido Autlan 
during the agrarian reform in the 1930's, this was a large ejido which was 
divided up in several smaller some years later. In the 1960*s he started to 
rent a plot that was part of Ejido Autlan. He rented it for several years until 
he could acquire the ejido rights to the plot. 
In 1968, Mariano Encino was the local representative of the PRI, he 
remained in that position during ten years from 1966 to 1976. He was very 
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much involved, together with other farmers mainly from Autian, like Luis 
Rosales and Horacio Limon, in the promotion of the sugarcane planting in 
the area. They were the founders of the Association of sugarcane producers 
in Autian and they were instrumental in the set up of the new sugar refinery 
in the region. They had to go around ejido communities in the valley and 
convince their neighbours to send telegrams to the President of Mexico 
asking for the sugar refinery to be installed in the area. That was a trying 
task because, they first had to convince the local peasants that planting 
sugarcane was a profitable crop and that they would consent to give it a try 
in their plots. 
Mariano Encino's account of the first years of sugarcane in the valley 
describes very vividly the complex negotiations among the different parts 
involved in die setting of a new sugar refinery in the Valley of Autian. 
Encino participated in the dealings from the beginning and he comments: 
"The first promoter of the project was Don Chuy Gonzalez who 
ordered us to bombard the president and some ministers with 
telegrams asking for the sugar mill, that was going to be installed 
somewhere in Michoacan, to be sent to the Valley of Autian, 
because we needed desperately a new source of work in the area. 
When we heard that the sugar mill was coming to Autian, twenty 
seven producers formed the association of sugarcane producers 
(affiliated to the CNC). The Company that built the refinery bought 
30 hectares of land at the side of the main road that cross the 
valley. At the beginning, the local people did not like the sugar 
refinery to be installed nearby. We, the members of the PRI's 
committee, went around asking in the ejidos to help us to send to 
the president telegrams asking for a new source of employment in 
the valley. Originally, it was going to be installed in El Grullo but 
the major of the town refused to help to find the most convenient 
place to build the sugar refinery. They did not want a refinery in 
the area which would pollute their environment with black ashes, 
they said that they had enough with their crops of rice and peppers. 
The land where die refinery was finally built belonged to a pair of 
brothers from El Grullo who did not want to sell. The Governor 
had to intervene and asked them to accept a permutation of 
properties in the area, in order not to hinder the construction of the 
sugar refinery in the spot that a surveyance had chosen. Mario 
Reyes Drake (a wealthy land owner from El Grullo) sold the land 
for the permutation, the brothers agreed and the transaction was 
118 Chapter 4 
closed. The rest of the land was donated by The General Lopez 
Arreola who owned a property close to the river.' 
The first three years all the canes harvested were used as seed; it was 
only until the beginning of 1971 when the refinery began to grind sugarcane. 
Mariano Encino commented that he only received $5,000 pesos ($400 dlls) 
as payment of his first harvest. The yield of the sugarcane was very low, the 
prices they paid for it were also very low and the first producers had to pay 
for the construction of the bridge and roads of access to the plots of 
sugarcane. They considered the expenses onerous and tried to cover some of 
mem by charging a toll to all the drivers using the bridge, but General Lopez 
told them off for going against the law that forbids any private person to 
demand payment for the use of a public bridge. Though they had helped to 
pay for it. 
Mariano Encino became one of the first sugarcane producers. In 1968, 
he planted seven hectares of sugarcane in an ejidal plot that he was renting; 
with the time he managed to obtain the right to that plot in the Ejido Autlan. 
Later on, he acquired nine hectares of land; some years later, when he sold 
his shop in the market, he bought six-and-a-half hectares more. His land 
assets, in total, add up to fifteen-a-half hectares of private property and seven 
hectares in the Ejido Autlan. Mariano mentioned how through his 
participation in politics he became aware of new possibilities to be developed 
in agriculture and the sugar refinery. 
In 1968 they were notified that the sugar refinery was going to be 
installed in Autlan. The Company in charge of the surveyance and project to 
build the refinery arrived later in that year. Somebody from the national 
union of sugar refinery workers started to look for some people to work in 
the construction of the sugar mill. There were some complains among local 
neighbours about the way the one in charge of hiring new personnel was 
handling it, some people accused him of charging the hiring workers some 
money for getting a job. Don Chuy (the national leader) found out about it 
and immediately withdrew the hiring commission from that person and 
offered it to Mariano with the special recommendation of not charging a 
single penny to any worker that would be hired. Mariano Encino became the 
delegate in charge of hiring and did not let Don Chuy down, he did not 
charge anything for hiring new people. His brother-and-law was one of the 
first local workers that Encino recommended and helped to be hired in the 
refinery, he got a job as driver and he continued to work in the refinery until 
his retirement in 1986. When most of the necessary workers were installed in 
their new jobs, Mariano was released of his responsibilities and he stopped 
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receiving his fifty pesos weekly salary. However, he was told there was a 
job available as the one in charge of the 'room of tools', and if he was 
interested, he could get that job. Mariano accepted the offer because it 
brought an extra salary to his family income and offered him the possibility 
of getting to know other people, which he has always considers very 
important to get on in life. 
Mariano Encino has worked hard and thrivened on his political 
participation, he helped his wife in the shop they had in the market; he 
planted sugarcane in the plot he rented; he acted for some months as the 
delegate of the national syndicate in charge of hiring new personnel to work 
in the refinery; when he completed that task, Encino was offered and 
accepted a job in the refinery as the person in charge of the tools for the 
workers. He continued actively involved with the local branch of the PRI and 
he helped to organize the newly formed association of sugar cane producers 
in the valley, being elected as treasurer of the association, post that he held 
during several years. Mariano said: 
T called many persons to come and work in the construction of the 
sugar refinery, but lots of them did not come because it was very 
hard the digging for the foundations. However, when the sugar 
refinery was installed and it started to grind sugarcane, the work 
became much easier, it was a matter of pushing buttons, then many 
people complained that I did not call them to work in the sugar 
mill. Some, even said that I only asked my friends to come and 
work in the refinery. But that was not true, they did not come 
because they did not want to do heavy jobs and soil their hands.' 
He worked different shifts in the sugar mill and remained in his job 
until he asked for a lift of absence in 1985. He is not going back to work to 
the refinery and he has applied for an early retirement, which would entitie 
him to draw his pension. He is in his late sixties and still very active. He 
participates in party politics although less actively than before. In previous 
local governments he has been member of the municipal council being in 
charge of the maintenance of public roads and the slaughterhouse. He was 
once federal deputy representative. He has also been treasurer of the local 
trade guild. 
In the last years he has spent more time in his private activities: he has 
35 hectares of sugarcane, some are on rented land. He also plants some 
maize and sorghum and would like to buy some heads of 'spotty cattle' for 
milking and meat. He used to keep a small heard but it became very difficult 
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to control the animals; they were jumping fences and Mariano had to pay the 
damages that could amount up to 200,000 pesos. Thus, he decided to get rid 
of his cattie and concentrate on sugar cane production. Mariano Encino's 
participation in local politics and his involvement in the CNC association of 
sugar cane producers buttressed his entrepreneurial ambitions and through his 
shrewd dealings he could take advantages of the different possibilities that 
the governmental developing institution offered to the ambitious new 
sugarcane producers in the valley. He managed to obtain soft loans to 
acquire agricultural machinery and he bought a big tractor and a heavy lorry 
to transport sugar. He also has a three ton. lorry and a pick-up vehicle. His 
oldest son uses the three tonnes, lorry and he hires a driver to use the heavy 
lorry. He drives the pick-up. 
Mariano Encino received over twenty-five million pesos from the 
sugarcane yielded in the thirty hectares he cultivated in 1986-1987. He 
expected to receive around fifty million in the 1987-1988 harvest. But it 
would all depend on the saccharose index for that year; he knew that the 
guaranteed bottom price would be 37,000 pesos and based on that price he 
calculated that his profits would amount to fifty million. Encino thinks that 
sugarcane is nowadays the most economically profitable crop in the region. 
He commented that a producer could gain more money if he planted 
tomatoes than growing canes but he also run the risk of losing all his 
investments if he could not sale them at a good price; which is too high a 
risk to run when the market is very instable and beyond the producers 
control. Mariano Encino explains: 
'We think that sugarcane is the crop that offers more incentives for 
the producers. If you plant seven hectares of sorghum and it yields 
five ton., you could sell it for 7,500,000 pesos. But one has to pay 
everything: fallow, this and other bits and pieces, and insurance. 
One would be lucky to come out even. In contrast with sorghum 
production, the sugarcane yield of seven hectares, when it has been 
properly attended, would leave you something between eight and 
ten million pesos. It is one of the safest crops that a peasant could 
produce. The refinery provides us with everything that is necessary 
to grow sugar cane. If the refinery gives me money to do a job on 
the cane and I fiddle the money and don't do the work; when the 
harvest comes you would be able to notice the difference. It is very 
clear, when one has not done any work on the crop, you do not 
harvest as much as when you do. These days, an inspector from the 
sugar mill goes around the plots verifying that the work has been 
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done before they would pay us. There have been comments that 
some sugar cane producers do not spend the money lended by the 
sugar refinery doing the jobs on the canes'. 
Occasionally this has been proved to be the case. However, before 
passing any harsh judgment on individual sugar cane producers, we should 
ponder their reasons to do it. In most cases, specially among small sugarcane 
producers, the refinery's loans are the main source of rapid cash to cover an 
unexpected expense. 
Although Encino owns fifteen and a half hectares of private property, he 
has never considered moving into the CNPP organization of the private 
landowners who produce sugarcane, he has remained a loyal member of the 
CNC. According to his version, the push to organize the private landowners 
in a different association, came from Guadalajara where Navarro Noriega 
(the CNPP national leader) gathered a group of landowners and founded the 
association. Navarro began to send people to create divisions among the 
sugarcane producers in the valley and some of the landowners started to 
resign and moved into the newly formed association. He thinks that one 
should hold strongly to his convictions. Thus, when he was approach to join 
the new association he declined the offer and remained as one of the oldest 
members in the older of the two associations of sugarcane producers in 
Autlan. Encino thinks that the CNC, is the most powerful of the two 
associations and he considers that its current secretary: Maximino Castillo 
Arenas, has been working hard and most producers are satisfied with his 
work. However, he did mention that there are some producers that have been 
complaining that his financial reports are not crystal clear and they would 
like that there were an official auditing of Maximino's administration. But 
Encino does not want to get in troubles with anybody: 
T tell them, yes, I am willing to support a petition to auditing the 
current administration, but I do not sign any paper, one can not be 
sure what could happen'. 
In the confrontation between Engineer Gabriel Limon and Maximino 
Castillo, Mariano, like many other sugar cane producers, did all they could 
to remain outside the conflict. He said that he did not know what exactly the 
problem was and he was still in good terms with Gabriel Limon. He met 
Eng. Lim<5n even before he became the person in charge of the agricultural 
extension department in the sugar refinery. Limdn took over that job in 1979 
and remained in that position until the end of 1984, when he was accused by 
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Maximino of having abused his position in the extension department to 
embezzle some money. The accusation gathered the refinery's manager 
support and finally Limon was suspended from his job, as it was described in 
the first chapter. However, Encino is not convinced that all the accusations 
against Gabriel were true. The issues of Limdn dismissal have been smudged 
by the contradictory accounts that different parts have given of the reasons 
that compelled the manager of the sugar refinery to fire Limdn and the 
diverse motives that different persons, involved in sugarcane production, had 
to take part and side with one of the two opposite sides in the confrontation 
that did not end with Limdn's dismissal. But as we will see in other section, 
it became a moot point between sugar cane producers representatives and the 
refinery administration. 
Mariano Encino has acquired a wide knowledge of the whole process of 
sugar production through his longstanding participation in different parts of it 
from the beginning, when the refinery Melchor Ocampo in the Valley of 
Autlân was only a draft project. He personifies the better off town dwellers 
who have played right their political cards allowing them to enhance their 
livelihood handsomely. Thus he is a social agent who has seized successfully 
the opportunities that his political participation has pushed in his way. 
Humberto Riesling: Agriculture, PRI and CNC 
Humberto Riesling is the son of German immigrants who arrived at a 
German settlement in Atequiza, Jalisco in 1925. He was born in Mexico 
three years later in 1928. When Riesling was sixteen he went to Guadalajara 
to work as mechanic with an owner of machinery. His boss sent him to take 
care of his machinery working in Casimiro Castillo and Riesling decided to 
remain there and start to work in agriculture. He married into the family of 
Paulo Ldpez Arreóla, the brother of General Ldpez Arreóla, which came 
from Cuatitián -a close by town, and had moved with his family to the area 
in the 1940's. That was the time when agrarian strives were taken place in 
most regions of Mexico and Paulo Ldpez A. had been at the front line of 
peasants demanding plots of land in that area. The Hacienda Lo Cultivado 
was expropriated and it became the Ejido Vicente Guerrero. Paulo Lopez A. 
was responsible of gathering ninety-eight petitioners to form the ejido and 
they were granted the land in 1944. All Paulo's ten children, regardless of 
their age, were included in the ejidal community and obtained the rights to 
individual ejidal plots. After Humberto married one of Paulo's daughters he 
began to work his wife's ejidal plot. Later on Humberto himself managed to 
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obtain rights in an ejido in the area. Since then he has been a full time 
farmer. He became a sugarcane producer in 1960, planting five hectares of 
sugarcane for the sugar refinery José Maria Morelos in Casimiro Castillo. 
When the sugar mill Melchor Ocampo was installed in Autlán he planted ten 
hectares of sugarcane, becoming one of the first sugar cane producers in the 
valley Autián-El Grullo. 
Riesling, like Mariano Encino, was very much involved in the creation 
of the first association of sugarcane producers in the Valley of Autlán that 
was originally called: Committee of Voluntary Sugar cane Producers. It was 
the first association of the local farmers who had decided to plant sugarcane 
and were committed to expand the planting of the crop because they 
genuinely thought that sugarcane production will become a good source of 
income. However, that was not going to be the case until several years later 
and the reason for that laid outside the regional arena as has been discussed 
in Chapter 2. The first sugarcane producers were people from the PRI (the 
dominant party). Riesling's account of the origins of die first association of 
sugarcane producers in the valley follows Encino's. Committed PRI members 
and the farmers they could entice into sugarcane production started to plant 
their plots with canes in 1968 at the same time the foundation work for the 
refinery began. The first harvest of sugarcane in the valley was not ground 
in the refinery but used to expand the crop in the area; it was until the 
second harvest that the sugar mill did a dummy run grinding a few of the 
harvested canes, which only last five weeks to do. 2 ) Riesling thinks that the 
refinery was brought to die valley because López Arreóla (Minister of 
Defence) and Chuy González (national leader of the refinery workers) 
lobbied for it and convinced the president Diaz Ordaz to send the sugar mill 
to the Valley of Autlán. 
At the beginning, sugarcane was planted in the plots with poor quality 
soil. Gordillo Luna, the national leader of the sugarcane producers at that 
time, negotiated a big loan for the newly formed association of sugarcane 
producers of Autlán-El Grullo to buy agricultural machinery. The machines 
were financed by this loan and the compulsory buying of shares by all 
sugarcane producers in the valley, who had to complied to the demands of 
their leaders. These agricultural machines, inspite of having been carelessly 
administrated by the committee of the CNC, performed a vital function in 
the opening of the valley to sugarcane production. Most of the plots in the 
irrigated system had not been properly levelled and suffered problems of 
drainage. The works that those plots needed to be done demanded the use of 
heavy machinery that was not locally available in the necessary number and 
it was beyond the economic possibilities of most peasants in the valley. The 
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Central de Maquinaria (machinery depot), as it was called the administrative 
group within the sugarcane producers association in charge of the machines, 
went into financial problems and was finally auctioned and sold for a small 
amount. There were 40 tractors, 18 cranes picking machines, 16 carts and 1 
steamroller. Riesling remembers that each sugar cane producer had to buy 
$4,000 pesos of shares that they never got back. The administrators of the 
central had to auction the machinery to pay its workers and that was the end 
of it; as far as the CNC Committee was concerned. But there were several 
sugarcane producers who complained about the way it was wound up. 
Like Mariano Enciso, Humberto Riesling considers that General López 
Arreóla and Chuy González were the instigators of the negotiations to bring 
the sugar refinery Melchor Ocampo into the valley. He mentioned how Paulo 
López Arreóla, die general's brother, looked around the valley for the place 
to build the refinery. People from El Grullo were against the construction of 
the refinery in the valley and they avoid anything to do with the construction 
of the mill, which was finally installed closer to El Grullo than Autlán's, 
though within municipal jurisdiction of the latter. H. Riesling recalls: 
'Sinforiano Limón, Luis Rosales, Mariano Encino were the ones 
that organized the first sugarcane producers, all of them were active 
members of the party (PRI)'. 
H. Riesling knows all the characters involved in the organization of 
sugarcane production in Autlán; he has participated in both, the PRI's 
politicking and the CNC association of sugarcane producers; he even became 
deputy of the latter in one of the first committees of the organization and he 
learned quite a bit of the regional and national political struggles among the 
leaders of the sugarcane producers. He recalled how Gordillo Luna, national 
leader of sugarcane producers in the 1970's, supported their local 
management of the association. Gordillo had to face in the national arena the 
challenge that Ramón Rosas Falla, leader of an opposite political group of 
sugarcane producers from Veracruz (one of the most important sugarcane 
producing area in Mexico); in a short time Ramon Rosas Falla became the 
main challenge to Gordillo Luna's leadership of the national association, as it 
was described in chapter 2. During the second half of the 1970's regionally 
based associations of sugarcane producers strove to consolidate their 
participation in the national association of sugarcane production. As the 
private capital deserted the sugar refineries, the Mexican government took 
them over pouring public investment in the dilapidated factories. Most of 
these regionally based associations were looking for a national representation 
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that helped them to consolidate their local achievements dealing with the 
refineries administrations. Among all the contenders, there were two who 
took command of the two main alliances of regional associations. They 
reached a truce among themselves, thus Gordillo and Rosas accepted to 
discharge into a third person the responsibility of leading the unification of 
the several regional associations into one national organization of sugarcane 
producers. This all-embracing association of sugarcane producers received 
the support of the national CNC (the national peasant confederation that 
militates in the PRI). 
Ramon Rosas Falla had a hand over Gordillo, he was supported by the 
sugarcane producers from the sugar mills in the Gulf of Mexico, which is the 
largest single region of sugarcane production which gave the former a 
numeric advantage over the latter. Their confrontation took place at the 
national level, but there were other local contests for the leadership of the 
sugarcane producers, i.e. the tripartite coalition in the valley was gathered 
around the figure of the local strong man -cacique José Ma. Zarate. Zarate 
became a powerful regional figure through the different planning and 
developing projects that he sponsored as head of the South Commission; this 
commission funnelled public funds to specific projects that they selected, 
(one of these projects was administrated by Maximino Castillo in El Grullo). 
Riesling mentioned that the tripartite coalition that gathered some of the 
sugarcane producers in the valley was coached by Zarate in his attempt to 
expand his political dominion. Gordillo Luna supported the original group of 
sugarcane producers in Autlân; he had a long experience on politics among 
sugarcane producers, according to Riesling appraisal: 
'Gordillo Luna knew everything about anything related to sugarcane 
production and organization'. 
This political re-organization among sugarcane producers took place in 
all regions at the end of Echeverria's six-year presidential period. With the 
new government, Zarate lost the support of the national government and his 
influence wilted. Meanwhile, at the national level, Gordillo Luna's control 
over the national association was taken over by Rosas Falla. At the local 
level, an ejidatario from Rincon de Luisa was elected as the secretary of the 
Union of Sugarcane Producers of the Refinery Melchor Ocampo affiliated to 
CNC: Ramon Gordillo. Riesling seems to suggests than during the turbulent 
time at the national level, the political groups in Autlân lost their ground and 
an ejidatario was elected as the president of the unified CNC, this 
appointment was covertly supported by eng. Limdn, the head of the 
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extension department in the refinery. Riesling said that when these changes 
happened he turned all his efforts into his private businesses and did not 
form part of the new committee; he thought that Ramdn Gordillo was not up 
to the responsibilities of a secretary of the sugarcane producers organization: 
'he did not have enough brains to direct our association'. 
H. Riesling planted ten hectares of sugarcane in 1968. The variety that 
they were given by the extension department was not of good quality, neither 
was it suitable for the type of soil in the area. The first sugarcane producers 
dragged debts with the refinery for several years but most of those debts 
ended up being suspended. H. Riesling mentioned that when Gabriel Limon 
was in charge of the extension department, he had some troubles with him 
because he tried to swindle the sugarcane producers. Limon sent his 
inspectors in the extension department to evaluate the quality of the plots and 
decide if they were suitable for sugarcane cultivation. Sometimes they turn 
the petitions down alleging that the soil was not the appropriate to produce 
sugarcane, but later on they rented the same plots from willing farmers very 
cheaply to plant sugarcane in them. Riesling mentioned that this type of 
abuse was a common practice when Limdn was in charge of the extension 
department. 
Although Riesling has twenty-eight hectares planted of sugarcane -
twenty for the sugar refinery in Casimiro Castillo and eight for the one in 
AutiaX he has not only depended economically on sugarcane, he has always 
had some others sources of income. He used to grow maize, sorghum, 
melons and watermelons in the coast. He stopped growing the last two crops 
because a disease attacked them and made their production unprofitable. At 
that time he participated in the committee of the regional union of 
horticulture producers in the Coast of Jalisco; within the union they formed a 
consumers co-operative to buy fertilizers, fungicides and seeds at better 
prices. The co-operative was formed in 1981 and it is still going on, with 
Riesling as its current treasurer. At the end of the seventies Riesling with 
some relatives and other farmers, established a link with an American 
company, which became their partner to rent and plant fifty hectares of 
tomatoes and other vegetables. The enterprise run into financial troubles and 
he lost some money; preferring not to fight with his partners because they 
were members of the family he left the company. H. Riesling tried again, 
but this time with six new partners, to form an exporting company to 
commercialize their crops. They obtained a credit from the Bank of Foreign 
Commerce and they bought four acres in McAllen, Texas. They managed to 
keep it going during two years and they had to sell it when the Mexican 
currency started its roller-coaster of devaluation. One partner, who had 
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joined the company later on bought the company from the founder members. 
With the falling exchange rate of the Mexican peso, it became very 
expensive to get financing support to carry on with the company. They 
owned the land but they needed $70,000 dollars extra to build the warehouse 
and it was too risky to make that investment considering the numerous 
uncertainties involved in exporting vegetables to the protected American 
market. However Riesling did made some profit, he invested $16,000 dollars 
and received after two years $18,000 dollars plus the utilities of each year 
that were around $4,000 dollars. 
Riesling thinks that sugarcane is a slightly more profitable crop than 
maize. If one grows staple crops and cultivate them very well, it is possible 
to obtain almost the same profits as with sugarcane production but working 
harder that with sugarcane. The interest rates on the credit the refinery 
provides are very high, sugarcane producers are paying around eighty per 
cent of interest on their loans. But Riesling ponders that sugar cane 
producers still make profit: 
Tf one invests $100,000 pesos growing sugarcane, after a year-and 
a-half one receives three or four times the amount invested. It some 
ways, it is a crop for lazy farmers because the CNC does all the 
works for them'. 
Riesling mentioned that there are many farmers that receive credit to 
produce sugarcane in plots with very poor quality soil and which can not 
produce enough canes to pay back die loan. However, the refinery allows 
those sugarcane producers to continue producing low yields because these 
farmers have friends among the employees in the sugar refinery or they have 
some other plot with good yields and die administration can charge the debts 
of the poor plot to the account of the productive one. However, Riesling 
considers that: 
'Right now, I receive more from growing sugarcane than any other 
crop, because I do not have to make big investment. I have twenty-
eight hectares covered with cane: eight in the Refinery Melchor 
Ocampo and twenty in the Refinery Morelos; my brother takes care 
of the canes in Casimiro and I take care of die ones in Audan. 
Eight hectares here (in Autlan), yield more that ten hectares in 
Casimiro Castillo. The sugar refinery Morelos is very disorganized 
and the humidity of the sugarcane plots is drying up (sugarcane is 
produced in rainfed plots in Casimiro). I drilled a well in a fifteen 
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hectares plot and I do not use it because what you get from the 
cane does not pay the fuel. I am small private landowner here but I 
do not have the sugarcane on my name. In the coast I am both 
ejidatario and small landowner. I used to rent some land in the 
coast and they passed me the rights in 1957'. 
He has nine children but only one is working fulltime in agriculture, he 
studied veterinary and combines his profession with agriculture. Six of his 
nine children have obtained a university degree. Three of them work in 
different public offices i.e.-one in the department of agriculture in El Grullo, 
one in the municipal administration and one in the revenue offices in 
Guadalajara. The three younger children are still attending school. Through 
the sugarcane producers association Riesling get a small alimony ($13,000 
pesos per month) for each of the three students. 
Riesling substituted Jacinto Rojo as secretary of the Association of 
Sugarcane Producers affiliated to CNC at the end of 1987 in spite of not 
being the deputy of the secretary. Jacinto Rojo had been re-elected to that 
post in 1986 and had to step down due to some disagreements with 
Maximino Castillo. According to Riesling, Maximino asked him to help with 
the organization of the harvest two years ago because since then he had some 
problems with Jacinto. Thus when the personal differences between 
Maximino and Jacinto made the latter position in the CNC untenable, 
Riesling slip in, taking over Jacinto post as secretary without consulting the 
general assembly as it should have been done. Even before Riesling became 
secretary in the CNC council, he went along with the other members of the 
committee of sugarcane production and attended the meetings. Riesling 
attended the committee meetings to Maximino's request; this fact reflects the 
trust of the latter on the former. The only persons that were summoned to 
meetings were the legally constituting members i.e. president and secretary 
of each of the two associations of sugarcane producers and the manager and 
head of the extension department of the sugarmill. However, some other 
persons related in some way to the sugarcane production in the valley could 
attend the meeting as observants and they were not supposed to intervene in 
the discussions. Riesling not only attended the meeting but he participated 
actively in the discussions. Thus Maximino must have been given to Riesling 
the authorization to do that. Riesling participation in the CNC had gone 
through several changes. When the refinery was opened, he was one the first 
twenty-seven sugarcane producers in the valley. He occupied the post of 
deputy president of the CNC during Luis Francisco Barrios's presidency of 
the tripartite coalition at the end of the seventies. After this he detached 
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himself from the association until the 1980's when Maximino asked him to 
come back to work in the CNC. 
Riesling has come a long way from being the son of immigrants who 
started to work as a mechanic in Guadalajara; he is now a prosperous 
farmer, he owns over twenty hectares of land -private and ejidal, a tractor 
and other machinery e.g. a heavy lorry to transport sugarcane to the 
refinery. His economic achievements are intertwined with his political 
participation in the PRI and the CNC and his relation by marriage to Paulo 
Ldpez Arreola, who was a brother of the General Lopez Arreola, the strong 
political man with great influence on the PRI's politics in the region. Thus, 
like Mariano Encino, Humberto Riesling, has threaded a strong political 
network locally that has buttressed his economic activities, among which 
sugarcane and its related activities have become his main source of income. 
Conclusion 
Ejidatarios like Adán Romo, Ramón Gordillo and Jacinto Rojo from 
Escondido, and Mariano Encino and Humberto Riesling from Autlán, were 
not only convinced to plant sugarcane by they became involved in other parts 
of the process working in the extension department and in the CNC 
association of sugarcane producers. Their participation opened new venues 
where they could improve their economic condition. Thus the five of them 
have not only increased their assets acquiring lorries and cranes, but they 
have also consolidated their political position in their ejidos. These 
pioneering producers played and important role in the expansion of 
sugarcane production in the Valley of Autlán-El Grullo. Their knowledge of 
the area and well established local networks facilitated the work of the 
refinery administrators who were foreign to region. Their committeed 
participation at different level of the organization of sugarcane production put 
in an advantageous position to seize the economic opportunities that came 
with the expansion of sugar cane production in the valley. These cases 
highlight the diversity among sugarcane producers and their individual way 
of decision making within conditions which are not totally of their own 
choice. 
The five sugarcane producers described in this chapter have participated 
in the CNC or in the local branch of the PRI, some like Encino and Riesling 
in both. The way of participation and the degree of involvement in the CNC 
and the PRI vary from one producer to the other. However the main 
difference between ejidatarios from Escondido and the producers from 
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Autlân who have found their access to an ejidal plot is the wider networks 
that the latter have established. Encino and Riesling's commercial and 
political networks have enhanced their economic possibilities and they have 
made a go of it. Their economic assets are larger than any of the three 
ejidatarios from Escondido I discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
The larger set of political and economic possibilities in towns provides 
immediate advantages to sugar cane producers living in towns which 
ejidatarios living in more distant communities miss. Although these 
differences are constantly eroded by the expansion of all means of 
communication which accompanies economic development, they are still a 
constraining fact to sugarcane producers living in small communities, as 
Ejido Escondido, with bumpy roads of access and without private telephones. 
These unequal conditions provide sugarcane producers living in town with 
advantageous conditions which allow them to consolidate their economic 
position. 
Whereas political participation in the PRI was the starting point to the 
economic success of Enciso and Riesling; the participation in the CNC 
organization was the beginning of a more modest economic success of 
Romo, Gordillo and Rojo. The CNC organization of sugarcane producers is 
a public 'corporation' (Jessop, 1990: 120) which incorporates producers into 
the Mexican State through the mediation of PRI. This mediation is sui 
generis and is constandy renegotiated. Everyone of the cases of sugarcane 
producers described in this chapter account for their independence of mind 
and individual approaches to deal with institutions and to play the system to 
their advantage. 
NOTES 
1. This bridge communicates the two main towns in the valley without having to 
make a long detour around the mountains that surround the valley. The 
construction of this road and bridge was charged to the first sugar cane 
producers. 
2. It last five weeks from 15 March to 20 April, 1971. Manual Azucarero 
Mexicano. 1972. 
CHAPTER 5 
MIDDLE AND LARGE PRIVATE LANDOWNERS: SUGARCANE 
PRODUCTION AND THE CNPP 
Out of the 167 private landowners in the valley of Autlan-El Grullo, who 
produce sugarcane for the Melchor Ocampo refinery, 111 of them - 66% -
have moved their allegiance from the CNC to the more recendy formed 
CNPP affiliated association. In spite of their smaller representation, the 
CNPP has carved out a space in the political arena where the organization of 
production is bargained over between the refinery administration and 
representatives of both associations. The participation of medium to large 
sugarcane producers in the politics of production differs from that of small 
ejidal producers. They have access to a wider range of economic and 
political resources. The way in which these wealthier sugarcane producers 
deal with the refinery administration and the producers associations 
highlights the complex interweaving of interests within the refinery, producer 
associations and State politics in Mexico. The Mexican State embraces the 
different social groups and associations within its ubiquitous ruling party, the 
PRI, which has been in power for the last sixty years. Thus employees of the 
state-owned refinery, Melchor Ocampo, and the sugarcane producers of the 
two affiliated associations, of the CNC and CNPP, are all involved in some 
way or other in state politics. However, the socio-economic conditions of 
these middle to large sugar producers permeates their political inclinations 
which as they do for the majority affiliated to the CNC, described earlier. 
The five sugarcane producers described here all kept a low profile when 
they were members of the CNC. They never felt at ease in an association 
where the overwhelming majority are ejidatarios. Pina Lara is the daughter 
of one of the promoters of the CNPP like Arturo Sanchez Ruy. They are 
both members of wealthy families in El Grullo, who only planted sugarcane 
when it became a profitable to do so. The two of them belong to the board 
of the CNPP and Arturo Sanchez was also president when he succeeded his 
father at the head of the association. The last three sugarcane producers to be 
discussed, have all members of the executive committee in the CNPP: Juan 
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Ruiz has been re-elected secretary twice, Gonzalo Blake was the treasurer in 
a previous committee and is still very much involved in the everyday running 
of the association, and Armando Castro was elected the president of the 
CNPP's committee in 1987. The five of them have large plots planted with 
sugarcane and have invested in different enterprises related to sugarcane 
production; thus they have lorries and wagons to carry the cane from their 
plots, and have invested, individually or in partnership with other CNPP 
members, in cranes to pick up the cane and load it onto the lorries. The five 
of them are prosperous farmers with diversified economic interests who 
claim they abhor politics and are only concerned with producing sugarcane 
more efficiently. However, they take special interest in the organization of 
sugarcane production, as well as in the organization of other economic 
activities in which they are involved, all of which are soaked in political 
negotiation. 
Pina Lara: Sugarcane and Land Concentration 
María Josefina Lara Corona, better known as Pina, is the only child of a 
wealthy local family whose ancestors are among the local landowning 
families of several decades back, even before 1912 when El Grullo was 
granted the title of municipality. Pina's mother was the only child of a 
marriage between landowners, from both paternal and maternal sides, and 
she thus inherited a large estate. Pina's mother married a hard working and 
shrewd outsider, Ismael Lara Caso, who consolidated the family's 
agricultural enterprise, growing a diversity of cash crops. Don Ismael had 
tried his luck in different parts of Mexico, including employment with the 
national rail company of the Yucatan Peninsula and the post of constable in 
Mexico City, where he was working when a friend offered him the chance to 
join him in opening a factory for processing goat's milk in El Grullo. He 
arrived there at the end of die 1930's. Don Ismael and his friend worked 
hard and soon became the leading local producers. In the 1940's, he met 
Pina's mother and they married. Pina, being the only child of an only child, 
would inherit several properties in the valley. Ismael had not been involved 
in agriculture before he came to El Grullo and his father-in-law was sceptical 
of his ability to take over and manage his agricultural and cattle production. 
However, Ismael committed himself to work hard and learn fast and was 
ready to take over the family enterprises when his father-in-law, Pina's 
grandfather, became ill in the middle of the 1940's. Since then he has been 
in charge of the family business. Just in the last few years, Ismael, who is 
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eighty-two years old, has been handing over to his daughter Pina the 
management of all their economic activities, which are mainly linked to 
agriculture and catde ranching. 
Don Ismael recalls that when President Alemán visited the region in 
1951, he had been invited to the reception and he used the opportunity to 
talk to the President about government aid to drain 3,000 hectares of land in 
El Grullo. He mentioned that the local politicians had opposed the idea 
because they considered that Alemán would not sponsor any initiatives 
coming from party members belonging to a different political faction within 
the PRI to his own. However, Don Ismael considered that they would stand 
a good chance to obtain a favourable answer if they could address the 
President publicly and ask him for financial support. He was right. Alemán 
agreed to provided the necessary public funds to drain the land. The 
government's response paved the way for the owners of land in the central 
part of the valley, who drained and levelled the land and immediately planted 
it with different crops. Don Ismael remembers growing maize, barley and 
cotton. The latter fetched a good price during the 1950's, but after several 
seasons it became susceptible to disease and thus the cost of production 
increased tremendously and it became too expensive to grow. He planted 
various vegetables and melon at different times while always maintaining the 
production of maize, milo-maize and sorghum to feed the cattle. Don Ismael 
added that it was during Alemán's presidency that the Tacotán Dam was 
finished; it is the dam that provides the water to irrigate 9,000 hectares in 
the valley of Autián. 
The agrarian reform expropriated some of the estates owned by Ismael's 
wife. But they immediately found ways to protect their numerous properties, 
claiming they had been divided up between family members and close 
friends. In the 1950's, a few peasants again invaded some of the family's 
plots, claiming 32 hectares of irrigated land, but Ismael went to the 
government offices in Guadalajara and the case was taken to the Supreme 
Court which passed sentence in his favour. Since then there have been 
several threats against their estates but without success. In the late 1970's, 
there were some agrarian petitions by landless peasants that were investigated 
by the employees of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. On one occasion 
when Pina was the municipal president of El Grullo, she was approached by 
the Agrarian Reform envoy, an engineer from Mexico City, to summon Don 
Ismael to reply to accusations that he had simulated the division of his 
properties in order to avoid expropriation of the large estates controlled by 
him. Pina told the engineer that Don Ismael was her father and that he would 
certainly like to discuss such false accusations and resolve them once and for 
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all. She asked him to join them for supper. During the visit, when engineer 
had finished supper, Pina and her father explored the possibility of 
dismissing some of the claims on their land. The engineer refused to give in 
to their thinly disguised bribe and left without having reached any agreement. 
Some months later a new engineer came from Mexico, one who was willing 
to help them sort out these claims on some of their properties. They found 
out that if landowners planted sugarcane, they could declare up to 300 
hectares as a small property that was not expropriable; Pina and Ismael had 
around two-hundred hectares planted with sugarcane and that backed up their 
claim to own a small estate. Since then they have not faced any other serious 
threat to their numerous properties. Ismael mentioned the severe approach of 
General Arreola with respect to agrarian problems: 'The General was a hard 
man. When I told him about the problems I had facing some agraristas 
(landless peasants demanding a plot of land), he told me to kill them and 
charge their deaths to his account. But I never did anything. I thought that if 
I had not given them life, I certainly did not have the right to take it away'. 
Pina is more critical of the agrarian policies of the Mexican 
Government, and blames them for the state of uncertainty that reins among 
landowners in the countryside. She thinks that such policies are the reason 
why some farmers do not invest more to improve their land. They are afraid 
that one day the government will decide to expropriate it and they would lose 
not only their estates but all the improvements and assets that they have 
invested in them. Some times the criticisms are targeted directly against the 
agraristas; Pina talks with contempt about them, accusing them of being lazy 
and careless: 
'Ejidatarios are lazy scoundrels. They wait for us to improve our 
land, and then accuse us of being big landowners and claim their 
rights to our land, knowing that the stupid government would grant 
it to them. Most of them do not like to work and some even rent 
back their ejidal plots to the previous owners. They are not like us. 
We have received the land from our ancestors, we love it and know 
how to work hard and obtain high yields from it'. 
Pina attended a private religious school where she started studying 
accountancy. But she did not like school and asked her father to give her 
some job to do. She was asked to keep a check on the stock of seeds, 
fertilisers and insecticides that Don Ismael kept in the warehouse next door 
to their home. She took her work seriously and kept the stock up-to-date. He 
was impressed with her performance: 
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T worked very hard. Sometimes I had to get up before sunrise and 
half-asleep count the sacks of fertiliser; I started to carry a small 
gun that I still keep on my night table. I learned to deal with the 
workers and not to trust them. Little by little I was asked to 
participate more in the organization of the different jobs that my 
father did, till the point that now I am in charge of the whole 
business and my father does only small tasks that do not tire him. 
He is in his eighties and worries me driving around bumpy roads 
on his own. That is the reason why I always ask some worker to 
accompany him on his rides around our different plots. He usually 
transport the workers to the plots in the morning, takes their 
lunches at midday, and picks them up in the afternoon'. 
Don Ismael comments that they only started to grow sugarcane at the 
turn of the 1980's when the refinery stopped interfering with the producers' 
decisions about how to grow sugarcane on their own plots. When the 
refinery was installed the head of extension was always demanding that 
producers narrowly follow its sugar yields programme. The refinery's 
attitude had changed, not only leaving the organization of production but the 
organization for cutting and transporting of cane to the refinery to the 
associations of sugarcane producers. Sugarcane has become Pina and 
Ismael's main economic activity, but not the only one. They have two 
hundred hectares planted with sugarcane that yields over one hundred ton per 
hectare, and they grow maize and sorghum to feed their three hundred head 
of cattie. Don Ismael considers that sugarcane brought new life to El Grullo. 
They own other assets such as three tractors, one harvesting machine, three 
cranes, three small lorries and two big ones, urban property in El Grullo and 
Guadalajara. They are one the wealthiest families in the valley and have had 
different problems with the refinery administration than those described by 
the small producers. 
Pina considers the employees in the sugar refinery to be lazy and very 
inefficient in their work. She blames them for taking advantage of their 
status as state employees, receiving more perks than the workers in the 
private refineries where they are better trained and work harder. She 
acknowledges that Engineer Osuna, the manager of the refinery, is hard 
working and a good administrator, but thinks he is always trying to be one 
step ahead of the producers. As one of the largest sugarcane producers in the 
area she deals with different employees in the refinery. Pina visits the 
premises regularly. If they wanted, they could finance their whole process of 
sugar production on their different plots themselves, but they mink it is 
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better to draw some credit from the refinery and to be in debt to them as a 
way of keeping the refinery's commitment to them. They mentioned that for 
a short while, when commercial interest rates soared to keep pace with 
inflation, the refinery continued to lend money at much lower rates so that it 
was good business for the producers to borrow as much as possible and 
invest it in something else. But now the rates are the same as the banks, 
which has made the credit for sugarcane production expensive. Thus the 
farmers that can afford cut down on their borrowing. 
Pina is outspoken and has confronted the current head of the extension 
department on several occasions. One was to complain about that for some 
reason the credit department had not authorised the credit she had asked for 
to buy fertiliser for forty hectares planted with cane. The head of the 
extension had washed his hands of the matter and sent her to the credit 
department. The head of the credit had told her that they were unable to 
decide such matters and they were acting under orders. Pina angrily went 
back to the extension department and told them that the head of the extension 
department was a stupid man. She also accused them of having something 
against her and of not having the guts to tell her to her face what was going 
on. The room was charged with animosity when she left. Later she decided 
to make amends and invited Engineers Blanco and Negrete for lunch. In the 
restaurant, according to Pina, their attitude changed completely. After a few 
drinks they were relaxed and in a good mood. They assured her that they 
had not decided on retaining her credit for fertiliser and hinted that the order 
had come directly from the manager, that they had to follow his orders if 
they wanted to keep their jobs and their pensions, which was the only asset 
they had to support themselves in their old age. Whatever the reason might 
have been, Pina requested credit again and this time it was granted rapidly. 
She mentioned that decision making in the refinery was a labyrinth, but she 
had found her way through and around it. 
Besides the family business, Pina has participated in politics and was 
elected Municipal President of El Grullo in 1979. In 1980, immediately after 
her term of office, she became a national congresswoman for the period 
1980-1982. The way that her political participation started highlights political 
procedures in the PRI. Pina recalled how she was approached by an envoy of 
the regional political patron General Santiago L6pez, an acquaintance of her 
father. The envoy told her that the General had been searching for a suitable 
candidate for the municipal presidency and her name had cropped up several 
times, always accompanied by comments that she was well known and liked 
by all kinds of people. Pina was not sure that she wanted to commit herself 
to this task. She gave as an excuse her father's age and frail health which 
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meant she had taken on much of his work, adding that she totally lacked 
political experience. The envoy insisted that she would be the ideal 
candidate, young, popular, hard working and without political feuds. He 
asked her to think about it and consult with her father, which she did it. Don 
Ismael was very proud that the General had thought of her for municipal 
president and said if she felt she could meet the challenge she should not 
disappoint the General, so she accepted the PRI candidacy. Her political 
motto was that she would take care of the municipal finances with the same 
zeal she has always put into attending her family businesses. She was elected 
by an ample majority. 
She remembers those years with nostalgia and mentioned how much she 
enjoyed organizing different activities and festivities. At the end of her 
period she was called to talk to the State Governor, she was worried and 
wondered what she could have done wrong. But the reason for her visit 
turned to be exactly the opposite; the governor was impressed with her 
performance and asked her to remain in politics but as congresswoman for 
the electoral district of which El Grullo is a part. Don Ismael, again, was 
very supportive and encouraged her to accept the post, in spite of the fact 
that it would keep her away from home very often and he would have to take 
back some of the responsibilities for the family business. In Pina's account of 
her political career there was never any doubt that having been chosen by the 
PRI as its candidate, being elected was taken for granted. That was pretty 
much the case for sixty years, from the 1930's to 1980's all over the 
country. Pina claims that her first hand experience of politics only confirmed 
her concern about the honesty and efficiency with which public affairs are 
conducted by the bureaucrats and elected representatives of the PRI. She 
mentioned that they not only received high salaries but lots of other perks. 
She feels strongly against the overwhelming power of the PRI, to the point 
that she was very vocal about her support for the opposition party in the last 
presidential elections. She considered that the opposition candidate to the 
presidency was a better candidate because he was a successful entrepreneur 
and knew the value of money. Thus he would have been able to improve the 
public finances of the Mexican Government, which are in a poor state. 
Don Ismael and Pina used to be members of the CNC when they first 
planted sugarcane. At that time this was the only association of sugarcane 
producers in the valley and they recalled with horror how they had to belong 
to an association where the majority of members were ejidatarios. However, 
very soon after they started to grow sugarcane, some of the larger producers 
began their efforts to create a new association where the landowners would 
be the majority and which would be affiliated to CNOP (the National 
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Confederation of Popular Organizations, which was a political umbrella for 
accommodating a diversity of groups within the PRI, one of which was the 
CNPP). Don Ismael participated in the two attempts to get it off the ground 
and became a member of its first committee when it was finally formed in 
1981. Since then either Don Ismael or Pina have participated on the board of 
the association. Being the largest sugarcane producers in the CNPP puts 
them in a special position, though not the most popular one. As was to be 
expected, their wealth attracted envy and suspicion, which they have learned 
to live with. However, Pina knows that because of that she should try to 
keep a low profile in the association, which amounts to relinquishing any 
attempt to be elected to a post on the Committee, though she remains on the 
council of the CNPP. Don Ismael and Pina had been able to afford to wait 
before going into sugarcane production, until through the trials and errors of 
others it was evidently profitable to do so. They waited until the refinery's 
promise of good profits became reality and avoided the worries and losses 
that the first sugarcane producers had to face. 
Pina Lara is the largest individual producer to supply the Melchor 
Ocampo refinery. She and her father are among the largest landowners in the 
Autldn-El Grullo valley. Although she has enjoyed occupying public posts 
she does not regard these posts as important. From first hand experience she 
believes that the PRI and its government bureaucrats colluded in disregarding 
the participation in government of entrepreneurs and business men, whom 
she believes to be the backbone of production. She blames the government 
for the economic havoc and complains bitterly about the laziness of most 
workers in the country. Pina Lara voices the ideological justifications of 
local wealthy landowners who have been unable to transform their 
anachronistic ways of organizing production on their estates. These 
landowners see the thread of being affected by the agrarian reform as the 
main reason hampering investment and innovation in agriculture. Pina's style 
has been criticised by other members of the CNPP, for example Gonzalo 
Blade, whose vicissitudes with sugarcane are described below. 
Sugarcane and Local Entrepreneurship 
Private landholders have different property arrangements to those held by 
ejidatarios. They look down with contempt upon the ejidatarios' rights to the 
small plot given under the agrarian reforms of the 1930's. But it was the 
ejidatarios had tested out different varieties and overcame the failures of 
some of those experiments and bore the brunt of the initial costs of opening 
Middle and Large Private Landowners 139 
roads of access paving the way for the considerably rise of sugarcane prices 
in 1980. Growing sugarcane had become now profitable and attractive to 
local farmers who were now boasting of the shrewdness in making economic 
decisions, claiming that they worked more efficiendy than peasants without 
whose risks there may have been no profitable sugar business. Pina is 
outspokenly critical of their abilities. Other middle farmers, in condescending 
terms, consider that ejidatarios lack the knowledge and means to become 
competitive producers. They consider that the government should stop 
throwing money away on their plots and instead provide public resources to 
middle and large farmers who are more likely to raise a profit than peasants. 
Pina Lara, Gonzalo Blade, Arturo Sanchez Ruy, Juan Ruiz Corona and 
Armando Castro, all middle to large farmers, have consolidated their already 
comfortable livelihood by growing sugarcane and taking advantage of the 
different financial opportunities offered by government development 
institutions to acquire vehicles and agricultural machinery. 
Gonzalo Blade: A Modern Entrepreneur 
Pina Lara, whose family have for generations owned land in the valley and 
has lived most of her life in El Grullo, has a style which contrasts with that 
of Gonzalo Blade, who like Pina produces sugarcane and milo-maize for 
cattle fodder on his estate, which next to Pina's is one of the largest in the 
valley. Gonzalo administers the family estate, where he grows 110 hectares 
of sugarcane. The farm totals 150 hectares but they have only managed to 
irrigate the land planted with cane. It is irrigated from water pumped from 
the river that borders one side of the farm. They are outside the irrigation 
system, which has left Gonzalo with the opportunity to expand sugarcane 
production from the original 40 hectares that he planted in 1982, to the 110 
that he has now. Gonzalo is a newcomer to the valley, though his mother's 
family comes from a nearby area. He grew up and attended the university in 
Guadalajara, capital of the State of Jalisco. He obtained a degree in civil 
engineering and worked for a couple of years in this profession. For a while 
he combined his job as civil engineer with the weekend agricultural activities 
on the land his father had just recently acquired in the valley of Autlan. 
Gonzalo's father is a retired surgeon who used to have a farm nearby 
Guadalajara where he kept an orchard and an apiary, which he had in mind 
to expand when he retired from the medical profession. However the rapid 
growth of Guadalajara was engulfing most of the surrounding agricultural 
land, which made expansion difficult and expensive. He began to look for 
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land not too far from Guadalajara, and found prices were much lower the 
farther away from the capital he moved. The search took him to the valley of 
Autian where he found the estate that he finally bought at the end of the 
1970's. They had to install the water pumps to irrigate the land, which was 
the time Gonzalo commuted between his job in Guadalajara and the work on 
the farm in the valley until he considered that he was doing neither job 
properly and resigned his job in Guadalajara to throw himself full time into 
their newly acquired land. He grew courgettes, tomatoes and melons with 
very uneven outcomes, one season making good profit and the next having to 
sell the production at a price below its cost. 
Although he had tried to obtain the refinery's consent to plant sugarcane 
since 1980, it was not until 1982 when the new manager arrived, that he 
managed to earn their sponsorship. This is sealed by the contract the refinery 
makes with the producers that commits it to buy all the sugarcane produced 
on the plots contracted and without which it is not worth growing sugarcane. 
Gonzalo mentioned that the inspectors sent by the refinery's extension 
department, who had declared their land unsuitable for sugarcane, were the 
same ones to declare his land to be of good quality when he met them in the 
office of the new manager, the second time round. He concluded after 
talking to other sugarcane producers, that the failure of his previous attempts 
was that he did not offer a 'personal compensation' to the inspectors as was 
the custom. However, when the inspectors saw Gonzalo talking to the new 
manager, whom they did not know, they must have assumed that he was an 
acquaintance of Gonzalo, and to the latter's amazement, rushed to say that 
they had inspected Gonzalo's land and considered it suitable for sugarcane. 
He started with 40 hectares and augmented this every year until the 110 that 
he had in 1987. The estate ownership belongs to his father and his siblings 
but he is the one in charge of organizing the sugarcane production and the 
cattle they keep. He is energetic and hard working, his wife complained that 
he never takes a break, not even on Sunday. The sugar yields good crops 
and so does the sorghum that he grows to feed the cattle. He has a lorry and 
agricultural machinery. Gonzalo considers that sugarcane production yields 
good profits, which although smaller than from export vegetables, lack their 
high risk, since the costs are balanced against the pre-set selling conditions 
which are negotiated by the representatives of the sugarcane producers and 
the refinery administration at the beginning of each season. 
Gonzalo is very active in the CNPP. He held office as treasurer in a 
previous committee. He carried out a reshuffle of the association and 
convinced members that they needed to modernise the administration and 
keep it out of the political sexennial turn over. The assembly accepted the 
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motion and they created the post of administrator of the CNPP, who would 
be a permanent employee in charge of organizing the various affairs 
concerning the planting, distribution of fertiliser and the cutting and 
transporting of the sugarcane to the refinery. The person hired for this post 
was a newly graduated industrial engineer, who happened to be Gonzalo's 
younger brother, Adan Blade. Gonzalo agreed to be left out of the newly 
elected committee. Although he, like Pina, is a members of the board of the 
association where most affairs are regularly discussed before they are 
presented to the general assembly, convened more sporadically than the 
board. Gonzalo shows up almost daily at the CNPP offices and the refinery 
premises. He is always thinking about new business to make, for example he 
has started to sell tires of a specific brand that had no distributor in the 
region. He also encouraged and financed his wife to open a shoe shop in El 
Grullo. Thus he has diversified from agriculture and animal husbandry to 
commerce. He likes to contrast his administrative methods with Pina's, 
highlighting that she has an archaic way of dealing with her employees, 
which he considers harsh and inefficient. He mentioned that Pina pays very 
low salaries which the workers compensate for by dragging their feet. In 
contrast, Gonzalo pays higher salaries and provides his workers with better 
working conditions than the average in the region, which he believes makes 
his employees better workers than Pina's. 
Gonzalo Blade claims to have a more efficient organization in his plots 
than Pina and her father, although he has fewer assets. Gonzalo shares his 
points of view about how to organize the sugarcane production with Arturo 
Sanchez, Juan Ruiz and Armando Castro, who, like him, have shared the 
leadership of the CNPP. The four of them have been members of the board 
and executive committee of the CNPP (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of the 
CNPP structure). 
Arturo Sanchez: Diversified Businesses and Sugarcane 
Arturo Sanchez Ruy was President of the CNPP until the end of the 
harvesting season of 1987. He is a young entrepreneur, being the oldest son 
of a family of six children, most of them women, the only brother having 
emigrated to the USA. He has thus inherited the responsibility for managing 
the family businesses that include two petrol stations, a video shop, various 
lorries, agricultural machinery and land planted with sugarcane. He is very 
proud of the achievements of the CNPP in the relatively short time that it has 
142 Chapter 5 
been working, and thinks they might have done more things if its members 
were more cooperative: 
"In this refinery there used to be only one organization that was run 
by the ejidatarios. Small landholders like me felt we were not given 
any attention. There were three unsuccessful attempts to form our 
association, because we Mexicans think firstiy of ourselves, 
secondly of ourselves and thirdly of ourselves, and want things to 
improve without any specific effort on our part. In 1981, we finally 
became an association independent of the CNC and we affiliated 
ourselves to the national CNPP organization. My father was the 
first president but after three years he left and I took over. We got 
strong support from Gabriel Limdn, and all those producers who 
left the CNC, joined our association. The state authorities refused 
to grant us legal status. They told us that the association had first to 
have assets. We looked for a way to acquire these without sponging 
on our sugar cane producers. We succeeded and were then legally 
recognized. My father worked for the association without receiving 
any payment, now we receive nominal compensation. We have, as 
an association, a special credit account with the refinery. We have 
acquired a steamroller, land, pick-ups, tools and our own offices. 
In order to have working capital in the association, we have had to 
tax members three per cent of the cost of transporting our sugar 
cane. Some did not like it. They are not like ejidatarios, who don't 
complain when you deduct one or a thousand pesos from them. Of 
course, ejidatarios don't care because they don't count the pennies 
they receive from the government. They are not aware that unity 
would make them strong. The refinery manager has tried to put 
pressure on me. But I am not like the CNC leaders, I am 
independent. This manager has concentrated all the decisions in his 
own hands. He is a bastard. Although he confuses austerity with 
stinginess, I respect his managerial abilities. He increased 
sugarcane milling in this refinery from 1,400 to 3,000 tonnes per 
day. I take my hat off to him, he is a good administrator'. 
Arturo Sanchez Ruy is impatient and puts up with very little. Once 
when fed up with the delays and evasive answers given him by engineer 
Baltazar Blanco,1* he asked Blanco to explain himself, and added that if he 
had something personal against him and was a real man, he should come off 
refinery property and fight. Blanco dismissed the provocation, and wrote a 
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long letter to the Production Committee, complaining about Arturo's 
behaviour, but the Committee let the incident subside into the oblivion of the 
Committee files. Arturo Sanchez's character is resented also by other 
members in the CNPP, who go as far as saying that Sanchez's leadership is 
the main reason why the CNPP has failed to expand its membership. 
Juan Ruiz: Sugarcane and CNPP 
Juan Ruiz had to leave the valley at the end of the 1950's to look for a job, 
which he found in Mexico City where he lived for eleven years working as a 
bank security officer and later as taxi driver. He got tired of living in the big 
city and came back to his native town. He rented his uncle's land and started 
to grow vegetables, melons and whatever he could plant. 'I just about made 
ends meet', he said. It was very difficult because he was an independent 
small renter and the export cartels very often took advantage of these 
producers. He decided to go into business with his brother selling 
insecticides. Tn those times before sugarcane was grown in the valley, 
everything was melon.' He became a member of a low-interest savings bank 
in El Grullo.2* Although, Juan is only a renter, he has been re-elected twice 
as the CNPP representative in El Grullo. Finally in 1977, Juan decided to 
plant 20 hectares of sugarcane that he increased to 28 hectares the following 
year, this time sharing the responsibility with his brother. At the beginning 
they had some troubles with the crop because the extension department was 
disorganized and gave them no advice on the best time to plant and cultivate. 
Juan still blames them for not obtaining good production during those five 
years. 
'To top it all, I had the bad luck to have seven hectares catch fire 
that were not ready to be cut. My debt with the refinery sky-
rocketed. My brother decided to pack up, but I said: I have lost on 
this and I am going to pull myself up with this, and if I don't 
manage to succeed, I'll leave this town and nobody will see me 
again. Fortunately, the price of sugarcane rose and the production 
on my plot increased and my debts diminished and for the last five 
years I have made a profit. In agriculture, you have to have a 
strong faith, like with Christ, believing without seeing'. 
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Juan Rufz has been very active in the CNPP association since it was 
formed in 1982. Juan thinks that the founder of the association had to be 
hard to start it off: 
'Francisco J. (Sanchez) is a hard man and sometimes even despotic 
but that was exacdy what was needed to consolidate the association. 
He got tired of going up and down to deal with different problems 
and he left Arturo (his son) in his place and I became secretary. In 
1984, we were elected for a new period. Although we were not the 
very popular among the big sugarcane producers, especially with 
Pina, who happens to have good connections with the leader in the 
national committee. We told our leaders in Mexico to stop 
interfering with our decisions, and they agreed'. 
Juan Rufz was re-elected as secretary for a new three year period in 
1987. He is in charge of organizing the burning, cutting and transporting the 
cane of the farmers affiliated to the CNPP to the refinery during the harvest 
season. After the harvest is over, both associations have to programme the 
new planting and replanting of sugarcane for their respective members. The 
organization of all works involved in planting, harvesting and delivering of 
sugarcane to the refinery, cannot be easily improvised and Rufz Corona, like 
Jacinto Rojo in the CNC, has to plan the work in advance and is probably 
the reason why they remain on their jobs for longer periods than the 
presidents of both associations, who deal mainly with political and financial 
negotiations with the refinery's administrators and their national leaders, (see 
table 3, chapter 7). 
Armando Castro: Lorries, Pigs and Sugarcane 
Armando Castro is a farmer in his forties, who has 40 hectares planted with 
sugarcane, though he takes care of another 120 hectares that belong to his 
mother and sisters. He planted sugarcane for the first time in 1975 which 
yielded good crops during three seasons but the prices were low and the 
costs charged by the refinery were high, which left them with a negligible 
margin of profit, if anything at all. Before Armando planted sugarcane for 
the first time, his father was in charge of their farm and he grew staple crops 
like maize, sorghum and sometimes beans. In 1978, Armando, tired of the 
low profit margins of sugarcane, planted cantaloupe melon instead; other 
seasons he varied the crops and grew different vegetables which were very 
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profitable when there was a good price in the market, specially if they could 
export them to USA. However, in some seasons the export price was low 
and they would have to sell cheaply in the national markets. But the good 
years made up for the bad and Arturo kept producing melon and vegetables 
from 1978 to 1984, when he finally decided to pack in the melon and tried 
sugarcane again. The main reason in this occasion was that the melon plants 
were attacked for a stubborn fungus which they could not find the way to 
eradicate. Thus the cost of production increased and the yields decreased and 
it was just the time to look for an alternative crop. The price of the 
sugarcane had improved steadily in last five years and the sugarcane 
producers were more content with their profits than they were some years 
ago when Armando stopped growing cane; so he decided to give sugarcane a 
second try. 
When Armando planted sugarcane the first time around, there was only 
one sugarcane producers association, the CNC, to which he belonged for the 
three years that he grew sugarcane. The second time around he joined the 
CNPP. He considers that it is the only association really concerned about the 
sugarcane producer's interests and where politics do not count as it does in 
the CNC. Since Armando planted sugarcane he visited assiduously the CNPP 
offices and he attended all their general assemblies and was invited to join 
the council of the association, where its more active members, who seem to 
be also the better off, discuss the general policies of the association before 
they are presented to the general assembly. The council members tend to be 
those for whom sugarcane production accounts for a significant part of their 
diversified income. Armando, for example, not only has forty hectares 
planted with sugarcane, but he also has a pig farm, agricultural machinery to 
work in his land, and four large lorries. He mentioned that when he was 
younger he used to drive one of those lorries himself. Nowadays the 
administration of his different businesses takes all his time. He has been very 
active too in the associations of pig producers in the region. Armando Castro 
grew sugarcane in the 1970s but gave up as he expressed it: 
"The first time we planted 40 hectares of sugarcane we could 
harvest them three times. The yield was high but the price was low 
and it left very little profit. Probably the management in charge of 
the refinery was not as good as it is now. So we decided to explore 
other crops like cantaloupe melons and vegetables. They were more 
profitable than cane but the costs of production and risks were also 
higher. When we started having troubles with a persistent disease 
on the cantaloup we returned to cane. I planted 40 hectares once 
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again, then other members of my family joined in and now we have 
among us one hundred and twenty hectares planted with sugarcane'. 
He likes to organize different activities, and is not afraid to express his 
opinions or pursue a good cause even if it is a difficult one. Those are the 
reasons why he believes the CNPP's members voted him President of the 
association for the period 1988-1990. 
From the first moment that Armando joined the CNPP, he became 
interested in the way the association was organized. He reviewed very 
carefully the contract signed between the refinery and the producer through 
the two producers associations. He is a self-taught accountant and thinks it is 
vital to be a good book-keeper to make a profit. His perusal of the costs of 
production highlighted the fact that the costs of transporting the sugarcane 
from the plots to the refinery were unnecessarily high. Armando knows the 
freight business inside out. So he decided to analyse the freight tariffs and he 
came to the conclusion that not only were they were extremely high but the 
administrative costs, which are usually covered by the lorries owners, were 
being covered in their totality by the sugarcane producers. He considered 
that the CNPP administration should have been charging the lorries owners a 
percentage of their pay to cover administrative costs. He proposed first to the 
CNPP council and later to the general assembly that they should charge the 
transporters a modest three per cent, which according to Armando is a 
normal procedure and it could be could as high as ten per cent. This motion, 
to the chagrin of the transporters was not only well received by the 
producers, but it was immediately implemented by the CNPP. The 
freighters, among whom there were some sugarcane producers, complained 
and argued that paying three per cent from their earnings to the association 
left them with a very small profit and they tried to convince the CNPP 
administrators to revoke the decision. But the producers had made up their 
minds and kept the three per cent condition. The majority of the transporters 
refused to carry their loads and the CNPP members decided that they could 
dispense with their services. The better off members immediately acquired 
one or two lorries and several carts which could be towed by tractor. The 
CNPP representatives were very proud of having taking over the freight of 
their sugarcane and they claimed that there would be an extra source of 
income for the few who could afford to buy lorries or carts and tractors. The 
havoc caused by the three per cent charge did not affect the majority of the 
CNPP members, who did not participate in the decision making, but neither 
did they see their freight costs reduced. However, Armando was very proud 
of the whole operation and considered the campaign a great success for the 
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CNPP members who would retain the profits involved in the freight of the 
cane to the refinery among themselves. 
Armando Castro is a busy man, rushing from the CNPP offices to his 
private offices where he runs his other businesses which demand from him a 
fair amount of travelling. He holds strong views against mixing politics and 
business and much prefers the latter. His definition of politics is very much 
reduced to the control of the government by the PRI, the ruling party, that 
according to him is the origin of the economic disarray of Mexican public 
finances; this position is pretty much shared by the majority of the members 
in the CNPP, which contrast with the opinions held about the subject by the 
CNC members, who are less sharp in their comments and some of them are 
very supportive of the party. In this respect, Armando Castro follows the 
dominant trend among the most conspicuous members in the CNPP, who 
have been able to consolidate their comfortable livelihood without needing to 
depend directly on the intervention of public sponsorship as has been the 
case for the smaller and less well-off sugarcane producers. Armando Castro 
inherited land and other economic assets from his father, as did all of the 
others described here save Juan Ruiz, but he had access to his uncle's land, 
which he has rented for the last fifteen years. These cases, of sugarcane 
producers affiliated to the CNPP, have highlighted the better material 
conditions that generally prevail among members of that organization. 
Conclusion 
Middle and large sugarcane do not belong to one association as, with very 
few exceptions do the ejidatarios. They are split: 66.05% belong to the 
CNPP and 33.91% to the CNC; whereas the latter belong 99.59% to the 
CNC and only 0.41% to the CNPP. The landowners who have remained in 
the CNC, like Mariano Encino, declare they prefer to stick to their old 
association out of loyalty, others claim that they are better protected against 
land invasion if they belong to the CNC, which has been one of the 
associations to support landless peasants in their demands for land. In the 
case of the landowners affiliated to the CNC, like Humberto Riesling and 
Mariano Encino, discussed in Chapter 4, it is important to consider their 
involvement in the PRI, as it was through this channel that they joined 
sugarcane production in the first place. For those in the CNPP, political 
participation played a muted influence in their decision to grow sugarcane. It 
is not possible to draw a stark division between the middle and large 
sugarcane producers based on their affiliation to one or the other of the two 
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associations, except that two out of three are members of the CNPP, and 
they tend to be more critical of the PRI, and more demanding to the refinery 
administration than the CNC's members who are predominantly ejidatarios 
and more accepting of the refinery decisions. However, as I argue in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the CNC by the power of its numbers, is the more 
influential of the two associations of sugarcane producers in the valley. 
Middle and large farmers have a different relation to the producers 
associations and the dominant political party, to which both belong, than 
ejidatarios. Private landowners distrust the official discourse about agrarian 
reform and they have kept at arm's length from the national CNC and the 
PRI. They command enough economic and social power to be able to 
negotiate the terms of their relation to them. Some of them have even 
accepted to be PRI candidates to public offices, e.g. Pina Lara, who was 
elected municipal president in El Grullo. Their economic and family 
networks provide the support to consolidate their business without depending 
solely on direct public funds as some ejidatarios do. And when middle and 
large farmers do receive public financial support they are in better position to 
capitalize on it, as they have done in Autlan-El Grullo, where they have 
acquired agricultural machinery and lorries to do the work on their plots and 
transport their cane. The middle and large sugarcane producers have been 
able to take advantage of the improved conditions that both associations 
together have negotiated with the refinery administration. 
These sugarcane producers are a new local economic group which deals 
with the state-own refinery from a point of economic strength as the 
government has been concerned to consolidate its "alliance for profits", 
(Purcell, 1981: 211). This is a new political scenario in the sugarcane 
producing areas, where traditionally large landowners used to own the 
refinery and could control the organization of production to increase their 
profits, keeping refinery workers and sugarcane producers under their 
control. Whereas in the new state-own refineries, the organization of 
production has become a contested arena where sugarcane producers from all 
economic levels have to organize themselves to negotiate with the refinery 
administration as it is discussed in Chapter 6 and 7. 
NOTES 
1. Balthazar Blanco came to work in the refinery in 1984, some months before 
Lim6n was sacked. A new position was created for Blanco who latter took over 
from Lim6n, but was himself replaced a few months afterwards by a protegee 
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of the Mexico City central offices. This was used as strategy for getting rid of 
Limon. 
2. 'Caja Popular' is a savings institution, which lends its members money at much 
lower interest rates than commercial rates. This institution is linked to 
agriculture and sells fertilizers and insecticides at lower than market prices. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE SUGARCANE PRODUCERS ASSOCIATIONS 
CNC AND CNPP 
As soon as the sugar refinery Melchor Ocampo was installed in the Valley of 
Autlan-El Grullo the first sugarcane producers rallied around a producers' 
association affiliated to the CNC of the PRI. Over a decade later some of the 
larger producers split from CNC to create their own association. This new 
association was also affiliated to the PRI but under the umbrella of the CNPP 
(national confederation of small landowners). In this chapter I depict the part 
played by these two associations of producers in the politics of sugarcane 
production in the region. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, most sugarcane 
production in Mexico was taken over by the Mexican state in the 1970's and 
its organization became an arena where politics at the national and local level 
intertwine. Because of the different interfaces of social agents at local, 
regional and national organizational levels the arrangements tended to change 
as they went from one arena into the next. In these interfaces strategic actors 
and political groups influenced and re-organized state policy and actions. In 
the first section I discuss the local initiatives and their political lobbying that 
was of decisive influence in the opening of the refinery Melchor Ocampo in 
the region. These harbingers of sugarcane production founded the CNC in 
1969 which remained the only association of sugarcane producers in the 
valley for over a decade. In the second section I present the general 
assemblies of the CNC where the committee, headed by the president 
Maximino Castillo, leads the discussion with the compliance of the attending 
members. In the third section I turn my attention to the other association of 
producers, the CNPP, describing the different economic interests of the 
larger sugarcane producers that propelled them to leave the CNC to create a 
second association of sugarcane producers. This split was orchestrated by 
large landowners, who claimed that the representatives of the CNC catered 
for the interests of the smallest sugarcane producers -ejidatarios- thus 
ignoring their demands. In the fourth section I turn to the general assemblies 
of the CNPP where participants are more vocal, demanding from the 
The Sugarcane Producers Associations CNC and CNPP 151 
executive committee, especially from its president, more detailed information 
on the accounting and policies of the organization than the CNC members 
do. 
The different styles of leadership and participation in the two 
associations of sugarcane producers highlight what Zukin and DiMaggio 
(1990: 15) describe as the complex contingent nature of economic action. 
They emphasise the embeddedness of economic action on cognitive 
processes, culturally enabling and constraining patterns, social networks and 
political agencies. Thus sugar cane producers have created two different 
associations to organize sugar cane production and to represent them in their 
dealings with the refinery. Although both associations apparently share the 
main objective of protecting the interests of sugarcane producers, the way 
they go about this differs. Members of both associations have to fight for 
their right to participate in the decision making and the outcomes of the 
negotiations that take place reflect the level of involvement of the different 
producers in each association. Most CNC members delegate decision making 
to their leaders, whereas a larger number of CNPP members participate 
directly in decision making through their involvement in the council of the 
CNPP. These organizational differences reflect the different socio-economic 
composition of each association. 
As I pointed earlier in the thesis, the associations of sugar cane 
producers (ejidatarios and private landowners) in Mexico have been linked to 
the PRI. There has been a symbiotic relation between state development 
policies and the consolidation of these sugarcane producers' associations. 
Sugarcane producers have expanded their participation in the political 
organization of sugarcane production through their two associations, which 
have turned out to be strong negotiators in the political organization of 
sugarcane production administered by the Mexican government. Current 
literature on Mexican politics describes this process as part of the integration 
of producers into the Mexican corporatist state (see Pare" et al, 1987). Such 
analysis tends to emphasise the manipulative intervention of governmental 
institutions into the producers's affairs. A notable exception is Glantz's 
(1979) biography of an ejidal leader who became a regional figure promoting 
the grass-roots organization of sugarcane producers in the north-west of 
Mexico. 
Without trying to blur the necessary analytical distinctions between 
government administration and producers interests, I consider that it is more 
relevant, for the material I will discuss in this chapter, to think of the 
sugarcane producers, their associations and the government institutions 
involved as functionally distinctive but socially integrated entities. Thus sugar 
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cane producers are not docile spectators in the political arena; far from it, 
some of them are active participants in Mexican politics through their 
membership of the PRI, CNC and CNPP, which have evolved into 
corporatised institutions within the Mexican state.1* As in previous chapters, 
I will highlight in this chapter individual participation in the collective 
making of the organization of sugarcane production. 
As I have described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, sugarcane producers are a 
diversified group. There are small ejidatarios with plots of cane of half a 
hectare and a handful of landowners with fields from fifty to two-hundred 
hectares of sugarcane. The difference in plot size goes hand-in-hand with the 
difference of assets accrued by producers. The different memberships in the 
two associations are easily recognised during the general assemblies of the 
associations. The CNC's members tend to accept acquiescendy their leaders' 
explanations, whereas the CNPP's members are more inquisitive and 
demanding towards them than the former. The better-off sugarcane producers 
seem to be more concerned about reducing costs and increasing profit than 
the less well-off producers, who appear to be content with their income from 
the cane and the fringe benefits that come with it, e.g. health insurance. The 
differences between CNC and CNPP members, as they are described in this 
chapter, highlight their varied socio-economic background and interests and 
how they take care of the latter within the boundaries structured by the 
former. 
The diverse socio-economic conditions among sugarcane producers 
congealed in the branching off of a significant number of wealthy producers 
into a new association. This newly formed CNPP association was launched 
under very different conditions to the ones faced by the original CNC 
association. The cane producers, who decided to form a new association to 
represent their interests, considered they deserved more attention than the 
one provided by the CNC leadership and had the means and social networks 
to put across their demands. Thus the CNPP was set up with the 
participation of strong producers who played an important role in the board 
of the new association. They participated in the decision making in the 
CNPP more directiy than they ever did in the CNC and this gave the CNPP 
a more consensual approach than the CNC, which has a more centralized 
leadership than the CNPP (Adams, 1975). 
The organization of production in both associations share the basic 
procedures but they differ in their implementation. The CNC executive 
committee made most decisions which it latter communicated as a fait 
accompli to its members. Whereas the CNPP leaders had to consult the 
council members who play an active role in the running of the association. 
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Most council members owned lorries and cranes to transport the cane and 
kept a close eye in all the decision the CNPP made about die organization of 
sugarcane production. The organizational differences between the two 
associations derived not only from the diverse socio-economic conditions of 
their members but also from the size of each association. The CNPP had just 
over one-tenth of the CNC's members. The administrative demands of 
organizing 815 producers are different to the ones suitable to deal with over 
114 producers, especially when the latter are wealthy and outspoken. 
Pioneers of Sugarcane Production: CNC Association 
The CNC Association is the largest of the two associations that represent the 
sugarcane producers in the Valley of Autlân-El Grullo. It counts among its 
members eight hundred and fifteen of the nine hundred and twenty nine 
sugarcane producers in the region, who represent 87.6% of the total 
producers and administer 69% of the land planted with sugarcane. Ninety 
three per cent of CNC's members are ejidatarios who hold smaller plots than 
the CNPP's members, 4.6 hectares is die average size; whereas the average 
size for the CNPP's members is 14.5 hectares. However there are large and 
small sugarcane producers in both associations; the difference is more of 
numbers: the great majority of the CNC's members are ejidatarios, whereas 
these only account for 0.41% of the CNPP's membership. The different 
constituencies of each association play a fundamental role in the definition of 
their policies and the way they deal with the refinery administration. In this 
section I describe the beginnings of the CNC, which can be traced back to 
the opening of the refinery in the region. 
Local Support to Refinery 
There is general agreement among the first sugarcane producers about the 
description of the early struggles to attract public funds to build a sugar mill 
in the region of Autla^i. Export agriculture had its ups and downs and tomato 
production, which was to become an economic boom, had just started. Thus 
the possibility of building a sugar refinery in the region captured the 
imagination of the farmers and politicians who knew about the state plans to 
expand sugar production. The national sugar agro-industry was in crisis and 
the Mexican Government had decided to step in and re-organize the industry, 
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as described in Chapter 2. The inhabitants of the Valley of Auüán rightíy 
boasted that their region was ideal for producing sugarcane. 
The national leader, who came from a region near the valley of Autlán-
El Grullo, have approached the Minister of Defense, General Santiago López 
Arreóla, who was a native of the Autlán region and had maintained a strong 
influence on local politics. According to several sugar cane producers 
interviewed, these two were the promoters of the installation of the refinery 
in the valley Autlan-El Grullo. General Lopez had helped his brother to 
become elected to several public positions and at the time he was a 
congressman. Paulo López Arreóla, the general's brother, had been bolstered 
by the General to be elected as congressman just before the negotiations to 
bring the refinery to valley took place. Paulo mentioned that he was 
congressman for the PRI, when the possibility of installing the refinery 
cropped up and he claimed to have participated in the negotiations to bring 
the refinery to Autíán. Humberto Riesling, Paulo's son-in-law, elaborated: 
'Don Paulo López Arreóla, myself and other members of the PRI 
started a committee to promote sugar cane planting among the 
farmers in Autíán. It was around the end of 1968. I ended up as 
deputy of the president in the first committee. Their petition for the 
refinery was backed up by Lopéz Arreóla and Jesús M. Gonzalez, 
whose participation I consider decisive to the allocation of the 
refinery in Autlán. Paulo looked around for a plot to build the 
refinery. He wanted it in El Grullo, but the people there rejected 
the project. Jesús M. was of a different opinion and suggested a 
plot nearer to Autlán. Finally it was decided that it would be built 
by the main road near the river where it is now'. 
Local representatives in coordination with national leaders, promoted the 
opening of the sugar refinery in the Valley of Autlán-El Grullo. They were 
supported enthusiastically by PRI members, especially the ejidatarios. 
The Central de Maquinaria (Central Depot) 
The first sugarcane was planted in plots with very bad soil. These were the 
only plots that some peasants and farmers were willing to spare from other 
cash crops to experiment with new crops. Although the yields were low, 
there were some advantages in planting sugar cane i.e. immediate access to 
credit from the refinery, the right to health services and the opportunity to 
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level and drain their plots. The first two services were provided by the 
refinery; the last one had to be organized by the sugarcane producers 
themselves. In order to be able to do this, the newly formed association 
negotiated, with the sponsorship of one of the national leaders of sugarcane 
producers, a loan to acquire the necessary machinery to improve the 
conditions of the plots that would grow sugarcane. The first CNC executive 
committee obtained the loan and bought forty tractors, eighteen lifting 
cranes, sixteen carts and one steam roller. The committee appointed Ramón 
Navarro, an ejidatario from Autlán, as the administrator of the machines. 
Though sugar producers had to buy shares for the machinery, they did not 
complain about it because the tariffs to rent the machines which would 
improve their plots were the cheapest in the region. Ramón Navarro had 
heard about the machines that the CNC association had bought and offered 
his services. He had been a tractor driver and mechanic. Ramón was 
acquainted with Luis Rosales, the president of the organization, and decided 
to ask him for a job in the newly formed Central de Maquinaria (depot of 
agricultural machinery), when he was hired as administrator of the machines. 
Ramón recalled: 
T received the machines which came all the way from Mexico 
City. I checked them and kept their invoices and wrote down their 
numbers in a notebook. I knew how to do it because I had worked 
with agricultural machinery in Guanajuato. Then I had to hire 
drivers to operate the machines. The first thing that I asked each 
applicant was to drive the tractor. If he did not check the oil of the 
machine I knew he was not a good operator. We started to work on 
very difficult plots -those that nobody wanted to work on. The 
roads were in awful conditions and the whole operation was hard 
work. Farmers offered their plots with bad quality soil to plant 
sugarcane and the poor machines had to fight their way into those 
marshes'. 
According to the administrator and some producers, the machines 
levelled and furrowed their plots cheaper than any of the privately owned 
machines. It was a pioneering task what the operators of those machines 
accomplished. Indeed, the machines wore out very quickly under such an 
intense working schedule and lack of maintenance. The committee of the 
CNC association practised a loose administration of the machines, which was 
beyond Ramon's control. They would authorise extra work that was not 
registered by the administrator. It seems that different persons had access to 
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those machines, wearing them out without paying for the services received. 
After five years of having driven the machines to the ground, charging low 
tariffs, even below their running costs and without investing any time or 
resources in their maintenance, as it could be expected they began to break 
down. However a handful of machines kept going for a bit longer, providing 
cheap services until most machines reached the end of their working life. 
Although cane growers had to contribute to buy the machines, the 
improvements they made on their plots were worth more than the expenses 
they had to cover. 
The collapse of this Central de Maquinaria tarnished the public image 
of the CNC representatives. In 1982 the new refinery administration 
retrieved the machines and auctioned them in order to recover the loans that 
were never repaid by the Central. Although the pioneers of sugarcane were 
asked to contribute five thousand pesos to buy the machines, the amount was 
only a small part of their cost and their contribution was more than 
compensated by the low tariffs the CNC charged to them. Thus when the 
worn-out machines seized up the refinery administration demanded from the 
CNC members the repayment of the debt for the credit given to them to buy 
the machines. The executive committee declared they were unable to cover 
that amount. The refinery administration repossessed the machines and 
auctioned most of them, among which there were some that still had some 
working life left in them. These were snatched by the better off sugarcane 
producers who could take advantage of the public funds expended again on 
sugar cane production in the 1970's and 1980's. 
Although, most sugarcane producers recall angrily the outcome of the 
central depot, they also recognise that without it they could hardly have 
improved the levelling and drainage in their plots, which has improved not 
only the yields of sugarcane but also the value of the plots. Thus die loser in 
this transaction was the government institution that provided the loans to buy 
the machines; the debt was partially paid from the sale of the machines but 
most of it was written off. Sugarcane producers improved the conditions of 
their plots and their production increased. Although outcome could be 
considered an inefficient way of expending public funds, it nevertheless 
contributed to the welfare of the majority of sugarcane producers, namely the 
ejidatarios. 
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Sugar Politics in the National and Local Arenas 
During the 1970's the associations of sugarcane producers in the long-
established refineries were striving to extend their regional influence to the 
national political arena. The new sugarcane producers in Autlar. followed the 
political leadership of those representatives from other regions with more 
experience. Gordillo Luna, leader of UNPC (National Union of Sugarcane 
Producers), one of the three associations that claimed to have national 
support, had been in very close contact with the leaders of the CNC 
association of sugarcane producers in Autlan. He had sponsored the local 
committee in their petition to obtain the credit for the machines that played 
an important role in spreading sugarcane production on plots with poor 
quality soil, or with uneven surface and lacking drainage. Humberto Riesling 
remembers him as an astute leader well versed in all that is related to 
sugarcane production. However, as will be seen, national political strife and 
local politics swayed the commitments of the sugarcane producers in Autlan 
from Gordillo Luna to the up-and-coming leader of the Alliance of sugarcane 
producers. 
In the early 1970s, there was a local political patron, an in-law of the 
then president of Mexico, who tried to exert political control over the CNC 
and found some supporters among the sugarcane producers. But they were a 
minority and the overwhelming majority of the CNC's members backed the 
rising new leader of the unified national association of sugarcane producers; 
i.e. all the regional and national associations of sugarcane producers 
affiliated to the CNC merged into one association. 
The early leaders of the CNC association had participated in the local 
branch of the PRI and through their politicking, they had consolidated their 
control over the organization of sugarcane producers and the administration 
of the central depot. The CNC acquired the machines mainly with the loan 
from the FIMAIA (a public financial institution to acquire machinery for 
sugarcane production), though they also collected money from the producers 
through shares. However, the administration of the machines and other 
vehicles, was exclusively responsible to the committee of the CNC that 
retained its same members but just reshuffling them in different posts until 
the late 1970's, when new faces cropped up among the members of the 
committee. Thus Humberto Riesling and another four men remained 
members of the committee in different positions until the end of the 1970's. 
Local producers, specially from Autlan, had seized control of the executive 
committee in the CNC and through their political network could negotiate 
good deals with the refinery manager. Some ejidatarios from Escondido 
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managed to work in the CNC association, which provided its sugarcane 
producers with direct access to decision making in the CNC which they 
extended until the end of the 1980's when Jacinto Rojo stopped being the 
secretary of the CNC executive committee, as described in the chapter 4. 
The employees in the refinery's extension department went around the 
ejidos expounding the advantages of planting sugarcane. In contrast with the 
more politically involved cane growers, peasants in the ejidos were more 
cautious about planting cane. Adán Romo, a sugarcane producer from Ejido 
Escondido, recalled that in a nearby ejido the farmers made fun of the 
extension workers and drove them out of their village. Nevertheless, the 
meager economic advantages and fringe benefits e.g. credit and health 
services, that sugarcane offered enticed the less well off farmers to try 
sugarcane on their plots. Jacinto Rojo, an ejidatario from Escondido together 
with others, mentioned that their plots needed basic improvements e.g. 
levelling and drainage that they could not afford to pay. Thus when the CNC 
acquired the agricultural machines and offered the farmers to do those jobs 
on their plots if they would plant sugarcane and they would pay them when 
they harvest their cane, a good number of ejidatarios accepted to plant 
sugarcane on their plots. However, the ejidatarios with better plots of land 
and some other resources, remained growing the traditional staple and other 
cash crops until the conditions for the sugarcane producers improved (see 
Chapter 3), as it did indeed in the late 1970's and early 1980's when these 
better off ejidatarios finally gave up their various crops to plant canes. 
The founder-leader of the older sugarcane producers association Luis 
Rosales, an active member of the PRI's branch in Autlán, committed himself 
to and succeed in building up a strong producers association. As president of 
the association he also played an instrumental part in the creation of the 
central depot. Rosales remained in the presidency for six years tighdy 
controlling the association and finances in both the CNC and the central de 
maquinaria. The local chairman of the PRI, Leo Encino, as I described in 
Chapter 4, was a supporter of Rosales which helped him to secure a job in 
the refinery. Some of the first sugarcane producers did not approve of 
Rosales performance as leader and complained about his mismanagement of 
the central depot. Rosales, as president of the CNC and technical 
administrator of the central depot, always boasted about the low rates they 
charged for the work they provided for sugarcane producers. However, a 
good number of sugarcane producers thought differently and were able to 
express their grievances through political confrontations. These local 
differences were intermingled with the struggles going on at national level at 
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a time of changes and political manoeuvres which helped the critics of the 
CNC executive committee to re-new its membership. 
Political Dealings among Cane Producers in Autlan 
As the national political struggles between cane growers and the state went 
on, the producers in Autlan split into three factions that tried to establish 
links with one of the political cliques struggling at national level. One faction 
was bolstered by a local patron, who was affinally related to the then 
president of Mexico, and a group from Ejido Escondido that has been an 
opinion leader in the valley. A second group was gathered around an 
ejidatario from El Grullo and the third group, which continued supporting 
Luis Rosales, was aligned with one of the three recently formed national 
associations.2* The three national associations became one at the end of the 
1970's and affiliated themselves to the CNC.3' And so did the three local 
factions. The struggles among the producers together with the bankruptcy of 
the Central de Maquinaria eroded the authority of the founding leaders of 
the association, who have managed to carve their personal economic well-
being as they consolidate the political influence of the association of 
sugarcane producers. Thus when they took the backseat of the association, 
the newly elected members of the committee lacked experience to manoeuvre 
the CNC association with its expanded responsibilities and decision-making 
power. This impasse allowed Gabriel Limdn, who still held a strong grip on 
the extension department, to stretch his influence into the producers' 
association. Most of the new members of the committee accepted Limdn's 
interference in their affairs. He was a cane producer himself, who took 
special interest in helping the sugar producers, some of whom were his 
relatives, to deal with the refinery administration under the recently settied 
agreements. Curiously enough, the outcome of the national consolidation of 
the CNC rocked the boat of the local executive committee, which was taken 
over by a new group led by ejidatarios from Escondido with the covert 
support of Limdn. 
With the newly acquired strength of their membership now expanded 
beyond regional boundaries, the national associations exercised their muscle 
against the Mexican state. In 1975 sugarcane producers were called to join a 
national strike demanding an increase in the price of sugarcane and to have a 
more active participation in the decision-making processes. They won both 
demands. Though the increase in price was hardly worth the strike, the 
creation of la tripartita to coordinate policy-making among different 
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producers associations and the refinery administration was a solid triumph 
for the producers. In some regions, Autíán among them, the sugarcane 
producers began to take more responsibility for the association of planting 
and harvesting of sugarcane, always in coordination with the extension 
department. Engineer Limon was the head of it in the refinery Melchor 
Ocampo and often led the discussion to conform to his ideas, which were 
taken on board by the newly elected committee of the CNC. The president, 
Ramón Gordillo, and the secretary, Jacinto Rojas, were both ejidatarios from 
Escondido who had been involved in some aspects of the organization of 
sugarcane production but had little experience in its control. Thus it took 
them some time to work out the know-how of directing the organization of 
sugarcane production and how to deal with Limón, who had a strong 
influence on the running of the CNC. 
Jacinto Rojas spent most of his time in the daily organization of field 
tasks, which he had learnt to do when he worked in the extension department 
for three seasons. Thus he was very well acquainted with the job. Although 
Ramón had worked for the extension department too, he could not change 
gear into his executive responsibilities as quickly as Jacinto did; he was faced 
constantly with what seemed to him insurmountable obstacles. Ramón 
worked as foreman of sugarcane cutters and had originally declined the 
nomination as candidate for the presidency of the association. He explained 
to the proposers with humility that he had not finished school and that he 
would not know how to administer all the different operations that the CNC 
association was responsible for. However, according to Ramón: 
"They told me that they wanted me to become the next president 
and I excused myself because I did not have much education. But 
the next day they brought to Escondido a big group of ejidatarios of 
different ejidos. Everybody was cheerful. When I was asked to 
accept the nomination I repeated that if I accepted I would need 
somebody to keep the books, but not an accountant because they 
only learn how to cheat people. Instead I suggested hiring a good 
secretary. I was the only candidate and when the national delegate 
came to supervise the election he told me that was it and I was in 
for the presidency'. 
Ramón recalled that he had some troubles with Limón, who had a 
strong hold on most of the work in the sugarcane fields. He mentioned one 
occasion when he was cajoled by Limón to accept charging the sugarcane 
producers the costs of transferring the surplus of cane that could not be 
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ground in the Melchor Ocampo to Casimiro Castillo, a nearby refinery. 
When he realised that he had been taken for a ride, he asked help from the 
national committee, and the issue was finally settied to the producers' 
advantage. At the end of his period in the committee, Ramón was asked to 
stand as candidate for a second period. He was tired and felt that he had not 
taken care of his own business; but in the end he was persuaded by the 
support of a large group of producers to run for a second period. Ramón 
mentioned that he faced opposition from a few ejidatarios, including some 
from his own ejido, who dared to accused him of embezzling some money, 
which he denied categorically. He also mentioned that his confrontations with 
Limón might have played a part in the hasty formation of a second electoral 
ticket with Maximino Castillo Arenas as president and Jacinto Rojas 
remaining as secretary of the committee. Jacinto acknowledged that there 
were rumours about Ramon's embezzlement, but he gave more weight to the 
fact that Ramon's administration had been unable to curb the extension 
department's intervention in CNC affairs. Ramon's intention to run for re-
election spurred the creation of two other lists of candidates both including 
ejidatarios from his own community -Adán Romo, ej¡datado from 
Escondido, headed one and Maximino, from a nearby town, the other. 
Maximino Castillo was a newcomer to the region, who had recentiy 
taken over the administration of a plot planted with sugarcane. He had a low 
level job in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and he had become a 
prominent member in the local branch of the PRI, which served him well 
when some months after his election as president of the CNC committee of 
the sugarcane producers, he was also elected Municipal President of Union 
de Tula, a town near the Valley of Autlan-El Grullo. The elections for the 
CNC presidency were fought neck and neck and Ramón lost his re-election 
by only eight votes. Maximino recalled that when he was offered the 
candidacy he excused himself arguing that he knew little about sugarcane 
production and even less about the CNC association and its dealings with the 
refinery. However, he felt confident enough to learn the job as it came 
along; which indeed he did with success. Maximino was elected president of 
the committee a few months after the new manager arrived. Both were new-
comers to the politics of sugarcane production in the area. The leaders of the 
CNPP association had been in the business over a year before the arrival of 
the manager Osuna Gómez and the election of Maximino. They were on very 
good terms with Limón, the head of the extension department, who was the 
doyen of the group in charge of organizing production in Autlán. In the 
process of getting to grips with the administration of the CNC association, 
Maximino found overbearing the administrative interference of the extension 
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department in the CNC affairs, which he tried to minimise. However, it was 
not easy to do so and he only began seizing some control when the new 
refinery manager backed his demands, which expanded and consolidated 
Maximino's ascendancy among the CNC's divided members at the expense 
of Limdn's influence. 
The leaders of the associations of sugarcane producers are subject to 
political swings; though they have more stable terms in office than refinery 
managers. For example, Maximino has consolidated his ascendance in the 
CNC. He has been re-elected twice and he has become one of the most 
powerful members of the committee of sugarcane production in the refinery 
Melchor Ocampo. Likewise the CNPP leaders have settled a convenient 
arrangement among themselves to keep the control of the association in the 
hands of the council members. 
Political Reshuffle in the CNC Association 
The administrative changes in the refinery coincided with the election of a 
new CNC leader which opened the possibilities to renegotiate the terms of 
the relations between the administration and the largest of the two producers 
associations. Osuna, the manager, and Maximino, the CNC leader, started 
reorganizing their respective association immediately. Maximino's first 
political deed was to rally the CNC members against Limdn, which he did 
successfully. It seemed that in co-ordination with the newly appointed 
manager, Limdn was sacked being accused of embezzlement. Maximino's 
public triumph was buttressed by the new manager, who was carving on his 
administrative space after the loss of Limdn's, i.e. 
Osuna saw Limdn's ascendency in the refinery as an obstacle to the 
centralised administrative practices he wanted to implement. Maximino 
worked out that getting rid of a powerful head of the extension department 
would expand the room for manoeuvre for both the manager and die CNC 
executive committee and so he decided to attack Limdn. The way that it was 
done was to accuse Limdn of embezzlement and demand at the national 
assembly of the CNC producers' association that the national committee 
present their demand to the general director of Azucar, S.A. As Jacinto 
Rojas, then secretary of the local CNC committee, described Limon abused 
of his position as head of the extension department. He approved credit to 
grow cane on plots with poor quality soil which could not repay the loans to 
refinery increasing its list of credit defaulters. 
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The participation of the CNC members in the removal of Limon was 
decisive. With the political pressure exerted by the national and local CNC, 
Osuna, the manager, could get rid of Limon without having to go through 
lengthy and expensive legal and administrative procedures involved in 
employee dismissals. However the hasty removal of Limon bounced back on 
them when he took the refinery adminstration to court and was acquitted 
from the embezzlement accusation that had justified the dismissal from his 
post as head of the extension department. But, the slow pace of the legal 
system kept Limon out of the way for a few months, which gave Osuna 
enough time to reorganize the refinery administration. His new 
administrative system included a tighter central management in the refinery 
and the delegation to producers associations, of some of the responsibilities 
that Limon had kept very much under the control of the extension 
department. Those new arrangements were immediately taken on board by 
Maximino, who turned them to his political advantage in front of the 
producers. With this expanded room for manoeuvre, Maximino and the 
CNPP leaders strived to increase their participation in the organization of 
sugarcane production, as had been stipulated in the 1979 decree but not yet 
implemented. There were immediate changes in the organization of the 
planting, cutting and transporting of the sugarcane which had, until then, 
been under the supervision of the extension department and which were now 
handed over to the executive committees of CNC and CNPP associations. 
The committees' members had to learn fast how to handle the resources that 
they now had in their hands. They did it rapidly and efficiently but with a 
different style in each association. Though both associations have similar 
administrative structures, they have different ways of operating them. These 
differences can be perceived by the style they adopt for organizing the 
planting, cutting and transporting of the cane and also by the way each one 
handles its general assembly meetings. However most CNC members 
remained unaware of these changes and continued minding their own 
business without attempts to participate in the decision making. CNPP 
reacted differendy as I discuss in section three of this chapter. 
The majority of sugarcane producers affiliated to the CNC are small 
ejidatarios and medium scale producers, and a few large landowners, who 
consider that the CNC has a stronger political stand to support them against 
the claims from landless peasants to a plot of land. Thus they think that they 
might avoid these types of hassle if they are members of same association as 
the small growers. The leadership of the CNC has not been controlled by the 
large producers but by those who have political connections with the PRI. 
Their party alliance has helped them to keep control of the executive 
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committee for long periods as I mentioned in the previous paragraphs. 
Changes in the leadership reflected the balance of power among the different 
internal groups which used their strategic abilities to consolidate an 
advantageous relation with the current refinery administration. Thus the CNC 
forbearers were very active in the PRI and it was through these networks that 
they could promote the opening of the refinery Melchor Ocampo in Audan. 
In the period of expansion of the crop, there was room to incorporate a few 
ejidatarios in the committee. These original members consolidated their 
power through their control of the central depot and their close collaboration 
with Limon, who worked in the extension department from the early years of 
the refinery and who remained there until his dismissal in 1984. 
The sexennial change at national government bequeathed to Melchor 
Ocampo a technocratic administrator, who could harness the organization of 
sugarcane production and establish a balance of power within the contesting 
parts involved in it. In his effort to consolidate his position, Engineer Osuna 
gained the support of the other new-comer, Maximino Castillo, who did not 
belong to any of the local political groups within the PRI's constituency. 
This alliance obtained its first victory when they managed to get rid of 
Limon, expanding the room for manoeuvre for both Osuna and Maximino 
and curtailing the other participants' political clout. These conjunctural 
elements allowed the new-comers -Maximino Castillo, in the CNC 
leadership, and Armando Osuna, in the refinery adminstration, to develop a 
strategic alliance against Limon's influence in the organization of sugarcane 
production, which also improved the productivity of the refinery. The change 
of CNC leadership and refinery direction facilitated the reorganization of 
sugar production in the field and in the refinery. 
The CNC association is more hierarchically structured than the CNPP 
association though they both perform the same functions and are ruled by 
similar statutory regulations. The different composition of their membership 
accounts for the dissimilar forms of leadership and social control in each 
association. The CNC is the largest of the two associations and the majority 
of its members are ejidatarios who live in small villages. Most ejidatarios 
have less resources than the wealthier producers affiliated to the CNPP. In 
contrast with the latter, ejidatarios lack the means to expand their economic 
activities around sugarcane production. They have to migrate temporally to 
the USA and the magnitude of their sugarcane interests do not demand as 
much close supervision as for CNPP members'. This situation gives the 
CNC leaders more leeway to decide the CNC policies with less or no 
consultation than the CNPP leaders. Maximino has concentrated decision 
making in his hand. Decisions are presented as a fait accompli to the general 
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assembly to be rubber-stamped. Thus Maximino has more control over CNC 
members than the CNPP leader has over its membership. The refinery 
manager is aware of and takes care of this fact. In the next section I describe 
an CNC assembly were the interaction of Maximino and the CNC members 
reflects the vertical hierarchy of the association. 
CNC General Assemblies 
CNC executive committee has three main members the president, the 
secretary and treasurer. They are the ones in charge of organizing the main 
activities of planting, cutting, and transporting the cane. The special activity 
committee includes a long list of other members in charge of activities such 
as sports, women's issues and health services, but who are mainly expected 
to attend the general assemblies and support the executive committee's 
decisions from their high places in the podium. The office work is attended 
to by five office secretaries and one accountant who can, but do not have to 
be, sugarcane producers and members of the CNC association. The field 
activities are organized by an elected secretary, who coordinates the work of 
five foremen and the permanent and temporary workers and cane cutters 
during the harvest. Jacinto Rojo, an ejidatario from Escondido, was the 
secretary when I first visited the CNC office in February 1987 and he 
remained in his position until he had a series of disagreements with 
Maximino, who finally asked him to leave his job for a period of a year; but 
before it was due, Jacinto had decided not to return. Maximino did not think 
twice and immediately asked Humberto Riesling to take over Jacinto's post 
which he was not entitled to do, i.e. according to the statutes of the CNC 
when one of the elected members in the executive committee fails to finish 
his period the committee should call on a general assembly to elect a new 
member to replace the one leaving. However, Maximino did not bother to do 
it according to the book and presented the replacement as a foregone decision 
to the general assembly that accepted the new appointment with buzzing 
commentaries which were never openly contested in the general assembly. 
The two different versions of the incident reflect the change in the balance of 
power within the CNC committee. Whereas before all the executive 
committee's members drew together the main decisions, with Jacinto's 
removal it was quite clear that Maximino had grasped total control of the 
committee. In this remodelled political landscape Jacinto, as much as Limon, 
could have cast a shadow on Maximino's power. But Jacinto was not 
interested in fighting back. Some ejidatarios have interpreted his acquiescent 
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acceptance of Maxiraino accusations as an implicit acknowledge of their 
truth. Jacinto gave a different version to Maximino's about of the reason 
why he was pushed to drop out of the committee: 
T started to disagree with Maximino about the way he told his 
favorite secretary, who has been his lover for a while, to keep the 
loan agreements of the sugarcane producers even after they had 
repaid them, which I think is illegal. Once I told her off about this 
in front of one of the sugarcane producers. She went straight away 
to cry about it with Maximino, who, shouting told me off. Our last 
argument was about some payments that the refinery advanced to 
the sugarcane producers that were not cashed by them. Maximino 
somehow managed to deposit them in an investment account 
without notifying the owners of those cheques. Of course he paid 
them back when some of the sugarcane producers reclaimed them 
but he kept the interest which should have been returned to the 
owners of those cheques'. 
Jacinto's appreciation of Maximino swung from total admiration and 
support when I had just met him, to utter mistrust and contempt at the end of 
my fieldwork. Jacinto mentioned that Maximino was very good at punching 
below the belt, but he admitted that Maximino was an skilful leader. Other 
members of the committee are adamant supporters of Maximino, e.g. Pina 
Limdn, in charge of women's issues, she commented: 
'Maximino has done so much for the sugarcane producers. He built 
our new offices and an assembly room. Before he became president 
we had to borrow the assembly room in Las Paredes. It was a 
stinky flee-ridden place, but now we have our own new building. 
He works so hard for all of us, but there are very envious people 
who do not like him. I have told them when they criticise 
Maximino that if they do not like him they should join the 
association of the rich sugarcane producers. Although I do not 
know anything about politics, Maximino asked me to be in charge 
of women's issues. I do not have very much to do besides attending 
the committee meetings and the general assemblies'. 
The fact that Maximino was elected the first time by a small margin of 
votes is reflected in the constant complaints from some CNC members about 
his administration. However Maximino has gained the support of many 
The Sugarcane Producers Associations CNC and CNPP 167 
members who did not vote for him the first time, but did support his re-
election. These new supporters attribute to Maximino's ability the fact that 
the price of sugarcane increased during his leadership, though it was decided 
by the producers leaders and the government negotiators at the national level. 
There are some staunch critics who have not changed their minds and voice 
their complaints every so often in the general assemblies; though they have 
not been able to rally enough support to become a threat to Maximino's 
leadership of the CNC association. Maximino holds a tight grip on the CNC 
which is reflected in the way he runs the general assemblies, which take 
place the first Sunday morning of the month. I will portrait several passages 
that I witnessed in the general assemblies where Maximino manoeuvres the 
support of the assistants. 
Account of Some CNC General Assemblies 
I have selected a sample of issues in the general assemblies which reflects the 
style of leadership and the kind of responses from the audience. As I 
describe these issues for both associations, the socioeconomic differences of 
their members and their demands and expectations become more clear. The 
general assemblies have been scheduled for the first Sunday of the month, 
however, a few days in advance radio spots remind and confirm the time of 
the meeting. The assembly is regularly scheduled at 10.00 o'clock in the 
morning but it is usually postponed for at least one hour. According to the 
book, the committee's members must wait to gather the required quorum, 
which should be two thirds of the 815 sugarcane producers affiliated to the 
CNC association, who, if they all ever attended an assembly, would not be 
able to sit next to each other in the assembly room since the hall can hold no 
more than 150 chairs. It looks like a large classroom, the type that has been 
built in rural areas, but with a one meter high podium where the whole 
committee seats itself looking down on the other members attending. 
The two best attended assemblies were those at the beginning and the 
end of the harvest. On these Sundays the number of participants swells from 
over 150 to 300 participants who have to hover around the assembly room 
peeping through die window as they are unable to squeeze themselves in. It 
seems that the committee has decided to consider a legal assembly when it is 
attended by any number over 150. Thus when the assembly's room looks full 
enough, on the committee's opinion, the assembly starts. Either the secretary 
or the treasurer calls for the attention of the audience, who are usually 
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talking to each other in small groups, and invites them to take a seat as he 
announces the reading of the minutes of the previous assembly. 
The agenda's first item is to declare die assembly open; the second is 
the election of a chairman of the assembly, which is rapidly done as there is 
always somebody who is briefed by the committee in advance, to suggest a 
name which is immediately ratified by the audience. The third item is the 
reading of the minutes of the previous assembly and the mail. The dealing 
with the first items is almost ritualistic and repetitive in every assembly; the 
rest of the agenda is more varied though the leading strength of Maximinio 
verbosity mesmerises his audience, who mainly asks for basic information 
and very seldom dares to inquire about their real worries, or even less 
demand further explanations on some of the vague comments and 
propositions that abound in Maximino's oratorical display. However there 
have been occasions when some sugarcane producers have interrupted 
Maximino's harangue, but it has to be an extremely serious matter to impel 
them to ruffle Maximino's feathers. 
On one occasion Maximino spent a long time expounding some of the 
decisions about the life insurance scheme that the national CNC committee 
asked them to join but he considered that was not good value for money 
because they delay the payment for such a long time and they give 
preference to the surviving relatives of the cane growers in Veracruz (whose 
organizations are more numerous and powerful). Thus Maximino suggested 
that me cane producers in Autlan create their own life insurance scheme. 
The assembly agreed to do it and chose three members to help the 
committee to organize an alternative insurance policy. The immediate gain 
was that they would not have to send their premium to the CNC national 
headquarters in Mexico City, which amounted to the price of nine tons of 
sugarcane per producer as they had been asked to do. They would develop 
their own fund in a short time. This decision could be advantageous to both 
individual CNC members and the local CNC administration; the former 
would receive the money more rapidly than if they had remained in the 
national scheme; and the latter would have access to the money of the 
premiums, which otherwise would have been handled by the national 
committee in Mexico City. 
The next point was a threatening warning against the few who rejoiced 
at the reinstatement of Limdn as employee in the refinery and he uttered that 
he would not allow the refinery to get away with it. Maximino added that he 
had already sent a letter of complaint to the refinery's manager notifying him 
that the CNC sugar producers might organize industrial action against the 
refinery if they did not pay attention to their complaints against Limdn. 
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Maximino repeated several times that cane producers supporting Lim<5n's 
reinstatement were as corrupt as he was; he also emphasised that he would 
repeat their complains until they understood why Limdn should not be 
reinstated, Maximino insisted: 
'He (Limon) bribed the court judges to decide in his favour. We 
must use our power to keep him out of the extension department. If 
you do not agree with this, you should make up your mind and 
decide if you are with or against us. I am not going to allow them 
(the refinery administration) to tread on our assembly. The few that 
are happy, it is because they are as dishonest as Limdn. But we 
have to make the refinery's adminstration respect us'. 
Maximino continued talking in a calmer tone about the works to be done 
after the end of the harvest which must include the replacement of old cane 
with new plants on plots with a lower yield than eighty tons per hectare, as it 
is clearly stipulated in the farmer's contract with the refinery. He mentioned 
that they had discounted fifty pesos per ton to the sugarcane cutters which 
they would give back to them at the end of the harvest; he explained that 
they have to do it as an incentive to keep them cutting during the whole 
harvest. Maximino added that with the interest on the retained money kept in 
a bank account, the CNC was going to throw a big party at the end of the 
harvest for all the cutters and they would raffle thirty electric blenders, 
fifteen irons, two stoves and one refrigerator. He reminded the assembly that 
the sugarcane cutters were the ones who had the worst job in the harvest, 
thus they do the work that farmers would not do themselves. 
Maximino asked the assembly to consider carefully if they should allow 
the farmers with plots on the lowlands near the river to keep planting 
sugarcane despite their producing high yields but with a very low level of 
saccharose, which means that they are creaming off the benefit of the 
sugarcane producers who produce lower yields but with higher levels of 
saccharose in the rest of the valley. He insisted that they should think about 
it and that they would discuss it in the next assembly. 
Maximino went on to gloat over his successful negotiations with the 
national committee and the government to obtain the loans to provide the 
CNC 's members with their own petrol station, which would deliver a 
product of better quality than that sold by the petrol stations in El Grullo. 
However, they would only be able to sell petrol to CNC's members and 
nobody else. They should be very strict about that because they would hurt 
the interests of the owner of the petrol stations in the region, who might 
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complain about it to Pemex (the parastatal that produces and distributes all 
the oil and its products in Mexico). 
Maximino asked the audience if there were any other points to be 
discussed. The people in the audience talked to each other and wagging their 
heads they responded that there were no other points to be discussed. 
Maximino urged them to attend the next assembly and brought it to an end 
with a raffle of fifteen irons and three electric blenders among women with 
children that had attended the meeting; which provoked a uproar among the 
women in the assembly. 
This account of a typical general assembly of the CNC association 
portrays how the assemblies are skilfully staged and most of the events in 
them carefully monitored. The selection of the chairman, the reading of the 
previous minutes, and the choice of the items to be discussed, are prepared 
by the committee and presented to the assembly by Maximino; the other 
members of the committee very seldom interrupt his monologue. The 
sugarcane producers do ask some straightforward questions, which are 
immediately responded by Maximino. However, there was one assembly, the 
one following when the committee had handed out its financial report of the 
last year, when the usually polite questions were outshone by the belligerent 
demands for a full external enquiry into the committee's financial 
performance. 
Several participants demanded clear explanations about the data in the 
financial report. One of them mentioned that there were discrepancies 
between the money received by the CNC administration and the expenses in 
the financial report handed out by the executive committee at the end of the 
previous general assembly. He even summoned Maximino to explain these 
differences in the accounts that he pedantically pin-pointed one by one. The 
list of complaints was long. It also included the fact that there was some 
money that it was accounted for in the report as credit to sugarcane 
producers but which they claimed not to have received. There were also 
complaints about the money and the interest that they had retained from the 
cheques of the lorries's drivers and sugarcane cutters, which under the high 
interest rates in Mexico during that time amounted to several million of 
pesos. 
The participants also proposed to the general assembly and its executive 
committee the election of a vigilance committee to survey the finances of the 
current administration. Other members of the audience suggested electing the 
overseeing committee straight away. There was a short intense silence and 
Maximino retorted in an angry tone that he was not going to accept any 
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criticism coming from the treacherous cane growers who had very likely 
been advised by Limon. 
Maximino began attacking the dishonest members of the committee that 
he had dismissed. He did not mention any name but he gave enough clues to 
guess that he was referring to Jacinto Rojo, who was lurking in a corner with 
a faint smile on his face, ready to retaliate if his name were to be mentioned. 
Maximino spouted that he had never embezzled any money from the 
association, although he might have drawn some money from the CNC 
accounts for emergencies in the administration of the different services they 
provide to all, as several accounts of the CNC are in his name. But he 
challenged the distrustful members to get along with the enquiry. He 
emphasised that he was sure that he had not done anything wrong. Maximino 
was in full swing, accusing the complainers of being envious of all the 
improvements he had done to the CNC association. He offered that he 
himself would ask the national committee to send an oversteering 
commission to be responsible for the financial enquiry. To my astonishment, 
the complaining producers accepted the suggestion and Maximino closed the 
stormy session still in control of the organization. 
The discontented sugar producers wrote a six page document where they 
pointed out all the anomalies they could identify in Maximino's 
administration, including the accounts where they had found discrepancies. 
They asked for the creation of the overseeing committee and demanded also 
the rebate of the payments that the CNC adminstration charged them to buy 
some water pumps, even though the general assembly had voted against their 
acquisition. This point was not mentioned in any of the assemblies that I 
witnessed but it was a sore point among the sugarcane producers with a 
critical view of Maximino's administration. They also complained about the 
excessive numbers of vehicles and other equipment that the CNC association 
had acquired at the members' expenses but without their consent. They even 
accused Maximino of renting ejidal plots himself to grow sugarcane, which 
is a common practice, though forbidden by the agrarian law. They also 
charged him with having cashed the cheques of the harvest that some 
sugarcane producers had not managed to cash as soon as the refinery issued 
them, which yielded the executive committee a handsome profit that was kept 
in the association's account. They closed the letter taunting Maximino about 
a trip to Cuba that they claimed he had charged his expenses to CNC, 
entailing that all costs were paid by all the sugarcane producers affiliated to 
it. They addressed the letter to the general secretary of the national CNC 
with copies to the President of Mexico and the Governor of the State of 
Jalisco. 
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To the chagrin of the critics of Maximino, nobody acknowledged having 
received the letter. They inquired about it with no other answer than the 
vague comment that they are verifying the facts included in the letter before 
taking any further action. Meanwhile, Maximino keeps running the 
association as usual and his opponents seem to have decided to forget about 
their complaints for the time being. 
Maximino recalled the accusation against his administration in most of 
the following assemblies with thundering menaces against 'the envious and 
treacherous members who wanted to tarnish his image because they are 
enemies of the sugarcane producers'. He repeated that he would be better off 
taking care of his own business but he felt the commitment to consolidate all 
that he had achieved for the benefit of the sugarcane producers. The audience 
listened to the harangue acquiescently, keeping their doubts and 
disagreements to themselves most of the time. 
Although there are some CNC's members who are very critical of 
Maximino's leadership, most of them are still his unconditional supporters, 
to the point that he was re-elected for the second time after I left the area. 
He has carved a strong niche of power in the organization of sugarcane 
production. He is the leader of the largest of the two associations in the 
region, holding a tight grip on the running of the CNC association. He has 
established his credentials as a tough negotiator with the refinery 
administration, which probably started with his involvement in the dismissal 
of Limon so much wanted by both: the newly-appointed administrator of the 
refinery Melchor Ocampo Engineer Osuna, and Maximino Castillo, newly-
elected president of the CNC association. Maximino's control on most affairs 
of the association would be difficult to attain in the CNPP association where 
the three members of the committee share the decision making. Maximino 
does not worry about adding charges to CNC expenses, which are distributed 
among all the members. He even distributes petrol coupons among the 
employees in the extension department and he invites the heads of the 
different departments for drinks and meals in the local bars and restaurants, 
and to the big celebrations that the CNC throws for different reasons at the 
beginning and end of harvest or the opening of the petrol station in front of 
the CNC's offices. These invitations are very much appreciated by the 
refinery employees, who have to eke out the drastically diminished real value 
of their salaries. 
Maximino Castillo holds a strong grip on the CNC association. He has 
reshuffled the membership of the executive committee, including old 
members, e.g. Humberto Riesling, who had been marginalised in the 
previous committee, and some other sugarcane producers from El Grullo, 
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who could not be identified with the local political groups. Thus he has 
consolidated his control over the decision making in the CNC, curtailing the 
influence of the extension department that during Limdn's time exercised 
some power over previous committees. On the one hand, Maximino has 
increased the CNC's bargaining power, and on the other, he has managed to 
subject the majority of the CNC members to his political will. Although the 
majority of the CNC members still consider Maximino's leadership very 
favourably, they have started to express concern about his re-election. 
However, these discontented individuals have not managed to gather round a 
possible contender against Maximino. This situation contrasts with the one 
found in the CNPP, where there are more powerful individuals who keep the 
president of the executive committee on his toes. 
Social actors structured their individual contributions to the organization 
of sugar cane in different ways which had diverse consequences. The CNC 
leader consolidated his control over his member and increased his room for 
manoeuvre to deal with the refinery administration. These outcomes 
benefited CNC members though they were not involved in the decision-
making. The majority of the CNC members were satisfied with their leader's 
achievements and in spite of some serious reasons to doubt his probity, they 
stood behind him. This response differs from the CNPP members who are 
more critical and demanding of their leaders, sometimes to their own peril as 
it will be described in the following two sections of this chapter. 
Technocratic Ideology: CNPP Association 
Sugarcane producers affiliated to the CNPP (the national confederation of 
small landowners) in the Valley of Autlan are a small group of 114 
members, 111 of whom are landowners. The average plot is 14.5 hectares. 
This size and greater encomp;isses some 40 per cent of its members, which is 
three times the average size tor CNC members. However there are economic 
differences other than the size of plot between members of the two 
associations. Current property rights entitle landowners to the total 
ownership of their land and allot to ejidatarios only the rights of usufruct.4' 
Though in practice ejido plots are increasingly being handled as if they were 
private ones and there is an amendment to the law that would entitle 
ejidatarios with the full ownership of their plots. 97% of the CNPP members 
are landowners who consider their enemies to be all peasants who benefited 
from the agrarian reform that granted them ejido rights to small plots of 
land, that were expropriated from large landowners in the past sixty years. 
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The largest sugarcane producer in the Valley is an active member of the 
CNPP who blames the ejidatarios for all the problems of Mexican 
agriculture. She insists on her condemnation of them as the main reason for 
many farmers not investing more resources on their farms. 
Pina's condemnation of the redistributional land reform is shared by 
most of the private landowners, regardless of their producer association 
affiliation. 'We are like water and oil, we can not blend together', 
commented the founder president of the CNPP about ejidatarios and 
landowners. Some of the landowners who remained in the CNC association 
after the creation of the CNPP association mentioned that they considered 
that being in the same association with the ejidatarios, sharing the CNC 
political representation, might protect their land tenure from any claim to it 
from the landless peasants who could try to get hold of an ejido plot of land. 
Some landowners tried growing sugarcane in the early 1970's but they 
gave it up and planted other more profitable crops. Pina's father, Don 
Ismael, mentioned that they only became interested in planting sugarcane in 
the 1980's when the refinery management and its extension department had 
released their tight control over the sugarcane producers. The head of the 
extension department and extension workers used to check every stage of the 
production process and they would reprimand the producers if they departed 
from the set agricultural practices. Don Ismael emphasised that he would not 
put up with this which was why he refused to plant cane. But he commented 
that the opening of the refinery in the valley: 'brought life back to the 
region'. Ismael and his daughter Pina have always produced maize and 
sorghum for their cattle in part of their land. But they also tried other crops, 
e.g. cotton in the 1950s, and different fruits and vegetables in the following 
years until they began to plant sugarcane which now covers 200 hectares of 
their land. They did this partly on the advice of friends working in the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, who told to them that the government, as a 
way of encouraging sugar production, now protected larger acreages of cane 
growing land against possible redistribution. Thus if they planted sugarcane, 
they could hold out against the claims of landless peasants. 
Some large producers do not consider the crop as their main economic 
activity. Landowners do not see themselves as sugarcane producers. They 
consider themselves farmers who grow cane along with other crops and who 
do not need the credit provided by the refinery. Most of the sugarcane 
producers affiliated to the CNPP, have on average, larger plots than the 
CNC members. They own some agricultural machinery and have other 
businesses. Some have cattle, others own shops, and one of them two petrol 
stations. Others combine sugarcane production with practising a profession. 
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They are on the whole better off than the majority of the members of the 
CNC, who are ejidatarios with small plots, who have also diversified their 
sources of income but mainly through the hiring of their labour force and 
migrating to the USA. The CNPP representatives claim to have among their 
members the three largest sugarcane producers of the zone. However, they 
have only attracted to their files 115 sugarcane producers who represent 12.4 
% of the total cane producers in Autlan, though they control 30% of the land 
planted with sugarcane. 
The national CNC was created in 1973. Six years later some of the 
landowners growing sugar in Autlan made the first attempt to organize a 
local group, which broke away from the CNC to form their CNPP group. 
The first attempt was unsuccessful and it was one year later in 1980 when 
Francisco Sanchez Ruy collected 70 signatures and rallied 20 landowners to 
form the CNPP. Sugarcane producers have expanded their participation in 
the political organization of cane production through their two associations, 
which have been able to become strong negotiators in the political 
organization of cane production administered by the Mexican government. 
However, cane producers are not docile spectators in the political arena. Far 
from it. Some of them engage in Mexican politics through their participation 
in the PRI, CNC and CNPP. Grass-roots representation is constrained by the 
corporates, accordingly to some authors, even co-opted by these sectorial 
associations which operate under the broad direction of official economic 
policy.5' Nevertheless local members are far from inactive and I will 
emphasise in this section, as I have already done in previous ones, the 
individual participation of social actors in the collective making of the 
organization of sugarcane production. 
As I have described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, sugarcane producers are a 
diversified group, at one extreme there are small ejidatarios with plots of 
cane of 1/2 hectare and, on the other, a handful of landowners with fields 
from 50 up to 200 hectares of sugar. Economic differences are intermingled 
with political clustering in complex patterns. There are small and large 
producers pursuing their different economic interests through their 
involvement in both associations of sugarcane production. However, the 
shedding of the small and large farmers is clear-cut: all except three of the 
758 ejidatarios are members of the CNC; whereas the CNPP has rallied into 
its membership 168 farmers out of the 225 landowners who grow sugarcane 
for the refinery Melchor Ocampo, (see table 2, chapter 7). Thus most of the 
smaller sugarcane producers have kept their membership in the CNC as one 
which claims to care for the ejidatarios' interests, whereas the other two 
thirds of the larger farmers have moved out of the CNC to form the CNPP. 
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The different membership in the associations can be discerned during the 
general assemblies where the behaviour of the assistants to the CNC 
assembly contrasts with that adopted by the CNPP's members, the latter 
being more critical and demanding toward their leaders than the former. The 
better-off sugarcane producers claim to be more concerned about reducing 
costs and increasing profit than the less well-off producers, which explains 
why the former are more vocal in their meetings than the latter. 
Although only one third of the supporters for the new association 
participated in the first meeting; they set the legal basis for it. A member of 
the national CNPP committee came to the meeting as deputy of the national 
general secretary. According to Francisco's account, the deputy was a skilful 
politician who had been among the founders of the national CNPP 
association, who knew the procedures by heart for establishing a producers 
association. Francisco, having been the most committed promoter, was 
appointed to be the first president of the association. He mentioned that he 
did not want to take that responsibility, but because he had been involved in 
setting up the association, the other participants considered him the best 
candidate. Francisco also had political experience and had to accept the 
leadership of the newly formed CNPP organization of sugarcane producers. 
Francisco recalled that when a new manager, Don Carlos, arrived in 
1978, he told him that he did not know very much about sugarcane, but he 
had been appointed manager of the refinery Melchor Ocampo through his 
political network. Don Carlos was himself a farmer very concerned about the 
landowners' rights that he considered were overlooked by the government in 
favour of the peasants. Don Carlos asked Francisco why the landowners in 
the valley did not have their own association. Francisco explained how the 
first sugarcane producers had mainly been ejidatarios, who founded the CNC 
association of cane producers. Don Carlos said that landowners were as 
Mexican as the ejidatarios and had the same rights, so they should be 
represented in the sugarcane production committee. Don Carlos suggested to 
Francisco that he try again to form an association independent from the 
CNC, which would cater for the needs of the private landowners. He even 
offered to help them discreetly because, as manager of the refinery, he was 
not supposed to get involved with the producers. He even mentioned that 
Limdn (the head of the extension department) might be able to help 
Francisco and the other sugarcane producers interested in forming a new 
association. Limdn was approached by Francisco and other sugar producers 
and helped them covertly to launch the new CNPP. 
The boundaries between public responsibility and private interests 
among sugarcane producers and refinery employees are often merged and 
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blurred as is the case with Limdn, who combined being the head of the 
extension department with growing sugarcane for the IMO. In spite of the 
possible conflict of interests, the refinery does not forbid its employees from 
growing sugar. Limon was member of a local family who owned land in the 
region and who supported the landowners' demands against the refinery with 
more enthusiasm than he attended to the ejidatarios' demands. Thus he threw 
himself into the creation of the association. 
The members of the first CNPP committee had to deal with the 
opposition of the CNC executive committee that accused them of diminishing 
the power of negotiation that the CNC had striven for. However, the CNC 
blows were ineffectual. The new CNPP under the command of Francisco 
Sanchez Ruy began to make its own space and took its place in the 
committee meeting where the organization of planting, cutting and 
transporting the sugarcane is planned. 
The members of the first CNPP worked with more enthusiasm than 
knowledge. They did not receive any economic remuneration for the long 
hours they put in; they only claimed travel expenses. The current executive 
committee, in spite of having an agenda full of activities and commitments, 
has not asked for higher expenses; its members receive only a modest 
economic reward. Francisco Sanchez Ruy's public image is one of a strong 
domineering person. There were complaints among the members of the 
CNPP about Francisco's heavy handed way of leading the association. But 
they agreed that probably that was what they needed in order to establish the 
new CNPP association against the more conspicuously numerous CNC. The 
number of members of the CNPP has increased very slowly. However they 
already produce 30% of the sugarcane in the valley and they have become an 
alternative for landowners. Landowners do not have to belong to the CNC 
which is more concerned with the problems and needs of the ejidatarios. 
Ernesto Zuno, a farmer who owns both an ejido and a private plot, 
moved to the CNPP as soon as he was approached by the early organizers in 
1980. He remembers that Limdn was a supporter of the new association and 
a close advisor to its founders. Ernesto thinks that the CNPP administration 
is more efficient than the CNC. There are fewer members, who, according 
to him, are more demanding than the ones affiliated to the CNC. CNPP 
members always check carefully their accounts and the CNPP's reports. 
Ernesto shares with other CNPP members the conviction that ejidatarios 
accept the financial reports of their organization without complaints because 
they do not care. The landowners however, count every penny and they 
complain all the time about the smallest thing; they know better die value of 
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money and how hard that is to make it. CNPP members consider that they 
do not receive as much help from the government as ejidatarios do. 
Although the CNPP committee members have been aware of the need to 
increase their constituency, they do not have a clear policy about how to do 
so. Francisco Sanchez, the first president of the executive committee, 
concentrated his attention on rectifying what he considered a disadvantageous 
relationship with the extension department in the refinery, which, according 
to him, always gave priority to the CNC demands. The working relations 
between the extension department and the CNPP have been difficult since 
Limdn was removed from his post as head of the department in 1984. The 
current head of the extension department seems to be more interested in 
cajoling the willing leaders of both association to invite him out for meals 
and drinks. 
The CNPP leaders think they should not have to do such a thing in 
order to receive the treatment they deserve. In contrast to them, the CNC 
leaders seem to comply willingly to those implicit requests. Thus Baltazar 
Blanco, the technical advisor in the extension department has a good opinion 
of Maximino's leadership and a poor one of Arturo's, the previous CNPP 
leader. This is reflected in the expediency with which Blanco deals with the 
CNC's requests and his tight-fisted response to the CNPP. This differential 
treatment was a cause of great complaints among the latter committee 
members. On one occasion, Arturo considered that Blanco had gone too far 
when he did not include any of the CNPP members' plots in the weekly list 
of sugarcane ready to be cut. Arturo did not accept Blanco's assessment. He 
went straight to Blanco's office and contested his decision, accusing him of 
giving preferential treatment to the CNC members. Arturo demanded a 
convincing explanation from Blanco and if one was not forthcoming he 
would defy Blanco to leave the refinery premises and fight it out physically 
until they could resolve what seemed to Arturo mainly personal 
disagreements between Blanco and himself. Blanco diffused the complaints 
and refused to keep talking to Arturo. Instead he began dictating a letter of 
complaint about the incident, addressed to the committee of sugarcane 
production of the refinery Melchor Ocampo. Later the complaint evaporated 
in laughter when it was discussed at the committee meeting. Blanco abused 
his power to delay the procedures concerning the CNPP because he resented 
the CNPP members's off-handed way of dealing with extension department 
employees. 
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Streamlined Administration 
In contrast with the CNC's leaders, the leaders of the CNPP are low-keyed. 
They do not organize parties or meals at the beginning and the end of the 
harvest as the CNC's leaders do. Neither do they invite the employees for 
the occasional meal, which is considered a public relation expense by the 
CNC's leaders. However, the CNPP threw a big party when they 
inaugurated their new offices and warehouse. The first part took place in the 
premises where a mariachi (a Mexican string and brass band) greeted the 
guests. The national leader drove with his wife from Guadalajara especially 
for the occasion. When he arrived all the guests were invited to walk into the 
warehouse where there had been set a long table facing the rows of chairs as 
they do for the assemblies. Arturo gave a small introduction about the 
purpose of the gathering and immediately handed over the microphone to the 
national leader who delivered a good speech, full of praise for the local 
CNPP committee. He also highlighted the relevant contribution of the sugar 
agro industry to the Mexican economy. He mentioned that sugarcane was the 
only crop whose price was indexed to the inflation rate, which was the main 
reason why, in spite of high inflation rates, sugarcane has remained one of 
the more profitable cash crops in Mexico. The leader repeated that although 
they were earning less than the previous years, their profit margins were still 
considerable. He also encouraged them to keep up the hard work and 
increase their productivity. He closed his talk saying: 'sugar is produced on 
the land not in refinery, the refinery only grinds and refines the sugarcane 
we grow'. When the speech ended Arturo invited the audience to go to the 
Lions' Club where the celebrations would continue with a meal. 
What happened in the club shed light on the infighting in the CNPP. 
The club was packed with more guests than those who attended the inaugural 
speech in the offices. The tables seated eight to twelve guests and in the 
middle there was one long table laid with a white table cloth, that was the 
high-table reserved for the national leader and special guests i.e. the manager 
for the refinery and some of his superiors in the national institution in charge 
of sugarcane production, (Azucar, S.A.) the committee's members of the 
CNC, the leaders of the local branch of the PRI, the municipal presidents of 
El Grullo and Autlan and other notables citizens in the region. However, 
Arturo Sanchez and Juan Ruiz, the president and secretary of the CNPP 
committee, decided to go and sit with their families at a nearby table. Pina, 
who is a personal friend of the national leader sat at the table, commenting 
that Arturo and Juan knew nothing about good manners in politics. Gonzalo 
Blake, who like Pina, is not a member of the committee, joined the high-
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table and added to Pina's comments that they were behaving as if they were 
in a wedding party where one might sit together with his family. David 
Blake, the CNPP's administrator, pointed out that the committee members 
should have sat at the main table with the visiting authorities. It was obvious 
that there was a rift in the CNPP. The committee leaders did not approve of 
the close connection that some powerful members, like Pina, had with the 
regional politicians and the national leader of the CNPP, as described in 
chapter 5. 
Pina Lara and Arturo Sanchez's description of their rivalry complement 
each other, though their interpretations are opposite. Pina was the deputy 
president in the previous committee headed by Arturo. During a management 
crisis in the CNPP, Arturo threatened to drop the leadership of the CNPP if 
the council's members did not stop bickering with each other, which had 
been delaying the decision making process with a deleterious effect on the 
organization of their activities. The members of the council and the executive 
committee begged Arturo to withdraw his resignation but he said that he 
would have to think about. The temporarily acephalus executive committee 
kept its everyday routine but postponing the main decision until the crisis 
was over. Meanwhile, Pina, without consulting the other members of the 
committee, asked the national committee to confirm her as president of the 
Audan-El Grullo CNPP as is stipulated in the in the statutes of the CNPP 
association, i.e. the deputy president takes over the presidency if the one in 
charge can not continue in function. The national leader, being a personal 
friend of Pina, wrote back immediately backing her to take over the 
presidency of the executive committee. When the other members found out 
they threw a tantrum and called for an emergency meeting where they 
accused Pina of wanting to depose the elected president by a coup. Pina 
answered laconically that she had to take over the presidency because there 
were so many urgent decisions to be made in the CNPP and she only did 
what she was supposed to do as deputy president which was to take the post 
over when the elected one is unable to fulfil his functions. Francisco 
withdrew his resignation straight away and business went back to normal but 
with a higher level of animosity between Arturo's supporters, who were the 
majority, and Pina's few ones. 
Private landowners form the majority of the CNPP's membership. Thus 
their opinions, which coincide over the central issues, pervade the decision 
making of CNPP's policies. The council, which in the CNC plays a 
perfunctory role in the running of the organization, impinges on the CNPP's 
committee decision-making. The council's members should be elected every 
three years, but in practice the same individuals have remained in their 
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position since they were first chosen. The members of the council have 
formed a coalition with the other influential group within the CNPP -a group 
of the owners of carts and tractors that transport the sugarcane to the 
refinery. Ten of the twelve members of this group are landowners with large 
plots, only two of them own small plots of land. All of them have 
agricultural machinery and other sources of income but sugarcane accounts 
for a good part of their income and they frequent the CNPP offices, seeming 
to have more business to deal with in the association than the other members 
and they are certainly more involved in its politics and operation. However, 
they do not share each others' political inclinations, which became evident 
when Arturo's term was reaching its end and his successor had to be 
selected. 
Arturo called for a council meeting. On this occasion he had asked the 
secretary to prepare some snacks and non-alcoholic beverages to be served at 
the meeting. Pina mentioned that it was very unusual for Arturo, who is 
known as being thrifty, to care for those things. But she soon found out his 
intention. He had orchestrated the selection so as to favour his own choice of 
committee members. Arturo knew that if the council approved the electoral 
team, the general assembly would accept it without question. The group in 
power was nominating Juan Ruiz for president, who was the secretary under 
Francisco's leadership; for the secretary they appointed Ernesto Zuno and for 
the treasurer Armando Castro. Arturo's supporters, half of the council, knew 
his intention but it took the other half by surprise and they accepted the 
candidates reluctantly. After the meeting, the opposing half discussed the 
proposition among themselves, which they saw as an imposition and decided 
to present an alternative electoral ticket. 
The dissident council's members canvased around the other CNPP 
members. They even held two meetings where they complained about 
Arturo's attempts to extend his power over the association beyond his term 
of office. They would do what they could to avoid that outcome. There were 
negative comments about the selection of Juan Ruiz as president because he 
was a close friend of Arturo. Thus the former would continue exactly with 
the latter's policies at a time when it would be better for the CNPP to renew 
itself and introduce some administrative changes. Pina found particulary 
objectionable Ernesto's nomination as secretary. She considered small 
producers did not understand the problems of the large ones, i.e. Ernesto as 
a small producer could not respond to the interests of the large producers, 
who according to her were the core of the CNPP. Pina and Gonzalo Blake 
(two of the largest sugarcane producers) led the group that presented a 
different list of candidates 
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Arturo's group realised that Ernesto's nomination had not been approved 
by several members of the council so they dropped him. The new winning 
ticket included Armando Castro, who had been proposed as treasurer in the 
second list of candidates, as president, Juan Ruiz as secretary, and Lucas 
Manzano as treasurer. Armando Castro had also been nominated for the 
presidency in the contesting list backed by Pina's group, but leaving Juan 
Ruiz out of it. It seems that the two groups in the council made a 
compromise and settled their differences. Juan remained in the finally elected 
committee but not as president and Ernesto, the small producer, was left out, 
though he continued coordinating the cutting and transporting of the 
sugarcane from the plots of the CNPP's members to the refinery. 
The council of the CNPP and the cart owners' group, have interlocking 
membership. These persons are those with political influence in the CNPP. 
However, they have to submit their agreements and propositions to the 
consideration of the general assembly. The CNPP membership is more vocal 
than the CNC's. The former demand more details and explanations about the 
expenses of cutting and transporting the cane, the quota charged by the 
CNPP and any policy that the committee expounds to the assembly. The 
internal conflicts in the CNPP are not only based on economic differences; 
they are enmeshed with different political networks at local and national 
level. Whereas Pina is a close friend of the CNPP national leader, Arturo 
relies on the loyalty of local supporters. But both factions agree about the 
main CNPP purpose: to cut costs and increase profits. 
CNPP general assemblies are longer and the committee's proposals 
more closely scrutinised and contended than those presented by the CNC 
committee to its audience. In order to be able to compare the dynamic in the 
assemblies of both associations I describe in the next section CNPP general 
assemblies, as I did with the CNC assemblies presented earlier in this 
chapter. 
CNPP General Assemblies 
In contrast to the CNC CNPP's general assemblies, do not take place 
regularly. Its members claim to have better things to do with their time than 
attend meetings. The assemblies are organized every so often when the 
committee and the council consider that there are important issues to be 
discussed and to be approved by the general assembly. They tend to be 
programmed at the weekend and preferably on Saturday morning or evening. 
The committee distributes invitations including the agenda for the assembly a 
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few days in advance. The attendance varies less than in the CNC. It is 
usually around 60 members which is about half of the membership, which is 
a larger proportion of their membership than those who attend the CNC 
assemblies. According to CNPP statutes a quorum is not considered a 
sufficient basis for decisions to be taken. 
One of the assemblies I attended will serve as an example of the tone of 
the CNPP meetings in general.* The assembly was scheduled for seven 
o'clock. Five to seven in the evening, a few minutes before the starting time 
the members began to arrive at the CNPP offices. They stand at the entrance 
greeting and talking to each other as they wait for the president to seat them 
on the folding chairs that have been squeezed in at the entrance of the 
warehouse which is beneath the offices. The chairs are arranged in informal 
rows facing a long table, which is at the same level as the chairs. This is not 
like in the CNC's assembly room where the presiding table is situated on a 
one-meter-high podium. Some of the farmers talked about the problems they 
had with their machines and lorry operators, as one of them said: 'some of 
them drink, others do not work on Sundays and some others wear out the 
machines in no time at all. We can not win with them'. Before the elections 
other members discussed politics and the candidates that the committee was 
going to propose. There were references to the possibility of forming a 
different electoral list to oppose the committee's. 
At five minutes past seven the secretary announced that the meeting 
would start at its second calling at half past seven. Somebody was criticising 
Arturo for his unfriendly personality; sometimes he is easy and friendly and 
at other times he is grumpy and dismissive, according to the member 
speaking -Arturo is the one to blame for the stagnation of CNPP's 
membership. Although the association had an increased number of hectares 
during Arturo's administration, it has lost members. At 7.34 p.m. the 
audience are ushered to take their seats because the assembly is about to 
start. The assembly is presided over by the president Arturo Sanchez, the 
secretary Juan Ruiz, the administrator Adan Blake and his brother Gonzalo 
Blake, who is member of the council and used to be treasurer in the previous 
committee. Arturo opens the session and immediately reads the minutes of 
the last assembly that took place six months ago. Some members in the 
audience asked Arturo to repeat some points and there were a couple of 
minor amendments made. Arturo asked Adan, the administrator, to take 
notes and pass them later to the office secretary who could not attend the 
assembly. With those minor corrections the minutes were unanimously 
approved. 
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The next item on the agenda was the reading of the provisional financial 
report for the harvest of 1986-1987 just finished a month ago. At the end of 
the reading Engineer Lim<5n asked if the committee would distribute copies 
of the report and Arturo answered that he was using a provisional one but 
would later make available a copy of the final report to all the CNPP's 
members. Pina asked why the report was divided into two. Arturo explained 
that it was because there are two seasons in the production cycle. Pamela 
Sanchez (Arturo's cousin) asked contentiously why they had spent twelve 
million to buy a second-hand steam roller that did not work, which meant 
they would have to spend 7,000.000 pesos more to repair it. Arturo 
explained that a new machine would cost 90,000 dollars (around 
225,000,000 Mexican pesos). He mentioned that they were assured by the 
sales man that he would return the money if we had any trouble with it. 
Another member asked if they had charged the cost of that machine to all the 
members or just to those who needed some work to be done on the access 
roads to their plots. The answer was that all members would share the bill 
because it was an acquisition that would benefit all the CNPP's members at 
one point or another. Pina criticised the fact that they had not consulted the 
other mechanics on the purchase, she added that old machines were very 
problematic. Somebody shouted that 'every old maid is problematic'. Pina 
retorted quickly that 'every old male is problematic too'. Gonzalo joined the 
discussion and mentioned that they had recommended buying a renovated 
second-hand engine from USA for 400 dollars (10,000,000 pesos). Pina 
suggested that they consult a trustworthy mechanic like Eduardo, who was in 
the audience. Arturo mentioned that they had two options: to repair the 
machine or sell it. Eduardo commented that dealers in the USA are more 
concerned about the quality of their products and offer some guarantee which 
makes them more trustworthy than Mexican dealers. Pina's father added that 
he had been very lucky. He had not had any trouble with the various second 
hand machines he had bought in the USA. Arturo asked the assembly to elect 
a commission to sort out the problem of the steam roller; the commission 
included Eduardo, Gonzalo, Armando Castro and Nacho, all members of the 
CNPP council. 
Arturo continued discussing the expenses during the harvest that 
amounted to 50,000,000 pesos just on cutting and transporting. The 
administration expenses amounted 90,000,000 pesos together with other 
expenses and interests they added up to one hundred and sixty million which 
balance with the different sources of income, including the three per cent 
contribution of the carts and lorries. Thus the financial management left the 
CNPP with a profit of twenty four million pesos. Armando inquired as to 
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how much the expenses had increased in the last year. Arturo said 90% but 
that the price of sugarcane had gone up by 105%. Without taking into 
consideration investments, the expenses only increased fifty per cent from 
forty to sixty million. Arturo insisted that they would understand more 
clearly all the transaction once they had a copy of the complete financial 
report that would be distributed in the following months as soon as the 
administration closed its accounting year. 
The next item presented to the assembly was the request of the sister of 
one the CNPP's members who owns a house in front of the CNPP office at 
the edge of the road. She would like to avail her of a free supply of 
electricity from the CNPP electrical transformer. Everybody agreed to it but 
somebody said that it should be the low voltage 120, not the high 210, which 
is used mainly for industrial purposes in Mexico. Thus they should use 
electricity only for their domestic appliances. The lady stood up and thanked 
the assembly, assuring them that she would only consume electricity for 
domestic use. 
There followed a discussion of how to improve their yields and the 
assembly decided to commission Juan Ruiz to visit the most efficient 
refineries in Mexico to learn about it. They considered that the refinery 
Melchor Ocampo could be turned from being one of the most efficient into 
the best refinery in the country. They said that it was very important to have 
a considerable proportion of young sugarcane and to increase die yield of the 
old canes. One way of increasing the yield of the latter was delaying their 
cutting to the beginning of the next harvest. These measures boost the level 
of saccharose, which could be low early in the season, but which usually 
increases as the harvest goes on. The cane growers who were willing to 
defer the cutting for one harvest have several advantages: firsdy they obtain 
a higher price for it without having spent very much extra on it; secondly 
they increase their yield from forty to one hundred per cent; and thirdly, the 
level of saccharose is at least one point higher than the other sugarcane 
programmed to be cut at the beginning of the harvest. Arturo and Juan Jose" 
emphasised that if they could not persuade some growers to defer cane 
cutting and therefore improve their yields. The mill would start crushing 
cane with very low levels of saccharose which would bring down the final 
average level of saccharose and hamper the obtention of the premium for 
higher saccharose level. This would impinge on the final price of the 
sugarcane since it is calculated when die harvest and the crushing is 
completed. The other obstacle to improve the initial saccharose level is that 
the Ministry of Agriculture had only authorised an extension of 200 hectares. 
But they knew and had accepted that it was very unlikely that they could 
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obtain an additional extension to those 200 hectares before the dam in 
construction was finished. 
The following point brought to the forum was a complaint about the use 
of extra ammonia on the sugarcane, which had been proved to increase the 
yield. But the refinery management said that ammonia makes the extraction 
of the saccharose from the canes very difficult. They think that the criticisms 
were raised by Maximino who wanted less ammonia to be bought arguing 
that the CNC had already bought fertilizer to sell it to the CNPP. The critics 
said they knew it was all Maximino's intrigues because he complained and 
enquired who had given Gil permission to sell and apply the ammonia. 
However, Gil and his collaborator said they had shown the benefits of using 
extra ammonia, thus the sugarcane producers who wanted to keep using it 
should not worry about Maximino's complaints. 
When the discussion about ammonia subsided Arturo addressed the 
assembly and told them that he had done his part of the job. After his third 
harvest as president he would not attempt a fourth re-election, i.e. they 
should elect a new committee. What followed was one stage in the batde for 
succession mentioned in general terms above. The national committee had 
been notified and they would send a delegate who would supervise the 
canvassing, the selection of candidates, and the elections. Arturo mentioned 
that during the several years he had been involved in the committee as 
deputy and elected member of the committee, he had got to know the people 
who were really interested and committed to work for the betterment of all 
the CNPP members, and having spotted them, the committee had already 
selected their candidates to run for the next election. Arturo proceeded to 
present this chosen electoral team. Juan Ruiz was appointed as president, 
Ernesto Zuno as secretary and Lucas Manzano as treasurer. Arturo also read 
the names of the members of the vigilance council and finishing mentioned 
that the sugarcane producers of Autlan, El Grullo, El Limdn and other 
nearby ejidos had been taken into consideration and the selection of 
candidates included members from each place. There was an uproar in the 
meeting. Finally one of them suggested that the assembly should select its 
own candidates. Pina commented that they should not rush into any decision. 
She even questioned if there was a legal constraint to do it. Pamela asked 
why the elections were not mentioned in the agenda of issues to be 
discussed. Other members pointed out that there was no legal quorum. It 
should be over sixty per cent of attendance to decide such as important 
matters and they were only forty six of the hundred and fourteen members. 
Thus they should delay the discussion to the next assembly. 
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On the attack again Pina asked Arturo how many new members had 
affiliated to the CNPP in the last years: 
"Have we gained or lost representation among the total of sugar 
producers in the region? I have heard that we used to deliver 33% 
of the sugarcane and it has shrank to 27%, is that true?'. 
Arturo commented that the CNPP had increased its membership but not 
at the same speed as the expansion of sugarcane planting in the area. He 
emphasised that most of the members who decided to withdraw their CNPP 
membership and return to the CNC, were less than 4% of the membership. 
Arturo pointed out that the deserters left because they were lorry and car 
owners and were against paying 3 % of their gross earnings for administrative 
costs that the CNPP had decided to charge to them. As it happened the 
deserters eventually paid 5% not 3% because a few months latter Maximino 
asked the lorry operators working for the CNC to contribute to the running 
of the association. Arturo assured the assembly that they had earned new 
members, even though they had a smaller acreage, and thereby deliver less 
sugarcane to the refinery. Pamela asked again if the CNPP had increased or 
decreased its power. Armando Castro intervened with his conciliatory deep 
voice: 
'We should not criticize each other, just for the sake of it. This 
committee has strived and obtained important achievements like the 
keeping our expenses to a minimum. We must nurture the unity 
among all the members in order to consolidate our strength. We 
should sponsor other candidates if we feel that its the best for our 
association and we must stop fighting each other'. 
Arturo seemed very pleased with Armando's intervention, he added: 
'The CNPP association should increase not only the number of its 
sugarcane producers but its resources and services available to its 
members'. 
A member who had not talked before asked what were the requirements 
to be a candidate for the committee. Arturo replied that the only requirement 
was that he/she should grow sugarcane on a private or ejido plot and have 
been members of the CNPP association for at least three years. He 
mentioned that the representative of the national committee would come in 
the following weeks to sanction the selection of candidates and the final 
elections. The excitement of the discussion had subsided and Gil commented 
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that all the members should become responsible for bringing new members 
to the CNPP. Arturo said in a contemptuous tone that from June to 
September was the best time to change from one organization to the other 
because the harvest is over and there is enough time to deal with the 
administrative hassle before the next harvest. 
The next questions asked by those attending returned to 
economic matters. One member wanted to know when they were going to 
receive the last payment for the sugarcane. Arturo explained that the refinery 
had to calculate the final price of the sugarcane according to the saccharose 
point beyond the bottom level 8.3 of saccharose level; which in the case of 
the sugarcane for the refinery Melchor Ocampo had been four or five points 
higher than the minimal level. The refinery administration could take up to a 
month to issue payments. Somebody else asked for the interest rate on 
agricultural loans. Arturo said that it was the commercial rate of 78%, but 
was subjected to change if the banks changed their rates. Arturo mentioned 
that the national delegate was coming for several days, he also encouraged 
them to be more punctual and arrive on the dot to their meetings. He asked 
several times if there were any other issues that anybody would like to 
discuss. There were none so he brought the assembly to an end. The public 
stood up and split into small groups discussing mainly the coming elections. 
As can be seen most of the CNPP's members, especially the ones in the 
advisory council, keep an eye on the decisions of the executive committee. 
The members of the latter complain about the never-ending demands of the 
former. Though there are more individuals participating in the decision 
making of the CNPP, it is not run in a truly democratic fashion. It is obvious 
that the better-off members, who also own cranes and carts for lifting and 
transporting sugar cane have the upper hand in the running of the 
association. They are the ones who are consulted about policy making, very 
often presenting their decisions to the general assembly as a fait accompli. 
The participants in general assemblies in the CNPP association ponder most 
committee propositions and demand detailed explanations of the policies 
proposed by it. The wealthier members, who also influence more directly the 
decision making, claim to have more rights in this respect, based on the 
larger economic resources they have invested in sugarcane production. This 
superior attitude of the most powerful members has alienated the small 
producers who have contemplated the possibility of leaving the CNPP to join 
the CNC. However, the dominant clique in the CNPP is unconcerned. 
Although the current CNPP committee has a few cautious members like 
Gonzalo Blake and Juan Ruiz, the current president of the executive 
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committee considers it is best for all that the large growers should be 
powerful too. 
Sugarcane producers have joined the association that they consider more 
apt for looking after their interests. Ejidatarios have remained in the oldest of 
the two associations that is part of the peasant sector (CNC) in the PRI. 
Private landowners have branched off from the CNC to form their own 
association (CNPP) affiliated to the sector in the PRI which caters for 
landowners and professionals. The differences in the socio-economic 
composition of each association are highlighted by their different styles. The 
CNC executive committee has more leeway to make decisions concerning 
organization than the CNPP committee, which has to refer most of its 
decisions to the council, where the largest producers hold sway. These 
wealthier sugarcane producers demand to be consulted before the executive 
cornmittee makes decisions about the organization of sugarcane production. 
They keep a close eye on the association's expenses and they protest 
immediately at the slightest increase. 
Conclusion 
The creation and evolution of the CNC and CNPP associations have different 
starting points. Whereas the CNC gathered its members at the opening of the 
refinery, the CNPP stemmed from the CNC over a decade later, attracting to 
its ranks middle to large landowners, who were late-comers into sugarcane 
production and did not feel at ease rubbing shoulders with the 'lower-class' 
ejidatarios, but the majority of the sugarcane producers remained faithful 
members of the CNC. The arrival of a new strong minded and technocratic 
administrator at the refinery Melchor Ocampo changed the political 
landscape. The CNC severed its links with Limdn and made an alliance with 
the new administrator. In contrast to the CNC the CNPP supported Limdn 
and kept their distance from the administrator. These difference on the 
standing towards Limdn's dismissal became a landmark of the reshuffling of 
the political forces among the different actors involved in the organization of 
sugarcane production. The CNC, led by Maximino who did not belong to the 
dominant political group once led by General Lopez Arreola, could rearrange 
CNC political loyalties, which suit the new manager's design to eradicate the 
political profile of the organization of production. 
The CNPP was still wet behind the ears when the new manager arrived, 
but they decided to keep themselves out of Limdn's affair. The outcome of 
this confrontation was the consolidation of the new administrator's control 
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over the refinery's involvement in the organization of production. The CNPF 
kept itself out of this affair, still finding its bearings on the changing 
administrative and political scene. The succeeding era of sugarcane 
production was built on three newly reconstituted agencies: refinery 
administration, and the CNC and CNPP executives committees. Though their 
constituencies gave them different representational power, they were fairly 
evenly matched to defend their own interests against each other. The forum, 
where the confrontations and negotiations took place, was the committee of 
sugarcane production, which I describe in the next chapter. 
The striking differences of organization and leadership between the two 
sugarcane producers associations dispel any gross generalization that one 
might make about farmers and peasants submission to institutions and state 
intervention. Even more they highlight the social actors' rich repertoire for 
dealing with the institutional forces and for pursuing their own interests. The 
social actors who share similar socio-economic conditions tend to cluster in 
associations that reflect their concerns and take care of their class interests. 
Sugarcane producers in the Valley of Autlan-El Grullo have consolidated 
their collective bargains with the refinery administration through two 
institutionally similar associations but structured differently. The leadership 
in the CNC association has remained in the hands of one person who has 
more power than the leader in the CNPP where decision making is a more 
consensual process than in the CNC. 
NOTES 
1. Jessop (1990: 120), describes corporatism as the 'representation mediated 
through a system of public 'corporations' which are constituted on the basis of 
their members' function within the division of labour'. 
2. ANPCA (Asociación Nacional de Productores de Cana de Azúcar). 
3. This newly-formed national association of sugar cane producers became one of 
the most powerful groups within the CNC, which is the peasant sector of the 
PRI. 
4. See M. Gates, 1986 and more recently Teichman, 1992. 
5. Purcell and Kaufman Purcell 1977, discuss the way in which a confusion of 
political goals under the corporatist style of discretionary and disaggregated 
decision making, establishes control over labour and business. 
6. I asked the committee of the CNPP for permission to attend their assemblies, 
and, as was the case with CNC leaders, they granted it, only demanding that I 
should be a silent observer. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE REFINERY ADMINISTRATION AND THE COMMITTEE 
OF SURGARCANE PRODUCTION 
In this chapter I concentrate my attention on the senior employees of the 
refinery Melchor Ocampo (IMO). Of special importance are those who 
through their positions deal directiy with the sugar cane producers, 
particularly the manager of the refinery and the head of the extension 
department who are the refinery's representatives in the sugar cane 
production committee, discussed in the second section of this chapter. These 
refinery employees belong to the government industrial bureaucracy, in mis 
case Azucar, S.A. This supervisory and technical staff have interests which 
are different and often contradictory to the producers' interests. Most 
refinery employees come from outside the region and their career promotions 
depend less on the sugar cane producers' evaluation of their performance 
than on the political negotiations within the different formal groups and 
informal factions to which each belong in the State bureaucracy. 
Functionaries in the parastatal refineries consider they have to lead the 
organization of sugarcane production and sugarcane producers should 
cooperate with them. This is the way sugar refineries, like most industries, 
have always been run. But state intervention and its political consequences 
have laid bare a new set of arrangements for producers and employees that 
were not accessible to them under the administration of the privately owned 
refineries, where purely economic criteria tends to prevail. 
To analyse the organizational structure of the refinery, it is necessary to 
highlight the distinctive characteristics of the public organizations in which 
the pursuit of individual self-interest takes a different form to the one found 
in the private organizations. The employees' career building in the state 
owned refineries goes beyond the process of rationalization and 
'bureaucratization' in the refinery. These employees must cast their networks 
wider than employees and even then the sexennial turnover at the national 
level might disrupt their administrative career. This certitude of unpredictable 
changes demands from refinery employees to deploy a complex set of 
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strategies which relies more on the expansion of political networks than in fulfilling to the letter their job specification. These conditions provide a open but uncertain path of professional advancement and make the economic diversification through varied means essential to the employees' professional survival and their families' economic well-being. The careers of the refinery employees describe in this chapter illustrate these processes very neatly. 
The Mexican State has intervened in sugarcane production since the 1930s when it fixed the prices of sugar and sugarcane alcohol. Later on the State launched financial institutions to bolster the domestic supply of sugar which had shrunk as a consequence of the low profit margin left to the refinery's owners (see Chapter 2). The profits sunk to such a low level that some sugar refineries declared themselves bankrupt and were bought up by the Mexican State. Its intervention kept the jobs provided by the refineries in the rural areas and assured the supply of a staple product in the diet of the population, and even expanded export production in the succeeding years to the American market. As explained in chapters 1 and 2, sugarcane production, after a period of state-sponsored growth, moved into a severe crisis in the 1960s and the Mexican State once again had to intervene, but this time more drastically, purchasing most of the remaining refineries in production and promoting new ones (see Gallaga, 1984 and Perez Arce, 1979). 
The refinery IMO in the Autlan-El Grullo Valley was one of a handful new refineries financed by the state in its attempt to revitalise sugar cane production. The feasibility project made in 1968 recommended the opening of a sugar refinery in the region. The construction of the sugar mill began in 1969, and the first crushing took place the following year in 1970. From the beginning, the appointments of the manager and the head of the different departments in the refinery were subject of political negotiation at different levels between the functionaries in charge of administering the state-controlled refineries and other governmental offices. Thus the IMO has always received a newly appointed manager a few months after a new President of Mexico comes to power. These managers, in spite of their different degrees of expertise, have improved sugarcane production in the IMO (see table 2). 
Periodical Removal of the Refinery's Administrators 
The political turnover that accompanies the national change of government in Mexico includes different modes of political action; Kaufman Purcell, 1980, 
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describes diem as fluid political clientelism, reliance on political middlemen, 
patronage and political entrepreneurism. Though the high rank personnel in 
most public offices is reshuffled periodically, (González Casanova, 1986), a 
good number of them find a new political appointments in different public 
institutions i.e. through their political and personal commitment to one or 
several middlemen and patrons, the dismissed functionaries find a new 
position. The replacement of managers of the parastatal refineries follows the 
same political pattern as in the ministries. During the nineteen years 1970-
1988 that IMO has been working, it has had four different managers. The 
first one arrived in the Spring of 1970, a few months after L. Echeverría 
became president and remained in his post until the following presidential 
elections in 1976. The second manager arrived some months after the 
election of J. López Portillo as president of Mexico for the period 1977-
1982. This second manager remained in the post over five years and left a 
few months before the sexennial pandemonium, being replaced by the third 
manager that only covered the transition period during a year and a half. The 
fourth manager: engineer Armando Osuna Gómez, following the dominant 
tendency, arrived a few months after the change of the national government 
and he remained at the head of the refinery Melchor Ocampo for six years 
(see table 3). When the national government and with it the administration of 
the parastatal institutions changed, he was promoted to the post of general 
manager in the largest refinery under the state administration (a few months 
after I had left the field). The political selection of the refinery managers has 
very often disregarded their administrative experience and managerial 
abilities. These appointments cause disruptions in the organization of 
production and are resented by sugarcane producers and refinery employees. 
The fact that this refinery is state-own allows refinery employees and 
sugarcane producers to consider that they should have more saying in the 
running of a public, which they would not contemplate if they were dealing 
with a private refinery. 
The appointments at the next level down from the manager i.e. the 
directors of the different departments in the refinery tend to follow the same 
cyclical pattern as the manager's appointment, although the former are more 
likely than the latter to remain for longer periods on their job. The other 
possibility open to the middle rank employees, many of whom are engineers 
of some kind or another, is internal job promotion in the refinery where 
individuals could start working immediately after they finished university 
climbing to the directorate of a department. For example the current head of 
the electrical department, Juan José Lemus Lara, came to work in the 
Melchor Ocampo on a temporary probationary contract in 1970. After a year 
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they gave him a permanent contract. A year later he was promoted to chief 
of one shift, and in June 1978 he was appointed as director of the electrical 
department. Juan Jose" Lemus is one of the few employees to head a 
department in the refinery, who comes from the region; his grand parents are 
from Autian and he grew up in Guadalajara, though he came to visit them 
very often and spent most of his holidays in the area. He claims to be native 
of Autiah because that is where his heart is. 
There is another director, Lorenzo Ordonez, who like Limdn and Juan 
Jose* Lemus, arrived during the construction of the refinery and is still 
working in it. His first commission was to pave the way into the refinery, 
when the refinery was ready, he was offered the job in the department of 
maintenance of the buildings, warehouse and surroundings. He accepted the 
offer and settled in the region. Six years later he became the director of this 
department; after eighteen years of living in the region Ordonez considers 
that he and his family have settled in region for good and he only wonders if 
they will have to move into Guadalajara when the children finish their basic 
education and want to attend university. Although Ordofiez came to the 
refinery at the same time as Limdn, he was not politically ambitious. But 
neither he has ever ruffled other people's feathers as much as Limdn. He has 
kept a low profile and is very content to have remained working in one place 
instead of moving around the country, building roads as he had done before 
he came to the region to work in the construction of the roads around the 
IMO. Limdn, Ordofiez and Lemus were in charge of technical departments 
and have settled in the region for good. At this level it is more likely that the 
employees remain in the same place than at the managerial level, this post 
being always at the mercy of the sexennial political and administrative 
changes. The purpose of the following will be to indicate how sexennial 
changes influence local sugarcane political administration in the context of a 
long-run tendency towards greater vertical integration and control over 
sugarcane production. 
The Extension Department 
The best-known local ex-employee of the refinery is Gabriel Limdn, who 
was a protagonist in the strike described in Chapter 1. He started as 
topographer during the building of the refinery in 1969, he then became 
extension worker in the extension department where he remained in different 
posts up to its direction, a post that he held when he was dismissed in 1983. 
Limdn's first promotion was to the sub-direction of the extension department 
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in 1973. Four years later when the new manger arrived in 1977, Limdn was 
appointed head of the department, his last promotion was decided by the 
newly arrived administrator, who did not know the region and probably did 
not have his own candidate or had one recommended from Mexico City. 
During Limdn's direction the extension department not only expanded the 
cultivation of sugar cane but strengthened its influence in the regulation of 
production, to such extent that it almost took over the whole organization of 
planting, cultivating and harvesting sugar cane from the producers. Limdn 
belongs to a well-known local family; who knew the region thoroughly and 
learnt all the nuances about growing sugarcane in his long stay in the 
extension department. When he was promoted head of the extension 
department, he seized more control over the organization of sugarcane 
production than any of his predecessors had ever done. Limon centralised 
most of the production decisions issued by the extension department to the 
sugarcane producers in the Aultah-El Grullo Valley. He also made most 
decisions about what plots would receive credit and extension services for 
growing sugarcane. Limdn's career highlights his ability to manipulate 
structures as he pursues his interests. The other refinery employees have 
searched for their economic goals through different paths which will be 
discussed in the next sections. 
When Engineer Armando Osuna arrived in 1982, Limdn thought that he 
could win him over and let him remain in his post as head of the extension 
department. Limdn decided to offer Osuna the opportunity to acquire joindy 
a 21 hectare plot of land, that was being sold very cheaply. Osuna foresaw 
the profitability of the investment and agreed to buy the plot in partnership 
with Limdn. They went on to plant sugarcane on it. A few years later they 
sold the plot for a sizable price, making a good profit out of it. Limdn 
considered this acquisition would consolidate his relationship with the new 
manager. He felt more relaxed about the administrative changes and assessed 
that his position was not in jeopardy, which proved to be an over-optimistic 
assumption, as we learnt. 
Armando Osuna accepted the job as manager of the IMO when the 
sexennial turnover put him out of his high-up job in the Ministry of Mines 
and Parastatal Industries (Secretaria de Minas e Industrias Paraestatales). He 
had been in charge of assessing the credit and resources that the treasury 
should give to the refineries, praising himself on being a tough negotiator. 
Osuna got the measure of the organization of sugarcane production in IMO 
very soon and immediately drafted the necessary changes to improve it. 
Osuna's managerial style is autocratic and soon enough run into Limdn's 
influential position. He decided to curtail Limdn's control. Osuna might have 
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foreseen that Limdn's clout could temper his plans to improve the refinery 
productive performance, based on centralised managerial plans. Osuna had 
offered Limon's post to the agricultural engineer Baltazar Blanco, who 
considered the offer of becoming head of the extension department in Audah 
refinery as a real promotion. Blanco decided to leave behind his job in 
Atencingo, one of the largest sugar refineries in Mexico and moved to 
Autlah, which has the advantage of being closer to Michoacan where he 
owns an avocado orchard. Osuna's selection of Blanco was based on the 
technical credentials of the latter who had been working in Atencingo 
refinery where he was one of several extension advisers in a huge extension 
department where there was a strong competition for any promotion. Thus 
Osuna's offer to become head of the extension department, even though it 
was in a smaller refinery, was a promotion Blanco could not let go. He 
accepted it straight away and arrived at Autiah a few weeks after Osuna. 
Limdn still remained on his post and Blanco began to work as technical 
advisor attached to the extension department. Blanco understood that he had 
to wait for Limdn to leave the department before he could take over, and 
was patient. However Limdn had no intention of leaving his post and tried to 
engraciate himself with the new manager. The purchase of a plot of land of 
twenty one hectares very cheaply was one way of doing so. Meanwhile 
everything in the extension department continued as before but with an extra 
technical advisor. 
In spite of Limdn's engraciating gestures, Osuna decided to replace him 
with one of his men without the local attachments that Limdn had, someone 
who would willingly follow Osuna's decisions about the production 
organization. Limdn felt he knew the region, the producers and their 
problems better than Osuna and was expecting to continue his work as 
before, probably adjusting some of the practices to fit the new 
administration. A war of accusations and counter-accusations broke out 
which eventually reached the point where Limdn had to be removed. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Limdn belongs to a local family and has always 
lived in the region, except for the five years he spent at the University of 
Guadalajara, where he obtained his degree as agricultural engineer. His first 
job was as topographer in the extension department in the newly opened 
Melchor Ocampo refinery in 1969. Two years later he was offered a job as 
extension worker and in 1973, he was promoted to the post of technical 
coordinator of the extension workers. Limdn was finally asked to become the 
superintendent of the extension department in 1977. He acquired an extensive 
knowledge during the eight years he worked as extension worker and 
technical coordinator in the refinery. Being a well regarded local employee 
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facilitated his dealings with the farmers. Limdn liked to supervise all the 
works closely in the department and he kept the extension workers on their 
toes, so they say. He was the superintendent who extended the sugarcane 
acreage from 2,548.65 hectares in 1977 to 4,577.20 in 1984. 
Limdn had been arguing that he could reduce costs and increase yields if 
he was allowed more control of production and closer supervision than 
before. The leaders of the CNC and CNPP disagreed and insisted that 
greater productivity could only be achieved via the greater participation of 
the producer associations. Both sides are partially right and there are some 
improvements to be done in the organization of sugarcane production. But it 
is an undeniable fact that Limdn presided over the doubling of sugarcane 
production during the six year he was head of the extension department in 
the refinery Melchor Ocampo from 1977 to 1982 (see table 2). However, 
based on the commentaries of the different parties involved in this expansion 
of production, it would be unfair to bestow all the praise on either side 
(producers and extensionists), both played their respective part well. 
From the beginning of the refinery until the early 1980s, the extension 
department controlled the planting, cultivating and harvesting of sugarcane. 
The early superintendents were expected to take on increased level of 
responsibilities in production organization than the latter ones. They also 
handled more resources and had more elbow room than the current 
superintendent. Limdn mentioned that he was accused of having authorised 
credit to barren plots which would not yield enough to repay the loans. He 
mentioned that those loans are a current risk in all the refineries. Even more, 
he added that the authorisation for that credit had to be approved by several 
parties, among which were included the manager, the head of the credit 
department and the general accountant. Limdn considers the accusation as a 
malicious political blow under the belt. The accusation was not purely of 
ineptitude, but also of corruption, since the implication was that the loan was 
not used for agricultural purposes. Limdn dismisses the accusation as 
political. From the outside Limdn appears to be stretching the rules. Such 
transactions might be judged as corrupt but they might as well be considered 
as an appropriation of public resources which is condemned as illegal by the 
book of rules and procedures, but which are accepted as fair play in 
everyday negotiations and in some cases are even considered legitimate 
practice.1' Limdn accused Osuna, the new manager, of having done exactiy 
what he was accused of: giving credit to plant sugarcane on plots without the 
right conditions for the crop. 
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THE MELCHOR OCAMPO REFINERY: DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION 
Harvest Length of Tonnage Tonnage of Tonnage Saccharose 
Year harvest of cane refined of standard (%) 
in days sugar sugar 
1971 38 20,941.13 1,676.15 11.80 
1972 65 55,633.71 5,574.95 12.95 
1973 109 116,466.50 13,050.30 13.65 
1974 85 86,129.11 9,026.35 12.74 
1975 143 136,586.66 15,057.30 13.45 
1976 121 134,298.90 14,762.90 13.23 
1977 149 164,092.32 17,628.65 12.98 
1978 173 204,515.35 22,375.15 13.56 
1979 204 231,145.71 25,376.15 13.92 
1980 178 208,689.44 21,862.25 13.15 
1981 228 262,492.81 24,873.75 13.21 
1982 176 263,011.71 17.048.60 13.62 
1983 166 364,225.20 38,225.20 13.22 
1984 128 320,697.55 36,402.20 13.55 
1985 134 380,086.40 44,114.40 14.04 
1986 161 447,231.77 52,472.95 14.04 
1987 178 514,889.77 57,812.60 13.79 
1988 172 524,794.73 60,117.60 13.96 
One of the previous CNPP's leaders, Sanchez Ruy, corroborated Limón analysis, mentioning that he could not have authorised the credit without the approval of the manager; furthermore, he added that probably general Lopez Arreóla manipulated his political influence to obtain those credits that were granted to some of his supporters and political clients. Limón emphasises that he did not steal from the sugarcane producers as Maximino, the CNC's leader, says. If anything Limón mismanaged public funds, which according to the popular opinion, are there for the taking, and are mismanaged by most public administrators. Although Gabriel Limón was removed from his position as head of the extension department at the end of 1984, he still had political presence among both the refinery's employees and the sugarcane producers. Limón contested the legality of his dismissal. Two years later a legal court revoked it and the administration received a legal order to reinstate Limón and pay back all the salaries they have missed to pay him during his suspension. This 
Table 2: 
The Refinery Administration and the Committee ofSurgarcane Production 199 
legal decision took Osuna by surprise because he had not even considered 
that Limdn might come back to work in the refinery. The only immediate 
measure Osuna could take was not to let Limdn occupy his old office, 
instead he was allotted a tattered desk in an empty office; though according 
with the legal verdict, Limdn should have been reinstated to his previous 
position. However he considered that he had won a batde in the ongoing war 
that Osuna had mounted against him. The ensuing confrontations and the 
strike that was called by the CNC leader to repeal Limdn's reinstallment 
were recounted in Chapter 1 with a brief sketch of the main characters 
involved in this 'social drama'. 
The organization of sugarcane production in the valley of Autian has 
thrived under the protected internal market. The Mexican government on the 
one hand has kept a low consumer price of sugar, even below its cost of 
production in most refineries; on the other hand it has increased the price of 
sugarcane paid to the producers. Thus it has heavily subsidised sugar cane 
production and consumption, which is considered a staple item in the diet of 
the majority of the Mexican population (see Chapter 2). This policy has 
benefitted the food industry as much as sugarcane producers, who have seen 
their profits from sugarcane production increase steadily in the last ten years 
from the beginning of the 1980's. In this context the associations of 
sugarcane producers and the functionaries administering the parastatal 
refinery Melchor Ocampo have developed a particular 'interactional modus 
vivendi' (see Chapter 1) that has succeeded in improving sugarcane 
production to the point that it is one of the few state-own refineries that 
could be profitable even if the prices were not controlled. However, the 
refinery has not been always in the fast track of efficiency. The sexennial 
political turnover landed all kind of managers on the refinery. Some were 
well versed in the complexities of sugar productions, others were appointed 
for purely political reasons. In spite of the government's sexennial turnover, 
Limdn ascended steadily from the bottom to the top job in the extension 
department, where he participated in the consolidation of sugarcane 
production. Sugarcane had spread to cover two thirds of the irrigated land in 
the valley Audan-El Grullo at the time of my fieldwork 1987-1988. 
The opening of the refinery in the valley, the creation of the associations 
of sugarcane producers, first the CNC and a decade later the CNPP, and the 
establishment of the committee of sugarcane production which I discuss in 
the next section of this chapter, should not be considered only as the 
outcome of the state intervention in the region. They should be understood as 
the result of the participation of local farmers and politicians, who lobbied 
for the refinery to be installed in the valley, and die involvement of local 
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professionals like Limon and Lemus, who have participated in the 
administration of the refinery. The ups and downs in the history of this 
refinery could be followed through the change in Limdn's fortune, who has 
been around since the fledging years of the refinery at the turn of the 1970s 
to the expansion of the sugar production to the limits of its existing capacity 
in the 1980s. 
Turmoil in the Extension Department 
Although, as already seen, Limdn wanted to retain as much control over 
sugarcane production as possible. He was very much in favour of the 
creation of a second association which would represent and cater for the 
interests of the larger producers. He said that he was approached by people 
from the PRI in Guadalajara and Mexico, who suggested he could advise the 
landowners in their efforts to form their own association, the CNPP which 
he did successfully. The beginning of the 1980's was the time when most 
CNPP organizations of sugarcane production were formed in different 
sugarcane producing areas in Mexico. The national CNPP was led by a 
charismatic national politician from Jalisco who has always been a staunch 
supporter of the PRI. Limdn considers that in very short time the CNPP has 
improved its administration and offers better services to sugarcane producers 
than the CNC. He thinks that landowners with larger plots are more 
demanding than ejidatarios, thus the CNPP's leaders have to account for 
every penny they charged their members. Whereas the CNC's leaders could 
get away with flexible accounting without provoking an uproar among its 
members. Although Limdn has not been able to be reinstated as 
superintendent, his opinions still carry some weight among sugarcane 
producers from both the CNC and CNPP associations, who still consult him 
about their cane. Limon's vast experience of cane growing and his long 
standing acquaintance with the local producers have cast a shadow over his 
successors in the extension department. In contrast with Limdn's influence 
among the sugarcane producers, Blanco and Negrete, who took over Limdn's 
job, are considered inefficient agricultural engineers and dithering 
administrators, who are afraid of contravening Osuna's attempt to control all 
stages of sugarcane production in the refinery Melchor Ocampo. 
I present a historical sketch of the careers of Blanco, technical advisor 
in the extension department, and Negrete, head of the extension department. 
Examining their professional curriculum, it is possible to get a glimpse of 
their networks and the way these social actors instantiate organizational 
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structures, deal with the unacknowledged conditions and spur unintended 
consequences, (Giddens, 1976). Blanco and Negrete being both outsiders to 
the region might account for some of their lack of commitment to the 
organization of sugarcane production in the valley. Furthermore, their 
professional aspirations seem to lay outside sugarcane production which 
inclined them to a certain lackadaisical approach to their work. Baltazar 
Blanco comes from a neighboring state where he has relatives who help him 
to administer an avocado orchard he acquired some years ago. Blanco 
graduated as agricultural engineer at the National Agricultural University in 
Chapingo, i.e. when he obtained his degree in 1969, he was immediately 
recruited into one of the refineries in Michoacah recently acquired by the 
state. He worked there as technical phytopathologist, which had been his 
speciality at university. In the afternoons Blanco found a second job in the 
association of avocado producers, he also rented a plot where he planted 
sugarcane, and in this way he could save enough money to buy his own 
orchard. He remembers that he had to work hard, including Saturdays and 
Sundays; he was very proud of his orchard and regretted moving to a far 
away refinery in Atencingo, Puebla, when the national government had its 
sexennial turnover. 
Blanco commented that the refinery of Atencingo was huge and it was 
very difficult to gain any promotion, besides, it was too far from his 
orchard. He began to look for any available job in the other refineries nearer 
to Michoacan. Blanco's search coincided with Osuna's acceptance of the 
direction of the refinery Melchor Ocampo and his subsequent search for a 
new agricultural engineer who would come to take over Limdn's post. As 
soon as Osuna assessed the conditions in the IMO, he started looking for a 
technical engineer who could concentrate all his attention on the technical 
agricultural endeavors leaving political matters and hence overall control to 
Osuna. A friend of Blanco recommended him to Osuna, who offered him the 
post of superintendent in the IMO in Autian. Osuna's purpose suited Blanco 
aspirations, he would be promoted to head of the extension department, 
which implied higher salary and status; and Autian was closer to Michoacan, 
which would allow him to visit his orchard more frequentiy than when he 
worked in Atencingo. Blanco arrived at Autian a couple of months after 
Osuna's arrival. 
Blanco came with the idea that Limdn would resign soon after Osuna's 
arrival and move to other refinery as many heads of departments in the 
parastatal refineries do when the sexennial political turnover takes place. 
However, that did not happen as quickly as Blanco expected. Limdn had 
mobilised his contacts, especially his close relationship with the regional 
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director of Azucar, S.A., the parastatal institution administrating the 
refineries. For a few months Limdn seemed to have secured his continuance 
as superintendent. Jacinto Rojo, secretary of the CNC, recalled that the 
regional director came to talk to the manager and the CNC's leaders and 
asked them to stop the slanderous campaign against Limdn. But all the 
regional director achieved was to hasten the attacks against Limdn which 
reached a head at a national meeting of the sugar industry. As we mentioned 
before, Maximino accused Limdn publically and he claimed to have a file 
with proofs of all accusations. They even threatened to delay the beginning 
of the harvest if the national leader of the CNC and the national director of 
Azucar, S.A., did not remove Limdn from his post. The public pressure and 
the threat of disrupting the crushing of the sugarcane, hastened die dismissal 
of Limdn and the appointment of Blanco as his successor, a post, that he 
only held for a couple of months until Pedro Negrete was appointed Limdn's 
successor by the headquarters in Mexico City. Osuna could have contested 
the appointment with the possibility of having it revoked but that would have 
antagonised a national director, who could jeopardise Osuna's future 
promotions. Thus Negrete became Limdn's successor as superintendent of 
the extension department and Blanco return to his post of technical advisor in 
the extension department but keeping his improved salary. 
Osuna must have pondered the political toll of keeping Blanco and 
rejecting Negrete's appointment as head of the extension department against 
the economic cost of adding a technical advisor to the payroll of the refinery. 
Osuna decided to keep Blanco as technical advisor and confirm Blanco as 
superintendent of the extension department. Blanco kept his improved salary 
as superintendent and cleared the office for Negrete. Negrete must have been 
aware of the political strings that were pulled in order for him to replace 
Limdn, therefore he knew Osuna saw his appointment as an imposition and 
quite understandably he felt insecure upon his arrival at the refinery. He had 
strived for a post as superintendent in a refinery in Nayarit, his home state 
bordering Jalisco. He would have preferred to have been appointed to a 
refinery in Nayarit, but that was not possible and Limdn's post in Audah 
seemed to be Negrete's best chance to move closer to the place of his choice. 
Pedro Negrete started his studies in the National Agricultural University 
at Chapingo, the same as Blanco but he was expelled, a fact that he seemed 
to be very proud of. He fancies himself the black sheep of the family. He 
was admitted into a private college of agriculture where he finally graduated. 
Negrete mentioned that his father is a rich man who has an extensive 
network among wealthy and politically powerful figures at local and national 
level. He mentioned that it was through his father's relations that he 
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managed to be appointed by somebody in Mexico City to the post of 
superintendent of the extension department in the refinery Melchor Ocampo. 
Which has probably turned out to be a more difficult situation to endure than 
he thought. He complains very often of 'his lordship', as he calls Osuna, 
who sees Negrete's appointment as an imposition from the national 
headquarters, which he felt constrained to take on board. This is 
understandable considering that Osuna did not hide his total disrespect for 
Negrete, who became Osuna's favourite subject of innumerable heavy 
handed jokes, which Negrete suffered without complaint. He seems to be 
mainly concerned with cajoling drinks and meals from the sugarcane 
producers and acquire seniority in the refinery. 
Negrete has been working in public refineries for eighteen years. He 
started as foreman of the burning and cutting in a refinery in the South-east 
of Mexico. After a few years he was promoted to the sub-direction of the 
admimstrative department in a different refinery. Later on, he was sent to 
another refinery where he was appointed deputy director of the extension 
department, where he remained for two years until he came to Autiah. 
Negrete complained about the low salaries the refinery's employees earn, 
which have not kept up with inflation and he mentioned that the manager is 
the only one who does not have to worry, because he holds the single post in 
the refinery where there are possibilities of making extra money without any 
risk of being caught. Negrete thinks that the most important tasks in the 
extension department are to keep up-to-date records of the age of all the 
sugarcane plots and programme the cutting according to their age and test for 
the level of saccharose which is carried out weekly, following the age 
records of the sugarcane in each plot. Apart from this they have to make 
sure that the sugarcane producers fertilise, cultivate and water their canes as 
they are expected to do. Negrete, as superintendent of the extension 
department, is the deputy of the manager in the committee of sugarcane 
productions whose weekly meetings that to his regret he has to attend 
regularly. Although only Negrete and Osuna are the legal representatives of 
the refinery administration in these committees, Blanco has been asked by 
Osuna to participate on the committee, which he does regularly. 
Negrete considers the CNPP's political leanings very conservative and 
the CNC's, populist; though he thinks that both organizations handle the 
planting, cultivating and cutting very similarly. He thinks that the CNPP's 
leaders lack political sensibility, which he sees as the main reason why some 
of their members have moved back to the CNC. Whereas, the CNC leaders 
are more politically minded, especially Maximino, who according to 
Negrete, is the one who has renovated the CNC association and increased its 
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members. Although Blanco shares Negrete's opinions about the sugarcane 
producers' associations, he is more critical about the CNPP leaders than 
Negrete and considers them arrogant. Both of them consider all the 
sugarcane producers as very fortunate farmers, who do not have to break 
their back to earn a decent living income. In spite of their shared submission 
to Osuna's whip hand, Blanco and Negrete keep their distance from each 
other. 
Blanco and Negrete consider that the privately owned sugar refineries 
are more efficiently administered than most of the public ones. Negrete as 
much as Blanco would like to find a job in a place not far from where they 
come from. If that is not feasible, they would like to have the possibility of 
negotiating an early retirement with a wholesome compensation for the years 
they have worked in different public refineries. In spite of their technical 
knowledge and experience, they do not have a strong commitment to their 
work, which is very much noticed and resented by the sugarcane producers 
of both associations. But the tacit duality of the direction of the extension 
department has landed the department in noman's land: on the one hand, 
Negrete argues that without the support of the manager he cannot implement 
anything properly, therefore, he considers any attempt to improve their 
services as an utter waste of time; on the other, Blanco argues that he does 
not have the power to make the necessary improvements he would like to 
promote among the sugarcane producers. Thus the department continues 
functioning by inertia. But they both claim that the extension department is 
functioning better that ever, which is an opinion not shared for anybody else, 
including the extension workers in the refinery or by the manager, who 
disregards the extension department's functions and concentrates his attention 
of the industrial processes in the refinery. 
Blanco and Negrete, not surprisingly considering that the former was 
appointed by Osuna and the latter was selected by the national headquarters, 
differ on their judgment of Osuna administration. Whereas Blanco considers 
mat Osuna's administrative policy of tightening the belts and reducing the 
expenses to the minimum possible is what was necessary to improve the 
productivity and run the refinery more efficiently; Negrete considers that 
Osuna had gone too far and the lack of resources for maintaining and 
repairing the machinery properly would reduce its lifespan severely. 
However, they keep a low profile and their opinions to themselves and avoid 
at all cost any confrontation with Osuna. Their main concern is not 
increasing productivity in the sugar fields but surviving Osuna's 
administration. These working conditions do not encourage employees to 
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The Rank and File in the Extension Department 
Field inspectors are the rank and file in the extension department. The 
qualifications to become one of them have soared from basic education to a 
university degree, normally in agricultural engineering among the younger 
newly recruited inspectors. They are the local employees in the extension 
department who rush round the plots planted with sugar, checking the work 
for which the farmers have asked credit for from the refinery. They are 
supposed to give technical advice to the sugarcane producers and report any 
anomaly in the sugarcane crops. In the harvest they are the ones in charge of 
sampling the canes that according to their own statistical records are the ones 
that had reached the right level of saccharose and are ready to be cut. During 
this period field inspectors work even harder trying to turn out a list of the 
ripe cane which should be left without water for three to four weeks before 
cutting. This routine process is complicated and difficult to run smoothly. 
The inspectors have to sample the plots that are analysed by the refinery 
laboratory. With the test results, the extension department elaborates the list 
of plots to be cut and sends an invoice to the producers to stop watering the 
canes. In order to get the maximum level of saccharose, sugarcane should be 
cut when it reaches its optimum level in the growing cycle. The tests they 
extension workers do are the most reliable proof that only ripe canes would 
be ground, yielding as much sweetness as they could. Thus it is essential to 
keep detailed statistics of the canes age in order to help the inspectors to 
programme the sampling and revision of the sugarcane plots. This work is 
responsibility of Blanco, the technical advisor, who is very proud of his 
statistical abilities. However, inspectors and cane growers are not very 
impressed by them and even make jokes about it. Negrete and Blanco passed 
the buck to each other, which, to cane growers annoyance, delays the 
provision of the extension department services. 
Although field inspectors are key figures keeping a constant supply of 
high saccharose canes to the refinery, they have a low status and earn a poor 
salary. They like their job and do it well but they complain of the lack of 
incentives, and their bosses' poor performance. Even the manoeuvrability 
they have has been reduced under the current refinery leadership as will be 
seen below. They consider the dual leadership of Blanco and Negrete 
confusing and tiring; their way of dealing with it is to ignore them and do 
improve their performance, which they see as lees important than developing 
political networks. 
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their job as they have always done. The older ones, who have been in the 
extension department from the begirining, learnt together with the sugarcane 
producers and know the region and the condition of the canes in most plots 
but they also have established a good relationship with most sugarcane 
producers. They mentioned that most producers are well disposed though 
there are a few difficult ones. It is remarkable that in spite of the odds 
against them, these workers manage to do their job properly. There are some 
complaints about Blanco only being interested in gathering statistics and 
Negrete's aloofness, but they resent more the administration's neglect 
towards the sugarcane fields, which after all yield the basic raw material, 
without which the refinery would not function. The inspectors are the 
bedrock of the extension department, who have kept it running smoothly by 
themselves, and in spite of their aloof superiors. 
An Efficiency Seeker 
Armando Osuna Gomez arrived at the refinery Melchor Ocampo in 1983, a 
year after the national sexennial political turnover. He had been in the region 
before, several years ago while he was an industrial supervisor in the 
national headquarters of Azucar, S.A. in Mexico City. He had to visit the 
refineries and advise and report about their industrial efficiency. During that 
visit, Osuna met Juan José Lemus, the head of the electrical department, who 
was already working in the refinery, and kept in touch over the years. When 
Osuna accepted the post as manager of the IMO, he looked for Juan José and 
asked him if he could help him to find cheap decent accommodation until he 
could sort out the change of adminstration in the refinery; he complained that 
he did not have any money. Juan José found a room in Audah with some 
acquaintances and invited him to have his main meal with Juan José's 
parents. Juan José mentioned that he even had to lend Osuna money (the 
equivalent of his monthly salary at that time) to buy his airfare ticket to 
Mexico City. When Juan José finally dared to ask Osuna to pay him back the 
money, Osuna pretended to be enraged and refused to pay him back. After a 
few weeks, when they got to know each other better, Juan José discovered 
that Osuna had terrible manners. He swears all the time everywhere, which 
annoyed Juan José's parents so much that he had to ask Osuna to look for 
another place to eat. He gave the excuse that his parents were going on 
holidays. Juan José called Osuna what the locals call a stingy person: 'dry 
excrement'. A few weeks later Osuna moved to one of the rent-free houses 
that the refinery provides for its employees. Osuna's next request to Juan 
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José was to buy the newspaper in Autiah and deliver it to the office daily. 
Juan Jose stopped doing it after three months. When Osuna asked him why 
he had stopped buying the paper he told him that he had not paid him back 
anything. Osuna retorted that he knew that Juan José read it before he 
delivers it to him, thus he considered he should not have to pay for a second-
hand newspaper. 
Juan Jose Lemus was already superintendent of the electrical department 
when Osuna arrived and he was confirmed in his post as were most of the 
other industrial superintendents, including Limon. Osuna warned all the 
superintendents that he would not tolerate indiscipline or laziness, he was 
determined to improve the productivity of the refinery at any cost. According 
to Juan José, Osuna believes that in order to make workers and employees 
more productive, he should terrorise them and put one against each other, 
e.g. when Osuna reprimands a worker he tells him that his immediate 
superior has complained about him. He did it to one of Juan José's workers. 
However Juan José refused to sign the report and assured the worker that he 
would have issued a warning before sending a report, Juan José comments, 
'Most workers in the refinery hate Osuna and he knows it which is 
why he never enters the factory in his own and very often he 
carries a gun. There is one foreman who has been on the brink of 
hitting him; he is fed up with Osuna's abuses and he does not give 
a damn about the consequences, he just wants to strike him. This 
chap suffered a nervous breakdown. When he recovered I 
recommended that he leave the refinery before he suffers 
irreversible psychological damage. I also want to resign but I first 
have to negotiate my compensation, which should amount to 
something substantial after having worked in the IMO for eighteen-
and-half years'. 
Juan José commented that Limon misjudged Osuna's character, the 
former passed on some confidential information, including the facts about 
irregularities in the refinery adminstration. This information was later used 
by Osuna against Limdn accusing him of embezzlement. However, the 
documents that Osuna could present did not prove clearly the charges against 
Limdn thus they had to be negotiated and finally settled out of court. Osuna 
is regarded as a good administrator in the headquarters in Mexico City, he is 
an efficient manager, who has improved the productivity in the refinery; they 
do not care how he does it. According to the opinion of several employees, 
Osuna does not release any information which could benefit them, e.g. he 
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never told them about the credit scheme for the refinery's employees. They 
have tried to complain about Osuna's abuses to the national director, but he 
refused to talk to them. 
Osuna was the national sub-director of investments during Lopez 
Portillo's government 1977-1982, and had to evaluate and authorise all 
applications for new investments submitted by the different refineries. He 
recalled with nostalgia the powerful position he had; all the refineries' 
managers and the regional director were eager to see him but they had to 
queue up for an appointment with him. He was, according to his own 
description, one of die 'bureaucratic gods that earn huge salaries and do very 
little*. However, when the new national government took over, as was 
expected, he had to resign and the only job they offered him was the 
direction of the refinery Melchor Ocampo. Osuna commented that they 
probably thought he would not accept it but he did and there he was 
suffering his sexennial punishment. He said: 
T am tired of the daily problems in the refinery and for my mental 
health I must leave this job. Nobody appreciates the enormous 
effort to keep things under control and ticking over'. 
Osuna considers die Mexican State to be a very inefficient administrator 
of the refineries: 
'The Mexican State is inefficient and expensive, and in some cases 
corrupt, but corruption is not the main problem; the worse ailments 
are inefficiency and disorganization. The thefts of a few 
functionaries do not drive a country into bankruptcy. It is the 
inefficiency of the system, including the private sector, which, by 
the way, has benefited the most from state mismanagement, that is 
rocking the system'. 
Osuna is very critical of the way the Mexican State handles the sugar 
agro-industry, e.g. the price of sugarcane, he thinks is higher than it should 
be but the Government wants votes and the bureaucrats think that if they 
give the farmers what they want, they would continue supporting the system. 
Osuna would like to be able to put more pressure on the sugarcane 
growers but that would be politically risky and admits that both associations 
are working efficientiy. Although he thinks that if the cultivation, cutting and 
transport of cane were under the direct control of the refinery, as they used 
to be, he could reduce the costs of production. Being a industrial chemist 
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himself, Osuna considers that the most important part of sugar production 
takes place in the refinery. However, most of the other superintendents 
disagree with that, they think that sugar is produced in the field and only 
transformed in the refinery; but of course, if the refinery does not work 
properly, the saccharose would be wasted and the productivity 
disappointingly low. Limon and Juan José, staunch supporters of the latter 
view, have commented that Osuna arrived at the refinery Melchor Ocampo 
when the expansion of the cultivation of sugarcane began to yield young 
canes with a high saccharose content. However, the extension department, 
under the combined direction of Negrete and Blanco, has not implemented a 
programme to keep renovating the stock of sugar canes, which would have an 
adverse effect on die productivity of the refinery in a few years time. Blanco 
has acknowledged the potential problem they are letting themselves in for but 
he blames Negrete, who as superintendent of the department, should be 
organizing the whole operation which obviously would demand convincing 
both sugarcane producers and manager about the profitability of replanting 
new cane. Thus the former want to get as many cuts from their cane as they 
could and postpone the replanting as long as possible; the latter, trying to 
keep the expenses to the minimum, would like to avoid having to provide the 
credit for renewing the sugarcane. Both sides are postponing to deal with the 
long-term consequences of their lack of investment. 
Sugarcane producers in both associations consider that Osuna is a good 
administrator, he is the one who has improved the productivity in factory, 
which has increased the bonus on the basic price of sugarcane. However 
several sugarcane producers, especially among the CNPP's members, have 
expressed their distrust of him. They mentioned that he does not keep his 
word and he is a difficult character. But he is a good administrator and as 
long as he continues making the refinery workers work, they would not like 
him to leave; but neither would they consider him their friend. 
Osuna's administration has reorganized two of the three major areas of 
the refinery's activity: inside the factory itself and in administrative practice, 
(farm management being the other arena). Whereas before Osuna's arrival, 
the extension department elaborated the policies and controlled the 
production and transporting of the cane to the mill; now Osuna has 
centralised the decision making about anything financial, which have reduced 
the scope of the superintendent in the extension department. In the mill he 
has cut down to die bare minimum all working premiums and he has 
negotiated with the union leader an arrangement to hold down the 
unreasonable demands that are made by some workers, who according to 
Osuna are not only lazy but also untrained. 
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An unintended consequence of having reduced the control of the extension department, was the possibility that sugarcane producers through their representatives increased their participation in the decision making, which they did. Another one is the lack of long- term planning to maintain a high yield of young sugar cane with high saccharose level. On the one hand, Osuna opened the way to the consolidation of the participation of the sugarcane producers on the organization of sugarcane production. But on the other, he restrained the participation of the workers in the productive process. 
Other Actors Involved in Sugar Production 
Sugarcane producers are dependant on just one buyer of their produce, which could corner the producers into disadvantageous conditions. However, the two national organizations that represent the interests of the sugarcane producers have acquired considerable bargaining power. The union of the workers in the refineries is one of the most powerful in Mexico and it is affiliated to the PRI, the dominant party that has remained in power for the last sixty years. The sugarcane cutters, being mainly seasonal migratory workers, are the only members of the labour force in the sugar industry who have seen their organizational attempts tempered, and have to put up with very hard working conditions and meager salaries. Most of them are seasonal workers, who come from poor regions far away from the valley, mainly from Guerrero, where they either have tiny barren plots of land or no land at all. Although their work cutting sugarcane is essential for agro-industrial process of sugarcane production, they have not managed to target their anger beyond themselves. The cutters are unaware of the organization of sugarcane production and are interested in their foremen, who are the ones they identify as their bosses. These foremen are the only persons they know and trust. The sugar refinery workers in the parastatal refineries have job security; the main obstacle is acquiring full-time positions. There are three main grades through which workers are promoted: from the lowest rank of casual worker; the seasonally permanent (secure job during the harvest); and finally permanency. The promotions are totally controlled by union's leaders, who have designed a scale to upgrade the workers; which seems to rely mainly on seniority at work and political networks. The leaders of the national union of sugar workers tend to remain in power for long periods; they do not depend, like the refinery's top employees do on the sexennial political turnover. 
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During the eighteen years of the refinery Melchor Ocampo there have been 
only one change of the local leader in die union representing the refinery's 
workers. 
The first local leader was member of the national committee and a close 
friend of the powerful national leader of the union and he participated very 
actively in the negotiations to bring the refinery to the Autian Valley. He 
also organized the repatriation of some workers, who had been made 
redundant when a refinery closed in Veracruz. These workers became die 
permanent labour force of the IMO. After the repatriated workers were 
installed in the IMO, there were very few vacancies left for local workers, 
which became a point of complaint among the locals who had had large 
expectations about the opening of a new refinery in the region. 
When the first manager arrived he realised that the union leader already 
in post had more experience in sugar refineries than himself, i.e. the leader 
had seized enough power to control the refinery workers and even to be able 
to influence the cane producers' leaders. He saw three managers pass 
through the adminstration of the refinery while he remained in power and 
without anything disturbing his ascendancy over the workers. His hegemonic 
control began to face opposition as the balance between the old workers, who 
came from a nearby region, and the more recently hired workers, who tend 
to be local, tilted towards the latter. Finally the death of the national leader, 
who was his friend and supporter, shook the balance of power in the local 
union and in the normally perfunctory election, a local worker snatched the 
leadership of the union of sugar workers in the refinery Melchor Ocampo. 
This local leader was concerned not only with how much they could 
squeeze out of the refinery administration but with the working conditions 
and the quality of work the workers undertook. This new young leader had 
respect for the technocratic managerial organization that Osuna tried to 
implement in the refinery. He had even been criticised by many workers for 
his bias towards the manager. Osuna recognised the power that the workers' 
leader held and learnt how to deal with him. Here we see the fundamental 
constraint on Osuna's control over the labour force in the mill; he cannot 
suspend a worker, but must refer him to the union representatives, who are 
those who decide the necessary corrective measures and ascertain the cause 
of the complaint. Osuna complains bitterly about the lack of training among 
the workers which could create all kinds of problems on the production line. 
He also thinks that they have more workers than they really need. He 
considers that the refinery could function with one third of its current 
workers. Although the union leader agrees, he thinks that they could reduce 
their number by no more than one third. However, the leader's responsibility 
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is to fight for more jobs and he finds Osuna's administration a hard nut to 
crack. 
The Sugarcane Production Committee 
In this section the key social actors and representatives come together in the 
committee meetings wherein takes place the process of transforming rules 
and procedures to coordinate the organization of sugarcane production. The 
different interests that each of the three parties to the committee of 
production represents are played against each other always reaching workable 
agreements. Before 1982, the organization of planting, harvesting and 
transporting the sugarcane to the factory in the IMO was under the control of 
the head of the extension department, which left sugarcane producers with 
little room for manoeuvre. However, the 1979 presidential decree laid out a 
different range of possibilities for the various agents involved in sugarcane 
production, especially to those working with the factories taken over by the 
state, like the sugarcane producers in Autlâh, e.g. to make sugarcane 
producers associations responsible for the organization of planting, 
harvesting and transporting the cane. As such it seems the state is a more 
accommodating administrator of the refineries than the private ones. Not 
surprisingly some sugarcane producers in Autlâh grasped the opportunity to 
control the organization of sugarcane production in the early 1980s. This 
they did with the implicit support of the current refinery administration at 
that time. Their initiative is evident in the committee of production. Although 
the sugarcane producers involvement with the organization of production is 
set out in the 1979 decree, most local sugarcane producers have not been 
able to implemented it as well as the producers from the Autlân-El Grullo 
Valley. The capacity to commit the producers to participate in the 
organization of production is a difficult process and it has been accomplished 
differentiy in each region. Sugarcane producers' demands for the creation of 
committees of production was granted by the government in the 1979 decree. 
This enaction, in spite of extending producers' rights, was not taken over 
immediately in most sugarcane producing areas. The decree implementation 
in each individual case was the outcome of political negotiations between 
producers associations and refinery administration. 
The sugarcane producers in Autlâh are among the few who have sought 
to enact the decree that allows them more bargaining power. They have 
started without the drawbacks that cane growers have endured in die old 
cane-growing regions. They have also made the best out of the political 
The Refinery Administration and the Committee ofSurgarcane Production 213 
negotiations between the Mexican State and the cane growers associations.3 
This happened at a time when the Mexican State was expanding its financial 
support to sugarcane production (see Chapter 2). It seemed an efficient way 
of creating industrial and agricultural jobs in rural areas and the public 
administrators involved were sympathetic to sugarcane producers who had 
endured hard times during the 1970s. New sugarcane producers, like those in 
Autiah-El Grullo, benefited from what old sugarcane producers from other 
regions had achieved in their negotiations with the government during the 
1960s and 1970s. 
In the next sections I will describe the formation of the production 
committee in the refinery of Melchor Ocampo, which illustrates the 
consolidation of two groups of sugarcane producers as much as their 
different interests and strategies. I will also present the point of view of the 
refinery administrators, who have to juggle their personal interests with the 
government policies and the producers demands. The interface situation of 
these social agents 'where the different life-worlds interact and 
interpenetrate' (Long and Long, 1992: 6) is the main focus of this chapter. 
Committee of Production in the Refinery Melchor Ocampo 
The shift in the control and organization of sugarcane production, from the 
extension department to the representatives of the sugarcane producers 
associations in Autiah, started very shortly after the formation of the second 
association of sugarcane producers in the valley, the CNPP. As is always the 
case in such periods, the waning of the sexennial national administration, 
bred uncertainty among the government's employees. This fact, together with 
the interest of regional and national politicians in creating a distinctive 
political force among the landowners producing sugarcane, spurred the 
formation of that second association of sugarcane producers in Autiah, as 
described in Chapter 6. This event shifted the power significantly towards 
the cane growers in the organization of production. In addition, the leaders 
of the older CNC felt the pressure of having to compete with the CNPP for 
new members or even to keep the old ones; thus the leaders of both 
associations worked hard to increase and retain their membership. They 
made as many demands as they could from the refinery administration and 
more than before they took to heart the interests of their sugarcane producers 
in defending their rights against the refinery administration. When the new 
manager, Armando Osuna, arrived at the refinery Melchor Ocampo, both 
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associations had already consolidated their position within the committee of 
sugarcane production and were unlikely to relinquish it. 
The committee meetings of the refinery Melchor Ocampo are an arena 
where middle level negotiations take place. In them the representatives of 
sugarcane producers and the employees of the refinery discuss, decide and 
plan die production and transportation of sugarcane to the refinery. Though 
the three parties that participate are legally defined as equal, the refinery 
representatives have qualitatively more possibilities to slant in their favour 
the decision-making in the committee meetings. They are bureaucrats who 
control a large budget that is partly expended on credit for the sugarcane 
production, i.e. they hold the purse-strings. The quantity of cane producers 
is their strength. In addition, cane growers provide the main raw material 
without which the refinery can not operate. The mutuality and 
interdependence in production is what is most evident in the committee 
meetings. One can see this in the ways they communicate with each other 
and in the routines they develop to address and handle different topics inside 
and outside the meetings. Through all these exchanges they create what, 
Goffman, (1984) describes as an 'interactional modus vivendi'.3* Goffman's 
concept conveys the diversity of the social agents involved in the committee 
meetings, each with their distinct approaches to common production issues. 
Lopez Portillo's presidential Decree of 1979 revoked previous 
agreements between the State and the sugarcane producers and established 
new rules. Among these new conditions the creation of the committee 
meetings underlined the changes in the power relations between the state and 
the nationally organized producers. Under the new arrangement the industrial 
representatives i.e. the manager and the head of the extension department 
should meet regularly with the representatives of the sugarcane producers 
from both associations. The meetings should be held every week during the 
harvesting season and twice a month or when necessary any other time. The 
committee's agreements should be endorsed by each and every one of the 
members of the committee. The committee is entided to decide the 
programmes for organizing the harvesting, planting and transporting of 
sugarcane. The tariffs and payments for the different services to produce and 
transport the sugarcane are also calculated and approved by the members of 
the committee, which had to be updated every so often under the endemic 
conditions of a high inflation rate that the Mexican economy has suffered 
during the last decade.4' These tariffs were a constant point of dispute 
between the refinery and producers' representatives. The expenses of running 
the committee of sugarcane production are covered by the sugar mill and the 
producers. The former pays half of the total expenses and the producers' 
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Taking off 
Following the 1979 decree, the sugar production committee in the refinery 
Melchor Ocampo was legally constituted at the beginning of 1980, as in most 
sugar factories in Mexico; but it only started to function properly in the 
Autumn of 1982. The operation of die committee varies from one sugar 
refinery to the other and reflects the state of the negotiations and power 
relations between the factory administration and the sugarcane producers' 
representatives, which is by no means always in favour of the administration, 
as has often been argued in the studies on sugarcane producers.* In the case 
of the committee in the refinery Melchor Ocampo, decision-making was 
decided by both the two main antagonistic sections of the committee: the 
sugar mill administration and the sugarcane producers. The members of each 
of the two sides do not always close ranks because of a constant 
recomposition of alliances adjusting to the diverse and shifting interests of 
the social agents and their affiliation to one of the two cane growers' 
associations. In some issues one association has sided with the administration 
against the other. 
Limón was still the superintendent of the extension department in 
Melchor Ocampo when the committee was formed; he even played a 
protagonist's role in the beginning. Fernando Navarro Cárdenas, the 
manager of the factory at the time, was a friendly person whose several 
businesses in other regions of Mexico kept him away from Autíán very 
often; he found it very convenient to delegate a good deal of the decisions to 
Limón, who knew the region and its sugarcane producers very well. Limón 
had been involved in the creation of the independent association of sugarcane 
producers among the landowners in the valley. IMO's sugarcane production 
committee was finally formed in October, 1982. The founding members 
included Fernando Navarro, manager of the factory with Limón as his 
deputy; Ramón Gordillo, president of the CNC with Jacinto Rojo as his 
deputy; and Francisco Sánchez Ruy, president of CNPP with Ismael Encino 
as his deputy. The committee composition has changed several times, each 
time a new manager or superintendent was appointed or when new 
representatives were elected in either of the two associations. 
The leaders of the newly formed CNPP had very good relations with 
Limón, acknowledged Limón's involvement in the creation of their 
representatives distribute the other half among their members according to 
tonnage produced.5* 
216 Chapter 7 
independent association and followed his suggestions in the committee meetings. The representatives of the CNC association were ejidatarios in the process of learning the intricacies of bureaucratic dealings. They accepted trustingly Limdn's initiative in the committee, who tended to make most of the decisions. CNC and CNPP representatives have remarked that they did not know very well how to phrase their demands and have them fulfilled in the early committee meetings. But they have since acquired the ability to deal successfully with the other members of the committee in order to snatch what they need from the sugar mill's administration (see table 3). 
Table 3: 
REPEENTATTVES AND DEPUTIES OF THE CONSTITUENT 
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE MECHOR OCAMPO SUGARCANE COMMITEE 
Year Refínery CNC CNPP *** 
1982 Fermín González 
Gabriel Limón * 
Ramón Gordillo ** 
Jacinto Rojo ** 
Feo.J. Sánchez R.** 
Arturo Sánchez Ruy 
1983 Armando Osuna 
Gabriel Limón * 
Ramón Gordillo ** 
Jacinto Rojo ** 
Fco.J.Sanchez R. 
Arturo Sánchez Ruy 
1984 Armando Osuna 
Gabriel Limón * 
Max. Castillo A. 
Jacinto Rojo ** 
Fco.J.Sanchez R. 
Arturo Sánchez Ruy 
1985 Armando Osuna 
1. Balt. Blanco 
2. Pedro Negrete 
Max. Castillo A. 
Jacinto Rojo ** 
Arturo Sánchez Ruy 
Juan Ruiz Corona 
1986 Armando Osuna 
Pedro Negrete 
Max. Castillo A. 
Humberto Reisling 
Arturo Sánchez Ruy 
Juan Ruiz Corona 
1987 Armando Osuna 
Pedro Negrete 
Max. Castillo A. 
Humberto Reisling 
Armando Castro 
Juan Ruiz Corona 
Gabriel Limon is one of the protagonists in the strike, see Chapter 1. 
These are Ejitatarios from escondido. 
All the leaders of die CNPP have been sugarcane producers from El Grullo. 
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Ramón Gordillo from Ejido Escondido was the CNC's president when 
the committee was formed. He admitted that he would usually follow 
Limón's recommendations in the committee meetings. In the early days of 
the committee, the extension department continued to be in charge of the 
organization of the planting and cutting. Ramón was at the end of his term as 
president when Osuna, the new manager, arrived in Autíán; a few months 
later Osuna began re-organizing IMO administration. According to other 
CNC members, their leader Ramón was overwhelmed by the challenge of 
taking over the organization of production in the plots; he could not keep up 
with Osuna's pace. Therefore when his term ended, the CNC members 
decided to look for a new candidate to replace him. Paradoxically, Limón 
was among those who suggested the name of Maximino as a good candidate 
for the leadership of the CNC. As mentioned in Chapter 6, he was elected 
by a small majority; but in a very short time he managed to gain the support 
of the majority and seize control of the association; which was bolstered by 
the part he played in Limón's dismissal. 
The CNPP handing over the leadership was initially a family affair; 
Arturo Sanchez Ruy's father handed over the presidency to him in 1985 and 
he remained in office until the end of 1987, when Armando Castro was 
elected as the new CNPP's president. The election of the new CNPP's 
president did not change the compositon of the committee of production. 
Thus Arturo who had been representing his father in the meetings regularly 
and his election, merely legitimized his de facto participation. Arturo was a 
good and aggresive negotiator. He did not feel as overwhelmed by the task 
as Ramón did but he became tired and fed up at the end of his ter. He 
wanted to spend more time on his own businesses and take a rest from the 
intensive politicking involved in the committee. Armando, the new CNPP 
president, has a more subde style but he too is a business man; like Arturo, 
he also claims not to be interested in politics but in helping to run efficientiy 
the CNPP. 
Navarro Cárdenas, the IMO manager when the first committee of 
sugarcane production was convened, was replaced by Osuna Gómez after die 
national government changed. The new manager, as described in previous 
chapters, was a very energetic state employee who had worked for a long 
time with private companies before he was appointed to the national 
headquarters in charge of the state-owned refineries. In that post, Osuna 
worked as head of the office that authorized the loans and credits to the state-
owned refineries. He had a broad vision of how different refineries were 
administered in different regions of Mexico and was very critical of the ways 
they were being run by most of the managers. 
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Osuna came to the IMO with the aim of reorganizing the sugar mill, 
which he accomplished in no time at all. Limdn was the first of the old 
employees who suffered the impact of the new administrative policies which 
were bound to curtail the leverage he had acquired over the years. Osuna 
must have realized the constraints that a strong local employee could put on 
his highly centralized style of management and started to plot how to get rid 
of him. His next stept was to approach the sugarcane producers 
representatives' asking for their support to remove Limon from his position 
as head of the extension department. CNPP representatives claim that they 
told Osuna that they did not have any complaints against Limdn and they did 
not forsee any advantage in supporting Osuna's decision to replace Limdn, 
somebody they knew and trusted regardless of his faults, by somebody else 
who was an unknown entity. 'Better the devil you know' is how he put it. 
CNPP representatives refused to support Osunas's plan to oust Limon. 
Osuna's plan was better received by CNC representatives. Maximino Castillo 
was newly elected as president with the covert support of Limon, in spite of 
the fact that Maximino had been linked to a local political group different to 
that which Limon belonged to. However, Maximino turned out to be a 
skilful political manipulator. He realized that supporting the manager's 
efforts to replace Limon in the extension department would be advantegeous 
for him, making Osuna beholden to him. 
A year after Osuna's arrival at Melchor Ocampo, Maximino made his 
first public attack on Limdn accusing him in the committee meeting of 
having abused his authority as head of the extension department. Osuna 
pretended to be surprised and immediately ordered an investigation, before 
the begirming of the harvesting season 1984-85. Limdn's dismissal was 
hastened by Maximio's appeals to the national director. At the end of 
November 1984, Osuna dismissed Limdn without giving him any 
compensation. In the second committee meeting of 1985, Osuna introduced 
to the committee the new superintendent of the extension department, 
Baltazar Blanco, who would participate as the manager's deputy in the 
following meetings. However, Blanco's appointment as head of the extension 
department was effective for only a couple of months. As I have explained in 
the previous chapter, Osuna had to ask Blanco to hand over his post to Pedro 
Negrete Borrego, who had been sent to replace Limdn by somebody very 
high up in the headquarters of the parastatal Azucar, S.A. Osuna had no 
choice but to accept the appointment. However, he created the position of 
head of the technical section of the extension department which came to be 
occupied by Baltazar Blanco and he continued to attend the committee 
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Committee's Modus Operandi 
Regardless of managerial or political changes, the committee of sugarcane 
production in the refinery Melchor Ocampo remains constituted by three sets 
of members: the representatives of CNC and CNPP and the sugar mill's 
adminstration. The committee meetings are attended by the constituent 
members, the committee's secretary plus some other observers like Blanco, 
members of each sugarcane producers' association, and when necessary, 
other employees of the sugar mill, who only intervene in the discussion when 
they are asked to. (Their interventions are not recorded in the committee's 
minutes, though sometimes they bring up important points of discussion 
which are taken up by some of the legal members of the committee being 
thenceforth included in the committee's agreements). The committee seems 
to have a flexible attitude towards attendance and allowed me to observe 
them during the productive cycle 1987-88. 
The representatives of both sugar producers associations are outspoken 
and they argue their case forcefully; most of the time they put forward 
similar demands joining forces against the refinery administration. But there 
have been cases when the interests of sugarcane producers belonging to 
different associations clash and each side has to try to woo the manager, who 
would use the opportunity to play the interests of one association against the 
other. Regardless of their differences they have to reach an agreement in a 
short period of time -i.e. within the time span of the sugar cycle. The 
committee members have to discuss and approve the programmes of 
planting, cutting and transporting the cane, which would be implemented by 
the farmers in coordination with their associations and the supervision from 
the extension department. The committee's agreements rule the different 
activities and they are usually followed by all the producers. 
The CNC leader has expressed his disappointment with the fact that 
even though they represent 70 % of sugarcane producers, their vote in the 
committee is equivalent to the CNPP's, which only accounts for the 30%. 
Osuna reckons that Maximino's leadership of the largest organization could 
create more problems than the CNPP's president. Thus he has negotiated 
some concessions with Maximino behind the back of the CNPP leaders. As 
far as I could see, Osuna juggles with short-term financial resources, e.g. the 
soft loans to cover the running cost of the associations and discretionary 
meetings even though Negrete became the manager's deputy and was the one 
that signed the agreements. 
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personal loans to individual sugarcane producers. It seems that both leaders are content with their particular arrangements. 
The Setting of Committee Meetings 
The meetings take place weekly in the refinery's offices at the side of the factory. The building is spacious but badly designed. The spatial distribution is somewhat eccentric; in some rooms three secretaries have been squeezed in, while large spaces lay empty between crowded rooms. The committee meetings are supposed to be held in the conference room at the side of the manager's office, which is invariably referred to as the meeting place in the minutes and agreements, even though this is not always so. The conference room is a rectangular large room, its walls covered with warped and splintered wood. The thick, jaded curtains hang lopsidedly from their rails, covered with a film of sticky black sugarcane ashes, accumulated over the years adding a special touch to the derelict atmosphere of the place. The surface of the long table in the middle has been stamped indelibly all over with the faded rings of wet glasses and cups. There are eight chairs scattered around the long oval-shaped table; in some ocasion the CNC representatives have lent the admimstration some extra chairs from the ones they have in their assembly room. The air-conditioner works well but makes a lot of noise, so they have the choice of sweating their way through the discussion or interrupt each other constantly to repeat what they say. Most of the time, they compromise and switch the machine on-and-off, and in some occasions they hold the meetings in the manager's office where the air-conditioner quietly cools down the atmosphere. 
The decaying look of the offices matches that of the refinery and the orchards. Osuna claims that they are not making enough profit to spend on improving the premises. It is the manager who suggests that they hold the meetings in his office. Osuna sits behind his desk and the other members take a seat in a sofa and two armchairs placed in front of the desk. This set-up could only accommodate the six officers of the committe, leaving the secretary and other observers to fetch chairs from the conference room. If somebody arrives late, they knock on the door, come in, look around for an empty place and if there is none, they go and bring one in. Some chairs are moved back against the wall to squeeze more in. 
While the "musical chairs' goes on, Osuna continues signing one document after another from the awe-inspiring fortresses of paper piled upon his desk. Though Osuna's invitation to his office might appear to be made 
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for reasons of the comfort and convenience of all, Osuna knows the 
advantage of holding the meetings on his territory. Sometimes in the middle 
of a discusión Osuna pretends he is concentrating on signing papers but he 
intervenes straight away if somebody raised a point that concerns the 
management of the refinery. Osuna surely gives his secretary precise 
instructions about which telephone calls he would receive when he is 
participating in the committee meetings. The calls which he answers are 
always from important people in the regional administrative offices in 
Guadalajara or from the national headquarters of Azúcar, S.A. in Mexico 
City.75 During one of those telephone calls Osuna made an appointment to 
have lunch with the person in charge of the credit department; on another, he 
invited the regional manager to come and visit the Melchor Ocampo 
Refinery. Osuna commented to the other members of the committee what a 
close friend he is to some of those characters at the other end of the line who 
hold powerful positions in the national bureaucracy, sometimes dressing up 
his remarks with colourful details of their friendship and even dropping hints 
about his knowledge of their private life, usually with sexual innuendos. The 
loud conversations Osuna carries on by phone in the middle of the meetings 
are always spiced with his comments about his political ascendancy in the 
national headquarters of Azúcar, S.A. He does seem to impress some of the 
committee's members, though they lose their impact as they get to know him 
better. 
Vera Lopez, the committee's secretary sends a reminder to the 
committee members with the exact time and sometimes mentioning the main 
points to be discussed. The representatives usually arrive on time announcing 
their arrival to Osuna's secretary and waiting to be asked to enter his office 
or to walk with Osuna towards the conference room. The first minutes are 
full of gossip while those present wait for those who are late. After five to 
fifteen minutes somebody asks for the meeting to begin. Vera hands around 
copies of the previous meeting's minutes. With the agreement of all, the six 
officers sign it. They invariably do so in the meetings I attended which is not 
surprising because Vera only writes down in those documents what has been 
agreed and accepted unanimously, leaving the long and some times 
acrimonious discussions out of them. 
The first striking difference between the two associations in terms of 
their participation at the committee's meetings is the finicky concern the 
CNPP's representatives have about every penny that is involved and the 
almost blaze attitute of the CNC's leaders about it. It is not surprising than 
the sugarcane producers affiliated to the CNPP pay slightly lower 
administrative expenses that the CNC's members, though Maximino denies it 
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blatantly each time he is asked about it. Thus the CNPP's members demand an open and clear account of what their leaders are deciding on their behalf and expect them to provide the best value for money; whereas the majority of the sugarcane producers affiliated to the CNC do not dispute their leaders' decisions and accept most of the agreements they establish in the committee meetings. CNC leaders, more than CNPP leaders, like to flex their political muscle against the refinery's administration, as will be seen in the next section. 
As I discussed in Chapter 6, small sugarcane producers have different interests to the larger ones. The way each producer pursues them is reflected in their political leanings and choice of producers association. Whereas small ejido producers affiliated to the CNC accept their leaders decisions, the large producers who are CNPP members demand explanations of every decision their leaders take on their behalf. Middle and large landowners perceive the CNPP association as service provider. In contrast with small producers who look up to the CNC association as their political shield against both large owners and government bureaucrats. The interface of these varied interests is illustrated by the interactions of the different actors involved in the committee meetings which I describe in the following section. 
Negotiation about the Canes Being Swept Away 
In this section I describe the dynamics of negotiations and confrontations among the three parties, based on a selection of the dialogues that took place in the committee meetings. I will follow one dispute through several meetings and pass over most of the regular points of the agenda that include: deterrnining die harvesting schedule; budgeting for the hiring of die sugarcane cutters together with their salaries and lodging and calculating the total costs of cutting and transporting cane to the factory, based on the tonnes cut. The topic I have chosen, among the more routine items in the committee, refers to the decision about how much would be paid and by whom to the sugarcane producers who lost their crop when the river flooded their plots. The negotiations around the payment of the cane swept away by the river highlight several important points on the organization of sugarcane production and summarize the relations between the key agents of sugarcane production. The 1979 decree, specifies that if the sugarcane sponsored by the refinery is damaged by natural disasters their estimated losses, deducting the cost of harvesting, should be compensated at 66% of their value. This 66% 
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compensation should be provided equally by the mass of sugarcane producers 
and the refinery. Thus the sugarcane producers who lost their cane during 
the flood in 1987 in the valley of Autlah-El Grullo were entitled by the 
decree to receive a compensation of 66% of the estimated value of their 
canes. However, there was disagreement among some producers and the 
refinery's administrator. Some producers held the view that cane grown on 
the bank of the river produce high yields but with very little saccharose 
content, whereas most of the plots in the rest of the valley produce lower 
yields but with a higher content of saccharose. Because the cane price in the 
region is based on the average level of saccharose obatain every harvest, the 
producers in the lowlands, when their canes are not flooded by the river, 
have natural advantages over the rest of the producers that give them extra 
profit. This fact is resented by the rest of the producers who considered it an 
unfair advantage. 
The manager's chief concern was cutting the cost of production as much 
as possible. In this occasion it happened that the majority of the sugarcane 
producers who had lost their cane in the flood were members of the CNC 
and Maximino had promised them in the general assembly that he would 
fight for their compensation. The losses among the sugarcane producers 
affiliated to CNPP were negligible. So, on the one hand the manager and the 
CNPP representatives wanted to negotiate to pay as little as possible of the 
prescribed 66% of losses and on the other the CNC representatives 
demanded the payment of the total amount, even though their other members 
would have paid their share of it. 
Although the 66% compensation is specified in the 1979 Decree, in fact 
it is always contested and quite often, like many other articles in the decree, 
overruled. These historical particularities leave the situation wide open for 
negotiation by all the contenders. In the description of the committee 
meetings, these manoeuvres come to life exposing the shifting alliances 
among the three parties in pursuit of their interests. 
In the first of the three committee meetings where the case of the 
damaged cane was discussed, Maximino placed the issue squarely before the 
meeting explaining that 154 of the 177 hectares flooded belong to CNC 
members. Thus he had to protect his members interests and pleaded with the 
committee members to go ahead with the stipulated compensation they were 
entitled to. Osuna immediately quibbled with Maximino's petition and went 
through all kinds of financial reasons as to why they should not go by the 
book. After an intense discussion, they agreed to think it over, estimate the 
amount of the losses and delay their decision until the next committee 
meeting. They moved on to other issues and ended the meeting. 
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In the second meeting Baltazar Blanco, the technical advisor of the 
extension department, gave an estimate of the total cost of the losses. As 
before, Maximino, stated the legal position that two thirds of the losses 
should be split equally between the refinery and the cane growers. Osuna 
pointed out the difficulty of convincing the majority of cane growers that 
they should accept a deduction from their profits to compensate the growers 
who had been struck by the flood, although he admitted this is what the law 
requires. Arturo Castro, the CNPP leader, suggested that they split the 
possible agreement into two: an immediate and a long-term one. As an 
interim measure Osuna conceded that interests would not be charged on the 
loans of the flooded canes, which was accepted. But Maximino added a 
demand for those with emergency credit on behalf of his affected members. 
Osuna neither agreed nor disagreed and, leaving the answer in the air, he 
quickly moved the meeting to other business before closing the proceedings 
in a rush. 
During the weekend Maximino did not remain idle. He consulted the 
CNC legal advisor in the national headquarters in Mexico City and 
committed himself at the monthly assembly that he would defend the interests 
of the CNC members whose cane had been swept away by the flood. 
In the third meeting matters reached a head. From the very beginning it 
was obvious that Maximino was about to seize the initiative. He brought 
along Oliver, a legal adviser from the CNC headquarters. This time, Osuna 
suggested that the meeting be held in the conference room and was very 
courteous to the visiting lawyer. Osuna asked Negrete, the head of the 
extension department, to announce the total cost of the losses of 187.55 
hectares flooded. This, with interests, amounted to 114 million pesos. 
Maximino intervened straight away recommending that the affected growers 
bear 50% of the cost, instead of the stipulated 33.33%, and the rest be 
covered by the refinery and the mass of growers. Osuna commented that 
whatever they decided should take into consideration that floods have become 
endemic to die region and they would need to make provisions for future 
accidents. Juan Ruiz, from the CNPP, proposed that the victims of the 
accident only be given credit to replant cane without the insurance against 
floods. Osuna repeated emphatically that if the refinery gave them credit they 
would not be covered against floods. 
Once again the financial and legal implications were discussed in more 
detail with actual figures on this occasion and with the additional 
participation of Oliver. Osuna justified his reluctance to pay arguing that they 
had covered similar losses two years in a row which had made the cane on 
the bank of the river too expensive and thus should not be granted credit. 
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Juan Ruiz insisted that they should find an immediate solution to the flooded 
cane and an agreement for future floods. Maximino, having calculated the 
odds against him, repeated his earlier solution of charging 50% of the costs 
to the growers with flooded canes. Finally, this suggestion was the basis for 
the final agreement reached among all the committee members about the 
division of loss-bearing responsibility. But its implementation, raised further 
financial complications, specifically, who should cover the interests and extra 
costs that me replanting would imply. 
Some explanation is needed here. Although there has been rather limited 
scope for interpreting the allocation of financial responsibility for the loss of 
damaged cane, the law does not specify precisely how the cane should be 
replaced, and who should shoulder the costs of the interests accruing to 
loans for the replacement. This is particularly important when, as with the 
case of the IMO, the whole aim of Osuna's management was to run the mill 
efficiendy cutting the costs to the minimum. This meant that he loathed 
advancing any unnecessary funds. Such reluctance was evident in the 
discussion about who would cover the cane replacement. Oliver proposed 
that the refinery should bear all the extra costs. Osuna characteristically, 
complained bitterly, but a solution was eventually found, wherein the issue 
of interests was referred to the national bank. Eventually the bank decided 
that the refinery should pay. 
The final agreement reached was a neat solution to a conflictive issue. 
The victims of the flood were entitled by law to receive a compensation of 
two-thirds of their losses. However, they were considered by most cane 
growers to have a relatively privileged position under normal circumstances 
because their crop yields them higher profit than the growers with cane away 
from the river bank. Thus most cane growers supported Osuna finacial 
reluctance to keep covering the losses of the cane near the river. Maximino 
was in a tricky situation: on the one hand he had to protect the growers who 
had damaged cane, and on the other hand he agreed with the majority of the 
growers that they should stop doing it. Finally all the parties involved 
relinquished some of their claims and reached a compromise: the cane 
growers with flooded cane would receive for the last time 50% compensation 
and they would be entirely responsible for any future accident to the cane 
planted on the bank of the river. 
At the end of the meeting, Osuna talked to Oliver and shook hands with 
him. Osuna extended an invitation to Oliver to come and visit them more 
frequentiy. Maximino walked back with him to the CNC offices and that was 
the end of that round of negotiations. Osuna had to agree to pay to the 
sugarcane producers 25% of their losses, which was 8% less than the 
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percentage specified by the 1979 Decree. The question concerning 
suspending interests on the loans of affected plots was sent to the tribune of 
conciliation and it was resolved in favour of the sugarcane producers some 
months later. 
The negotiations I have presented were mainly conducted between the 
CNC's representatives and the refinery's manager, who played the main 
roles, with the CNPP's representatives performing a minor but strategic role. 
The 1979 Decree stipulates that producers who lose their sugarcane by 
natural causes should be reimbursed to the tune of 66% of the estimated 
value of the cane lost (after the refinery and the association had discounted 
credit owed by the producers). The refinery provides 33%, and all the 
sugarcane producers, the other 33%. However, there was a catch on the case 
of the the sugarcane planted on the bank of the river in Audah. This crop has 
a high water content but a low saccharose content, whereas the sugarcane 
planted on higher plots, which is the majority, have less water but more 
saccharose. Since producers are paid by the tonne and water represents extra 
weight, sugarcane producers feel that they are effectively subsidising the few 
who produce cane on the bank of the river. 
On this occasion, most canes flooded belonged to CNC's members, 
though they are not the only ones who plant cane on the river banks. The 
CNPP has a little cane on the river banks and its members have been 
complaining for two years in succession that they have had to compensate 
those producers who had been receiving more than their fair share of profits 
in good years and when they are not flooded. Therefore, they wanted to 
discuss the issue and make some special arrangments for such future 
eventualities, though they were willing to pay on that last occasion. The 
manager is mainly concerned about cutting costs, but he knows he must tread 
carefully. The CNC wants the committee to follow the decree, which would 
imply that most of its own members would have to contribute their share. 
Maximino did not worry about these extra costs as A. Castro certainly did. 
Thus Maximino wants to pin down the committee to compensate his 
supporters. A. Castro is willing to pay this time, but he wants to lay out a 
new agreement to deal with future floods along the bank of the river. Osuna 
would like not to pay at all. 
The outcome of the negotiations was satisfactory for all parties 
concerned: on this occasion, for the last time, the commitee's members 
would pay compensation to the producers whose cane was flooded. But they 
would receive only 50% instead of the 66% stipulated in the decree. Finally 
after several discusions, it was agreed that in the future the planting of cane 
on the banks of the river was the total responsability of the producer who 
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Conclusion 
The managerial and organizational styles displayed by IMO administrators 
reflect their the uncertainty in their job career. Each of them has to develop 
their professional survival kit which includes extensive networking within the 
parastatal institution in charge of the state-own refineries. Their relations 
with the local political groups and organizations, including the producers 
associations, provided the opportunities to improve their economic means, 
e.g. Limon's offer to Osuna and the ivolvement of Blanco with the avocado 
producers in Michoacan. However, their career improvements depend more 
on wheeling and dealing at the national level in the parastatal intitution. This 
shielded them from the producers' barrage and provides them with elbow-
room to deal with their demands. 
Sugarcane producers and their leaders have developed different styles 
for dealing with the refinery administration. The CNPP leaders support the 
manager in his cost-cutting policies but are very critical of his attempts to 
increase the price of the financial services which the refinery provides. The 
majority of CNPP members scrutinises their statements and demands from its 
leaders an explanation of each item for which they have been charged by the 
refinery. This attitude puts pressure of the CNPP leaders who concentrate 
their concern on economic issues. This contrasts with the CNC leaders' 
concerns which are less specifically economic. 
The majority of CNC members are small producers but they grow two-
thirds of the sugarcane ground in the IMO, thus their leaders represent the 
majority of sugarcane producers in the region and this gives them some 
leverage to deal with the refinery adminstration. However, CNC leaders 
have a more politically oriented agenda, specially Maximino, who sees his 
leadership as a stepping-stone to other public posts e.g. the national 
leadership of sugarcane producers. Within this long-term and wider scope of 
interest CNC leaders juggle their political interests and the producers' to 
negotiate with the refinery. Most CNC members do not check their 
would not expect any compensation if they are ever flooded again. This 
outcome reflects the even balance of power of the leaders of the two 
associations and the refinery administrator. The refinery stands in an 
advantageous position in the negotiations through its control of financial 
support to grow sugarcane but the producers' associations grow the main raw 
material without which the refinery would stand still. Thus all the parties 
involved depend on each other and are compelled to hasten a solution. 
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statements carefully, as long as they receive some profit. This attitude gives the CNC leaders discretionary power which they have used skilfully, especially Maximino, who has consolidated his control over the CNC and managed to be re-elected twice. His accomplishments illustrate the individual capacity to play the system to his advantage while defending small producers' interests. 
The interface of the three parties involved in the committee of sugarcane production provide evidence of the interaction of social actors' different interests and how they deal with the institutional structures and manage to intertwine them with their individual expectations. As I Have described in this chapter, the different styles and strategies which these social actors display are part of their concrétisation of their interests and expectations within the social arena of sugarcane production. 
NOTES 
1. For a detailed discussion of the legitimte and non-legitimate practices see 
Schaffer, 1986. 
2. Jessop 1990: 110-143, describes the political implications of die corporative 
organization of different productive groups. Leal 1986, discusses how the 
Mexican State has consolidated its power through corporatism, which, 
according to Paré 1990, is suffering serious blows by the newly formed 
political alliances and peasant movements in Mexico. 
3. Goffman in "The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life' p . 2 1 , describes 
'interaction modus vivendi' as follows: "Together the participants contribute to 
a single overall definition of the situation which involves not so much a real 
agreement as to what exists but rather a real agreement as to whose claims 
concerning what issues will be temporarily honoured." 
4 . The annual rate of inflation with base 1980 in Mexico increased from 28.5% in 
1981 to 148.4 in 1987. See Ten Kate 1992. 
5. The articles mat regulate the committee meetings are described in die Decree of 
28th of December in which the planting and harvesting of sugar cane is 
declared of public interest. 
6. See Pare, 1979 and Pare et al, 1988. 
7 . Azúcar, S.A. is the government institution in charge of administering all the 
sugar mills owned by the Mexican State. It has its headquarters in Mexico City 
and below this, several regional officies in key sugar cane areas. 
CONCLUSION 
The strike of CNC sugarcane producers and the immediate response by the 
refinery administration neatly sums up the ongoing political negotiations 
between the main actors involved in the organization of sugarcane production 
in the Valley of Audah-El Grullo. In Chapter I, I introduced the protagonists 
of sugarcane production participating in the strike which I characterized as a 
social drama of confrontation and negotiation. In Chapters II, III and TV, I 
described the historical conditions in which ejidatarios and landowners made 
the decision to grow sugarcane. These social actors manifested a wide range 
of skills and an acute understanding of social institutions. This held true for 
all producers from the smallest to the largest. Hence they were actively 
involved in promoting their own interests and improving their circumstances, 
which clearly defies the images of powerless reactive peasants and farmers 
that abound in the literature on Mexico (see Pare" 1979 and Ronfeldt 1975). 
The individual accounts of sugarcane producers contained not just 
empirical information on day-to-day life at local level, but disclosed data on 
the broader social structures, at local and national level, underpinning their 
decision-making. It was clear that they were well aware of the range of 
economic choices available and tailored their expectations accordingly. The 
assets owned by each individual, or the lack of them, set the parameters for 
their decision-making. Ejidatarios and landowning cane growers, as I 
described in the early chapters, had different interests and responded 
differently to the refinery's encouragement to plant sugarcane. The diversity 
of social conditions in which each producer decided to grow cane could not 
have been determined without the close observation that an actor-oriented 
approach encourages. The decision-making and actions of each individual are 
influenced by the larger economic and political forces (though they cannot be 
reduced to such externalities). This is typified in the way that Eduardo Lara, 
who was influenced by the national policy of providing credit for sugarcane, 
decided then, to grow this crop in spite of his preference for staples and 
horticultural crops. But, equally, individual actions can influence wider social 
currents. A striking example of this is the case of Jacinto Rosas, an 
ejidatario who was instrumental not only in bringing the mill to the region 
but in encouraging other peasants to plant sugarcane. Curiously he himself 
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did not plant any cane until the new crop had proved its comparative 
benefits! 
It is necessary then to intertwine local data with an interpretation of the 
wider forces impinging on them and thus achieve a better understanding of 
the processes studied. Chapter VII provides the most striking panorama on 
this intertwining of levels, in the study of decision-making in the committee. 
It is clear that the different styles and strategies which the social actors 
display in the committee's meetings are part of their concrétisation of their 
interests and expectations within the political organization of sugarcane 
production. A specific example of this is the negotiation of the flooded canes 
by the sugarcane production committee. In this case the CNPP 
representatives had to support the CNC against the refinery in spite of the 
fact that none of their members had been affected by flooding. 
The opening of the refinery in the valley coincided with a series of crop 
failures which threatened the precarious economic conditions that most 
ejidatarios endured. As I have described in this thesis, the local producers 
themselves were involved in bringing the sugar mill to the region. Unlike the 
wealthier farmers, they did not have any extra resources to fall back on. In 
these economic conditions, the refinery's offer of cheap credit to grow cane, 
and to level and drain their land was a proposition difficult to reject. 
Ejidatarios and private landowners in Autlâh-El Grullo decided to grow 
sugarcane after considering the available alternatives. This differs from the 
conditions predominant in the regions where sugarcane has been a long-
standing crop, such as in Morelos and Veracruz. In such regions, landowners 
owned the mill and the cane was cultivated by farm workers whose status 
was even lower than that of the workers in the mill. In colonial times, in 
some old sugar mills, African slaves worked in the mill and local Indian 
peons cultivated the cane. In the post-revolutionary period, when the 
Mexican government carried through an agrarian reform and redistributed 
land, the mill owners lost the ownership of the land surrounding the mill, 
which was turned into ejidal land and assigned to individual heads of 
families. In order to oblige the new landholders to continue growing cane, 
the government decreed that the land surrounding a sugar mill become a cane 
supply zone. Conditions for sugarcane growers in these areas did not 
however improve, as shown in most studies of sugarcane growers in Mexico 
(see Chapter II). Yet, these conditions could not be more different to those 
faced by the peasants and farmers in the Autlah-El Grullo Valley as 
recounted by the sugarcane growers in this study. 
The organization of sugarcane production anywhere demands that the 
raw material be produced as near to the mill as possible and its supply 
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carefully coordinated with the industrial capacity available to process it 
(Mintz 1986: 48-61). All parties involved in sugarcane production need to 
follow a tight schedule, which might appear to limit cane growers' leeway 
for decision-making. But although the refinery administration tries to apply 
general rules of good practice for growing cane and to monitor what farmers 
do, this amounts to no more than a normative prescription. In fact, cane 
growers are entirely responsible for their crop and they usually make flexible 
use of the credit provided by the refinery to suit their specific needs. They 
have also found that cane needs less attention than other crops and, with the 
help of modern machinery, growers are left with time to develop other 
activities, the importance of which I stressed in Chapters III-V. 
Ejidatarios and landowning sugarcane growers in Autlah-El Grullo, who 
freely choose to grow cane, present a different scenario to those described in 
other studies on Mexican sugarcane growers. Summarising the varied 
accounts of how and when Autlah-El Grullo farmers decided to grow cane, 
we detected two main types of sugarcane growers: the small ejidatarios and 
medium to large growers. Most of the former were pioneers of cane 
production in the valley, who were followed by the bulk of the latter, once 
the crop had proved to be profitable. According to the individual 
circumstances of each producer, activities essential to cane production are 
complemented by other activities. All sugarcane producers have managed to 
accommodate sugarcane growing to their other economic activities. In the 
case of the wealthier growers, they have invested in machinery to cultivate 
and transport their and other growers' cane; whereas the small growers have 
been able to migrate seasonally, mainly to the USA, as migrant labourers. 
Furthermore individuals in both groups have launched themselves into 
political-administrative careers in the two associations of sugarcane growers, 
which has benefited them well, economically and politically. 
The associations of sugarcane growers are incorporated into the PRI, 
which has been in power for more than sixty years. As the government 
party, the PRI has consolidated a corporatist style of government where 
different social groups have been integrated into its structure. As the 
dominant party, the PRI has provided a stable political arena where different 
interest groups are supposedly able to discuss and resolve their varied 
agendas (Cornelius and Craig 1988). This corporatist structure has integrated 
ejidatarios and private landowners through two different organizations: the 
CNC and the CNPP, each one belonging to different sectors within the 
party. Whereas the CNC is part of the peasant sector, the CNPP belongs to 
the so-called "popular" sector, which gathers together small merchants, 
businessmen, government employees and private landowners. 
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In the first years of the sugar mill in the valley, there was only one 
association of sugarcane growers which was affiliated to the CNC and 
included all the producers, ejidatarios and private landowners. The first 
leaders of the association had been involved in the running of the local 
branch of the PRI and were instrumental in attracting the refinery into the 
area. As I mentioned above, at the beginning most cane growers were 
ejidatarios, but after a few years, when sugarcane had been established as a 
profitable crop, the wealthier landowners began growing it on their land. 
They mucked in with the ejidatarios in the same association, though they 
insist they only did so because there was no other alternative. Their sense of 
social superiority pervaded their early involvement in the CNC association. 
Social distance was less emphasised by the ejidatarios than by the private 
landowning growers, who never missed an opportunity to wax lyrically about 
the lack of ambition among ejidatarios and their uncritical acceptance of their 
leaders' decisions, which, they liked to stress, were not always in the 
growers' best interests. Finally, a group of producers succeeded from the 
CNC to form the CNPP. This was led by some of the wealthier cane 
growers, who claimed that their interests were not catered for by an 
association where ejidatarios were the majority. The break-away group 
considered themselves more financially adept and expected more detailed 
accounts from the leader of the association than they were given by the 
president of the CNC organization. 
Over the years, CNPP has attracted the majority of the medium to large 
private landowning growers and more recently even some ejidatarios. The 
organization of their association seems less centralised than the CNC 
organization. The members of the CNPP committee were forthright in their 
opinions, participated more actively than the CNC committee members in 
decision-making, and they kept a closer eye on their association's leaders 
than did the CNC membership. The CNPP is only one-tenth of CNC's size 
but a larger number of their members than those in the CNC owns 
machinery and lorries for carrying the cane to the refinery. Thus CNPP 
members have more of their own resources invested in sugarcane-related 
activities than the great majority of the CNC members. Given that the CNPP 
is not able to make the economies of scale that the CNC can achieve, the 
small savings on administrative costs are thereby particularly significant, as 
they go out of their way to point out. 
Although both cane growers' associations belong to the PRI, each has a 
different attitude towards the party. Most CNC members seem to support the 
regime unconditionally, whereas the CNPP members are more critical of it 
and some even support the right-wing opposition party, the PAN (National 
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Action Party). They claim that they are all for a more efficient administration 
which allows farmers and entrepreneurs to maximise their profits. They 
accuse the ejidatarios of cravenly accepting the CNC leaders' decisions. Up 
to a point this may be true, but it ignores the fact that smaller growers are 
more economically constrained, and therefore can less afford to take risks 
than the larger producers. This leads them to prize consensus and to 
cooperate with the leadership which they see as their protectors. Thus, the 
underlying economic logic is different in each case. Regardless of the 
economic differences and organizational structures, sugarcane growers in 
both organizations consider that their associations deliver a good service, 
though there is still room for improvement. 
In the Valley of Autlâh-El Grullo a group of local farmers and 
ejidatarios successfully lobbied the Mexican Government to attract public 
investment into the region, which arrived in the form a sugar refinery with 
the financial resources to build access roads and improve the conditions of 
the irrigation canals which had been neglected. In Chapter V and VI, I 
detailed how these peasants and farmers brought public investment to the 
region. In the same chapters I also explained how these groups have 
sharpened their capacity to deal with the refinery administration through the 
strengthening of their organizations. In Chapter VII, I closed the circle with 
a description of the process of negotiation between producers and the 
refinery administration over a key aspect of production, which reached an 
agreement satisfactory to all parties involved. This negotiation process 
highlighted the shifting alliances and interests among participants. 
The theoretical-methodological approach to the subjects of this study has 
been essentially a 'bottom-up' actor-oriented approach. Although I would not 
claim to have been a tabula rasa when I started the research I would 
certainly emphasise that this approach allowed me to immerse myself in 
different individual perspectives which, in spite of their contradictions, 
enabled me to grasp better the ethos of the organization of sugarcane 
production in the region. The cases elucidated the complex structuring of 
institutional arrangements. As North (1993) describes the process, as they 
interact individuals follow guides provided by the institutions which shape 
human interaction in historical contexts. These structures provide social 
actors with incentives in the political, social and economic arenas which, in 
turn, bring change to organizational arrangements. Sugarcane producers 
accept institutional constraints in order to diminish the uncertainty of their 
everyday life. Yet their participation in local economic and political 
organizations has repercussions beyond their region. As Gledhill (1994: 124-
125) argues, the study of micro-political processes not only illuminates local 
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situations but also contributes to the understanding of how the these impinge 
on larger political processes. The present analysis adheres to this theoretical 
perspective and has focused on the ways in which these different levels of 
political and economic organization at national and local level are brought 
together by the social actors involved in sugarcane production in Autlah-El 
Grullo region. 
Some of these peasants and farmers participated in the initial 
negotiations to bring the refinery into the valley, others had to be persuaded 
to grow sugarcane. In contrast with sugarcane producers in other regions, the 
ejidatarios' decision to grow sugar was based on the pursuit of their 
individual and family interests. As explained by Long (1977: 141), decision-
making processes should be analyzed together with the social networks of the 
decision-maker, though at the same time due weight must be given to 
changing macro-conditions. Hence in Chapters III and VI I describe how 
these ejidatarios took the decision to grow sugarcane when state-directed 
intervention boosted sugarcane production in their area. The Mexican 
government was trying to secure a steady supply of sugar for the domestic 
market. This policy was precipitated by the severe crisis of sugarcane 
production following the bankruptcies of several private refineries at the end 
of the 1960s (Purcell 1981: 224-225 and Singelmann 1993: 70-71). These 
national conditions provided local peasants and farmers with room for 
manoeuvre. They could join forces with sugarcane producers in other regions 
and push for better terms of production. These producers did not have to 
overturn archaic structures of exploitation as did die sugarcane producers in 
other regions of Mexico (see Ronfeldt 1975). The conditions were propitious 
for the emergence of an organization of production where all parties involved 
could participate fairly equally. However, such favourable conditions 
provided no more than the institutional arena wherein social actors had to 
negotiate and implement the agreed plans for the organization of production. 
In other regions, sugarcane growers were not able to seize as much control 
over production as where the producers in the Valley of Autlah-El Grullo. 
Explanations for the type of productive organization agreed to by 
sugarcane producers and refinery administrators in the valley must be based 
on the specific historical conditions in which these social actors were 
immersed. But the social actors involved not only relied on the prevailing 
social, economic and political institutions but transformed them in the 
process of fulfilling their own needs and aspirations. In the case of the 
ejidatarios and private landowners, they took advantage of integration into 
the official associations which bind them into the corporatist government 
apparatus (see Jessop 1990). 
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At farm level, producers relied on personal interaction with the refinery 
administrators to resolve their everyday farming decisions. But these matters 
are far from straightforward. As I discussed in Chapter VII, these 
admimstrators had not only the farmers' interests to respond to. They had to 
accommodate the producers' demands with their career aspirations which 
depended on other groups. They looked towards the national echelons of 
public administration - their line of command - where they hoped eventually 
to secure a place. So, they had to reconcile three different forces: producers' 
demands, national policies they had to implement, and their career 
aspirations, which was an extremely difficult task. 
However in practice, all parties involved in the organization of 
production seemed to have been able to work out a modus vivendi where they 
reconciled their differences and managed to run the organization of 
production efficiently in the Valley of Autlah-El Grullo. This made the 
Melchor Ocampo refinery one of the most profitable in the country. As was 
manifest in most comments, this was not achieved easily, though the results 
have been worth the effort and provide an example of successful cooperation 
between public administrators and local producers. The skilful negotiations 
of all parties involved demonstrates that the organization of sugarcane 
production in the valley was not run in an authoritarian style by the refinery 
administration. Each party involved took care of their own interests but at 
the same time were willing to work out their differences. Thus they managed 
to establish an efficient working arrangement which most certainly changed 
when the refinery was bought by the CNC organization and after three years 
sold again to a private consortium. The sound financial record and 
impressive level of productivity made this refinery an attractive investment 
when the privatising wave reached the sugar refineries in the late 1980s. 
How this change of ownership has affected the various actors involved in the 
organization of sugarcane production in the valley call for a further 
assessment of this new phase of state-peasant relations. 
Some Policy Implications 
The detailed knowledge of how social actors establish working rules of 
sugarcane production in a specific region highlights the complex negotiations 
and interactions entailed in the process. Using an actor-oriented perspective 
we can see how the sugarcane producers interface with the large forces of 
market and State. In this way, my study exposes the fallacy of condemning 
state intervention as such, without taking into account exactly how state 
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intervention actually occurs, which in the case I discuss includes the 
appropriation of state policy by local producers. Furthermore sugar mills in 
Mexico are a good example of how public funds have not only rescued the 
sugar industry from collapse, but have been the promoters of its expansion, 
such as opening state-owned refineries such as the IMO in the 1970s. 
The advantage of sugar production for the domestic market is based on 
not having to expose producers and consumers to fluctuating international 
prices, thereby reducing the trade deficit. During the last forty years the state 
has been committed to supporting a steady supply of sugar for the fledgling 
food industry that consumes the majority of the domestic sugar output. State 
support has made sugarcane a profitable cash crop and attracted peasants and 
farmers who in some cases planted sugarcane on the land surrounding 
existing sugar refineries, but who, in others, such as those described in this 
thesis, campaigned to persuade the government to open a refinery in their 
region. Sugarcane producers in such new areas have been confronted with 
different obstacles to those faced by producers in long-standing sugarcane-
growing areas, such as Veracruz and Morelos. The recent sugarcane 
growers, unshackled by exploitative sugar plantation systems, have been able 
to develop strong organizations, especially among the middle to large 
producers. The latter have also a higher level of commitment to sugarcane 
production, since they have invested a considerable amount of their own 
resources in it - buying machinery and lorries to load and transport the cane. 
In the recent rush of privatisation, the Mexican Government managed to 
sell-off most refineries, at give-away prices in most cases. The IMO, being 
one of the most efficient was snapped up immediately by the CNC 
organization, later to be resold to a private consortium. 
In this way the wealthier sugarcane producers, who are concentrated in 
the CNPP, have capitalised on the advantages of a profit-oriented refinery 
administration and they have managed to maintain and even increase their 
profits, while the prices of other, until recently profitable, crops have 
slumped. This has been made possible because sugarcane is one of the few 
cash crops that, in spite of the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
still benefits from a guaranteed price, thereby indicating continued state 
involvement. Sugarcane production in Autlah-El Grullo has doubled in the 
last three years, replacing other crops and turning the valley into a mono-
crop producing area. The interdependence of private enterprise and public 
support is reflected in the decisions made by farmers and peasants in the 
region, who have clung to this secure crop against the other more risky 
export crops. State intervention has been instrumental to the profit-making of 
sugarcane producers in Mexico and is one example of how it could buttress 
market forces in spite of NAFTA. 
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ACRONYMS 
ANPCA: Asociación Nacional de Productores de Caña 
CNC: Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant 
Confederation) 
CNIA: Comisión Nacional de la Industria Azucarera 
CNOP: Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares 
CNPP: Confederación Nacional de Pequeños Propietarios 
CTM: Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos 
FIMAIA: Fideicomiso de Maquinaria Agrícola para la Industria 
Azucarera 
FIOSCER: Fideicomiso de Obras Sociales para Cañeros de Escasos 
Recursos 
IMO: Melchor Ocampo refinery 
ONISA: Organización Nacional de la Industria Azucarera 
PEMEX: Petróleos Mexicanos (State-owned oil company) 
PRI: Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
SUMMARY 
The strike of CNC sugarcane producers and the immediate response by the 
refinery administration are a good example of the ongoing political 
negotiations between the main actors involved in the organization of 
sugarcane production in the Valley of Autlâh-El Grullo. I introduced in 
Chapter 1 the protagonists of sugarcane production participating in the social 
drama of confrontation and negotiation. I have described in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 the socio-economic conditions in which local peasants and farmers 
have evolved their decision to grow sugarcane. These social actors disclosed 
a wide range of skills and acute understanding of social institutions. This 
holds true among all producers from the smallest to the largest. The ways in 
which these different actors have got involved in sugarcane production defy 
the images of powerless reactive peasants and farmers that abound in the 
social analyses on Mexico. 
Sugarcane producers in the valley successfully lobbied the Mexican 
Government to attract public investment into the region, which arrived as a 
sugar refinery with the financial resources to build access roads and improve 
the conditions of the irrigation canals which had been neglected. The 
reconstruction of how these peasants and farmers brought to the region 
public investment to build a refinery and how they have developed, with the 
encouragement of the refinery, their own organizations to deal with the 
refinery administration, was covered in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the last 
chapter, I have closed the circle with a description of a negotiation between 
producers and refinery administration which reached a satisfactory agreement 
to all parts involved, this negotiation highlights the shifting alliances and 
interests among participants. 
The methodological approach to the subjects of study was a down-up 
actor-oriented approach. Although I would not claim I was a tabula rasa 
when I started the research I would certainly emphasise that this approach 
allowed me to immerse myself in the different individual perspectives which 
were, in spite of their contradictions, complementary to grasp the ethos of 
the organization of sugarcane production in the region. The individual cases 
illustrated their complex structuring of institutional arrangements. As North 
(1993) describes, individual decision-making follows guides provided by the 
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institutions which shape human interaction in historically contexts. These 
structures provide social actors with incentives and guidance in the political, 
social and economic arenas which they apply and develop in their 
organizations. Sugarcane producers assume institutional constrains to 
diminish the uncertainty in their everyday life. On the one hand their 
participation in local economic and political organizations have repercussions 
beyond their region as on the other the national organizations impinge on 
their activities. My study has focused on the ways how these different levels 
of political and economic organization at national and local level are brought 
together by the social actors involved in sugarcane production. 
Some of these local peasants and farmers participated in the initial 
negotiations to bring the refinery into the valley, others had to be lured to 
grow sugarcane. Their decision-making, in contrast with sugarcane producers 
in other regions, was based on the pursue of their own interest. As I 
described in Chapter 2, this was possible because they could make their 
decision when the state direct intervention in sugarcane production was 
trying to boost a steady supply of sugar for the domestic market; after 
several private refinery owners had gone into bankruptcy precipitating the 
crisis of sugar production at the end of the 1960s (Purcell, 1981: 224-225). 
These national conditions provided local peasants and farmers with room for 
manoeuvre. They could join forces with sugarcane producers in other regions 
and ask for better terms of production. Thus, they did not have to overturn 
archaic structures of exploitation as sugarcane producers in other regions in 
Mexico did (see Ronfeldt, 1975). These conditions were propitious for an 
organization of production where all the parts involved may have an equal 
participation. However, these propitious conditions only provide the 
institutional arena where social actors have to negotiate and implement the 
agreed plans for the organization of production. In other regions, sugarcane 
producers have not been able to seize as much control over production as the 
producers in the Valley of Autlah-El Grullo. 
The possible explanations to the type of organization of production 
agreed by sugarcane producers and refinery administrators in the valley have 
to be extracted from the specific historical conditions in which these social 
actors were immersed and how they not only rely on the hegemonic social, 
economic and political institutions but transform them to fulfil their need and 
aspirations. In the case of local peasants and farmers, they have learned how 
to deal with the dominant political party, which pervades in a corporatist way 
the negotiations between the governmental institutions and the civil society 
(see Jessop, 1990). Each local peasant or farmer has found a way to deal 
with the refinery employees. As I discussed in Chapter 7, the refinery 
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administrators have a different agenda to the producers, they look up to the 
national echelons of public administration, which is their line of command 
and where they would like to secure a place. These administrators have to 
reconcile the producers' demands with the national policies they have to 
implement and their careers, which is an extremely difficult task. 
However all parts involved in the organization of production seemed to 
have been able to work out a modus Vivendi where they have conciliated their 
differences and run efficiently the organization of production in the Valley of 
Autlah-El Grullo, which made the refinery Melchor Ocampo one of the most 
efficient in the country. As it was transparent in most comments, this was 
not achieved easily but the results have been worthwhile the effort. And 
these results provide an example of a successful cooperation between public 
administrators and local producers. 
The sound financial record and good level of productivity made this 
refinery an attractive investment when the privatising wave reached the sugar 
refineries in the early 1990s. As it could have been expected, the Ingenio 
Melchor Ocampo was one of the first refineries to be sold to CNC. How this 
change of ownership has affected all parts involved in the organization of 
sugarcane production in the valley must be assessed in a re-study. 
SAMENVATTING 
De staking van CNC suikerrietproducenten en het onmiddellijke antwoord 
van het bestuur van de raffinaderij zijn een goed voorbeeld van de 
voortgaande politieke onderhandelingen tussen de voornaamste actoren die 
betrokken zijn bij de organisatie van de produktie van suikerriet in de vallei 
van Autlah-El Grullo. In hoofdstuk 1 introduceerde ik de hoofdpersonen, 
actief in de suikerrietproduktie, die in het sociale spel van confrontatie en 
onderhandeling participeren. Ik heb in hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5 de sociaal-
economische omstandigheden beschreven waarin lokale peasants en boeren 
hun beslissingen om suikerriet te verbouwen hebben ontwikkeld. Deze 
sociale actoren beschikken over een grote variatie van vaardigheden en een 
scherpzinnig begrip van sociale instituties. Dit betreft alle producenten, van 
de kleinste tot de grootste. De manieren waarop deze verschillende actoren 
betrokken zijn geraakt bij de produktie van suikerriet weerlegt het beeld van 
de machteloze en conservatieve peasants en boeren dat veelvuldig in de 
sociale analyses over Mexico naar voren komt. 
Suikerrietproducenten in de vallei hebben met succes bij de Mexicaanse 
overheid gelobbyd om in de regio te investeren, wat resulteerde in een 
suikerraffinaderij voorzien van de financiële middelen om toegangswegen aan 
te leggen en de verwaarloosde irrigatiekanalen te verbeteren. De 
reconstructie van de manier waarop deze peasants en boeren publieke 
investeringen in de regio aantrokken om een raffinaderij te bouwen en hoe 
zij, met de aanmoediging van de raffinaderij, eigen organisaties ontwikkelden 
om met het bestuur van de raffinaderij te onderhandelen is beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 6. In het laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 7, sluit ik de cirkel met een 
beschrijving van een onderhandeling tussen producenten en het bestuur van 
de raffinaderij, wat resulteerde in een overeenkomst bevredigend voor alle 
betrokken partijen. Deze onderhandeling toont de veranderende allianties en 
belangen van de participanten. 
In deze studie werd een 'down-up actor-oriented' benadering gebruikt als 
methode om de onderwerpen te bestuderen. Hoewel ik niet wil beweren dat 
ik een tabula rasa was toen ik met het onderzoek begon, wil ik benadrukken 
dat deze benadering mij toestond mezelf te verdiepen in de verschillende 
individuele perspectieven die, ondanks hun tegenstellingen, complementair 
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waren om het ethos van de organisatie van suikerrietproduktie in dit gebied 
te begrijpen. De individuele cases verhelderden de complexe structurering 
van institutionele regelingen. North (1993) beschrijft dat het nemen van 
individuele beslissingen gebaseerd is op instituties die vormgeven aan sociale 
interacties in historische contexten. Deze structuren voorzien sociale actoren 
van drijfveren en een leidraad in de politieke, sociale en economische arena's 
die zij toepassen en ontwikkelen in hun organisaties. Suikerrietproducenten 
aanvaarden institutionele beperkingen om de onzekerheid in hun alledaagse 
leven te verminderen. Enerzijds heeft hun participatie in de lokale 
economische en politieke organisaties repercussies buiten hun regio, 
anderzijds worden hun activiteiten beïnvloed door de nationale organisaties. 
Mijn studie is gericht op de manier waarop deze verschillende niveaus van 
politieke en economische organisaties op nationaal en lokaal niveau samen 
worden gebracht door de sociale actoren die betrokken zijn bij de produktie 
van suikerriet. 
Enkele lokale peasants en boeren participeerden in de eerste 
onderhandelingen over de komst van de raffinaderij naar de vallei, anderen 
hebben zich moeten laten overhalen om suikerriet te verbouwen. Hun 
besluitvorming, in tegenstelling tot suikerrietproducenten in andere regio's, 
was gebaseerd op het nastreven van hun eigen belangen. Zoals ik in 
hoofdstuk 2 beschreven heb, was dit mogelijk doordat zij deze beslissing 
konden nemen toen de staat via directe interventie in de suikerrietproduktie 
probeerde een gelijkmatig aanbod van suiker te bevorderen; nadat 
verschillende eigenaren van particuliere raffinaderijen failliet waren gegaan 
hetwelk de crisis in de suikerproduktie eind jaren '60 bespoedigde (Purcell, 
1981: 224-225). Deze nationale omstandigheden gaven de lokale peasants en 
boeren keuzeruimte. Zij konden zich verenigen met de suikerrietproducenten 
in andere regio's en betere produktievoorwaarden eisen. Zo waren zij niet 
genoodzaakt, zoals suikerrietproducenten in andere regio's van Mexico, om 
de archaïsche structuren van exploitatie omver te werpen (zie Ronfeldt, 
1975). De omstandigheden waren gunstig voor een organisatie van produktie 
waarin alle betrokken partijen evenredig participeerden. Echter, deze 
gunstige omstandigheden voorzien alleen in een institutionele arena waarin 
sociale actoren moeten onderhandelen en de overeengekomen plannen met 
betrekking tot de organisatie van de produktie moeten uitvoeren. In 
vergelijking met de producenten in de vallei van Autlah-El Grullo, was het 
voor suikerrietproducenten in andere regio's niet mogelijk zoveel controle 
over de produktie te verkrijgen. 
De mogelijke verklaringen van de organisatievorm van produktie, 
overeengekomen door de suikerrietproducenten en de bestuurders van de 
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raffinaderij in de vallei, moeten worden gezocht in de specifieke historische 
omstandigheden waarvan deze sociale actoren onderdeel zijn, en hoe zij niet 
alleen steunen op de hegemonische, sociale, economische en politieke 
instituties maar deze ook transformeren om in hun behoefte en aspiraties te 
voorzien. De lokale pesants en boeren hebben geleerd om te gaan met de 
dominante politieke partij, die de onderhandelingen tussen de 
overheidsinstituties en de samenleving op een corporatistische manier 
doordringt. Elke lokale peasant of boer heeft een manier gevonden om om te 
gaan met het personeel van de raffinaderij. Zoals ik besproken heb in 
hoofdstuk 7 hebben de bestuurders van de raffinaderij een andere agenda dan 
de producenten; zij hebben ontzag voor de nationale geledingen van de 
overheid waaronder zij vallen en waarin zij een plaats willen veiligstellen. 
Deze bestuurders moeten de eisen van de producenten verenigen met het uit 
te voeren nationale beleid, èn met hun carrière, wat een uitzonderlijk 
moeilijke taak is. 
In de vallei van Autiah-El Grullo, echter, lijken alle partijen die bij de 
organisatie van produktie betrokken zijn de mogelijkheid te hebben een 
modus vivendi uit te werken, waarin zij hun verschillen verzoenen en 
waardoor zij de organisatie van produktie efficiënt kunnen uitvoeren. Dit 
maakte de raffinaderij Melchor Ocampo tot een van de meest efficiënte van 
het land. Zoals uit de meeste opmerkingen bleek, was dit niet makkelijk te 
bereiken, maar waren de resultaten de moeite waard. Deze resultaten geven 
een voorbeeld van een succesvolle samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en 
lokale producenten. 
De goede financiële prestatie en het hoge niveau van produktiviteit 
maakten deze raffinaderij tot een aantrekkelijke investering toen de golf van 
privatisering de suikerraffinaderijen begin jaren '90 bereikte. Zoals verwacht 
kon worden, was de Ingenio Melchor Ocampo één van de eerste 
raffinaderijen die aan de CNC werden verkocht. Hoe deze overgang van 
eigendom alle partijen, betrokken bij de organisatie van de produktie van 
suikerriet in de vallei, heeft beïnvloed zal in een vervolgstudie moeten 
worden vastgesteld. 
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